State Dept. of Rev. v. Wilson

No. 80-369 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981

STATE OF MONTANA, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL REHABILITIVE SERVICES, et al., Petitioners and Appellants, vs . ALFRED J. WILSON, Respondent and Respondent.

No. 80-423

STATE OF MONTANA, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND REHABILITATION SERVICES, et al., Petitioners and Appellants, VS . ROBERT JAMES FATZ, Respondent and Respondent.

Appeal from: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, In and for the County of Cascade. Honorable Joel G. Roth, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana J. Fred Bourdeau, County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana James, Gray & McCafferty, Great Falls, Montana

Fausto Turrin argued, Great Falls, Montana Asselstine & Cruikshank, Great Falls, Montana Brett C. Asselstine argued, Great Falls, Montana

Submitted: June 10, 1981 Decided: August 11-, 1981 Filed: AU6 1 1 19W

Clerk

H o n o r a b l e Mark P . S u l l i v a n , District Judge, delivered the Opinion of t h e C o u r t .

T h i s i s a n a p p e a l from j u d g m e n t s g r a n t e d r e s p o n d e n t s by the District Court of the Eighth J u d i c i a l District in p a t e r n i t y a c t i o n s b r o u g h t a g a i n s t them by t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f Revenue and the Department of Social and Rehabilitation

S e r v i c e s (SRS) . R e s p o n d e n t s had moved for judgments contending that

the statute of limitations on the determination of paternity, section 40-6-108, MCA, had run at the time appellants filed the petitions. I n g r a n t i n g t h e motions, the District Court dismissed the petitions filed by the

State. Appellants allege the statute of limitations is u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and s h o u l d be s t r u c k down.

A m a l e c h i l d was b o r n o u t o f wedlock t o E.F.L.R. on March 2 2 , 1 9 7 6 . A t a p p r o x i m a t e l y t h e same t i m e , t h e mother applied to the state for public assistance, including support for the child, and g a v e SRS s u f f i c i e n t i n f o r m a t i o n which would be enough t o s t a r t a p a t e r n i t y action against A l f r e d J . W i l s o n 11. The S t a t e a l s o o b t a i n e d an a s s i g n m e n t of the mother's claim for s u p p o r t from t h e p u t a t i v e f a t h e r when t h e baby was b o r n . The S t a t e b r o u g h t action against Wilson on May 22, 1979, more than three years after the b i r t h of t h e c h i l d . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i s m i s s e d t h e a c t i o n on m o t i o n o f t h e p u t a t i v e f a t h e r .

On A u g u s t 11, 1 9 7 2 , M.L. g a v e b i r t h t o a male c h i l d . Sometime t h e r e a f t e r t h e S t a t e of Montana became a n interested party because the mother assigned her rights to support t o SRS. On A u g u s t 4 , 1980, e i g h t y e a r s a f t e r the child's birth, SRS filed a petition against Robert James F a t z t o e s t a b l i s h p a t e r n i t y and o b t a i n s u p p o r t moneys.

Thereafter, on August 27, 1980, counsel for Robert James F a t z f i l e d a m o t i o n t o q u a s h t h e o r d e r t o show c a u s e r e q u i r i n g b l o o d t e s t s and a m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s t h e p e t i t i o n . On September 5, 1980, oral arguments were heard by the Honorable J o e l G. Roth and on S e p t e m b e r 2 3 , 1 9 8 0 , t h e c o u r t g r a n t e d r e s p o n d e n t ' s motion t o d i s m i s s .

The i s s u e b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t is w h e t h e r t h e t h r e e - y e a r statute of limitations on the determination of paternity i n s e c t i o n 40-6-108(3), MCA, violates the equal protection p r o v i s i o n of t h e F o u r t e e n t h Amendment o f t h e United S t a t e s Constitution and Article 11, Section 4 of the Montana Constitution.

An e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n i s s u e i s p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s c a s e . A p p e l l a n t s contend t h a t c h i l d r e n born o u t of wedlock, as a c l a s s , a r e t r e a t e d d i f f e r e n t l y from c h i l d r e n born i n wedlock because the first class loses rights during infancy for determination of paternity and child support. In p a r t i c u l a r , t h e c h i l d b o r n o u t o f wedlock may n o t m a i n t a i n a support action against the paternal parent a f t e r three years from t h e d a t e o f b i r t h of the child. S e c t i o n 40-6-108(3), MCA. C h i l d r e n born i n wedlock, whose paternal parent is p r e s u m e d , do n o t f a c e a s t a t u t e t h a t b a r s s u c h a c t i o n s .

C h i l d r e n b o r n o u t o f wedlock a r e n o t t h e s o l e p a r t i e s t h a t concern t h i s Court. W e a l s o m u s t c o n s i d e r t h e power o f the State through its agencies to bring actions of p a t e r n i t y under s e c t i o n 40-6-107, MCA. S t a t e agencies derive their power to bring paternity actions by way of this statute.

The Montana Constitution provides that all persons a r e g u a r a n t e e d t h e e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n of t h e laws. Art. 11, Sec. 4, 1972 Mont. Const.

Children Born Out Of Wedlock As to children born out of wedlock, we find that section 40-6-108, MCA, does create an unfair burden and unfairly discriminates against these children. The statute of limitations, as applied, is unconstitutional with respect to children born out of wedlock. The statute prevents any guardian, guardian ad litem or next friend of the child from maintaining an action for support from the paternal parent three years after birth of the child. Classifications of this nature are invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, if they are not substantially related to a permissible state interest. Mathews v. Lucas (1976), 427 U.S. 495, 96 S.Ct. 2755, 49 L.Ed.2d 651. The limitations statute constitutes an overly-broad restriction on the rights of children born out of wedlock. The Supreme Court of North Carolina addressed this same issue recently in County of Lenoir ex rel. Cogdell v. Johnson (1980), 46 N.C.App. 182, 264 S.E.2d 816. The court's statement has application here: "In the case sub judice, defendant argues that [the statute] bears a substantial relationship to the State's interest in preventing the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims. We disagree. As we stated previously, a child is entitled to support from its father throughout its minority. Therefore, a child's claim for such support at any time during its minority can never be said to be stale. Nor is [the statute] substantially related to the State's interest in preventing the litigation of fraudulent claims. We have no reason to believe that the mere passage of time bears a direct relation to the truth of the claim asserted. Moreover, the need of a child to

r e c e i v e adequate support m a n i f e s t l y outweighs t h e r e l a t i o n t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s may have t o t h e p r e v e n t i o n of f r a u d u l e n t c l a i m s . . . . " 264 S.E.2d a t 8 2 1 . The rights of the child cannot be so compromised

during its infancy. The c h i l d b o r n o u t o f wedlock c a n n o t be b a r r e d a c c e s s t o our c o u r t s d u r i n g i n f a n c y . Art. 11, S e c . 1 3 , 1 9 7 2 Mont. C o n s t .

Recently, we examined the scientific advances in b l o o d t e s t i n g i n d e t e r m i n i n g p a t e r n i t y and t h e d i s c r e t i o n a r y power of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t . Rose v . D i s t . Court of Eighth Judicial Dist. (1981), - Mont. , 628 P.2d 662, 38 St.Rep. 830. The newly-developed, greater percentage of accuracy in determining p a t e r n i t y allows greater protections f o r t h e a l l e g e d f a t h e r from f r a u d u l e n t c l a i m s . I n l i g h t of t h e s e advances, t h e s t a n d a r d of proof r e q u i r e d i n p a t e r n i t y a c t i o n s and t h e d i s c r e t i o n g r a n t e d t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n pretrial hearings, it is concluded that the purpose of s e c t i o n 40-6-108(3), MCA, a s applied t o t h e child through a guardian ad litem or other representative, is minimal or nonexistent compared to the interest of the child in o b t a i n i n g s u p p o r t from h i s p a t e r n a l p a r e n t . S t a t e Aqencies

T h i s C o u r t d o e s uphold t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s a s a g a i n s t t h e S t a t e where a s t a t e a g e n c y , s u c h a s t h e D e p a r t -ment o f Revenue o r t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f S o c i a l and R e h a b i l i t a -t i o n S e r v i c e s , d e r i v e s a r i g h t from t h e m o t h e r o f t h e c h i l d b o r n o u t o f wedlock t o b r i n g a c l a i m f o r r e i m b u r s e m e n t f o r child support through p a t e r n i t y actions. The i n t e r e s t o f t h e S t a t e i n t h e s e m a t t e r s i s e c o n o m i c , and t h e power o f t h e State to continually threaten its citizens in paternity actions must always be thoroughly examined and not taken

1i g h t l y . The S t a t e is n o t a c h i l d . In r e a l i t y , it cares not

s o much a b o u t t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f f a t h e r and c h i l d b u t more a b o u t economic r e i m b u r s e m e n t f o r w e l f a r e and o t h e r d e p e n d e n t aid. The r i g h t s g i v e n t o t h e S t a t e a r e n o t e q u a l to the rights and interests of the child or the reasons or necessity for finding the child's father. The s t a t u t e o f limitations, therefore, provides a protection against the inadvertence and delay of the State in actions for paternity. The p a t e r n a l p a r e n t p r o t e c t i o n offered by the s t a t u t e a s against the S t a t e has a s u b s t a n t i a l r e l a t i o n t o t h e intended purpose and, t h e r e f o r e , is c o n s t i t u t i o n a l .

W note t h a t the t o l l i n g s t a t u t e , e s e c t i o n 25-1-102,

MCA, by i t s t e r m s , h a s n o t been made a p p l i c a b l e t o Uniform Parentage Act cases. The matter of providing a proper

tolling statute for minors, at least, is called to the a t t e n t i o n of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e f o r f u t u r e a c t i o n .

The j u d g m e n t s o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t a s t o t h e s t a t e agencies are affirmed.

D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g i n p l a c e o f Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n C . Harr i s o n

W concur: e

Justices Mr. Chief J u s t i c e Haswell, d i s s e n t i n g :

I would r e v e r s e .

I a g r e e t h a t t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s is u n c o n s t i t u -t i o n a l as t o a n i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d f o r t h e r e a s o n s s t a t e d by t h e majority. I n my v i e w i t i s e q u a l l y u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a g a i n s t t h e S t a t e whose claims a r e d e r i v e d t h r o u g h and e q u a l to t h o s e of t h e i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d t o whom it h a s f u r n i s h e d s u p p o r t .

The s t a t u t e s o f t h i s S t a t e p r o v i d e :

"40-5-109. Remedies o f s t a t e - p o l i t i c a l - or sub- d i v i s i o n furnishing support. If a state o r a p o l i t i c a l subdivision furnishes support t o an i n d i v i d u a l o b l i g e e , it h a s t h e same r i g h t to i n i t i a t e a proceeding under t h i s p a r t as t h e i n d i v i d u a l o b l i g e e f o r t h e purpose of s e c u r i n g r e i m b u r s e m e n t f o r s u p p o r t f u r n i s h e d and of obtaining continuing support ." Here t h e S t a t e t o o k a n a s s i g n m e n t o f t h e i l l e g i t i m a t e

c h i l d ' s claim a g a i n s t h i s a l l e g e d f a t h e r . T h i s Court s t a t e d a l m o s t 50 y e a r s a g o :

" ... The r u l e i s e l e m e n t a r y t h a t a n a s s i g n - ment t r a n s f e r s t o t h e a s s i g n e e a l l t h e r i g h t , t i t l e and i n t e r e s t o f t h e a s s i g n o r i n t h e p r o - p e r t y assigned 782. . . ." 9 1 Mont. 493, 506, 11 P.2d

The same p r i n c i p l e a p p l i e s t o s u b r o g a t i o n which i s s i m p l y

a d e v i c e o f e q u i t y t o compel u l t i m a t e payment o f a d e b t by o n e who i n j u s t i c e and good c o n s c i e n c e s h o u l d pay i t .

S k a u g e v. M o u n t a i n S t a t e s T e l . & T e l . Co. (1977), Mont . I 5 6 5 P.2d 628, 34 St.Rep. 450. A c c o r d i n g l y , a l l t h e r i g h t s and r e m e d i e s o f t h e i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d were t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e S t a t e .

W h e r e , as h e r e , t h e r i g h t s of t h e S t a t e and t h e i l l e g i t i -m a t e c h i l d a r e i d e n t i c a l , how c a n t h e b a r o f t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i -t a t i o n s d e f e a t t h e S t a t e ' s claim b u t n o t t h e i l l e g i t i m a t e child Is?

Chief J u s t i c e