Caterpillar Tractor v. Dept. of Re

No. 80-307 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981

CATERPILLAR TRACTOR COMPANY, Inc., a Corporation, Petitioner and Respondent,

THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE OF THE STATE OF MONTANA, Respondent and Appellant.

Appeal from: District Court of the First Judicial District, In and for the County of Lewis and Clark. Honorable Gordon Bennett, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Terry B. Cosgrove, Special Assistant Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana For Respondent: Hughes, Bennett, Kellner & Sullivan, Helena, Montana George T. Bennett argued, , Montana

Submitted: June 17, 1981 Decided : AUG 6 - 1981 Filed: A U G 6 - 19m

Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from a declaratory judgment of the District Court of the First Judicial District, County of Lewis and Clark, determining that the two-year statute of limitations in section 27-2-211, MCA, applied to the assessment of corporate license tax for corporations which failed to file a return. Caterpillar Tractor Co., Inc., respondent, appealed to the State Tax Appeal Board (STAB) from a determination made by the Montana Department of Revenue, appellant, in December 1978, that respondent had been doing business in Montana for tax purposes for the years 1959 through 1971. Respondent alleged that appellant did not have statutory authority to assess any delinquent tax for a portion of the years under audit because such action would be barred by the applicable statute of limitations. While the matter was pending before STAB, the parties jointly petitioned the District Court for an interlocutory adjudication of the applicable statute of limitations. The District Court accepted jurisdiction for the purpose of determining that single legal issue. The court, in an original memorandum and supplemental memorandum amending opinion, held that the two-year statute of limitations contained in section 27-2-211, MCA, applies and controls the assessment of any corporation license tax. The result of that finding prohibits the assessment of any additional tax by appellant. From this judgment the Department of Revenue appeals. Respondent, an Illinois corporation, had business activities in Montana for the years 1959 through 1971.

Appellant alleges the business a c t i v i t i e s consisted of

s e l l i n g equipment through independent d e a l e r s o p e r a t i n g i n Montana. R e s p o n d e n t c o n t e n d s i t was n o t engaged i n b u s i n e s s f o r t h e y e a r s i n q u e s t i o n w i t h i n t h e meaning o f t h e Montana C o r p o r a t i o n L i c e n s e Tax A c t a n d , t h e r e f o r e , was n o t s u b j e c t t o the tax. I n December 1 9 7 8 , a p p e l l a n t n o t i f i e d r e s p o n d e n t

t h a t it had d e t e r m i n e d t h a t i t was d o i n g b u s i n e s s f o r t a x p u r p o s e s i n Montana f o r t h e y e a r s i n q u e s t i o n and demanded

that respondent file corporation license tax returns together with tax and i n t e r e s t due for the corporation's c a l e n d a r y e a r s December 3 1 , 1 9 5 9 , t h r o u g h December 3 1 , 1 9 7 1 .

Respondent appealed t h a t d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o STAB and later to the District Court by the interlocutory adjudication. The D i s t r i c t Court held that appellant is

l i m i t e d t o a p e r i o d of two y e a r s t o a s s e s s o r c o l l e c t a n y t a x a g a i n s t a t a x p a y e r who h a s f a i l e d t o f i l e a r e t u r n and is limited to a period of five years to collect a tax

d e f i c i e n c y a s s e s s m e n t f r o m a n y c o r p o r a t i o n which h a s f i l e d a return. The following chronology of statutory enactments, amendments, repeals and revivals, and Supreme Court d e c i s i o n s is necessary t o determine t h i s case. Not a l l o f t h e s e s t a t u t e s a r e c o d i f i e d i n t h e Montana Code A n n o t a t e d ;

therefore, use of Revised Codes of Montana citations is necessary. T h e Montana C o r p o r a t i o n L i c e n s e Tax A c t ( t h e A c t ) w a s

adopted in 1917. Section 5, Chapter 79, Laws of 1917, codified as section 2300, R.C.M. 1921, was the sole p r o v i s i o n which a l l o w e d t h e s t a t e t o a s s e s s a d d i t i o n a l t a x .

I t provided:

" I n c a s e s of r e f u s a l o r n e g l e c t t o make s u c h r e t u r n , and i n c a s e s o f e r r o n e o u s , f a l s e , o r fraudulent returns, the s t a t e treasurer s h a l l , upon t h e d i s c o v e r y t h e r e o f a t any t i m e within t h r e e years a f t e r s a i d return is due, make a r e t u r n upon i n f o r m a t i o n o b t a i n e d a s p r o v i d e d f o r i n t h i s a c t , and t h e a s s e s s m e n t made by him s h a l l be p a i d by s u c h c o r p o r a t i o n i m m e d i a t e l y upon n o t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e amount of such a s s e s s m e n t . . ." That portion of the Act was amended five times

b e t w e e n 1917 and 1963:

I n 1923 t h e c o r p o r a t i o n t a x s t a t u t e was amended in Section 2, Chapter 146, Laws of 1923, to substitute the S t a t e Board o f E q u a l i z a t i o n i n a l l i n s t a n c e s where r e f e r e n c e had been made t o t h e s t a t e t r e a s u r e r .

I n 1 9 3 3 a s e p a r a t e and d i f f e r e n t s t a t u t e was e n a c t e d which g r a n t e d t o t h e Board o f E q u a l i z a t i o n t h e a u t h o r i t y a t any t i m e to a s s e r t deficiency assessment of tax where no r e t u r n was f i l e d :

" I n t h e c a s e of a f a l s e o r f r a u d u l e n t r e t u r n w i t h i n t e n t t o evade t a x or of a f a i l u r e t o f i l e a r e t u r n t h e t a x may b e a s s e s s e d , o r a proceeding i n Court f o r t h e c o l l e c t i o n of s u c h t a x may be begun w i t h o u t a s s e s s m e n t a t any t i m e . " S e c t i o n 9 , C h a p t e r 1 6 6 , Laws o f 1933, c o d i f i e d a s s e c t i o n 2303.5, R.C.M. 1935.

I n 1945 t h e p e r i o d f o r a s s e s s i n g t h e a d d i t i o n a l t a x was changed from t h r e e t o f i v e y e a r s a l o n g w i t h some o t h e r u n r e l a t e d amendments, C h a p t e r 2 0 9 , Laws o f 1 9 4 5 , c o d i f i e d a s s e c t i o n 84-1505, R.C.M. 1947:

" A s s e s s m e n t o f Tax--Payment-Lien of Tax. A l l a s s e s s m e n t s s h a l l be made by t h e s t a t e b o a r d o f e q u a l i z a t i o n , and t h e s e i e r a l c o r p o r a t i o n s s h a l l be n o t i f i e d o f t h e amounts f o r which t h e y a r e r e s p e c t i v e l y l i a b l e , on o r b e f o r e t h e f i r s t day of J u n e of each s u c c e s s i v e year. Payment o f t h e t a x a s s e s s e d s h a l l be made by c o r p o r a t i o n s r e p o r t i n g on a c a l e n d a r y e a r b a s i s , on o r b e f o r e t h e f i f t e e n t h d a y o f June following t h e assessment of t h e tax. P a y m e n t o f s a i d t a x s h a l l b e made by c o r p o r a t i o n s o p e r a t i n g on a f i s c a l y e a r b a s i s

on or before the fifteenth day of the sixth month following the close of said corporation's fiscal year. In cases of refusal or neglect to make such return, and in cases of erroneous, false, or fraudulent returns, the state board of equalization shall, upon the discovery thereof at any time within five (5) years after said return is due, make a return upon information obtained as provided for in this act, and the assessment made by the state board of equalization shall be paid by such corporation immediately upon notification of the amount of such assessment . . ." In 1960 this Court, in State v. King Colony Ranch (1960), 137 Mont. 145, 350 P.2d 841, held that the 1945 statute, section 84-1505, superseded the 1933 enactment, section 84-1513, in determining which time limitation the state board would use in assessing taxes. This Court did not expressly mention that the 1933 statute was "repealed by implication" or any other legal rationale on that point. Not addressing the particulars of repeal, the Court said the 1945 enactment was later and, therefore, the later statute applied. At the next legislative session, the 37th Legisla.tive Assembly in Chapter 102, Laws of 1961, reenacted section 84-1505, R.C.M. 1947, which placed a five-year limitation upon the Board's authority to assess deficiencies in all instances and repealed all acts or parts of acts in conflict therewith: "(1) Assessment of tax--payment--lien of tax. All assessments shall be made by the state board of equalization, and the several corporations shall be notified of the amounts for which they are respectively liable, on or before the first day of June of each successive year. Payment of the tax assessed shall be made by corporations reporting on a calendar year basis, on or before the fifteenth day of June following the assessment of the tax. Payment of said tax shall be made by corporations operating on a fiscal year basis on or before the

f i f t e e n t h day o f t h e s i x t h month f o l l o w i n g t h e c l o s e of s a i d c o r p o r a t i o n s ' s f i s c a l y e a r . I n c a s e s o f r e f u s a l o r n e g l e c t t o make s u c h r e t u r n , and i n c a s e s o f e r r o n e o u s , f a l s e , o r fraudulent returns, t h e s t a t e board of equalization shall, upon t h e d i s c o v e r y t h e r e o f a t any t i m e w i t h i n f i v e ( 5 ) y e a r s a f t e r s a i d r e t u r n i s d u e , make a r e t u r n upon information obtained a s provided f o r i n t h i s a c t , and t h e a s s e s s m e n t made by t h e s t a t e b o a r d of e q u a l i z a t i o n s h a l l be p a i d by s u c h c o r p o r a t i o n i m m e d i a t e l y upon n o t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e amount o f s u c h a s s e s s m e n t . . ." In 1963 the 38th Legislative Assembly, by Chapter

186, Laws of 1963, substantially revised the Corporation L i c e n s e Tax Act and made t h e c o r p o r a t i o n l i c e n s e t a x s e l f -assessing. The t a x p a y e r was r e q u i r e d t o a s s e s s t h e t a x in t h e f i r s t i n s t a n c e , w h e r e a s p r e v i o u s l y t h e s t a t e b o a r d had d e t e r m i n e d t h e t a x i n t h e f i r s t i n s t a n c e b a s e d upon r e t u r n s . Among the changes made by the 1963 Legislature was the r e v i s i o n of s e c t i o n 84-1505, R.C.M. 1 9 4 7 , p r o v i d i n g t h a t no longer did the Department have the authority to make deficiency assessments. In addition, Section 2, Chapter 186, Laws of 1963, codified as section 84-1508.2, R.C.M. 1 9 4 7 , provided t h a t a l l d e f i c i e n c y assessments f o r corporat i o n l i c e n s e t a x p u r p o s e s were r e q u i r e d t o be made w i t h i n five years from t h e d a t e the r e t u r n was filed "except as otherwise provided in s e c t i o n 84-1513," R.C.M. 1947. The p a r t i a l t e x t provided:

" ( 1 ) Except a s otherwise provided i n s e c t i o n 84-1513, no d e f i c i e n c y s h a l l be a s s e s s e d o r c o l l e c t e d w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e y e a r f o r which a r e t u r n is f i l e d u n l e s s t h e n o t i c e of a d d i t i o n a l t a x p r o p o s e d t o be a s s e s s e d i s m a i l e d w i t h i n f i v e ( 5 ) y e a r s from t h e d a t e t h e r e t u r n was f i l e d . "

The i s s u e p r e s e n t e d h e r e i s w h e t h e r t h e 1 9 6 3 L e g i s l a -ture, in adopting Chapter 186, Laws o f 1963, intended to place a comprehensive five-year s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s on t h e Department's i n i t i a t i o n of d e f i c i e n c y a c t i o n s o r whether i t i n t e n d e d t o impose a f i v e - y e a r l i m i t o n l y on t h o s e c a s e s w h e r e a r e t u r n had b e e n f i l e d and t o p l a c e no l i m i t on c a s e s where t h e r e had been no f i l i n g a t a l l .

Appellant argues that the amendment to section 84-1505 adopted as part of the Laws of 1945 did not impliedly repeal section 84-1513; and, therefore, section 84-1513 was in full force and effect when the 1963 L e g i s l a t u r e adopted that s e c t i o n by reference. Appellant a r g u e s t h a t t h e o r i g i n a l 1 9 1 7 A c t was amended by t h e 1 9 3 3 A c t a n d , t h e r e f o r e , t h e 1 9 4 5 amendment t o t h e o r i g i n a l 1 9 1 7 Act d i d n o t r e p e a l t h e i n t e r m e d i a t e 1933 A c t or r e s t o r e t h e repealed and superseded p r o v i s i o n s of the 1917 A c t . Any a t t e m p t t o r e s t o r e t h e 1 9 1 7 A c t by t h e 1 9 4 5 A c t was e r r o r .

Appellant f u r t h e r argues t h a t t h i s Court e r r e d i n its decision in State v. King Colony Ranch, supra, and the o p i n i o n s h o u l d be r e v e r s e d . The 1 9 3 3 A c t i m p l i e d l y r e p e a l e d t h e 1917 A c t , and t h e a t t e m p t t o amend t h e o r i g i n a l ( 1 9 1 7 ) A c t by t h e 1945 amendment was c o n t r a r y t o t h e law b e c a u s e o f t h e i n t e r m e d i a t e 1933 A c t .

A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t s e c t i o n 84-1513 was a d o p t e d by reference by the enactment in 1963 o f section 84-1508.2. A p p e l l a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t s e c t i o n 84-1513 ( a r e p e a l e d a c t ) may be reenacted by reference. Appellant argues that Great Western S u g a r Co. v. Mitchell ( 1 9 4 6 ) , 119 Mont. 328, 174 P.2d 817, allows the legislature to a d o p t by reference a repealed act if there is a showing of clear legislative intent. The l e g i s l a t u r e did not specifically express the intent to revive because, appellant points out, of the confusion of the Kinq C o l o n y Ranch case. According to appellant, the " i n t e n t " was "obvious"--to have one s t a t u t e

f o r c o r p o r a t i o n s which f i l e and o n e f o r c o r p o r a t i o n s which do n o t f i l e .

Prior to 1963, under the provisions of the former s e c t i o n 84-1505, t h e D e p a r t m e n t had t o a c t w i t h i n f i v e y e a r s from t h e d a t e t h e r e t u r n was d u e t o c o l l e c t a d e f i c i e n c y . The 1 9 6 3 amendment made a s i g n i f i c a n t c h a n g e p r o v i d i n g f o r f i v e y e a r s from t h e d a t e t h e r e t u r n was f i l e d t o c o l l e c t a deficiency. Appellant contends from 1963 forward, the statute of limitations will not begin to run until a taxpayer a c t u a l l y f i l e s a t a x r e t u r n . The p e r i o d b e g i n s t o run o n l y when the taxpayer takes the affirmative act of filing the return.

T h e r e was o n l y one s t a t u t e dealing with deficiency a s s e s s m e n t s i n 1 9 6 3 , s e c t i o n 84-1508.2, R.C.M. 1 9 4 7 , and i t applies to corporations. The s t a t u t e p r o v i d e s f o r f i v e years from the time the return is filed for all corporations, and u n t i l the return is a c t u a l l y filed, the period does not begin t o run.

Respondent a r g u e s t h a t t h i s C o u r t , i n S t a t e v. King Colony Ranch, supra, held that by later enacting section 84-1505 i n 1 9 4 5 , t h e l e g i s l a t u r e had l i m i t e d t h e D e p a r t m e n t of Revenue in all instances including the nonfiling situation to a five-year period for assessment. Section 84-1505 c o n t r o l l e d , and s e c t i o n 84-1513 was n o t a n e f f e c t i v e and v i a b l e p r o v i s i o n upon which t h e D e p a r t m e n t c o u l d r e l y . T h i s , r e s p o n d e n t c o n t e n d s , i s c l e a r l y a h o l d i n g o f r e p e a l by implication. The holding in Kinq C o l o n y Ranch could be based only upon a finding and holding that the later e n a c t m e n t was so inconsistent as to impliedly repeal the

first. Respondent also argues that the District Court

correctly held that section 84-1513 was not revived or r e e n a c t e d by r e f e r e n c e . A p p e l l a n t ' s p o s i t i o n is t h a t mere r e f e r e n c e r e e n a c t e d t h e r e p e a l e d s e c t i o n 84-1513. However, respondent argues there is a distinct difference between "incorporation by reference" and "revival by reference."

What the Montana legislature did in 1 9 6 3 was to assume (incorrectly) that section 84-1513 was s t i l l a v a l i d and existing provision and could thus be incorporated by reference. This is far different from the legislature

e x p r e s s i n g an i n t e n t t o r e e n a c t a p r o v i s i o n , by r e f e r e n c e , which it knew had b e e n r e p e a l e d . T h e r e were i n t h e 1 9 6 3 A c t no e x p r e s s w o r d s and no language of r e v i v a l or reenactment. I t seems c l e a r t h a t t h e

1963 l e g i s l a t o r s were o b l i v i o u s t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h i s C o ur t

had concluded that the 1933 Act had been repealed or superseded by the 1945 Act and believed they could

incorporate t h a t A c t by r e f e r e n c e . T h e r e was no v i s i b l e a t t e m p t and, i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y , no i n t e n t i o n t o r e v i v e t h e 1933 A c t because t h e q u e s t i o n a p p a r e n t l y never a r o s e . Finally, r e s p o n d e n t c o n t e n d s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t was c o r r e c t i n h o l d i n g t h a t s e c t i o n 84-1508.2 h a s no a p p l i c a t i o n

w h e r e a r e t u r n is f i l e d . T h u s , t h i s c a s e i s c o n t r o l l e d by t h e g e n e r a l s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s , s e c t i o n 27-2-211, MCA.

A p p e l l a n t ' s a r g u m e n t t h a t p r i o r t o 1 9 6 3 i t had f i v e y e a r s i n which t o a s s e s s i n t h i s c a s e t h e n o n f i l i n g r e t u r n and t h a t t h e 1 9 6 3 amendment removed that l i m i t a t i o n would bring i n t o play the general s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s . S e c t i o n 25-1-102, MCA ( f o r m e r l y s e c t i o n 93-2401,

R.C.M. 1 9 4 7 ) , p r o v i d e s t h a t c i v i l a c t i o n s m u s t be commenced within the periods prescribed in the s t a t u t e s of l i m i t a t i o n s a f t e r t h e c a u s e of a c t i o n s h a l l h a v e a c c r u e d e x c e p t where i n special cases a different limitation is prescribed by statute. T h i s same s e c t i o n d e s c r i b e s t h e t e r m " a c t i o n " as including "a special proceeding of a c i v i l nature." The action of appellant in asserting liability against a taxpayer by way of deficiency assessment constitutes "a s p e c i a l p ro c e e d i n g of a c i v i l n a t u r e . "

S e c t i o n 27-2-211(c), MCA, p r o v i d e s a two-year statute of limitations for "a liability created by statute other than a penalty or f o r f e i t u r e . "

S e c t i o n 27-2-103, MCA ( f o r m e r l y s e c t i o n 93-2615, R.C.M. 1 9 4 7 ) , p r o v i d e s t h a t t h e s t a t u t e s of l i m i t a t i o n s a r e a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e S t a t e o f Montana. Respondent contends t h e Montana corporation license tax is a l i a b i l i t y imposed by s t a t u t e and, i n t h e absence of a s p e c i a l g r a n t of a u t h o r i t y p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 25-1-102, MCA, t o t h e S t a t e o f Montana g r a n t i n g a longer period of l i m i t a t i o n , the generic statute of l i m i t a t i o n s , which i s two y e a r s , would a p p l y .

Two c a s e s o f t h i s C o u r t c o n t r o l o u r d e c i s i o n i n t h i s case: S t a t e v . King Colony Ranch ( 1 9 6 0 ) , 1 3 7 Mont. 1 4 5 , 350 P.2d 841, and G r e a t W e s t e r n S u g a r Co. v. Mitchell (1946), 1 1 9 Mont. 328, 174 P . 2 d 817. I n G r e a t W e s t e r n S u q a r Co. t h i s C o u r t c o n s i d e r e d a c o r p o r a t i o n l i c e n s e f e e , p a i d under p r o t e s t by t h e s u g a r company. The company f i l e d i t s p a p e r s of incorporation with t h e S e c r e t a r y of State in 1916 and paid a fee for f i l i n g thereof a s p r e s c r i b e d by S e c t i o n 1, Chapter 37, Laws o f 1915. The f e e u n d e r t h e 1915 A c t was b a s e d on t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e f o r e i g n c o r p o r a t i o n ' s c a p i t a l stock represented by its property and business in this state. In 1923 the legislature enacted Chapter 132. Section 4 of that Act doubled the fee and repealed all conflicting acts. This Act was reenacted by a statute p a s s e d by t h e 1 9 2 5 L e g i s l a t u r e t o p r o v i d e t h a t t h e f e e was t o be c a l c u l a t e d on t h e " a u t h o r i z e d c a p i t a l s t o c k " i n s t e a d o f on t h e " i s s u e d c a p i t a l s t o c k . " T h i s C o u r t found t h a t t h e Act, in basing the fee upon authorized capital stock, a l a r g e p o r t i o n o f which r e m a i n e d u n i s s u e d , o f f e n d e d b o t h t h e commerce and due process clauses of the United States C o n s t i t u t i o n and was i n v a l i d .

The C o u r t f u r t h e r f o u n d t h a t where t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i n e n a c t i n g a new s t a t u t e t o t a k e t h e p l a c e o f t h e f o r m e r o n e , related t o a given s u b j e c t , intended t o continue t h e policy t h e r e t o f o r e pursued, where the new A c t would supplant the f o r m e r one o n l y i n c a s e t h e new A c t s h o u l d become o p e r a t i v e , and where such new A c t is declared unconstitutional, the repealing clause therein contained f a l l s with it. The new Act must be deemed as though never enacted, and the one sought to be repealed remains in full force and effect, c i t i n g Chicago, M . , S t . P. & P. R. Co. v . Harmon ( 1 9 3 1 ) , 89 Mont. 1, 295 P . 762, 764.

G r e a t W e s t e r n S u g a r Co. went on to hold that the l e g i s l a t u r e c o u l d a d o p t a s t a t u t e by r e f e r e n c e . Gustafson v. Hammond Irrigation D i s t . ( 1 9 3 0 ) , 87 Mont. 217, 287 P. 640. Considering whether the legislature could adopt a repealed act, a q u e s t i o n w h i c h was n o t b e f o r e t h e C o u r t , it s a i d : " I f we assume t h a t t h i s may be d o n e ( s e e 59 C . J . 618), before it may be accomplished there must be a clear l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t t o do s o . ( 5 0 Am.Jur. 574 n . 12) There

i s no l a n g u a g e i n C h a p t e r 1 6 9 [Laws o f 19311 t h a t i n d i c a t e s any s u c h l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t . " G r e a t Western Sugar Co., 174 P.2d a t 8 2 1 .

Appellant i n c o r r e c t l y r e l i e s on G r e a t W e s t e r n S u g a r - for Co. the proposition that a repealed statute may be r e v i v e d by r e f e r e n c e . That case, a s noted above, did not d e c i d e t h a t i s s u e , a s i t was n o t b e f o r e t h e C o u r t . I t held

that, if it could be done, there had to be a clear l e q i s l a t i v e i n t e n t t o do s o . While appellant argues that

there was a clear legislative intent to revive section 84-1513, R.C.M., 1947, we hold that because of no such e x p r e s s i o n i n t h e A c t s e c t i o n 84-1513 was n o t r e v i v e d . The next case for consideration is S t a t e v. King C o l o n y Ranch, supra, decided i n 1960, which b r o u g h t about the legislative enactment of Chapter 186, Laws of 1963. That case called for this Court to interpret what the

l e g i s l a t u r e had d o n e i n 1 9 3 3 and 1 9 4 5 . This Court held with r e s p e c t t o a l l t a x p a y e r s t h a t t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f Revenue had five years from t h e d u e d a t e o f the return, i n which to a s s e r t a d e f i c i e n c y judgment. This was the state of the law when the 1963

l e g i s l a t u r e e n a c t e d C h a p t e r 1 8 6 , Laws o f 1 9 6 3 , s e e m i n g l y i n t o t a l i g n o r a n c e o f t h e s t a t e o f t h e l a w i t had c r e a t e d by i t s 1 9 3 3 and 1 9 4 5 e n a c t m e n t s . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t comments i n i t s memorandum: " T h e r e w e r e i n t h e 1 9 6 3 A c t no e x p r e s s w o r d s and no l a n g u a g e o f r e v i v a l o r r e e n a c t m e n t . I t seems p e r f e c t l y c l e a r t h a t t h e 1963 l e g i s l a t o r s were o b l i v i o u s t o t h e f a c t o u r Supreme C o u r t had c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e 1 9 3 3 A c t had been r e p e a l e d o r s u p e r s e d e d by t h e 1 9 4 5 A c t and b e l i e v e d t h e y c o u l d i n c o r p o r a t e t h a t A c t by r e f e r e n c e . T h e r e was no v i s i b l e a t t e m p t a n d , i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y , no i n t e n t i o n t o r e v i v e t h e 1933 A c t because t h e q u e s t i o n

apparently never arose." I n view o f t h e f a c t t h e r e is no e x p r e s s i n t e n t t h a t the l e g i s l a t u r e intended t o reverse or reenact t h e s t a t u t e i n t h e 1 9 6 3 A c t , w e h o l d t h e e x c e p t i o n t h e r e i n s e t f o r t h is unenforceable. State v. King Colony Ranch, supra. We

f u r t h e r h o l d t h a t s e c t i o n 27-2-211, MCA, t h e g e n e r a l s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s on a l i a b i l i t y c r e a t e d by s t a t u t e , is t h e

c o n t r o l l i n g s t a t u t e i n t h i s case a n d t h a t a p p e l l a n t c a n n o t enforce t h e t a x s t a t u t e anytime t h e r e a f t e r . The judgment is a f f i r m e d .

Justice We concur: