Estate of Peltomaa

No. 80-418

I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

I N THE PUTTER O F THE ESTATE OF JACK LYLE PELTOMAA, D e c e a s e d .

A p p e a l from: D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e Second J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e C o u n t y of S i l v e r B o w , T h e H o n o r a b l e A r n o l d O l s e n , Judge p r e s i d i n g .

C o u n s e l of R e c o r d :

For Appellant:

W. D. M u r r a y , J r . , B u t t e , Montana

For R e s p o n d e n t :

N e i l J. L y n c h , Butte, Montana

S u b m i t t e d on B r i e f s ; A p r i l 22, 1981

Decided : f l H 1 7 18 99

Filed; 3UN 1 1 198ii

Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. This appeal arises from an order of the Silver Bow County District Court, the Honorable Arnold Olsen presiding, wherein the court dismissed appellant's petition for formal intestacy proceedings, after finding that appellant was not the common-law wife of the deceased, Jack Lyle Peltomaa, and had no interest in his estate. Jack L. Peltomaa died intestate on June 11, 1979. Decedent's brother, respondent herein, filed an application for informal appointment of personal representative on August 1, 1979. On the same day, letters were issued appointing respondent personal representative. Upon learning of the application and appointment, appellant, Debbie Guardipee, on March 19, 1980, filed a petition for formal determination of intestacy, determination of heirs, for supervised administration, and appointment of personal representative. In filing the petition for formal proceedings, appellant sought to have her self determined to be the surviving common-law spouse and, therefore, heir and to have herself appointed personal representative under a supervised administration of the estate. Respondent filed objections to the petition and brought to the court's attention an agreement signed by both appellant and respondent. The agreement was dated June 15, 1979, and provided: 'I.. . in view of the renunciation by DEBBIE GARDIPEE [sic] [appellant] in the Estate of JACK1E LYLE PELTOMAA, the PELTOMAA FAMILY conveys to DEBBIE GARDIPEE [sic] all of the household and personal property that may be in the possession of the PELTOMAA FAMILY because of the death of JACKIE LYLE PELTOMAA.

"The PELTOMAA FAMILY will pay for any outstanding debts that DEBBIE GARDIPEE [sic] may have at the present time."

After a hearing, the District Court denied all of appellant's contentions concerning her status as the surviving common-law spouse and dismissed her formal petition, granting respondent the right to continue an informal administration of the estate as personal representative. The main issue before this Court is whether the District Court erred in failing to find appellant the decedent's common-law wife. In this regard, appellant alleges that the existence of a marital relationship between her and the decedent is supported by the following evidence and testimony presented to the District Court during the hearing on the petition: (1) Appellant testified that she had lived with the decedent from February 1976 until his death and that she considered herself married to him. Appellant further testified that the decedent represented to others that appellant was his wife; that the decedent's aunt introduced her to some friends as Debbie Peltomaa; and that title to her car was in both appellant's and the decedent's name (the actual title was never produced at trial). (2) Respondent testified that various debts paid in behalf of appellant, in accordance with the June 15, 1979, agreement, represented monies owed by both appellant and the decedent. In particular, respondent testified that a Household Finance bill represented monies obtained by appellant and the decedent to pay for the purchase of a television and to pay for their moving expenses. Appellant

also points to testimony by respondent that he and his

f a m i l y have p a i d a p p e l l a n t $1,000, p a r t i a l l y o b t a i n e d from t h e s e l l i n g of the trailer d e c e d e n t was l i v i n g in a t the

time of h i s d e a t h . ( A p p e l l a n t a d m i t t e d , however, t h a t t i t l e t o t h e t r a i l e r was i n d e c e d e n t ' s name, although the rented s p a c e was in both their names. Respondent contends the title was not in appellant's name or in the decedent's

name. ) ( 3 ) A p e r i o d i c s t a t e m e n t from M o u n t a i n B e l l F e d e r a l

Credit Union was submitted i n d i c a t i n g p a y m e n t s made on a l o a n g i v e n t o a p p e l l a n t u n d e r t h e name D e b b i e K . P e l t o m a a . ( 4 ) Appellant introduced a hospital b i l l dated April 24, 1 9 7 9 , which l i s t s a p p e l l a n t ' s name a s Mrs. Debbie K.

(Guardipee) Peltomaa and which indicates t h a t Jack L. P e l t o m a a is h e r h u s b a n d . Appellant contends the b i l l a l s o

shows that the decedent maintained a medical insurance p o l i c y on h e r a s h i s w i f e . (Upon e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e b i l l , h o w e v e r , we s h o u l d n o t e i t m e r e l y l i s t s J a c k P e l t o m a a a s t h e "responsible party or n e x t of kin" and states: "doesn' t

know what kind" of insurance is a v a i l a b l e . There i s no i n d i c a t i o n on t h e b i l l t h a t a p p e l l a n t was a c t u a l l y c o v e r e d by a n i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y a s t h e d e c e d e n t ' s w i f e . ) ( 5 ) Appellant also introduced a 1978 f e d e r a l income

tax return filed jointly by decedent and appellant as

h u s b a n d and w i f e . Respondent claims that in light of all the above evidence, appellant has still failed to establish the e x i s t e n c e of a common-law m a r r i a g e . I n support of h i s p o s i t i o n , respondent contends t h a t h i s b r o t h e r n e v e r c o n s i d e r e d h i m s e l f m a r r i e d and was m e r e l y

living with appellant. Respondent further argues that appellant only represented herself a s Mrs. P e l t o m a a when i t was t o h e r f i n a n c i a l b e n e f i t ( i . e . , i n b o r r o w i n g money o r i n filing a joint tax return) and points out that the only t e s t i m o n y used i n support of appellant's position a r e her own s e l f - s e r v i n g statements. If a p p e l l a n t had b e e n l i v i n g w i t h t h e d e c e d e n t a s h u s b a n d and w i f e f o r o v e r t h r e e y e a r s , why was s h e u n a b l e t o p r o d u c e a n o t h e r w i t n e s s t o c o r r o b o r a t e her allegations?

Respondent also notes testimony to the effect that a p p e l l a n t was n o t l i v i n g w i t h t h e d e c e d e n t a t t h e time o f h i s death; that a f t e r being informed of decedent's death, appellant indicated that their r e l a t i o n s h i p was a l r e a d y a t an end; that appellant did nothing about the funeral arrangements and that she signed the June 15 agreement, renouncing any i n t e r e s t i n d e c e d e n t ' s e s t a t e w i t h t h e name Debbie G u a r d i p e e , n o t Debbie Peltomaa.

To e s t a b l i s h a common-law m a r r i a g e i t h a s been h e l d t h a t t h e proponent must prove:

". . . t h a t t h e p a r t i e s were c a p a b l e of c o n s e n t i n g t o t h e m a r r i a g e and t h e r e was m u t u a l and p u b l i c a s s u m p t i o n o f t h e m a r i t a l relation. The m a r r i a g e m u s t t a k e i m m e d i a t e l y and i t c a n n o t be c r e a t e d p i e c e m e a l . I t comes i n s t a n t l y i n t o b e i n g , o r i t d o e s n o t come a t a l l ; and i t s p a r t i e s must e n t e r i n t o a c o u r s e of conduct t o e s t a b l i s h t h e i r r e p u t e a s hus- band and w i f e . " I n Re M c C l e l l a n d ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 1 6 8 Mont. 1 6 0 , 164-165, 5 4 1 P.2d 780, 783.

See a l s o Miller v. Townsend Lumber Co. ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 152 Mont. 210, 448 P.2d 148; Elliot v. Industrial Accident Board ( 1 9 3 6 ) , 1 0 1 Mont. 246, 53 P.2d 451.

I n considering the t e s t i m o n y and e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s m a t t e r , we n o t e t h a t t h e f a c t s u s e d t o s u p p o r t t h e existence of a common-law marriage are mere isolated instances i n which a p p e l l a n t allegedly represented herself a s decedent's wife. The facts fail to show any s p e c i f i c agreement between appellant and the decedent concerning marriage; they do not estabish a continuous marital r e l a t i o n s h i p and a r e i n c o n f l i c t w i t h t e s t i m o n y p r e s e n t e d by respondent.

T h i s Court has c o n s i s t e n t l y held that the evidence p r e s e n t e d a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t m u s t be viewed by u s i n a l i g h t most favorable to the prevailing party. If there is credible evidence consistent with the findings of the District Court, those findings will not be disturbed on appeal. See Olson v. Westfork P r o p e r t i e s , I n c . ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 171 Mont. 154, 557 P.2d 821; C i t y of M i s s o u l a v. Rose (1974), 164 Mont. 9 0 , 519 P.2d 1 4 6 . I n s o reviewing t h e proceedings of t h e lower c o u r t h e r e , w e f i n d no e r r o r in the District Court's conclusion that appellant and the decedent never consummated, either formally or informally, a marital relationship.

Appellant has raised a second issue on appeal in contending that the District Court was in error for dismissing her petition for formal proceedings. In rejecting appellant's argument, we need only note that appellant's alleged interest i n t h e e s t a t e of t h e decedent is based s o l e l y on h e r contention t h a t she is a surviving spouse. Having already determined that appellant and decedent never consummated a marital relationship, and in further acknowledging the existence of appellant's signed renunciation agreement, this Court must agree with the D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t a p p e l l a n t h a s no interest in the estate and find that the petition was properly dismissed.

The order of dismissal as entered by the District Court is a f f i r m e d .

Justice We concur: