State Ex Rel. Smith v. District Cou

No. 82-218 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE O F MONTANA 1982

THE STATE OF MONTANA, ex rel., DANIEL PAUL SMITH, Relator,

THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, CASCADE COUNTY, HONORABLE JOEL G. ROTH, Presiding Judge, Respondents.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING: Counsel of Record: For Relator: Sandra K. Watts argued, Great Falls, Montana For Respondents: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana J. Fred Bourdeau, County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana For Amicus Curiae: Mike Meioy argued, Helena, Montana

Submitted: SEP 1 * Decided: DEG " 8

Filed: d - 1982

M r . J u s t i c e F r a n k B. M o r r i s o n , J r . , d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of t h e Court.

D e f e n d a n t D a n i e l S m i t h a p p l i e d t o t h i s C o u r t f o r a w r i t of supervisory control after respondent, the Eighth Judicial District Court, Judge Roth p r e s i d i n g , d e n i e d d e f e n d a n t ' s motion

t o e x c l u d e p u b l i c and p r e s s from a p r e t r i a l s u p p r e s s i o n h e a r i n g .

By h i s a p p l i c a t i o n , d e f e n d a n t s e e k s a l t e r n a t i v e r e l i e f r either (1) a n o r d e r r e v e r s i n g t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n and c l o s i n g

defendant's pretrial suppression hearing until the motion to suppress is d e n i e d or the case is complete; or ( 2 ) an order v a c a t i n g t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s o r d e r and r e m a n d i n g t h e c a u s e f o r a

full evidentiary hearing on defendant's closure motion.

D a n i e l S m i t h is c h a r g e d w i t h d e l i b e r a t e h o m i c i d e i n connec- t i o n w i t h t h e O c t o b e r 3 , 1 9 8 1 , s h o o t i n g d e a t h of A l f r e d L a P i e r , a

Great F a l l s r e s i d e n t . S m i t h s e e k s s u p p r e s s i o n of c e r t a i n items

of e v i d e n c e t a k e n f r o m h i s home and p e r s o n on t h e d a t e of his arrest. I n h i s motion d e f e n d a n t c h a l l e n g e s t h e l a w f u l n e s s of h i s

a r r e s t , a s s e r t i n g a l a c k of p r o b a b l e c a u s e , and t h e l a w f u l n e s s of t h e s e a r c h , a s s e r t i n g u n r e a s o n a b l e s e a r c h w i t h o u t w a r r a n t or con- sent.

A t t h e t i m e s e t f o r h e a r i n g on t h e s u p p r e s s i o n m o t i o n d e f e n s e

counsel noted that members of the public and a Great Falls Tribune r e p o r t e r were p r e s e n t in the courtroom. Counsel then

made a n o r a l m o t i o n to close t h e h e a r i n g to p u b l i c and p r e s s on

t h e g r o u n d s t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s f a i r t r i a l r i g h t s would be s u b s t a n - tially affected by dissemination of evidence that might be

suppressed. D e f e n s e c o u n s e l a r g u e d to t h e t r i a l c o u r t t h a t u n d e r Great Falls Tribune v. District Court of the Eighth J u d i c i a l District (1980), - .- Mont . -- - - , 6 0 8 P.2d 1 1 6 , 37 S t . R e p . 502, and American Bar Association (ABA) Standards Relating to Fair T r i a l and F r e e P r e s s , S e c t i o n 3 . 1 ( 1 9 6 8 ) , t h e s u p p r e s s i o n h e a r i n g

s h o u l d be c l o s e d . The S t a t e s a i d it had no o b j e c t i o n to a p u b l i c hearing. At this juncture, Judge Roth temporarily closed the h e a r i n g t o t h e p u b l i c and p r e s s to g i v e d e f e n d a n t a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o make a n o f f e r o f p r o o f .

D e f e n s e c o u n s e l made no f o r m a l o f f e r of p r o o f . I n s t e a d , she

d e v e l o p e d h e r a r g u m e n t t h a t c l o s u r e was p r o p e r u n d e r t h e Great - .-

-F.a l l s - - T r i b-n e c a s e , t h e 1 9 6 8 ABA s t a n d a r d , and G a n n e t t C o . , u- Inc.

v. DePasquale ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 4 4 3 U.S. 368, 99 S.Ct. 2898, 6 1 L.Ed.2d 6 0 8 , w h e r e i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h a t : (1) mem-

b e r s of t h e p u b l i c h a v e no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t u n d e r t h e S i x t h and Fourteenth Amendments to attend a pretrial hearing on a

m o t i o n t o s u p p r e s s ; and ( 2 ) t h e N e w York t r i a l c o u r t g a v e p r o p e r deference t o whatever right of access to criminal proceedings

t h a t m i g h t be g u a r a n t e e d b y t h e F i r s t and F o u r t e e n t h Amendments. Judge Roth denied d e f e n d a n t ' s motion. R u l i n g from t h e b e n c h ,

J u d g e R o t h f i r s t a c k n o w l e d g e d t h a t t h e Montana Supreme C o u r t had neither squarely addressed the issue of closed suppression

h e a r i n g s n o r a d o p t e d t h e 1 9 6 8 ABA s t a n d a r d p r o f f e r e d by d e f e n s e c o u n s e l , and s e c o n d l y , c o n c l u d e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t f a i l e d t o make a s u b s t a n t i a l s h o w i n g t h a t d i s s e m i n a t i o n of i n £ o r m a t i o n g a r n e r e d a t

a n o p e n s u p p r e s s i o n h e a r i n g would p r e j u d i c e d e f e n d a n t ' s r i g h t to a trial by an impartial jury. Judge Roth then continued the s u p p r e s s i o n h e a r i n g u n t i l s u c h t i m e d e f e n d a n t c o u l d a p p l y to t h i s

Court f o r appropriate r e l i e f . Defendant filed an application for writ of supervisory

c o n t r o l on J u n e 23, 1982. The S t a t e f i l e d i t s r e s p o n s e o n J u l y

6 , 1982. Subsequently, the Great F a l l s Tribune sought, and was granted, l e a v e to a p p e a r as a m i c u s c u r i a e . The a m i c u s b r i e f was r e c e i v e d J u l y 1 6 , 1982, and jurisdiction was a c c e p t e d J u l y 2 9 ,

1982. The C o u r t , s i t t i n g e n b a n c , h e a r d o r a l a r g u m e n t S e p t e m b e r 14, 1982. A twofold i s s u e is p r e s e n t e d to t h e C o u r t : (1) w h e t h e r t h e

public and press can be excluded from a p r e t r i a l suppression h e a r i n g t o e n s u r e a d e f e n d a n t ' s r i g h t to a f a i r t r i a l : and ( 2 ) i f

a p r e t r i a l s u p p r e s s i o n h e a r i n g c a n be c l o s e d , u n d e r w h a t s t a n d a r d

s h o u l d c l o s u r e be d e t e r m i n e d . When this Court last considered the interface between a

d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o a f a i r t r i a l and t h e r i g h t of

t h e p u b l i c and p r e s s t o o b s e r v e c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g s , there was b u t o n e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t d e c i s i o n t h a t a d d r e s s e d s i m i - lar concerns , Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, supra. The

h i g h e s t c o u r t of t h e l a n d s i n c e h a s r e n d e r e d two d e c i s i o n s t h a t have f u r t h e r explored the c o n t o u r s of these p a r t i c u l a r rights. An u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f Richmond N e w s p a p e r s , I n c . v . Virginia ( 1980 ) , 448 U.S. 555, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 65 L.Ed.2d 973, (plurality o p i n i o n ) , G l o b e Newspaper C o . v . Superior C t . (1982), U.S.

-- ---.- , 102 S.Ct. 2 6 1 3 , 7 3 L.Ed.2d 2 4 8 , and t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t - ween -a n n e t t and Great F a l l s T r i b u n e is c r i t i c a l to r e s o l u t i o n G - - - -

o f t h e case a t b a r . I n Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, s u p r a , t h e United S t a t e s

Supreme C o u r t u p h e l d a N e w York t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n t o e x c l u d e t h e p r e s s and p u b l i c f r o m a p r e t r i a l h e a r i n g i n a h o m i c i d e p r o s e - cution. G a n n e t- t interpreted Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment

g u a r a n t e e s t o a p u b l i c t r i a l t o be p e r s o n a l to t h e a c c u s e d , and n o t t o i n h e r e i n t h e p u b l i c a n y i n d e p e n d e n t , e n f o r c e a b l e r i g h t to attend criminal trials, or as in this instance, pretrial

suppression hearings. Although t h e c o u r t d i s c u s s e d t h e s t r o n g societal i n t e r e s t i n

public trials and the common law rule of open criminal pro-

c e e d i n g s , 4 4 3 U.S. a t 382-387, 99 S . C t . a t 2907-2309, 6 1 L.Ed.2d 623-628, it e x p r e s s l y s t o p p e d s h o r t of deciding t h a t the public a n d p r e s s had a r i g h t o f access to a p r e t r i a l h e a r i n g u n d e r t h e

F i r s t and F o u r t e e n t h Amendments. To t h e e x t e n t t h e r e may be a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d i m e n s i o n t o a r i g h t of access, n o t e d the court, t h e t r i a l c o u r t had p r o p e r l y a s s e s s e d t h a t t h e i m p l i c a t e d r i g h t was o u t w e i g h e d by d e f e n d a n t ' s r i g h t t o a f a i r t r i a l . 4 4 3 U.S. at

391-393, 99 S.Ct. at 2911, 2912, 61 L.Ed.2d 628-630. S i x months a f t e r G a n n e t t , t h i s C o u r t was p r e s e n t e d w i t h i t s

f i r s t f a i r trial-public t r i a l case. Great F a l l s -r i b u n e , s u p r a , -- T reversed a trial court's decision t o exclude press and public

from i n d i v i d u a l v o i r d i r e e x a m i n a t i o n s of p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s . We h e l d t h a t a t r i a l c o u r t c a n n o t r e s t r i c t t h e r i g h t of a n y p e r s o n

t o o b s e r v e s u c h p r o c e e d i n g s u n l e s s e x c l u s i o n of t h e p u b l i c be " a s t r i c t and i r r e p a r a b l e n e c e s s i t y to e n s u r e d e f e n d a n t ' s r i g h t to a fair trial." 608 P.2d at 121, 37 St.Rep. at 507.

Our d e c i s i o n was n o t b a s e d upon G a n n e t t l s a r t i c u l a t e d p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i n o p e n c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g s or a n y common law r u l e of

p u b l i c c o u r t p r o c e e d i n g b u t upon t h e " R i g h t to Know" p r o v i s i o n

articulated in Article 11, Section 9, of the Montana Constitution. Subject to individual privacy demands or a d e f e n d a n t ' s r i g h t to a f a i r t r i a l , w e d e t e r m i n e d t h a t a n y p e r s o n ,

including a representative of the media, has a constitutional r i g h t to o b s e r v e c o u r t p r o c e e d i n g s . 608 P.2d 1 1 9 , 37 S t . R e p . at 505, 506.

S h o r t l y a f t e r t h i s C o u r t a d o p t e d w h a t was t h e n c h a r a c t e r i z e d a s a s t a n d a r d s t r i c t e r t h a n t h a t of G a n n e t t , 6 0 8 P.2d a t 1 2 0 , 37 St.Rep. at 507, t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t addressed the

question reserved i n G a n n e t-: t w h e t h e r t h e F i r s t and F o u r t e e n t h Amendments g u a r a n t e e t h e p u b l i c and p r e s s a r i g h t of access to criminal trials. A r i g h t o f a c c e s s u n d e r t h e F i r s t Amendment and

a p p l i e d t o t h e s t a t e s by t h e F o u r t e e n t h Amendment, was r e c o g n i z e d by seven Justices in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 448 U.S. 555, 100 S.Ct. 2 8 1 4 , 6 5 L.Ed.2d 973. The case i n v o l v e d a s t a t e c o u r t o r d e r e x c l u d i n g t h e p u b l i c and p r e s s from a n e n t i r e t r i a l on f a i r t r i a l grounds.

Mr. C h i e f J u s t i c e B u r g e r , a u t h o r of t h e p l u r a l i t y o p i n i o n i n

Richmond --p a p e r s , w r o t e t h a t " [ a ] b s e n t a n o v e r r i d i n g i n t e r e s t News articulated i n findings, the trial of a criminal case m u s t be

open to t h e p u b l i c . " ( f o o t n o t e o m i t t e d ) 448 U.S. a t 581, 100

S.Ct. a t 2830, 6 5 L.Ed.2d a t 992. T h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s r i g h t to a f a i r t r i a l would c o n s t i t u t e s u c h a n i n t e r e s t was e v i d e n t ; that the trial court neglected to consider "various tested alter-

n a t i v e s " t o c l o s u r e which would s a t i s f y t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l demand of f a i r n e s s was c r i t i c a l . 448 U.S. a t 581, 100 S.Ct. a t 2829, 2 8 3 0 , 6 5 L.Ed.2d a t 580, 581.

In the United States Supreme C o u r t ' s most recent decision

r e g a r d i n g c l o s u r e of c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g s , a d e f e n d a n t s r i g h t to a f a i r t r i a l was n o t t h e p r e e m i n e n t c o n c e r n . Globe Newspaper C o .

v. Superior Court, supra, involved a con£ l i c t between the

p u b l i c ' s r i g h t of access t o c r i m i n a l t r i a l s and a s t a t e s t a t u t e mandating c l o s u r e of t r i a l d u r i n g t e s t i m o n y of a minor r a p e v i c - tim. J u s t i c e Brennan's majority opinion d e f i n i t i v e l y established

that under the F i r s t and F o u r t e e n t h Amendments "the press and g e n e r a l p u b l i c have a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t of a c c e s s to c r i m i n a l

trials," 1 0 2 S.Ct. a t 2618, 7 3 L.Ed.2d a t 255 " t h e d e n i a l [of

which must be] necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and [be] narrowly tailored to serve that interest."

102 S.Ct. at 2620, 73 L.Ed.2d a t 257. There, the interests

a s s e r t e d t o j u s t i f y c l o s u r e w e r e t h e p r o t e c t i o n of v i c t i m s from disclosure of sensitive information and the encouragement of r e p o r t i n g and t e s t i f y i n g by f u t u r e v i c t i m s . The G l o b e c o u r t was

n o t persuaded that either interest justified mandatory c l o s u r e ; t h e r e f ore, it reversed the state court decision. From r e v i e w o f t h e s e cases t h r e e c o n c l u s i o n s c a n be d r a w n .

F i r s t , a l t h o u g h b o t h t h e f e d e r a l and Montana c o n s t i t u t i o n g u a r a n - t e e t o members of t h e p u b l i c and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f the press a r i g h t t o observe criminal proceedings, t h e scope of t h e respec-

t i v e g u a r a n t e e s as y e t is n o t c o m m e n s u r a t e . The U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t h a s c o n s t r u e d t h e F i r s t and F o u r t e e n t h Amendments

to provide a right of access to c r i m i n a l trials; a right of

access t o --t r i a l c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g s h a s n o t b e e n r e c o g n i z e d . pre In contrast, the broad language contained in t h e -r e a t G- Falls T r i b u n e case, " t h a t any person h a s t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l right to

observe court proceedings," 6 0 8 P.2d a t 1 1 9 , 37 S t . R e p . a t 505, most c e r t a i n l y e n c o m p a s s e s p r e t r i a l p r o c e e d i n g s as w e l l as t h e actual trial.

Secondly, irrespective of the s c o p e of access r i g h t s , the n a t u r e of t h e g u a r a n t e e u n d e r t h e two c o n s t i t u t i o n s is s i m i l a r . W h e t h e r t h e b a s i s f o r t h e p r e s s and p u b l i c ' s r i g h t of a c c e s s be

t h e F i r s t and F o u r t e e n t h Amendments to t h e U n i t e d S t a t e C o n s t i t u -tion or the "Right to Know" provision of the Montana Constitution, t h e g u a r a n t e e is n o t a b s o l u t e . I t c a n be p r o p e r l y circumscribed when the right or i n t e r e s t a g a i n s t which it comp e t e s is w e i g h t y or c o m p e l l i n g . D o u b t l e s s l y , t h e r i g h t of a c r i -m i n a l d e f e n d a n t t o a t r i a l b y a n i m p a r t i a l j u r y is s u c h a r i g h t .

" 'Due p r o c e s s r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e a c c u s e d r e c e i v e a t r i a l b y a n i m p a r t i a l j u r y f r e e from o u t s i d e in£ luences . Given t h e p e r v a s i v e n e s s o f modern c o m m u n i c a t i o n s and t h e d i f f i c u l t y of e f f a c i n g p r e j u d i c i a l p u b l i c i t y from t h e m i n d s of t h e j u r o r s , t h e t r i a l c o u r t s must t a k e - o n g m e a s u - to-ensGiFiiTthiZthe - --- -c F X G str res 5iaiFn- - - - - -- n e v e r --e i g h e d a g a i n s t - .- c c u s e d w- the a . . . I 11

Nebraska P r e s s A s s o c i a t i o n v. S t u a r t ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 427 U.S. 5 3 9 , 5 5 3 , 9 6 S . C t . 2 7 9 1 , 2800, 49 L.Ed.2d 6 8 3 , 6 9 4 , c i t i n g S h e p p a r d v . Maxwell ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 384 U.S. 3 3 3 , 362-63, 8 6 S . C t . 1 5 0 7 , 1 5 2 2 , 1 6 L.Ed.2d 6 0 0 , 6 2 0 , ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) .

Though c o n c l u d i n g that it was n o t p r o p e r t o close t h e p r o -

ceeding in the Great - l l s T r i b u n e Fa - case, this Court intimated

t h a t i n c e r t a i n circumstances a defendant's r i g h t t o a f a i r trial i s p a r a m o u n t t o t h e p u b l i c ' s r i g h t t o know. The o p i n i o n s p e c i f i -c a l l y noted that brief c l o s u r e of i n d i v i d u a l v o i r d i r e examinat i o n s may be p r o p e r i f d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e of v o i r d i r e i t becomes n e c e s s a r y to a l l u d e t o inadmissible evidence. 608 P.2d a t 120, 37 St.Rep. at 507. The decision also referred to a pretrial suppression hearing, t h e i m p l i c a t i o n b e i n g t h a t c l o s u r e t h e n may

be appropriate t o p r e v e n t d i s s e m i n a t i o n of tainted evidence to t h e pool of p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s .

Finally, t h e q u e s t i o n i s open-ended a s t o p r e c i s e l y what t h e fair trial closure standard is under federal law. Globe

Newspaper - Co., is i m p o r t a n t b e c a u s e it is t h e f i r s t m a j o r i t y o p i -

nion recognizing a f e d e r a l r i g h t of access t o c r i m i n a l trials, but it p r o v i d e s little insight as to w h a t standard t h e United

States Supreme Court would employ in resolving a right of access/fair t r i a l question in a pretrial context. The S t a t e ' s interest i n s h i e l d i n g a minor rape v i c t i m from p u b l i c scrutiny simply cannot be equated with a criminal defendant's absolute right to a fair trial. It is therefore unlikely that the

" c o m p e l l i n g s t a t e i n t e r e s t / n a r r o w l y t a i l o r e d means" t e s t would be applicable in a f a i r trial situation.

What little that c a n be gleened f r o m Richmond N e w s p a p e r s , P

Inc. is that the United States Supreme Court probably w i l l expect trial judges to consider and dismiss less restrictive

alternatives t o closure before it w i l l uphold t h e e x c l u s i o n of

p u b l i c and p r e s s from a p r e t r i a l c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g . Although t h e B u r g e r o p i n i o n i m p l i e s t h a t t h e r e are fewer s u i t a b l e a l t e r - natives to c l o s u r e i n a p r e t r i a l c o n t e x t , 4 4 8 U.S. a t 581, 100

S.Ct. a t 2830, 6 5 L.Ed.2d a t 992, it d o e s not f o l l o w t h a t no a l t e r n a t i v e s to c l o s u r e w i l l e n s u r e d e f e n d a n t ' s r i g h t to a f a i r

t r i a l i n a p r e t r i a l proceeding.

Rather than developing t h e - - l l s - u n e s t a n d a r d of Great F - a T r i- b "strict and irreparable necessity, " a standard which emanates from federal cases whose continuing validity is q u e s t i o n a b l e ,

t h i s C o u r t w i l l f o l l o w t h e c o u r s e s u g g e s t e d by t h e S t a t e h e r e i n .

In so doing, we join the courts of Wyoming and Colorado in adopting, i n t o t o , S t a n d a r d 8-3.2 o f t h e American B a r A s s o c i a t i o n

S t a n d a r d s f o r C r i m i n a l J u s t i c e ( 2nd .Ed. 1 9 7 8 ) as t h e a p p r o p r i a t e test to reconcile the competing i n t e r e s t of public access and trial fairness. This is a r e v i s e d and more e x a c t i n g s t a n d a r d

t h a n t h e one proposed by d e f e n d a n t . Based upon the Right to Know provision of the Montana

C o n s t i t u t i o n and t h e r i g h t o f a c c e s s recognized under t h e F i r s t

a n d F o u r t e e n t h Amendments t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n , we hold t h a t t h e p u b l i c and p r e s s may be e x c l u d e d from a p r e t r i a l s u p p r e s s i o n h e a r i n g o n l y i f d i s s e m i n a t i o n of i n f o r m a t i o n a c q u i r e d a t t h e h e a r i n g would c r e a t e a c l e a r and p r e s e n t d a n g e r to the f a i r n e s s o f d e f e n d a n t ' s t r i a l and n o r e a s o n a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e means c a n be u t i l i z e d to avoid t h e p r e j u d i c i a l e f f e c t of such infor-

m a tion. The C o u r t e n c o u r a g e s t r i a l j u d g e s to s e e k f i r s t t h e v o l u n t a r y

c o o p e r a t i o n of t h e news m e d i a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s w h e n e v e r p o s s i b l e . Upon b e i n g informed of t h e d a n g e r p r e s e n t e d b y d i s s e m i n a t i o n of t a i n t e d e v i d e n c e t o t h e community a t l a r g e as r e g a r d s d e f e n d a n t ' s r i g h t t o a f a i r t r i a l , w e would hope t h a t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e

m e d i a would e x e r c i s e p r u d e n t judgment and d e l a y mass d i s s e m i n a - tion of potentially prejudicial information until the jury is

i m p a n e l e d or u n t i l a n e a r l i e r t i m e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e f a i r admi-

nistration of justice. The press is v e r y aware of the vital f u n c t i o n it s e r v e s i n p r e s e r v i n g t h e q u a l i t y and i n t e g r i t y of t h e

j u d i c i a l process.

" I n s t e a d of a c q u i r i n g information about t r i a l s b y f i r s t h a n d o b s e r v a t i o n or by word o f mouth f r o m t h o s e who a t t e n d e d , p e o p l e now a c q u i r e it c h i e f l y t h r o u g h t h e p r i n t and e l e c t r o n i c media. I n a s e n s e , t h i s v a l i d a t e s t h e media claim o f f u n c t i o n i n g a s s u r r o g a t e s f o r t h e p u b l i c . While media r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s e n j o y t h e same r i g h t o f access a s t h e p u b l i c , t h e y o f t e n a r e p r o v i d e d s p e c i a l s e a t i n g and p r i o r i t y o f e n t r y so t h a t t h e y may report w h a t p e o p l e i n attendance have seen and heard. This ' c o n t r i b u t e [ s ] t o p u b l i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e r u l e o f law and t o c o m p r e h e n s i o n of t h e f u n c - t i o n i n g of t h e e n t i r e c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e syst e m . . . N e b r a s k a P r e s s A s s n . v . S t u a r t , 427 U.S., a t 5 8 7 , [96 S . C t . a t 2 8 1 6 , 49 L.Ed.2d a t 7141 ( B r e n n a n , J., c o n c u r r i n g i n j u d g m e n t ) . " Richmond N e w s p a p e r s , I n c . v . V i r g i n i a ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 448 U.S. a t 5 7 2 , 5 7 3 , 1 0 0 S . C t . a t 2 8 2 5 , 6 5 L.Ed.2d a t 987. As well, t h e p r e s s s h o u l d be e s p e c i a l l y c o g n i z a n t of t h e h a v o c i t c a n wreak if it fulfills its role i n a less t h a n r e s p o n s i b l e manner. See, e.g. Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra; Estes v . Texas

s u i t a b l e a g r e e m e n t c a n n o t be r e a c h e d , t h e t r i a l c o u r t must t h e n p r o c e e d to h e a r i n g .

I n determining whether a " c l e a r and p r e s e n t d a n g e r " e x i s t s

t h e C o u r t s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g f a c t s m i g h t be c o n s i d e r e d : (1) e m p i r i c a l e v i d e n c e r e g a r d i n g t h e p e r c e n t a g e of g e n e r a l popu-

l a t i o n who r e a d n e w s p a p e r s o r who l i s t e n t o o t h e r f o r m s o f m e d i a ; (2) statistics regarding the percentage of media readers/ l i s t e n e r s who r e a d or f o l l o w h o m i c i d e or c r i m i n a l s t o r i e s ; and

(3) e x p e r t p s y c h o l o g i c a l t e s t i m o n y r e g a r d i n g t h e c a p a c i t y of an

i n d i v i d u a l to d i s r e g a r d p r e t r i a l p u b l i c i t y , which m i g h t i n c l u d e t a i n t e d e v i d e n c e , when making a n o b j e c t i v e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of the

f a c t s upon c o m p l e t i o n o f a t r i a l .

If t h e e v i d e n c e adduced s u p p o r t s a f i n d i n g t h a t t h e r e is a c l e a r and p r e s e n t d a n g e r t o t r i a l f a i r n e s s , t h e c o u r t s h o u l d t h e n

h e a r e v i d e n c e and a r g u m e n t a s to w h e t h e r less r e s t r i c t i v e a l t e r - n a t i v e s would s u f f i c e t o e n s u r e a f a i r t r i a l . The commentary to

Standard 8-3.2 lists the following as alternatives to be considered : (1) continuance, (2) severance, (3) change of venue, ( 4 ) change of venire, (5) intensive voir dire, ( 6 ) addi-

t i o n a l preemptory challenges, ( 7 ) s e q u e s t r a t i o n , and ( 8 ) admoni-

tory instructions to the jury. In this case some of these a l t e r n a t i v e s a r e obviously not applicable. Here, before those

alternatives be considered, t h i s Court w i l l require the trial

c o u r t and p a r t i e s t o c o n s i d e r t h e e f f i c a c y of entering a pre- s u p p r e s s i o n h e a r i n g p r o t e c t i v e o r d e r which would f o r b i d m e n t i o n

during the hearing of specific items of e v i d e n c e s o u g h t t o be

suppressed. If, as in the instant case, the e s s e n c e of the suppression hearing involves questions a s to t h e law£ u l n e s s of

the arrest, or the lawfulness of the search, the suppression hearing can proceed without identifying the specific items seized. T h a t would not be the case i n a suppression hearing

r e l a t i n g t o t h e a d e q u a c y of d e s c r i p t i o n of items c o n t a i n e d in a search warrant; in that situation, t h e c r u x of the suppression hearing is t h e n a t u r e or t h e identity of the particular items

seized. O n l y i f t h e t r i a l c o u r t f i n d s t h a t t h e r e is a " c l e a r and p r e - s e n t d a n g e r " and t h a t less r e s t r i c t i v e a l t e r n a t i v e s , including a

protective order, cannot protect defendant's right to a fair

trial, s h o u l d c l o s u r e be o r d e r e d . The C o u r t e x p e c t s t h a t f i n d - i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of law w i l l be e n t e r e d to s u p p o r t

a closure order. If the trial court decides that closure is

not required, t h e p u b l i c and p r e s s s h o u l d h a v e i m m e d i a t e access t o t h e t r a n s c r i p t of t h e c l o s e d h e a r i n g on t h e c l o s u r e motion.

If c l o s u r e is o r d e r e d , complete r e c o r d s of the closure hearing

a n d t h e s u b s e q u e n t s u p p r e s s i o n h e a r i n g s h o u l d be made and r e m a i n sealed until c o m p l e t i o n of the trial or an earlier time con-

sistent with trial fairness. We hereby vacate the District

C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n and remand t h i s cause f o r a hearing under t h e s t a n d a r d adopted by t h i s o p i n i o n .

J u d g e , s i t t i n g i n p l a c e of M r . Chief J u s t i c e Frank I . Haswell. , , '

l ~ h e p d a t e d v e r s i o n of t h e A B A ' s f a i r t r i a l and f r e e p r e s s s t a n - u dard states: " P r e t r i a l proceedings : exclusion of public and s e a l i n g of r e c o r d s

"Except a s provided below, p r e t r i a l pro- c e e d i n g s and t h e i r r e c o r d s s h a l l be o p e n to t h e p u b l i c , i n c l u d i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e news m e d i a . I f a t the p r e t r i a l proceeding t e s t i m o n y o r e v i d e n c e is adduced t h a t is l i k e l y t o t h r e a t e n t h e f a i r n e s s of a t r i a l , t h e p r e s i d i n g o f f i c e r s h a l l a d v i s e those pre- s e n t of t h e d a n g e r and s h a l l s e e k t h e v o l u n - t a r y c o o p e r a t i o n of t h e news m e d i a i n d e l a y i n g dissemination of potentially prejudicial i n f o r m a t i o n by means of p u b l i c c o m m u n i c a t i o n u n t i l t h e i m p a n e l i n g o f t h e j u r y or u n t i l a n e a r l i e r t i m e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e f a i r admi- n i s t r a t i o n of j u s t i c e . The p r e s i d i n g o f f i c e r may c l o s e a p r e l i m i n a r y h e a r i n g , b a i l h e a r i n g , o r any o t h e r p r e t r i a l p r o c e e d i n g , i n c l u d i n g a m o t i o n t o s u p p r e s s , and may s e a l t h e r e c o r d only if: " ( a ) t h e d i s s e m i n a t i o n of i n f o r m a t i o n from t h e p r e t r i a l p r o c e e d i n g and i t s r e c o r d would c r e a t e a c l e a r and p r e s e n t d a n g e r t o t h e f a i r - n e s s of t h e t r i a l , and

" ( b ) t h e p r e j u d i c i a l e f f e c t of s u c h i n f o r - m a t i o n on t r i a l f a i r n e s s c a n n o t be a v o i d e d by a n y r e a s o n a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e means. "The d e f e n d a n t may move t h a t a l l o r p a r t of t h e p r o c e e d i n g be closed to the public ( i n c l u d i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e news m e d i a ) , o r , w i t h t h e c o n s e n t of t h e d e f e n d a n t , t h e p r e s i d i n g o f f i c e r may t a k e s u c h a c t i o n s u a s p o n t e o r a t t h e s u g g e s t i o n of t h e p r o s e c u - t i o n . Whenever u n d e r t h i s r u l e a l l or p a r t of a n y p r e t r i a l p r o c e e d i n g is h e l d i n chambers or o t h e r w i s e c l o s e d to t h e p u b l i c a complete r e c o r d s h a l l be k e p t and made a v a i l a b l e to t h e p u b l i c f o l l o w i n g t h e c o m p l e t i o n of t r i a l o r e a r l i e r i f consistent with t r i a l fairness."