State Ex Rel. Maier v. City Court

No. 82-168

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MO!JTANA

STATE OF MONTANA, ex rel., LLOYD SCOTT MAIER, a Minor, and ROBERT P. MORIN, his attorney, Petitioners,

THE CITY COURT OF THE CITY OF BILLINGS, COUNTY OF YELLOWSTONE, HONORABLE DONALD E. BJERTNESS, A JUDGE THEREOF, Respondents.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING:

Counsel of Record: For Petitioners: Berger Law Firm, Billings, Montana Robert Morin, Billings, Pontana For Respondents: Donald E. Bjertness, Billings, Montana Peterson, Schofield and Leckie, Billings, Montana

Submitted: July 16, 1982 Decided: August 20, 1982 Filed: & u G 2 0 1982

M r . J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n delivered t h e O p i n i o n of the Court.

T h i s is a p e t i t i o n by t h e m i n o r , L l o y d S c o t t Maier, and h i s counsel, Robert P. Morin, f o r a w r i t of supervisory control o r

other appropriate writ. We grant the petition and deny. On F e b r u a r y 4 , 1982, the petitioner, L l o y d S c o t t Maier, was i s s u e d a n o t i c e to a p p e a r on a c o m p l a i n t of f a i l u r e to d r i v e i n a

c a r e f u l and p r u d e n t m a n n e r . The c o m p l a i n t was i s s u e d by o f f i c e r Dewayne Ness, a p o l i c e o f f i c e r employed by t h e C i t y of B i l l i n g s .

He was not required to appear until F e b r u a r y 11, 1 9 8 2 . The p e t i t i o n e r , Maier, a p p e a r e d o n t h e e l e v e n t h day b e f o r e t h e C i t y Court of the City of Billings, County of Yellowstone, before respondent Judge, Donald E. Bjertness. At the time of his

a p p e a r a n c e , he was a s k e d i f he had a p a r e n t w i t h him. He replied t h a t he d i d n o t and J u d g e B j e r t n e s s d i r e c t e d him t o l e a v e t h e c o u r t r o o m , g o t o a p h o n e p r o v i d e d f o r him and c a l l h i s p a r e n t s to

h a v e them a p p e a r w i t h him. A f t e r some t i m e h e r e a p p e a r e d i n t h e c o u r t r o o m , and i n d i c a t e d t o J u d g e B j e r t n e s s t h a t h i s p a r e n t s would

n o t a p p e a r w i t h him and he would h a v e t o a p p e a r by h i m s e l f . A f t e r

being told that t h e p a r e n t s would not appear with him, Judge B j e r t n e s s a c c e p t e d t h e p e t i t i o n e r ' s p l e a o f g u i l t y and f i n e d him in the amount o f $45. The m o t o r vehicle he w a s driving was

impounded a f t e r p e t i t i o n e r t o l d t h e c o u r t t h a t he d i d n o t have t h e $45. I n a d d i t i o n t o impounding t h e car he w a s d r i v i n g , the p e t i t i o n e r , Maier, was r e q u i r e d t o t u r n i n h i s Montana d r i v e r ' s

l i c e n s e to t h e c o u r t . Petitioner hired counsel i n February 1982, s i x days after having entered the plea and through counsel filed a motion t o withdraw h i s p l e a of g u i l t y w i t h a memorandum i n s u p p o r t to the c i t y court. At both appearances, the petitioner, Maier, was age

s e v e n t e e n , b o r n on J u l y 25, 1964. Two months later the petitioner appeared with counsel, Morin, r e q u e s t i n g a withdrawal of t h e p r e v i o u s p l e a of guilty.

A f t e r e v i d e n c e was h e a r d , J u d g e B j e r t n e s s e n t e r e d a w r i t t e n o r d e r denying the p e t i t i o n e r ' s m o t i o n to w i t h d r e w t h e p l e a of g u i l t y .

The court issued the order on May 1 3I 1 98 2 . A t t h e t i m e of h i s a p p e a r a n c e on A p r i l 1 2 , 1982, p e t i t i o n e r contended t h a t as a seventeen-year-old youth, h e was u n a b l e to i n t e l l i g e n t l y and understandingly e n t e r a p l e a of guilty. He

argued t h a t , a s a m i n o r , as a matter of law, he was i n c o m p e t e n t t o appear without p a r e n t and/or an attorney i n entering h i s plea

of guilty. The r e s p o n d e n t j u d g e , i n h i s May 1 3 w r i t t e n o r d e r d e n y i n g t h e withdrawal of the plea, stated t h a t a juvenile appearing i n the

city court on a traffic citation does not have the right to a p p o i n t e d c o u n s e l and f o u n d i t was u n n e c e s s a r y to h a v e a p p o i n t e d counsel present when one c o n s i d e r s t h e r e was no p r o v i s i o n f o r

i n c a r c e r a t i o n o f a j u v e n i l e upon h i s e n t r y of a p l e a o f g u i l t y o r a conviction relative to a minor traffic violation. The s o l e i s s u e p r e s e n t e d t o t h i s C o u r t by t h e p e t i t i o n e r ' s

request is w h e t h e r a m i n o r is i n c o m p e t e n t to a p p e a r i n a c i t y c o u r t on t h e c h a r g e o f f a i l i n g t o d r i v e i n a c a r e f u l and p r u d e n t manner without a parent, guardian or attorney and waive his

r i g h t i n o r d e r t o e n t e r i n t o a v a l i d p l e a of g u i l t y . The p e t i - t i o n e r a r g u e s Judge B j e r t n e s s f a i l e d to f o l l o w t h e clear mandates o f s e c t i o n 41-5-511, MCA, s e c t i o n 61-12-601, MCA, and o u r r e c e n t

case o f Edward v. C o l l i n g s ( 1 9 8 1 ) , Mont . -- 1 6 3 2 P.2d 325, 38 St.Rep. 1240. In Edward, supra, this Court considered a writ of habeas

c o r p u s o n b e h a l f o f a m i n o r who had e n t e r e d a p l e a of g u i l t y of illegal possession of alcohol, where the court sentenced the m i n o r t o a f i n e o f $50 and t e n d a y s i n t h e P o w e l l C o u n t y j a i l to

be s e r v e d on weekends. A s here, t h e y o u t h w a s unaccompanied b y a p a r e n t o r c o u n s e l a t t h e t i m e o f t h e p l e a and p e t i t i o n e r a l l e g e d

that he requested the right to speak to his father before entering a plea, but that such request was denied after he admitted the possession of two c a n s o f beer. This Court held

t h a t t h e Montana Y o u t h C o u r t A c t , Chapter 5, s e c t i o n s 41-5-101 t h r o u g h 41-5-924 applied. However, there is an important d i s t i n c tion be t w e e n Edward supra, and the present case. The v i o l a t i o n i n Edward w a s a n illegal possession of alcohol, where a n incarceration sentence w a s imposed. I n t h i s case t h e c h a r g e was o n l y t h a t of a t r a f f i c

violation without an imposition of any incarceration. Here, t h e r e was no p o s s i b i l i t y o f a n y j a i l t i m e b e i n g g i v e n as p a r t of

t h e s e n t e n c e a c c o r d i n g to o u r l a w . W e f i n d t h a t n e i t h e r t h e s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s of t h e Montana Y o u t h C o u r t A c t a p p l y n o r is t h e Edward case d e t e r m i n a t i v e of t h e

issue presented to us. Under t h e p r o v i s i o n of 61-12-601, MCA,

t h e c i t y c o u r t had j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e m a t t e r , and t h e p e n a l t i e s prescribed and ordered by t h e c o u r t were w i t h i n the statutory

authority granted. "Unlawful o p e r a t i o n by minor --- jurisdiction o f c o u r t s --- p e n a l t i e s . "(1) The d i s t r i c t c o u r t s and t h e j u s t i c e s ' c o u r t s o f t h e s t a t e and t h e m u n i c i p a l and c i t y c o u r t s o f c i t i e s and towns s h a l l h a v e con- c u r r e n t o r i g i n a l j u r s i d i c t i o n i n a l l pro- ceedings concerning t h e unlawful operation o f m o t o r v e h i c l e s by c h i l d r e n u n d e r t h e a g e of 18 years. "(2) Whenever, a f t e r a h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e c o u r t , it s h a l l be f o u n d t h a t a c h i l d u n d e r t h e age of 1 8 y e a r s h a s u n l a w f u l l y o p e r a t e d a m o t o r v e h i c l e , t h e c o u r t may: "(a) impose a f i n e , n o t e x c e e d i n g $ 5 0 , p r o - v i d e d s u c h c h i l d s h a l l n o t be i m p r i s o n e d f o r f a i l u r e to pay such f i n e ;

"(b) r e v o k e t h e d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e of such c h i l d , or s u s p e n d t h e same f o r s u c h t i m e as may be f i x e d by t h e c o u r t ; and

"(c) o r d e r a n y motor v e h i c l e owned o r o p e r a t e d by s u c h c h i l d t o be impounded b y t h e p r o b a t i o n o f f i c e r f o r such t i m e , n o t exceeding 6 0 d a y s , as s h a l l be f i x e d b y t h e c o u r t . However, i f t h e c o u r t s h a l l f i n d t h a t t h e o p e r a t i o n of such motor v e h i c l e w a s w i t h o u t t h e c o n s e n t of t h e owner, t h e n such v e h i c l e s h a l l n o t be impounded.

" ( 3 ) Upon nonpayment o f a n y f i n e h e r e i n p r o - v i d e d f o r , t h e c o u r t may o r d e r t h a t a n y motor v e h i c l e owned b y s a i d c h i l d o r o p e r a t e d b y s a i d c h i l d w i t h t h e c o n s e n t o f t h e owner s h a l l b e impounded u n t i l t h e f i n e s h a l l be p a i d , o r

may o r d e r t h a t t h e d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e of s u c h c h i l d s h a l l be t a k e n u p and h e l d by t h e p r o b a - t i o n o f f i c e r u n t i l payment of s a i d f i n e , o r may c a u s e b o t h s a i d motor v e h i c l e and s a i d d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e t o be t a k e n up and impounded u n t i l s u c h f i n e s h a l l be p a i d ; b u t no c h i l d s h a l l be c o m m i t t e d t o o r h e l d i n a n y d e t e n t i o n f a c i l i t y o r j a i l by r e a s o n of non-payment o f such f i n e ." S e c t i o n 61-12-601, MCA. I n addition, w e n o t e t h a t t h e Montana Y o u t h C o u r t A c t d o e s n o t a p p l y to t r a f f i c v i o l a t i o n s . S e c t i o n 41-5-511, MCA, provides as follows: "Right - Counsel. to I n a l l proceedings f o l l o w i n g t h e f i l i n g of a p e t i t i o n a l l e g i n g a delinquent youth or youth in need of s u p e r v i s i o n , t h e y o u t h and t h e p a r e n t or g u a r - d i a n o f y o u t h s h a l l be a d v i s e d b y t h e c o u r t , or in absence of the court, by its r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , t h a t t h e y o u t h may be r e p r e - s e n t e d by counsel a t a l l s t a g e s of the proceedings. I f c o u n s e l is n o t r e t a i n e d , or i t a p p e a r s t h a t c o u n s e l w i l l n o t be r e t a i n e d , c o u n s e l s h a l l be a p p o i n t e d f o r t h e y o u t h i f t h e p a r e n t s and t h e y o u t h are u n a b l e t o p r o - v i d e c o u n s e l , u n l e s s t h e r i g h t to a p p o i n t c o u n s e l was w a i v e d by t h e y o u t h and p a r e n t or guardian.. ." T h i s s t a t u t e h a s no a p p l i c a t i o n t o t h e case a t hand f o r h e r e t h e p e t i t i o n e r was i n t h e C i t y C o u r t of B i l l i n g s on a t r a f f i c

v i o l a t i o n , n o t as a r e s u l t o f a f i l i n g o f a p e t i t i o n a l l e g i n g him

t o be a d e l i n q u e n t y o u t h o r a y o u t h i n need o f s u p e r v i s i o n . Our s t a t u t e s p r o v i d e i n t h e above-quoted s t a t u t e , 61-12-601, MCA, for

t h e handling of violations by a m i n o r and t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n s of the court to handle such v i o l a t i o n . I n a d d i t i o n i t s h o u l d be

further noted that the Youth Court Act 41-5-203 provides:

" J u r i s d i c t i o n -- C o u r t . (1) of the E x c e p t as provided i n subsection ( 2 ) , the court has - exclusive jurisdiction of a l l proceedings u n d e r t h e Montana Y o u t h C o u r t A c t i n which a y o u t h is a l l e g e d t o be a d e l i n q u e n t y o u t h , a y o u t h i n need o f s u p e r v i s i o n , o r a y o u t h i n n e e d o f care o r c o n c e r n i n g a n y i n d i v i d u a l under twenty-one y e a r s of age charged w i t h h a v i n g v i o l a t e d a n y l a w o f t h e s t a t e or o r d i - n a n c e o f a n y c i t y or town o t h e r -h- n a t r a f f i c t a - -s -a- game v i o l a t i o n p r i o r - h a v i n g or f i h nd to become e i g h t e e n y e a r s - -" o f age. (Emphasis supplied. )

Having found that neither the s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s of the Montana Youth Court Act apply nor is Edward, supra, deter-

m i n a t i v e o f t h e i s s u e a t h a n d , we w i l l c o n s i d e r now t h e f a c t s o f t h e case p r e s e n t e d t o u s t o see i f it meets t h e i n t e n t of our law.

T h i s p r e s e n t s us with the i s s u e of whether the petitioner,

Maier, made a k n o w l e d g e a b l e w a i v e r of his rights prior to t h e time which h e e n t e r e d h i s p l e a o f g u i l t y . On the information submitted to us for our consideration in this petition it appears that the petitioner, Lloyd Scott Maier, d i d , i n f a c t , make a k n o w l e d g e a b l e w a i v e r of his rights p r i o r t o t h e t i m e he e n t e r e d t h e p l e a . T h e r e is n o t h i n g t o b a s e

any other contention, a s made by t h e comment t h a t h e d i d not

u n d e r s t a n d and know w h a t t h e l a w was i n r e g a r d to t h e r e q u i r e - m e n t s t o d r i v e a v e h i c l e i n a c a r e f u l and p r u d e n t m a n n e r . As a

seventeen-year-old, who had b e e n g r a n t e d a l i c e n s e to d r i v e a n a u t o m o b i l e , it would a p p e a r from h i s r e c o r d t h a t h e had t h e c a p a -

b i l i t y t o d e t e r m i n e i n h i s own mind i f h e h a d , i n f a c t , f a i l e d to

c o m p l y w i t h t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of t h e laws o f t h e S t a t e o f Montana. Here p e t i t i o n e r was g i v e n a n o p p o r t u n i t y b y the presiding judge and, in fact, d i r e c t e d t o c a l l h i s p a r e n t s to h a v e them a p p e a r w i t h him a t t h e t i m e h e made h i s a p p e a r a n c e . A s pre-

viously noted, h i s notice t o a p p e a r was issued on February 4 , 1982, a week before he was required to appear as he did on

F e b r u a r y 11, 1 9 8 2 . T h i s g a v e him s u f f i c i e n t o p p o r t u n i t y t o r e l a y t h a t n o t i c e of t i m e f o r h i s a p p e a r a n c e to a p a r e n t o r g u a r d i a n . H e c o u l d h a v e a t t h e t i m e of h i s a p p e a r a n c e had h i s p a r e n t s w i t h

h i m , o r as p r e v i o u s l y n o t e d o n t h e b a s i s of h i s t e l e p h o n e c a l l to g e t h i s p a r e n t s t h e y c o u l d h a v e b e e n w i t h him a t t h e t i m e he made h i s p l e a , and i t was o n l y a f t e r making t h e c a l l and i n f o r m i n g t h e presiding judge t h a t h i s p a r e n t s would not a p p e a r t h a t h e was a l l o w e d t o e n t e r h i s p l e a of g u i l t y . W e recognize t h a t t h e r i g h t to c o u n s e l is o n e of t h e funda- mental r i g h t s t h a t support j u s t i c e i n o u r s y s t e m and t h a t it is

a r i g h t e s s e n t i a l t o m i n o r s who a r e n o t k n o w l e d g e a b l e o f their fundamental r i g h t s . However, i n t h e case a t h a n d , it d o e s n o t

appear to be that we have one of those cases in which the

petitioner, a minor, c o u l d c l a i m he d i d n o t know what he was

d o i n g ; t h a t he d i d n o t know t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of h i s a c t ; and t h a t h e was n o t g i v e n an o p p o r t u n i t y t o have h i s p a r e n t s , g u a r d i a n s ,

o r a c h o s e n c o u n s e l t o r e p r e s e n t him.

I n view of t h e foregoing, we hold t h a t the p r e s i d i n g Judge, B j e r t n e s s , d i d n o t a b u s e h i s d i s c r e t i o n i n denying p e t i t i o n e r ' s

right t o w i t h d r a w h i s p l e a of g u i l t y and enter a plea of not guilty.

W concur: e

Chief J u s t i c e

, ' Justices