Taylor Rental v. Ted Godwin Leasing

No. 81-503

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

TAYLOR RENTAL CORPORATION,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

VS.

TED GODWIN LEASING, INC., FIRST BANK BILLINGS, Defendants and Respondents.

Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Yellowstone Honorable Robert Wilson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Calton & Hamman, Billinqs, Montana For Respondents: Robert P. Ryan, Billings, Montana Moulton, Bellingham, Longo & Mather, Billings, llontana

Submitted on briefs: L l r h 5, 1982 nac Decided: July 28, 1982

Mr. J u s t i c e D a n i e l J. Shea d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e C o u r t .

T a y l o r R e n t a l C o r p o r a t i o n a p p e a l s an o r d e r o f t h e Yellowstone County D i s t r i c t C o u r t g r a n t i n g summary judgment i n f a v o r o f d e f e n d a n t Ted Godwin L e a s i n g , I n c . Taylor Rental r a i s e s s e v e r a l i s s u e s b u t , i n looking through t h e r e c o r d , w e f i n d t h a t o n l y a p a r t i a l summary judgment was e n t e r e d , and even though t h e c a s e was c e r t i f i e d under Rule 5 4 ( b ) , M.R.Civ.P., t h e c e r t i f i c a t i o n i s wholly i n a d e q u a t e . For t h i s r e a s o n , w e d e c l i n e t o h e a r t h i s a p p e a l , w e w i l l n o t a c c e p t a n o t h e r c e r t i f i c a t i o n , and t h e a p p e a l i s d i s m i s s e d without prejudice.

The t r i a l c o u r t g r a n t e d summary judgment f o r Ted Godwin Leasing, Inc. (Godwin L e a s i n g ) t h e e f f e c t of which was t o g i v e Godwin L e a s i n g t h e r i g h t t o p o s s e s s i o n o r t o t h e p r o c e e d s o f t h e s a l e o f c e r t a i n equipment which i s t h e s u b j e c t of t h i s lawsuit. The t r i a l c o u r t , however, f a i l e d t o r u l e on t h e c o u n t e r c l a i m o f Godwin Leasing. I n t h e counterclaim Godwin a l l e g e d t h a t T a y l o r R e n t a l C o r p o r a t i o n had a g r e e d t o assume t h e d e b t s o f T a y l o r R e n t a l C e n t e r , a f r a n c h i s e e o f T a y l o r R e n t a l C o r p o r a t i o n , and t h a t t h e r e f o r e T a y l o r R e n t a l C o r p o r a t i o n owed an u n s p e c i f i e d amount o f r e n t on t h e equipment.

A f t e r t h e t r i a l c o u r t had g r a n t e d Godwin L e a s i n g ' s motion f o r p a r t i a l summary judgment, t h e a t t o r n e y f o r Taylor R e n t a l C o r p o r a t i o n w r o t e a l e t t e r t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t and a s k e d t h e c o u r t t o c e r t i f y a p a r t i a l summary judgment i n f a v o r of Godwin L e a s i n g as b e i n g " f i n a l and s u b j e c t t o a p p e a l . " The l e t t e r s t a t e d :

". . . i n t h e i n t e r e s t o f j u d i c i a l economy and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f j u s t i c e , w e r e s p e c t f u l l y r e q u e s t t h a t you c e r t i f y your o r d e r of J u l y 7 , 1981 a s b e i n g f i n a l and s u b j e c t t o a p p e a l and t o complete t h e r e c o r d s , w e would a l s o r e q u e s t you e n t e r an o r d e r denying o u r motion f o r summary judgment."

The trial court complied, and, in certifying the cause under Rule 54, merely stated: "That the undersigned [judge] hereby certifies that there is no just reason for delay in the entry of such final judgment in this matter." That is the entire certification order. In Roy v. Neibauer (1980),

- Mont. , - 610 P.2d 1185, 37 St.Rep. 897, because we were concerned with partial summary judgments coming to this Court either uncertified, or improperly certified, we set out in no uncertain terms what must be done to certify a

partial summary judgment or partial judgment for appeal. We need not repeat those requirements here except to state that none of them were followed. See also, Reidy v. Anaconda- Deer Lodge County (1981), - Mont . - 637 P.2d 1196, 38 , St.Rep. 2188, where, in holding that we would strictly adhere to the standards in Neibauer, we dismissed an appeal as improperly certified even though the trial court did attempt to comply with Rule 54 requirements. If parties insist in not complying with the rules and our decisions, we again will be compelled to resort to Rule 32, M.R.App.Civ.P., to impose sanctions for frivolous appeals.

Here, the appeal, because it is premature, is obviously frivolous. If improper certifications appear before this Court again, especially where there is no genuine attempt to comply with the rules, we shall treat them as frivolous appeals and impose sanctions. We dismiss this appeal, without prejudice.

FJe Concur: