Marriage of Burns

No. 82-35

I N THE SUPREME COURT O F THE STATE O F MONTANA

I N RE THE MARRIAGE O F

PEGGY ANN BURNS,

P e t i t i o n e r and A p p e l l a n t ,

-vs-

DEWEY JAMES BURNS,

R e s p o n d e n t and R e s p o n d e n t .

Appeal from: D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e Second J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e C o u n t y of S i l v e r B o w , T h e H o n o r - a b l e A r n o l d O l s e n , Judge p r e s i d i n g .

C o u n s e l of R e c o r d :

For A p p e l l a n t :

Joseph C. E n g e l , 111, B u t t e , M o n t a n a

For R e s p o n d e n t :

S w e e n e y and B e l k e , B u t t e , M o n t a n a

S u b m i t t e d on B r i e f s : A p r i l 15, 1 9 8 2

Decided: June 1 4 , 1 9 8 2

Filed: JUN 14 1982

Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n delivered the Opinion of t h e Court.

T h i s a p p e a l r e s u l t s froin t h e d e n i a l o f a p e t i t i o n by t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Second J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , i n and for the County of Silver Bow, for termination of the p a r e n t a l r i g h t s o f Dewey B u r n s .

Peggy B u r n s and Dewey B u r n s were m a r r i e d on December 3 1 , 1975. Two c h i l d r e n were b o r n a s i s s u e o f t h e i r m a r r i a g e .

A t t h e time of t h e d i v o r c e Peggy was awarded c u s t o d y of t h e c h i l d r e n . Dewey B u r n s was o r d e r e d t o c o n t r i b u t e $300 a month t o t h e m a i n t e n a n c e o f t h e minor c h i l d r e n . He was t o make p a y m e n t s t o t h e C l e r k o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t on t h e 6 t h and 2 1 s t d a y s o f e a c h month b e g i n n i n g April 21, 1978, and continuing until t h e youngest c h i l d reached t h e age of h i s majority. A d d i t i o n a l l y , Dewey B u r n s was t o m a i n t a i n h e a l t h i n s u r a n c e c o v e r a g e f o r t h e c h i l d r e n and t o c o n t r i b u t e $100 a month f o r t h e s u p p o r t and m a i n t e n a n c e o f Peggy B u r n s b e g i n -n i n g on A p r i l 2 1 , 1978.

From t h e o u t s e t , Dewey B u r n s f a i l e d t o make t h e r e -quired contributions. The r e c o r d s o f t h e C l e r k o f t h e D i s -t r i c t C o u r t i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e l a s t d a t e on which Dewey B u r n s made a c o n t r i b u t i o n , p r i o r t o t h e p e t i t i o n t o t e r m i n a t e h i s p a r e n t a l r i g h t s , was December 6, 1978.

On November 26, 1980, Peggy Burns petitioned the District Court to terminate the parental rights of Dewey Burns to the parties' two children under section 40-8-

111(1) a ) ( v ) , MCA, ( which p r o v i d e s :

" ( 1 ) An a d o p t i o n o f a c h i l d may be d e c r e e d when t h e r e h a v e been f i l e d w r i t t e n c o n s e n t s t o a d o p t i o n e x e c u t e d by:

" ( a ) both p a r e n t s , i f l i v i n g , o r t h e surviv- ing p a r e n t of a c h i l d p r o v i d e d t h a t c o n s e n t i s n o t r e q u i r e d from a f a t h e r o r m o t h e r :

" ( v ) i f i t is proven t o t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n of t h e c o u r t t h a t t h e f a t h e r o r mother, i f a b l e , h a s n o t c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e s u p p o r t of t h e c h i l d d u r i n g a p e r i o d of 1 y e a r b e f o r e t h e f i l i n g of a p e t i t i o n f o r a d o p t i o n ; " (Empha- sis s u p p l i e d . )

The petition to terminate was filed prior to the filing of a petition for adoption. See, Commissioners' N o t e s , c o n t a i n e d i n A n n o t a t i o n s t o s e c t i o n 40-8-111, MCA.

After the petition was filed, Dewey B u r n s made two lump s u n p a y m e n t s : one of $2,580 on December 23, 1980, coincidental with the first hearing on the petition to terminate h i s parental rights; and t h e s e c o n d o f $ 3 , 2 5 0 on May 6, 1981, again coincidental with the May 8, 1981, h e a r i n g c a l l e d by t h e c o u r t on t h e p e t i t i o n t o t e r m i n a t e h i s parental rights.

The appellant, Peggy, argues that these af ter-the-fact payments should not affect determination of the petition since the wording of the statute speaks about nonsupport prior to the petition to terminate. Tlrl e a p p e l l a n t a l s o a r g u e s s h e was t r e a t i n g $ 2 , 4 0 0 of t h i s money a s payment o f p a s t - d u e s p o u s e m a i n t e n a n c e , which was d e l i n -quent i n t h a t amount. It is important to note here that Dewey B u r n s i s s t i l l s e v e r a l t h o u s a n d d o l l a r s i n a r r e a r s o f h i s child support obligations.

At the first hearing, held December 19-22, 1980, Dewey B u r n s a r g u e d t h a t d e s p i t e t h e f a c t h e had n o t made h i s payments t o t h e c l e r k of c o u r t ' s o f f i c e , a s o r d e r e d by t h e decree, he had paid $925 in cash, plus $400 through his m o t h e r , p l u s $ 1 , 4 0 0 t o t h e S t a t e o f Utah t h e y e a r p r e c e d i n g the petition. Peggy was on w e l f a r e i n Utah and a s s i g n e d h e r claim to the State of Utah for support given these two c h i l d r e n by t h e w e l f a r e d e p a r t m e n t i n Utah. Peggy B u r n s ' s t e s t i m o n y i n d i c a t e d s h e r e c e i v e d o n l y $670 from Dewey B u r n s and t h a t Dewey had no e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t h i s c l a i m s . At best, by his own testimony, he contributed $2,725 from December 1 9 7 8 u n t i l December 1980.

The c o u r t found that according t o t h e c l e r k of the court's records the last child support payment by Dewey Burns b e f o r e t h e p e t i t i o n to terminate h i s parental rights was filed on December 6, 1978, and the next payment was filed on December 22, 1980. The court noted that Dewey B u r n s had made no c h i l d s u p p o r t payments t h r o u g h t h e c l e r k of c o u r t ' s o f f i c e f o r t w e n t y - f o u r months. In addition, the c o u r t f o u n d t h a t Dewey B u r n s f a i l e d t o make s u p p o r t p a y m e n t s a s o r d e r e d by t h e c o u r t a l t h o u g h f i n a n c i a l l y a b l e t o do s o and that he had maintained contact with the children and knew where t h e y w e r e . The c o u r t t h e n , i n a f i n d i n g o f f a c t , f o u n d t h a t Dewey B u r n s had paid a t o t a l of $4,750 i n back payments on a d v i c e o f c o u n s e l a f t e r t h e f i l i n g o f t h e p e t i -t i o n t o terminate h i s parental rights.

Peggy B u r n s t a k e s e x c e p t i o n t o s e v e r a l o f the t r i a l court's conclusions of law a s being contradictory to its f i n d i n g s of fact. The c o u r t c o n c l u d e d : t h a t the s t a t u t e is t o be i n t e r p r e t e d most s t r i c t l y i n f a v o r o f preserving the natural parent's rights; that i n viewing the evidence in that light, the evidence indicates that Dewey Burns, although financially able to do so, did not support his c h i l d r e n f o r one y e a r p r i o r t o t h e p e t i t i o n t o t e r m i n a t e h i s parental rights; and that Dewey B u r n s ' s neglect i n making court-ordered c h i l d s u p p o r t payments f o r a p e r i o d o f t w e n t y -four months justified Peggy's seeking to terminate his p a r e n t a l r i g h t s and r e p l a c e him a s t h e b o y s ' father with her second husband who would have provided a more stable and proper influence. The c o u r t , h o w e v e r , d e c l i n e d t o t e r m i n a t e t h e p a r e n t a l r i g h t s o f Dewey B u r n s , The c o u r t a l s o c o n c l u d e d t h a t because Peggy was j u s t i f i e d i n b r i n g i n g an a c t i o n t o terminate Dewey's parental rights for nonsupport of the children, s h e is e n t i t l e d t o c o s t s and r e a s o n a b l e a t t o r n e y f e e s even though t h e c o u r t m u s t hold t h a t t h e p e t i t i o n t o t e r m i n a t e i s n o t w e l l t a k e n and t h e r e b y d i s m i s s e d .

Two i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d on a p p e a l :

1. Did the District Court err in declining to terminate the parental r i g h t s of Dewey B u r n s a f t e r i t had established that he failed to make court-ordered child s u p p o r t payments f o r a p e r i o d o f t w e n t y - f o u r months p r i o r t o the petition to terminate h i s parental rights?

2. May after-the-fact payments be treated by the r e c i p i e n t a s payments o f o t h e r o u t s t a n d i n g o b l i g a t i o n s ?

W find the f i r s t issue determinative in t h i s matter. e

Two r e c e n t c a s e s o f t h i s Court, Matter of Adoption of SLR

(1982) 1 Mont . , 640 P.2d 886, 39 St.Rep. 1 5 6 , and M a t t e r o f A d o p t i o n o f S m i g a j ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 1 7 1 Mont. 5 3 7 , 560 P.2d

141, a r e c o n t r o l l i n g ,

Mr. J u s t i c e D a l y , t h e a u t h o r o f t h e m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n

i n - q u o t e d S m i g a j i n p a r t and s t a t e d : SLR,

"', , we h a v e no d i f f i c u l t y c o n s t r u i n g t h e p l a i n meaning o f t h e w o r d s i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e consent s t a t u t e s a s r e f e r r i n g t o the f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t t h a t a paren-t owes a child.' [Citation omitted,] Here, t h e f a t h e r was under a d u t y , p u r s u a n t t o t h e d i s s o l u t i o n decree, t o provide c h i l d support payments o f $100 p e r month. I t is u n d i s p u t e d t h a t t h e f a t h e r f a i l e d t o pay a n y c h i l d support over a year before t h e p e t i t i o n f o r a d o p t i o n was f i l e d . The p l a i n m e a n i n g approach of Smigaj r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e f a t h e r

contribute f i n a n c i a l support t o the child. The f a i l u r e t o p r o v i d e f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t c a n n o t be c u r e d by g i v i n g t h e c h i l d s e v e r a l a r t i c l e s of c l o t h i n g .

" S i m i l a r l y , t h e noncustodial parent cannot s a t i s f y h i s obligation t o provide f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t by i n c u r r i n g o r p a y i n g d e b t s which are unrelated to the child. It . . SLR, 64PI P.2d a t 887-888.

'The f a i l u r e t o p r o v i d e f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t c a n n o t be c u r e d by g i v i n g t h e c h i l d s e v e r a l a r t i c l e s of c l o t h i n g .

J u s t i c e D a l y n o t e d a l s o i n M a t t e r o f A d o p t i o n o f SLH, supra, that the noncustodial parent cannot satisfy his obligation to provide financial support by incurring or paying debts unrelated to the child. The e x p r e s s t e r m s o f the statute, as Justice Daly noted, referred to "support t h a t a p a r e n t owes a c h i l d . ' ' See a l s o , Smigaj, s u p r a .

Further, i n - t h i s C o u r t n o t e d t h a t t h e f a t h e r had SLR,

no v a l i d reason for f a i l i n g t o make even o n e c h i l d s u p p o r t payment d u r i n g t h e e n t i r e y e a r preceding the filing of the petition. He suffered no physical or mental impairment during that time, and h e p o s s e s s e d s k i l l s t h a t would have made him employable (carpentry, labor, operator of heavy equipment) . The f a t h e r v o l u n t a r i l y c h o s e a l i f e s t y l e i n c o n -s i s t e n t with parental support obligations. That he had a r i g h t t o choose such a l i f e s t y l e is conceded. T h a t h e had a legal right to prevent t h e a d o p t i o n of his child, however, is n o t c o n s i s t e n t with t h e v o l u n t a r y f a i l u r e t o c o n t r i b u t e to the child's support. In the words of the California court: "A s t a t u t e s h o u l d n o t be interpreted in f a v o r of a father who s e e k s t h e b e n e f i t of parental rights but shuns the burden of parental obligations." In Re Burton's Adoption ( 1 9 5 6 ) , 1 4 7 Cal.App.2d 1 2 5 , 305 P.2d 185, 191.

For these reasons, the c o n c l u s i o n s of the District Court as to the issues of father's contribution to the s u p p o r t o f t h e c h i l d r e n and h i s a b i l i t y t o s o c o n t r i b u t e a r e vacated. The rights of the father to the children are

terminated. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s r e v e r s e d and o r d e r e d t o cornply w i t h t h i s o p i n i o n .

W e concur:

Justices