Marriage of Hill

No. 81-275 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1982

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF: ZELDA SANGRAY HILL, Petitioner and Appellant, and ROBERT A. HILL, Respondent and Respondent.

Appeal from: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, In and for the County of Cascade Honorable H. William Coder, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Christensen and McLean, Stanford, Montana Jack M. McLean argued, Stanford, Montana For Respondent: Graybill, Ostrem, Warner and Crotty, Great Falls, Montana Leo Graybill, Jr. argued, Great Falls, Montana

Submitted: January 12, 1982 Decided : M4 j . 5 a I '2

Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n delivered the Opinion of the Court.

This is an appeal frorn a judgment of the District Court, Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , S t a t e of Montana, Cascade County, a r i s i n g o u t of a d i s s o l u t i o n of marriage. Appellant wife was g r a n t e d a d i s s o l u t i o n of m a r r i a g e on O c t o b e r 21, 1976, with t h e q u e s t i o n o f d i s p o s i t i o n of p r o p e r t y reserved. On December 17, 1980, a hearing on the disposition of property was h e l d in the District Court, The trial judge e n t e r e d judgment d i s p o s i n g of the marital assets, and from t h a t judgment w i f e a p p e a l s .

The i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d on a p p e a l a r e :

1. Was t h e r e sufficient evidence for the District Court to find that respondent husband owned one-half i n t e r e s t a s a t e n a n t i n common i n t h e " G a l l o d a y P l a c e " ?

2. Was there s u f f i c i e n t evidence for the District Court to find that the property known as the "Richardson P l a c e " had a f a i r m a r k e t v a l u e o f $160,000 a s of t h e d a t e o f t h e d i s s o l u t i o n of marriage?

3. Was t h e r e sufficient evidence for the District Court to find that the property known a s t h e "Home P l a c e " had a fair market value of $260,00I?I as of the date of d i s s o l u t i o n of m a r r i a g e ?

4. Was t h e r e sufficient evidence for the District Court to conclude that the remainder interest which

respondent received from h i s father's e s t a t e was a vested remainder s u b j e c t t o divestment?

5. Should a v e s t e d r e m a i n d e r i n t e r e s t be i n c l u d e d i n t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e f o r p u r p o s e s of p r o p e r t y d i s t r i b u t i o n ?

6, Was t h e r e sufficient evidence for the District Court t o c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y known a s t h e "Woodbury P l d c e " s h o u l d n o t be i n c l u d e d i n t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e ?

7. Did the District Court err i n deducting child support from the appellant's share of the marital assets when r e s p o n d e n t f a i l e d t o p e t i t i o n f o r c h i l d s u p p o r t ?

Respondent and appellant were married in Geyser, Montana, on June 14, 1959. Three children were born as i s s u e of t h e m a r r i a g e , b u t t h e i r c u s t o d y is n o t i n d i s p u t e . The d i s s o l u t i o n o f t h e p a r t i e s ' m a r r i a g e was g r a n t e d O c t o b e r 21, 1976, w i t h t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of p r o p e r t y r e s e r v e d .

Respondent is a farrner and c a t t l e rancher. During most o f t h e p a r t i e s ' seventeen-year marriage, t h e y l i v e d on a ranch near Raynesford, Montana, which r e s p o n d e n t f a r m s i n conjunction with his mother, Anna Hill, and his brother LeRoy H i l l . The r a n c h h a s a l w a y s been a f a m i l y o p e r a t i o n .

Respondent i n h e r i t e d a one-fourth remainder interest i n one-half of his parents' ranch pursuant to a decree of d i s t r i b u t i o n e n t e r e d on O c t o b e r 1 6 , 1 9 5 8 , a b o u t e i g h t m o n t h s prior to the parties' marriage. This property existed in two separate parcels known as the Home Place and the Richardson Place, Respondent's b r o t h e r r e s i d e d on t h e Home Place which contains about 2,956 acres. Respondent and appellant resided on the Richardson Place which contains 1,199 acres. Respondent and h i s brother each worked the p a r c e l o f l a n d on which h e r e s i d e d ,

On July 25, 1963, respondent and his brother purchased, a s t e n a n t s i n common, a b o u t 795 a c r e s o f l a n d known a s t h e Galloday Place. The l a n d was f i n a n c e d by a m o r t g a g e on a l l o f t h e l a n d owned by t h e H i l l s , i n c l u d i n g Anna and LeRoy H i l l .

At the t i m e of the dissolution respondent operated t h e G a l l o d a y P l a c e a s h i s own p r o p e r t y . Appellant t e s t i f i e d that while LeRoy, the husband's brother, had a one-half i n t e r e s t i n t h e G a l l o d a y P l a c e , i t was i n o r d e r t h a t o n e d a y the husband would have t h e Richardson and G a l l o d a y P l a c e s and h i s b r o t h e r would h a v e t h e Home P l a c e . Appellant a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t r e s p o n d e n t ' s b r o t h e r d i d n o t have a n y t h i n g t o d o w i t h t h e G a l l o d a y P l a c e b u t was h e l p i n g pay f o r i t s o h e c o u l d g e t t h e Home P l a c e .

In addition, i n 1972 t h e property was m o r t g a g e d to buy more l a n d . A t t h a t time respondent's two s i s t e r s s i g n e d a q u i t c l a i m deed to their i n t e r e s t s over to their mother. Respondent testified t h i s was d o n e a s a c o n v e n i e n c e t o t h e Federal Land Bank t o o b t a i n t h e l o a n and t h a t the sisters still have their equitable i n t e r e s t s coming to them. The m o r t g a g e o f a l l t h e H i l l l a n d s was i n c r e a s e d a g a i n when t h e b r o t h e r purchased o t h e r l a n d s .

T h i s c a s e was some f o u r y e a r s i n coming t o t r i a l . It was n o t u n t i l t h e p r e s e n t t r i a l j u d g e i n s i s t e d and s e t t i m e periods to ready the case for trial that it finally was tried. One of t h e p r o b l e m s a t t r i a l a r o s e from a n o r d e r o f t h e c o u r t , i s s u e d November 1 4 , 1 9 8 0 , s h o r t e n i n g t h e t i m e f o r response t o a p p e l l a n t ' s i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s concerning t h e r e a l property in which the husband claimed an interest and a r e q u e s t f o r a l i s t o f e x h i b i t s and p e r m i s s i o n t o e n t e r upon tile p r o p e r t y f o r inspection purposes. T h i s o r d e r was n o t timely complied with, causing appellant problems at the trial. At trial, r e s p o n d e n t i n t r o d u c e d h i s 1976 income t a x r e t u r n i n t o e v i d e n c e , and a p p e l l a n t a l l e g e s s h e d i d n o t h a v e time t o inspect it. Appellant a l s o a l l e g e s t h a t because of the lateness of its submission, she could not properly cross-examine r e s p o n d e n t on t h e c o n t e n t s o f t h e r e t u r n .

Subsequently, a p p e l l a n t requested t h e D i s t r i c t Court to take judicial notice of respondent's claimed one-half interest in 2,270 a c r e s of land a c q u i r e d i n 1972 known a s t h e Woodbury P l a c e . However, no f i n d i n g s o f f a c t o r c o n c l u -s i o n s o f l a w were made r e g a r d i n g t h i s p r o p e r t y .

Respondent d i d n o t p e t i t i o n f o r c h i l d support. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t , however, i s s u e d f i n d i n g s o f f a c t and c o n c l u -s i o n s of l a w on t h e m a t t e r . The judgment e n t e r e d on March 31, 1981, deducted $7,126 for child s u p p o r t payments from a p p e l l a n t ' s p r o p e r t y award.

The District Court found appellant's share of the i n a r i t a l e s t a t e t o be $30,432.51, l e s s $7,126 f o r c h i l d supp o r t and $ 1 , 1 2 5 f o r a p p r a i s a l .

The first issue is whether there was sufficient evidence for the District Court to find that t h e husband owned a o n e - h a l f e q u i t a b l e i n t e r e s t i n t h e p r o p e r t y known a s the Galloday Place. The G a l l o d a y Place was purchased in 1 9 6 3 and r e c o r d e d i n t h e names o f r e s p o n d e n t and h i s b r o t h e r a s t e n a n t s i n common. A s previously noted, testimony indic a t e d t h a t t h e r e c o r d owners of t h e H i l l p r o p e r t i e s a r e n o t always t h e e q u i t a b l e owners. The r e s p o n d e n t ' s s i s t e r s q u i t -claimed their remainder interest in certain properties to t h e i r mother to assist i n g e t t i n g a l o a n from t h e F e d e r a l Land Bank. While t h e r e s p o n d e n t i s t h e l e g a l o n e - h a l f owner

of the property as a tenant in common, according to the appellant, he considered himself the owner of the entire

property.

The G a l l o d a y P l a c e c o n s i s t s o f 795 a c r e s . The B l a c k Place, which was p a r t of t h e o r i g i n a l Galloday Place, cons i s t e d of f i v e a c r e s . The r e s p o n d e n t a r g u e s t h a t w h i l e t h e G a l l o d a y P l a c e was b o u g h t by him and h i s b r o t h e r t o be h e l d i n common o w n e r s h i p he does farm the property and has at times listed it in his financial statement. However, as previously noted, i n t h i s family ranch, o p e r a t i n g much l i k e a partnership, it was n o t uncommon when b o r r o w i n g from a bank t o i n c l u d e a l l t h e H i l l f a m i l y l a n d which was t o s t a n d good f o r t h e l o a n . A l l t h e H i l l l a n d s were farmed t o g e t h e r , and e a c h p l a c e made a c o n t r i b u t i o n whenever p o s s i b l e t o t h e payment on the Federal Land Bank mortgage. Therefore, respondent argues, the t r i a l c o u r t had reasonable evidence b e f o r e i t on which i t c o u l d draw i t s c o n c l u s i o n ,

The rule in Montana for our review of a property division of marital cases is whether the District Court acted arbitrarily, without employment of conscientious judgment or exceeded the bounds of reason i n view of the circumstances. Kuntz v . Kuntz ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 1 8 1 Mont. 237, 593 P.2d 4 1 , 36 St.Rep. 662.

On r e v i e w , the court's f i n d i n g s do n o t a p p e a r t o be arbitrary or beyond reason concerning this issue. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s a p p e a r t o be s u p p o r t e d by s u b s t a n -tial credible evidence, and the f i n d i n g s of the District Court concerning t h e Galloday Place a r e s u s t a i n e d ,

I s s u e s two and three, concerning t h e s u f f i c i e n c y of the evidence t o support the District Court's f i n d i n g s on

t h e v a l u e of the properties known a s t h e Richardson Place and t h e Home P l a c e , w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d t o g e t h e r .

The District Court found that the Richardson Place had a f a i r m a r k e t v a l u e o f $160,000 a t t h e t i m e o f t h e d i s -s o l u t i o n and t h a t t h e Home P l a c e had a f a i r m a r k e t v a l u e o f $260,000 a t that time. However, the court failed to set forth in its findings of fact how the net worth of the p a r t i e s was d e t e r m i n e d , a s r e q u i r e d by N u n n a l l y v . Nunnally

(1981) , Mont . , 625 P.2d 1 1 5 9 , 38 St.Rep. 529. The c o u r t found t h e f a i r m a r k e t v a l u e o f t h e R i c h a r d -

s o n P l a c e was $160,000. T h i s v a l u e was b a s e d e n t i r e l y upon t h e r e s p o n d e n t ' s testimony of per a c r e v a l u a t i o n . Respondent t e s t i f i e d a s t o t h e p e r a c r e v a l u e o f h a y and g r a z i n g l a n d . However, no t e s t i m o n y was p r e s e n t e d a s t o how many a c r e s o f c r o p , hay o r g r a z i n g l a n d t h e r e w e r e on t h e R i c h a r d s o n P l a c e or on the Home P l a c e . The only explanation that we can arrive at for the District Court's valuation is that it adopted t h e r e s p o n d e n t ' s proposed f i n d i n g s of f a c t on t h e s e matters verbatim.

A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t i n t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of p r o p e r t y Hamilton v. Hamilton (1980), Mont. , 607 P.2d 102, 37 S t . R e p . 247, is c o n t r o l l i n g . I n Hamilton, Arabian h o r s e s were a p p r a i s e d in the property d i s t r i b u t i o n without a findi n g a s t o t h e t o t a l number o f h o r s e s i n t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e . This Court held t h a t t h e t o t a l number o f h o r s e s was n e c e s -s a r y t o p l a c e a v a l u e on them. The s i t u a t i o n is s i m i l a r h e r e f o r it appears t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court ignored t h e testimony of a competent cour t-appointed appraiser, who valued the property some $68,000 higher than t h e v a l u e g i v e n by the respondent.

Viewing t h e t o t a l r e c o r d , we c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e t r i a l court erred in its v a l u a t i o n of both t h e Richardson Place and t h e Home P l a c e . The c o u r t f a i l e d t o c o n s i d e r t h e number of a c r e s of e a c h t y p e of l a n d which was used i n t h e v a l u a -tion. W h i l e r e s p o n d e n t ' s E x h i b i t B r e f e r s t o 1 , 2 0 0 a c r e s on t h e Richardson Place, t h e r e i s no r e f e r e n c e t o t h e a c r e a g e breakdown s o we are unable t o determine what p a r t of the l a n d was c r o p l a n d , h a y l a n d , o r g r a z i n g l a n d . As a result, we c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e v a l u a t i o n s o f t h e R i c h a r d s o n P l a c e and t h e Home P l a c e a r e n o t s u p p o r t e d by t h e e v i d e n c e .

Respondent a r g u e s t h a t h i s remainder i n t e r e s t i n both the Richardson Place and the Home Place should not be included as a part of the marital estate and that their valuations are therefore not relevant. T h i s c o n t e n t i o n is b a s e d on r e s p o n d e n t ' s claim t h a t h i s remainder interest in the Home Place and the Richardson Place is subject to divestment in the event that he dies before h i s mother, R e s p o n d e n t b a s e s t h i s c o n t e n t i o n on t h e wording o f the w i l l of his father, J. Elmer Hill. That c o n t e n t i o n d i s r e g a r d s t h e d e c r e e of d i s t r i b u t i o n i n t h e e s t a t e of J. Elmer I i i l l , d a t e d O c t o b e r 1 6 , 1 9 5 8 , which i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t p r o v i d e d :

" I T I S HERE A D J U D G E D AND D E C R E E D , t h a t ... t h e r e s i d u e o f s a i d E s t a t e o f J. Elmer H i l l , ... hereinafter p a r t i c u l a r l y described. .. be and t h e same i s h e r e b y d i s t r i b u t e d a s follows, to-wit:

"Real e s t a t e : To Anna Mae H i l l , f o r and during her l i f e t i m e , with f u l l c o n t r o l , use, p o s s e s s i o n , p r o c e e d s , and income t h e r e f r o m , and w i t h o u t liability for any injury, d e s t r u c t i o n , damage, l o s s o r w a s t e t h e r e t o , w i t h remainder s h a r e and s h a r e a l i k e t o R o b e r t A. H i l l [ r e s p o n d e n t ] .. .[description o f R i c h a r d s o n P l a c e and Home P l a c e ] ." The c o n t e n t i o n s o f t h e r e s p o n d e n t i g n o r e t h e s e t t l e d

law in this state. Even prior to the enactment of the Uniform P r o b a t e Code, a d e c r e e o f d i s t r i b u t i o n i s c o n c l u s i v e upon t h e r i g h t s o f d e v i s e e s u n d e r a w i l l . As stated in In r e B e l l ' s Estate ( 1 9 5 8 ) , 1 3 4 lvlont. 345, 350, 331 P.2d 517,

"A d e c r e e of d i s t r i b u t i o n i s c o n c l u s i v e upon

t h e r i g h t s of h e i r s , l e g a t e e s o r d e v i s e e s , s u b j e c t o n l y t o be r e v e r s e d , s e t a s i d e o r m o d i f i e d on a p p e a l . R.C.M. 1 9 4 7 , s e c t i o n 91- 3902; I n Re E s t a t e o f Murphy, s u p r a [other cases cited]. A decree of d i s t r i b u t i o n h a s t h e same f o r c e and e f f e c t a s d o e s a f i n a l judgment."

The r e s p o n d e n t ' s r e m a i n d e r i n t e r e s t i s c o r r e c t l y des c r i b e d i n t h e d e c r e e o f d i s t r i b u t i o n and c a n n o t be c h a n g e d by a c o l l a t e r a l a t t a c k i n which t h e r e s p o n d e n t s u g g e s t s t h a t the w i l l required a d i f f e r e n t t y p e of d e c r e e of distribu-

tion. W therefore conclude t h a t the D i s t r i c t Court's find- e

i n g t h a t r e s p o n d e n t ' s r e m a i n d e r i n t e r e s t was a v e s t e d i n t e r -e s t s u b j e c t t o d i v e s t m e n t i s n o t s u p p o r t e d by t h e e v i d e n c e .

The n e x t i s s u e is w h e t h e r t h e v e s t e d r e m a i n d e r i n t e r -e s t of r e s p o n d e n t s h o u l d be included in the marital estate f o r p u r p o s e s of property distribution. At t h e t i m e of the m a r r i a g e d i s s o l u t i o n on O c t o b e r 2 1 , 1 9 7 6 , t h e r e s p o n d e n t had a remainder interest with a present value, a property i n t e r e s t which w i l l r i p e n i n t o a f u l l o n e - f o u r t h interest in a l l of t h e l a n d upon t h e d e a t h o f h i s m o t h e r .

At least three jurisdictions, Kansas, Wisconsin and Kentucky, have h e l d t h a t a s p o u s e ' s v e s t e d remainder i n t e r -e s t i n r e a l p r o p e r t y should be c o n s i d e r e d i n t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of a marital estate. A s i m i l a r p r o b l e m was c o n s i d e r e d i n t h e c a s e o f McCain v . McCain ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 219 Kan. 780, 549 P.2d 896. T h e r e , t h e c o u r t n o t e d t h a t t h e h u s b a n d owned s p e c i f i c u n d i v i d e d f u t u r e i n t e r e s t s i n two q u a r t e r s e c t i o n s o f land.

Neither of these would ripen into a possessory interest until t h e termination of t h e e s t a t e of t h e l i f e t e n a n t of

each tract. Nonetheless, his interests were vested rem a i n d e r s which c o u l d be s o l d . They had p r e s e n t v a l u e . The court, speaking of a remainder interest subject to life e s t a t e , s a i d t h a t i t h e l d i n Woolums v . Simonsen ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 214 Kan. 722, 522 P.2d 1321:

". . . t h e a p p e l l a n t and h e r c h i l d r e n h a v e a remainder i n t e r e s t i n r e a l p r o p e r t y s u b j e c t t o a l i f e e s t a t e i n t h e mother of t h e a p p e l - lant, Considering t h e age of t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s mother, t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t and h e r c h i l d r e n w i l l s u r v i v e h e r m o t h e r . .. i s a good p r o s p e c t , B e c a u s e o f t h i s prob- a b i l i t y the appellant has a saleable property r i g h t of c o n s i d e r a b l e p r e s e n t v a l u e ... "Under t h e law o f t h i s s t a t e , t h e g e n e r a l r u l e i s t h a t a n y i n t e r e s t a p e r s o n may h a v e in property, vested or contingent, legal o r equitable , under e x e c u t i o n . . , may b e l e v i e d upon and s o l d [Citing cases.] Another c a s e h o l d i n g t h a t t h e i n t e r e s t o f a remain- derman , . . is s a l e a b l e is Markham v . Waterman, 1 0 5 Kan. 9 3 , 1 8 1 P. 621." McCain, 549 P.2d a t 900.

See also: Jordan v. Jordan (1969), 44 Wisc.2d 471, 171 N.W.2d 385; Rompf v . Rompf (Ky. 1 9 6 8 ) , 433 S.W.2d 879.

I n a d d i t i o n , s e v e r a l o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s have reached t h e same c o n c l u s i o n s when c o n s i d e r i n g o t h e r f u t u r e i n t e r e s t s of marital estates, See, Trowbridge v. Trowbridge (1962) , 1 6 Wisc.2d 176, 1 1 4 N.W.2d 129; Maxwell v . Maxwell (1921), 106 Neb. 689, 1 8 4 N.W. 227; Hughes v . Hughes (1975) , 132

Montana s t a t u t e r e q u i r e s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , in disp o s i n y of property f o l l o w i n g a d i s s o l u t i o n of m a r r i a g e , to " f i n a l l y , e q u i t a b l y a p p o r t i o n b e t w e e n t h e p a r t i e s t h e property and assets belonging to either or both, however and whenever acquired and w h e t h e r the title thereto is i n the name of the husband or wife or both." S e c t i o n 40-4-202,

MCA.

While the right to possession of a vested future i n t e r e s t is p o s t p o n e d , i t is s t i l l a p r o p e r t y i n t e r e s t t h a t c a n be d i s t r i b u t e d . S e e s e c t i o n s 70-1-315 and 70-1-317, MCA.

W agree with the court e i n McCain, supra, where it

found that since such vested interest could be sold or t o t h e r w i s e a l i e n a t e d , t r a n s f e r r e d o r mortgaged, t h e p r o p e r t y

had a p r e s e n t v a l u e and s h o u l d be i n c l u d e d . Respondent attempts to distinguish McCain because

K a n s a s h a s n o t a d o p t e d t h e Uniform M a r r i a g e and D i v o r c e A c t . However, the Kansas statute on the division of marital

p r o p e r t y is s i m i l a r t o t h a t o f Montana: "The d e c r e e s h a l l d i v i d e t h e r e a l and p e r - s o n a l p r o p e r t y o f t h e p a r t i e s , w h e t h e r owned by e i t h e r s p o u s e p r i o r t o m a r r i a g e , a c q u i r e d by e i t h e r s p o u s e i n t h e s p o u s e ' s own r i g h t a f t e r m a r r i a g e , o r a c q u i r e d by t h e i r j o i n t e f f o r t s , i n a j u s t and r e a s o n a b l e manner ... I' S e c t i o n 60-1610 ( d ) , K a n s a s S t a t u t e s Annotated. We find that the District Court erred in not

including respondent's vested remainder interest in the m a r i t a l e s t a t e f o r t h e purpose of d i s t r i b u t i o n .

The n e x t i s s u e i s w h e t h e r t h e r e was s u f f i c i e n t e v i - dence f o r t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o conclude t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y known a s t h e Woodbury P l a c e s h o u l d n o t be i n c l u d e d i n t h e marital estate. W have p r e v i o u s l y n o t e d i n s e t t i n g f o r t h t h e f a c t s e

in t h i s case that one of the problems that arose during t r i a l was r e s p o n d e n t ' s f a i l u r e t o co~nply w i t h the c o u r t ' s

o r d e r t o a l l o w s h o r t e r time t o respond t o i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s . This included respondent's 1976 f e d e r a l income t a x return

about which the appellant complained she did not have s u f f i c i e n t time t o p r o p e r l y cross-examine or analyze. This

r e t u r n c o n t a i n e d i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e Woodbury P l a c e . In view of the fact that t h i s case nust be returned to the District Court for reconsideration of the a s s e t s of the m a r i t a l e s t a t e , we d i r e c t t h a t on r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n a p p e l l a n t

b e a l l o w e d t o p u r s u e examination a s t o t h e Woodbury P l a c e . We also note that t h i s C o u r t d o e s n o t condone r e s p o n d e n t ' s f a i l u r e t o comply w i t h t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t o r d e r o r a n y o t h e r f r u s t r a t i o n of discovery. Owen v . F. A, Buttrey & Charles Revson ( 1 9 8 1 ) , - Mont, -, 627 P.2d 1 2 3 3 , 38 S t . R e p . 714.

The f i n a l i s s u e is w h e t h e r t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n d e d u c t -ing child support from appellant's share of the marital a s s e t s when r e s p o n d e n t f a i l e d t o p e t i t i o n f o r s u c h s u p p o r t , A p p e l l a n t l e f t t h e f a m i l y home i n J a n u a r y 1 9 7 3 and went t o G r e a t F a l l s where s h e a t t e n d e d a Vo-Tech school for eleven months. The r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t respondent paid f o r her t u i t i o n and e x p e n s e s and t h a t t h e c h i l d r e n r e m a i n e d on t h e r a n c h w i t h him d u r i n g t h i s period. Appellant returned to the family home on December 21, 1973, but left the ranch again and did not return until several months before the dissolution. During that time the children remained with respondent a t t h e ranch.

The decree of dissolution, dated October 21, 1976, provides, among other things, that "custody, support and v i s i t a t i o n of t h e minor c h i l d r e n was r e s e r v e d , " Appellant i n h e r c o m p l a i n t a s k e d t h a t t h e p a r t i e s be g r a n t e d " m u t u a l " c u s t o d y , and r e s p o n d e n t a l l e g e s t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n o f n e c e s -s a r y c h i l d s u p p o r t and c u s t o d y o f t h e c h i l d r e n was t h e r e b y placed in issue. The D i s t r i c t Court concluded that, "the reasonable cost of support of the minor children of the parties from October 21, 1976, through their respective majorities, is $14,252. One-half of t h i s sum, o r '$7,126' is t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of [appellant] to t h e support of the m i n o r c h i l d r e n from h e r s h a r e o f t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e . "

The c o u r t h e a r d no e v i d e n c e on t h e c h i l d r e n ' s f i n a n -

c i a 1 r e s o u r c e s o r s t a n d a r d of l i v i n g b e f o r e t h e d i s s o l u t i o n or on the financial resources of the appellant. These f a c t o r s must be considered in determining child support under s e c t i o n 40-4-204, MCA. W find, e therefore, that the D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n was n o t s u p p o r t e d by e v i d e n c e and

c o n s t i t u t e s an a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n . When t h e m a t t e r comes b e f o r e t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t on remand, t h e s e m a t t e r s may b e

c o n s i d e r e d w i t h p r o p e r t e s t i m o n y by b o t h p a r t i e s t o a r r i v e a t an e q u i t a b l e s o l u t i o n . The cause is remanded to the District Court with

d i r e c t i o n s t o comply w i t h t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s o p i n i o n .

W conc e