Marriage of Martin

No. 85-163 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1985

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF PEARL E. MARTIN, Petitioner and Respondent, and ROBERT M. MARTIN, Respondent and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, In and for the County of Cascade, The Honorable John M. McCarvel, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant: Baiz & Olson; Thomas A. Baiz, Great Falls, Montana

For Respondent: Alexander & Baucus; Nancy P. Cory, Great Falls, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: July 25, 1985 Decided : September 10, 1985

Filed: SEP 1 0 1 8

M r . J u s t i c e F r a n k B. Morrison, Jr. d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e Court.

The marital estate of R o b e r t. ! ? i Martin and Pearl E. M a r t i n was d i s t r i b u t e d i n t h e E i g h t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t C o u r t by decree dated January 31, 1985. Robert Martin a p p e a l s , alleging that the property division is inequitable and results in substantial i n j u s t i c e t o him. F7e d i s a g r e e and a f f i r m t h e decree of t h e District Court.

R o b e r t and P e a r l w e r e m a r r i e d on A u g u s t 1-2, 1972. She i s p r e s e n t l y 53 y e a r s o f a g e . H e i s 60 y e a r s o f a g e . Though both parties had children by prior marriages, no chi-Idren w e r e b o r n of t h e i r m a r r i a g e .

P e a r l i s a 1-egal s e c r e t a r y . H e r g r o s s income i s $ 1 4 , 8 0 0 a y e a r , w i t h t a k e home p a y o f $844 p e r month. H e r expenses t o t a l $ 1 , 4 3 0 p e r month. R o b e r t owns and o p e r a t e s G r e a t F a l l s Cleaning Service. His n e t m o n t h l y income i s a p p r o x i m a t e l y $1200, excluding t a x consequences from t h e d e p r e c i a t i o n of h i s business. H i s personal expenses t o t a l $850 p e r month.

T h e p a r t i e s t e s t i f i e d and t h e t r i a l j u d g e found t h a t t h e parties contributed their r e s p e c t i v e incomes t o t h e i r j o i n t benefit and t h a t t h e p a r t i e s ' nonfinancial contributions t o t h e marriage w e r e equal.

The t r i a l judge found t h e n e t m a r i t a l e s t a t e t o c o n s i s t of t h e following:

REAL PROPERTY

F a m i l y r e s i d e n c e - 2 2 7 1 Beech D r i v e , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana. (Equity i n c r e a s e since date of marriage). $21,600.00

R e n t a l P r o p e r t y - 8 0 7 and 809 6 t h S t r e e t SW, G r e a t F a l l s , Montana 46,831.80

R e s i d e n c e - 1546 Meadowlark D r i v e , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana

PERSONAL PROPERTY 1978 Ford Van 1976 Ford LTD 1966 GMC Van 1983 Buick Stocks and bonds Furniture, etc. Petitioner's IRA Acct. Respondent's LC1 Acct. Petitioner's Gov't. pension Respondent's savings acct. Respondent's checking account Petitioner's checking account Petitioner's savings account Respondent's IRA account Cash in safe (American) (Canadian) Husband's coin collection Joint coin collection Finding of Fact VII. Notably, the trial judge omitted Robert's cleaning business from the net marital estate, choosing instead to permit Robert to retain it in its entirety. The business is worth $81,000: $27,500 for the building; $8,500 for the equipment; and $45,000 for its good will. The trial judge divided the net marital. state between the parties as follows: PETITIONER Residence - 1546 Meadowlark Drive Stocks and bonds 1983 Buick Petitioner's IRA Account Petitioner's Government Pension Petitioner's Checking Account Petitioner's Savings Account Cash in safe (American) (Canadian) Coin collection Cash (to be paid by the Respondent within sixty (60) days

RESPONDENT

Residence - 2211 Beech Drive R e n t a l - 807 & 809 6 t h S t . S W Personal property - 2211 Beech D r i v e 1978 Ford Van 1976 Ford LTD 1966 GMC Van R e s p o n d e n t ' s LC1 Account R e s p o n d e n t ' s S a v i n g s Account R e s p o n d e n t ' s Checking Account R e s p o n d e n t ' s I R A Account R e s p o n d e n t ' s Coin c o l l e c t i o n

Finding of Fact V I I I .

R o b e r t o b j e c t s t o h i s $45,000 c a s h o b l i g a t i o n t o P e a r l , claiming that Pearl then receives 61% o f the net marital e s t a t e w h i l e h e receives o n l y 39%. However, R o b e r t f a i l s t o c o n s i d e r t h a t h e was a l l o w e d t o r e t a i n . h i s c l e a n i n g b u s i n e s s , despite Pearl's substantial contributions to its success.

The C o u r t n o t e s t h a t t h e P e t i t i o n e r s e t u p a bookkeeping system for the business, prepared income t a x r e t u r n s and answered phone c a l l s , f i l l e d i n f o r t h e s e c r e t a r y ' s v a c a t i o n s f o r 11 y e a r s and s a v e d some b u s i n e s s a c c o u n t s i n 1978. Petitioner t e r m i n a t e d h e r employment w i t h t h e law f i r m of A l e x a n d e r & Baucus i n 1978 t o accomodate [ s i c ] t h e Respondent. As a r e s u l t she l o s t fringe benefits and a Keogh P l a n i n t e r e s t , h a v i n g b e e n employed by t h a t f i r m s i n c e 1961. The C o u r t n o t e s t h i s b e c a u s e s h e i s n o t b e i n g awarded a n y i n t e r e s t i n t h a t business.

Finding of Fact IX. This finding supports the $45,000 payment.

Robert a l s o complains that the trial judge failed to p r o p e r l y c o n s i d e r t h e $11,000 i n p r o p e r t y h e b r o u g h t i n t o t h e marriage and the $16,000 he inherited from his parents. Again w e must d i s a g r e e . The $11,000 consists of t h e cash v a l u e o f a n i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y on R o b e r t ' s l i f e and t h e p r o f i t r e a l i z e d when R o b e r t s o l d r e n t a l p r o p e r t y h e b r o u g h t i n t o t h e marriage. Robert t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l t h a t t h e s e proceeds w e r e used t o p u r c h a s e t h e r e n t a l . p r o p e r t y owned by t h e p a r t i e s a t t h e t i m e of t h e i r dissolution. T h a t p r o p e r t y was i n c l u d e d i n Robert's portion of the marital estate.

There i s no s p e c i f i c r u l e c o n c e r n i n g how a n i n h e r i t e d asset is to be treated when marital property i s divided. "Each c a s e h a s t o b e d e c i d e d on i t s own f a c t s . " Vivian v. Vivian (2978), 1.78 Mont. 341, 344, 583 P.2d 1072, 1074. However, 5 40-4-202(1), MCA, does require consideration of

t h e " c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f t h e o t h e r spouse t o t h e marriage . . ." P e a r l and R o b e r t t e s t i f i e d t h a t P e a r l a s s i s t e d i n t h e u p k e e p

of the home, the rental property and the business. She willingly quit a long term job, forfeiting substantial retirement security, in order to assist her husband in improving his own life. Again, we find no abuse of d i s c r e t i o n by t h e t r i a l . j u d g e .

I n determining whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n , t h e reviewing c o u r t does n o t s u b s t i t u t e i t s judgment f o r t h a t o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t . The standard f o r review i s whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t acted arbitrarily without employment of c o n s c i e n t i o u s judgment o r e x c e e d e d t h e bounds o f reason resulting in substantial injustice. [ C i t a t i o n s ommitted.]

Creon v. Creon (1981), 1 9 5 Mont. 254, 257, 635 P.2d 1308, 1309. Not o n l y h a s t h e t r i a l j u d g e n o t a c t e d a r b i t r a r i l y n o r exceeded the bounds of reason, he has achieved a well-reasoned, exceedingly f a i r distribution of the marital property.

Affirmed. We c o n c u r :

.-' h i e f Justice