The Amelie

Mr. Justice DAVIS delivered the opinion of the court. The principle of maritime law which governs this controversy is too well settled for dispute. Although the power of the master to sell his ship in any case, without the express authority of the owner, was formerly denied, yet it is now the received doctrine of the courts in this country as well as in England, that the master has the right to sell in case of actual necessity. We are not called upon to discuss the reasons for the rule, nor to cite authorities in its support, because it has repeatedly received the sanction of this court. § From the very nature of the case (the court say), there must be this implied authority of the master to sell. The injury to the vessel maybe so great and the necessity so urgent as to justify a sale, and under such circumstances, the master becomes the agent of all concerned, and is re *27 quired to act for their benefit. The sale of a ship becomes a necessity within the meaning of the commercial law, when nothing better can be done for the owner, or those concerned in the adventure. If the master, on his part, has an honest purpose to serve those who are interested in ship and cargo, and can clearly prove that the condition of his vessel required him to sell, then he is justified. As the power is liable to abuse, it must be exercised in the most perfect good faith, and it is the duty of courts and juries to watch with great care the conduct of the master. In order to justify the sale, good faith in making it and the necessity for it must both concur, and the purchaser, to protect his title, must be able to show their concurrence. The question is not whether it is expedient to break up a voyage and sell the ship, but whether there was a legal necessity to do it. If this can be shown, the master is justified; otherwise not. And this necessity is a question of fact, to be determined in each ease by the circumstances in which the master is placed, and the perils to which the property is exposed. If the master can within a reasonable time consult the owners, he is required to do it, because they should have an opportunity to decide whether in their judgment a sale is necessary. And he should never sell, when in port with a disabled ship, without first calling to his aid disinterested persons of skill and experience, who are competent to advise, after a full survey of the vessel and her injuries, whether she had better be repaired or sold. And although his authority to sell does not depend on their recommendation, yet, if they advise a sale, and he acts on their advice, he is in a condition to furnish the court or jury reviewing the proceedings, strong evidence in justification of his conduct. The facts of this case bring it within these well-settled principles of maritime law, and clearly show that the master was justified in terminating his voyage and selling his ship. When the voyage began, the ship was seaworthy and well provided, but after she had been at sea a short time, she became disabled during a violent storm, and with great dif *28 ficulty was taken into the harbor of Port au Prince. The master at once entered his protest before the Dutch consul general (the ship being owned in Amsterdam), who caused three surveys to be made of the condition of the vessel. No action was taken on the first survey, but the result of the second was to incur an expense of one thousand Spanish dollars in partial repairs, decided by it to be practicable, and recommended, in order that the ship should be put in a proper condition to proceed on her voyage to Boston. In making these partial repairs, one of the sides of the vessel was uncovered, disclosing additional damages, of a serious character, not previously ascertainable, which caused the consul general to order a third survey. This third and final survey was thorough and complete. The men who made it were captains of vessels, temporarily detained in port, and the agents of American and English underwriters. No persons could be more competent to advise, or from the nature of their employment, better acquainted with the structure of vessels, and the cost of repairing them. Their report is full and explicit. After the advice given in it, the master, who was bound to look to the interest of all parties concerned in the adventure, had no alternative but to sell. In the face.of it, had he proceeded to repair his vessel, he would have been culpable. Being in a distant port, with a disabled vessel, seeking a solution of the difficulties surrounding him; at a great distance from his owners; with no direct means of communicating with them; and having good l'eason to believe the copper of his vessel was displaced, and that worms would work her destruction, what course so proper to pursue, as to obtain the advice “ of that body of men, who by the usage of trade have been immemorially resorted to on such occasions ?” * No prudent man, under the circumstances, would have failed to follow their advice, and the state of things, as proved in this case, imposed on the master a moral necessity to sell his vessel and reship his cargo. *29 But it is said, the fact that the vessel was repaired by the purchaser and sent to Boston, disproves this necessity. Not so. It may tend to prove the surveyors were mistaken, but does not affect the question of the duty of the master to follow their advice, when given in such strong terms, and with no evidence before him that it was erroneous. But in fact, the surveyors did not err in their conclusion that the vessel was not worth the cost of repairs, as the amount in the registry of the court for which the vessel was sold in Boston, will fail to reimburse the claimant the money expended by him, in purchasing and repairing her. It is insisted, eveD if the circumstances were such as to justify the sale and pass a valid title to the vendee, he, nevertheless, took the title subject to all existing liens. If this position were sound, it would materially affect the interests of commerce; for, as exigencies are constantly arising, requiring thé master to terminate the voyage as hopeless, and sell the property in his charge for the highest price he can get, would any man of common prudence buy a ship sold under such circumstances, if he took the title encumbered with secret liens, about which, in the great majority of cases, he could not have the opportunity of learning anything ? The ground on which the right to sell rests is, that in case of disaster, the master, from necessity, becomes the agent of all the parties in interest, and is bound to do the best for them that he can, in the condition in which he is placed, and, therefore, has the power to dispose of the property for their benefit. When nothing better can be done for the interest of those concerned in the property than to sell, it is a case of necessity, and as the master acts for all, and is the agent of all, he sells as well for the lien-holder as the owner. The very object of the sale, according to the uniform current of the decisions, is to save something for the benefit of all concerned, and if this is so, the proceeds of the ship, necessai’ily, by operation of law, stand in place of the ship. If the ship ean only be sold in case, of necessity, where the good faith of the master is unquestioned, and if it *30 be the purpose of the sale to save something for the parties in interest, does not sound policy require a clean title to be given the purchaser in order that the property may bring its full value ?■ If the sale is impeached, the law imposes on the purchaser the burden of showing the necessity for it, and this he is in a position to do, because the facts which constitute the legal necessity are within his reach; but he cannot know, nor be expected to know, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, the nature and extent of the liens that have attached to the vessel. Without pursuing the subject further, we are clearly of the opinion, when the ship is lawfully sold, the purchaser takes an absolute title devested of all liens, and that the liens are transferred to the proceeds of the ship, which, in the sense of the admiralty law, becomes the substitute for the ship. The title of Riviere, the claimant, was questioned at the bar, because he did not prove the master executed to him a bill of sale of the vessel. We do not clearly see how this question is presented in the record, for there is no proof, either way, on the subject, but if it is, it is easily answered. A bill of sale was not necessary to transfer the title to the vessel. After it was sold and delivered, the property was changed, and no written instrument was needed to give effect to the title. The rule of the common law on this subject has not been altered by statute. The law of the United States, which requires the register to be inserted in the bill of sale on every transfer of a vessel, applies only to the character and privileges of the vessel as an American ship. It has no application to this vessel and this case. * Decree affirmed. Footnotes [§] The Patapsco Ins. Co. v. Southgate, 5 Peters, 620; The Sarah Ann, 13 Id. 400; Post et al. v. Jones et al., 19 Howard, 157. [*] Gordon v. Mass. Ins. Co., 2 Pickering, 264. [*] Wendover v. Hogeboom, 7 Johnson, 308; Sharp v. United States Insurance Co., 14 Id. 201; Weston v. Penniman, 1 Mason, 306.