Norris v. Jackson

Mr. Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court. The first thing to be observed in the enactment made by the 4th section of the act of 3d March, 1865, allowing parties to submit issues of fact in civil cases to be tried and determined by the court, is that it provides for two kinds of findings in regard to the facts, to wit, general and special. This is in perfect analogy to the findings by a jury, for .which the court is in such cases substituted by the consent of the parties. In other words, the court finds a general verdict on all the issues for plaintiff or defendant, or it finds a special verdict. This special finding has often been considered and described by this court. It is not a mere report of the evidence, but a statement of the ultimate facts on which the law of the case must determine the rights of the parties; a finding of the propositions of fact which the evidence establishes, and. not the evidence on which those ultimate facts are supposed to rest. * The next thing to be observed is, that whether the finding be general or special, it shall have the same effect as the verdict of a jury; that is to say, it is conclusive as to the facts so found. In the case of a general verdict, which includes or may include, as it generally does, mixed questions of law and fact, it concludes both, except so far as they may be saved by some exception which the party has taken to the ruling of the court on the law. In the case of a special verdict, the question is presented *128 as it would be if tried by a jury, whether the facts thus found require a judgment for plaintiff or defendant; and this being matter of law, the ruling of the court on it can be reviewed in this court on that record. If there were such special verdict here, we could examine its sufficiency to sustain the judgment. But there is none. The bill of exceptions, while professing to detail all the evidence, is no special finding of the facts. The judgment of the court, then, must be affirmed, unless the bill of exceptions presents some erroneous ruling of the court in the progress of the trial. The only ruling in the progress of the trial to which exception was taken by plaintiff, was to the refusal of the court to permit him to prove that Gitchell, the landlord of defendant, had promised to pay the judgment under which the land was sold to plaintiff. We do not see that this was a matter of which plaintiff, a volunteer purchaser, had any right to complain. It could not extend the lien of the judgment beyond the time fixed by law, which seems to be the purpose for which it was offered. We have taken some pains to comment on the mode in which cases tried by the court, which are properly triable by a jury, may be reviewed here. Attention was called to the’ statute of 1865, in the case of Insurance Co. v. Tweed, * and we condense here the results of an examination of that statute. 1. If the verdict be a general verdict, only such rulings of the court, in the, progress of the trial, can be reviewed as are presented by bill of exceptions, or as may arise on the pleadings. 2. In such cases, a bill of exceptions cannot be used to bring up the whole testimony for review any more than in a trial by jury. 3. That if the parties desire a review of the law involved in the case, they must either get the court to find a special verdict, which raises the legal propositions, or they must *129 present to the court their propositions of law, and require the court to rule on them. 4. That objection to the admission or exclusion of evidence, or to such ruling on the propositions of law as the party may ask, must appear by bill of exceptions. As the only ruling of the court in this case that we can examine seems to have been correct, the judgment is Affirmed. Footnotes [*] Burr v. Des Moines Co., 1 Wallace, 99; Graham v. Bayne, 18 Howard, 62 [*] 7 Wallace, 44.