French v. Shoemaker

Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the'opiuion of the court. Accurate conclusions in motions like the present, involv-. ing important questions of practice, are essential to the correct administration of justice in all judicial tribunals exercising appellate powers, but they are especially so in this court, whether the case is brought here from a State court or a Circuit Court, as the jurisdiction of the court is special and must in, every case be tested by the Constitution and the laws of.Congress. Considerable importance is attached in this case to the motion for a supersedeas as well as to the motion to dismiss the appeal, but the court, in view of the circumstances, will first examine the motion to dismiss, as it is in its nature preliminary, and if granted will render it unnecessary to examine the other motion. • On the'sixteenth of November, 1868, the appellee filed a bill of complaint against the appellant in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Virginia, setting up *96 two written agreements therein described, and to. which special reference is made as exhibited in the record. They are both of the same date. Without entering much into details, suffice it to say that one purports to be an assignment by the appellant to the appellee of all his right, title, interest, claim, and demand whatsoever in and to the property, stock, road, road-bed, franchise, and charter of the Alexandria and Washington Railroad Company, for two specific purposes. (1) To secure the payment to the appellee of the sum of five thousand dollars advanced by the appellee to the appellant. (2) To carry into effect the purposes and objects set forth iu the other written agreement. Both agreements are signed by the appellant, and upon the back of the one given to secure the payment of the money advanced is the following agreement and consent: “ We, the undersigned, do hereby agree and consent to the terms and conditions of the within assignment,” .which expressly recites that it was executed to accomplish the two purposes already described. Reference to the record will show that the assignment is signed by the appellant and that the indorsement is signed by all the other parties supposed by him to have an interest in the assigned property. Special reference is made in the instrument of assignment to the purposes and objects set forth in the other written agreement, in which it is stipulated in substance and effect as follows: (1) That the appellant and Walter Lenox wilt convey all their right, title, and interest in that railroad company to a new corporation, to be formed as therein specified, or to devote all of that interest to the common benefit of the parties to the instrument, in the proportions therein specified, iu case the old company should be revived. (2) That they agree to assign to the new company, when the parties shall actually organize the same, all their interest as lessees of the Washington, Alexandria, and Georgetown Railroad, or to hold the same for the exclusive use of the parties to the agreement, according to'their respective interests. (3) That the appellee,' for himself and the Adams Express Company, covenants to aid the new company, with *97 money and credits, to pay, settle, or compromise certain specified liabilities as set forth in the agreement. Certain other important conditions are also inserted in the instrument, but they are not material in this investigation. Process was duly issued and served, and the appellant appeared and filed an answer setting up various defences to the merits of the claim made by the appellee. Subsequent to the filing of the answer the appellee filed the general replication, and the cause being at issue proofs were taken by both parties. Before the final hearing, however, the appellant filed a cross-bill, in which he insisted upon the defences set up in the answer, and also alleged that the other parties to the agreements were necessary parties to the bill of complaint. Due answer was made by the appellee to the cross-bill, and the appellant filed to the same the general replication. Such being the state of the pleadings, the cause, on the twenty-first of June last, came on for final hearing “upon the bill, answer, and replication, and upon the cross-bill, answer, and replication, and upon the proofs,” and the statement in the decree is that “ the court is of the opinion that the equity of the case is with the complainant,” and that the court “ thereupon do order, adjudge, and decree that James S. French, the defendant in the original bill, be perpetually' enjoined and restrained from any use of the name or title of the^president of the Washington and Alexandria Railroad Company, under any election to that office heretofore held, and from any action by himself or any attorney or agent to interfere with any proceeding for the reorganization of the said company under the contract mentioned in said bill, &c., and from any proceeding whatever not in accordance with the said, contracts, without prejudice,” as therein recited. Omitting the qualifications stated in the recitals, the decree continues as follows: “It is further ordered, adjudged,'and decreed that the said defendant, French, pay the costs in this cause.” Final decrees in suits in equity passed in a Circuit Court, *98 where the matter in dispute exceeds-the sum or value of two thousand dollars exclusive of costs, may be re-examined in this court, but the act of Congress does not define what is meant by the phrase" “ final decree.” Objection is made that the decree is not final because it does not in terms dismiss the cross-bill, but the court is of the opinion that the statement contained in the decree, that the equity of the case is with the complainant, by necessary implication disposes -of the cross-bill as effectually as it does of the answer filed by the appellant to the original bill of complaint. Leave, it is true, is giveu to either party to apply, at the foot of the decree, for such further order as may be necessary to the due execution of the same, or as may be required in relation to any matter not finally determined by it, but it is quite apparent that that reservation was superadded to the decree as a precaution and not because the court did not regard the whole issue between the piarties as determined by the decree. Such was doubtless the view of the Chief Justice who passed the decree, as the application for the appeal was made to him at the same term and was immediately granted without objection. Several cases might be referred-to where it is hold that a decree of foreclosure and sale of mortgaged premises is a final decree, and that the defendant is entitled to his appeal without waiting for the return ánd confirmation of the sale by a decretal order, upon the ground that the decree of foreclosure and sale is final as to the merits, and that the ulterior proceedings are but a mode of executing the original decree. * Unquestionably the whole law of the case before the court was settled by the Chief Justice in that deci’ee, aud as nothing remains to be done, unless a new application shall be made at the foot of the decree, the court is of the opinion that the decree is a final one, as it has conclusively settled all the legal rights of the parties involved in the pleadings. † *99 2. Beyond all doubt the appeal of the respondent in this case was allowed within ten days from the date of the decree, and the record shows that the bond to prosecute the writ to effect'and answer all damages and costs if he fail tc make his plea good was filed and duly approved within the same period, but it is denied by the appellee that the appeal operates as a supersedeas, because it is insisted that the bond given in the case is not in a sum sufficient to constitute- indemnity for the whole amount of the decree. Where the judgment or decree is for the recovery of ■money, not otherwise secured, the indemnity must be for the whole amount of the judgment or decree, including just damages for delay, and costs and interest on the appeal. * But in all suits where the property in controversy necessarily follows the event of the suit, as in real actions, replevin, and in suits on mortgages, indemnity is only required in an amouut sufficient to secure the sum recovered for the use or detention of the property and the other incidental items, as in cases where the judgment or decree is for money. What is necessary is that it be sufficient, and when it is desired to make the appeal a supersedeas, that it be filed within ten days from the rendering of the decree, and the question of sufficiency must be determined in' the first instance by the judge who signs the citation, but after the allowance of the appeal that question as well as every other in the cause becomes cognizable here. It is therefore matter of discretion with the court to increase or diminish the amount of the bond and to require additional sureties or otherwise as justice may require. † All that is required in a case where the writ of error is not a supersedeas is that the bond shall be in an amouut sufficient answer the costs in case the judgment or decree is affirmed. Nothing appears in the record to show that the indemnity given is .insufficient, and inasmuch as nothing ap *100 pears to tbe contrary the court is of the opinion that it must be presumed that the amount is sufficient. Appeals and writs of error are constituted a supersedeas in certain cases by virtue of the twenty-third section of the Judiciary Act, when the conditions there prescribed are fulfilled. Where those conditions are complied with the act of Congress operates to suspend the jurisdiction of the subordinate court and stay execution pending the writ of error or appeal, and until the case is determined or remanded. * Power to issue a supersedeas to a decree in a subordinate court does not exist in this court where the appeal was not taken and the proper bond given within ten days from the date of the order, except where an appeal was duly taken within ten days, and the aggrieved party is obliged to take a second appeal’ in consequence of the clerk below having neglected to send up the record in season, or where the granting of such a writ becomes necessary to the exorcise of the appellate jurisdiction of the court, as where the subordinate court improperly rejected the sureties to the bond because they were not residents of the district. † Appellate power in the controversy under consideration is conferred upon this court, and it is clear that this court may issue a supersedeas-in such a case whenever it becomes necessary to the exercise of its appropriate jurisdiction. ‡ ■ Attention will now be called to the grounds of the motion for a supersedeas, as shown in the affidavit of the appellant. He states that he filed a bill in equity in the Supreme Court of this district against Oscar A. Stevens, George W. Brent, W. Jackson Phelps, Richard T. Mernck$ J. Bean Smith, and Walter Lenox; that the respondents demurred to the bill on the ground that the appellee before the court was a necessary party respondent in the case, and that the court *101 where the bill was pending sustained the demurrer. Wherefore the appellant here amended his bill, and made the appellee a party respondent. Consequent upon those proceedings, as the affiant states, the Circuit Court for the District of Virginia laid a rule on him requiring him to appear in that court, on a day named in the rule, to show cause why he should not be fined and attached for the acts set forth in the petition, and charged therein to be in violation of the aforesaid order and decree of the court below in this case; that he appeared and showed cause as required, but that the court there being of opinion that he had violated the decree in the case before the court by filing his bill in equity in the Supreme Court of this district, ordered .that he forthwith dismiss the same and cease all proceedings under the same on pain of imprisonment, and that he, having no alternative but to go to jail or to submit to the order of the court, chose the latter, aud dismissed his bill of complaint. His views are that the Circuit Court erred in passing that order, and that that court gave an erroneous construction to the decree entered by the Chief Justice in the case, making it more comprehensive than its language will warrant, and he moves-this court to issue a. supersedeas or other suitable order to eon;ect those errors. Suppose the theory-'of the appellant is correct that the circuit judge in construing the decree gave it a scope beyond its legitimate meaning, very grave doubts are entertained whether this court, under the present motion, could afford the appellant any remedy, as the facts supposed would not show that anythiug had been done to defeat or impair the appellate jurisdiction of this court. Acts void in themselves may be done by the Circuit Court outside of the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court which this court cannot re-examine. Authority does not exist in this court to issue a supersedeas? except in cases where it is necessary to the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, but the court is hot inclined tb rest its decision in this case upon that ground, as we are all of the opinion that the circuit judge did not err in his construction of the order and decree enjoining the appellant in that de *102 cree'. He is perpetually enjoined and restrained from any use of the name or title of the president of the company under any election to that office heretofore held, and from anji action, by himself or any attorney or agent, to interfere with any proceeding for the reorganization of the company under the contracts, or from any proceeding whatever not in accordance with the said contracts. More comprehensive language could hardly be employed, and argument can hardly make it plainer or add anything to its force or effect. Both motions benieb. Footnotes [*] Whiting v. Bank of the United States, 13 Peters, 15; Bronson v. Railroad, 2 Black, 524. [†] Forgay v. Conrad, 6 Howard, 202; Thomson v. Dean, 7 Wallace, 342; Curtiss’s Commentaries, § 188; Beebe v. Russell, 19 Howard, 283. [*] Catlett v. Brodie, 9 Wheaton, 553 ; Stafford v. Union Bank, 16 Howard, 135 ; Same v. Same, 17 Id. 275. [†] Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 6 Wallace, 156; Rule 32; The Slaughterhouse Cases, 10 Wallace, 273; 1 Stat. at Large, 404. [*] Hogan v. Ross, 11 Howard, 295. [†] Hogan v. Ross, 11 Howard, 296; Ex parte Milwaukee Railroad Co., 5 Wallace, 188; Stockton et al. v. Bishop, 2 Howard, 74; Hardeman v. Anderson, 4 Id. 640; Wallen v. Williams, 7 Cranch, 279; Saltmarsh v. Tuthill, 12 Howard, 389. [‡] 1 Stat. at Large, 81; Stockton et al. v. Bishop, 2 Howard, 75.