Insurance Co. v. Transportation Co.

Mr. Justice STRONG delivered the opinion of the court. Mr. Phillips, in his Treatise on the Law of Insurance, lays down'two rules respecting the concurrence of different causes of loss, which the plaintiffs, in error contend should be applied to this case, and. which, if applied, they insist must lead to a reversal of the judgment in the court below. * The first of these is : “ In case of the concurrence of two causes of loss, one at the risk of the assured, and the other insured against, or one insured against by A., and the other by B., if the damage by the perils respectively can be discriminated, eac-h party must beat his proportion.” *197 The second is: “ Where different parties, whether the assured and the underwriter, or different underwriters, are responsible for different causes of loss, and the damage by each cannot be distinguished, the party responsible for the predominating efficient cause,' or that by which the operation of the other is directly occasioned, as being merely incidental to it, is liable to bear the loss.” These propositions may be accepted as correct statements of the law, and the question before us is, whether the Circuit Court, in giving judgment for the assured, failed to apply them rightly to'.the facts of the case. The insurance in this case was against all such loss or damage, not exceeding the sum insured, as should happen to the property by fire, other than fire happening by means of any invasion, insurrection, riot, or civil commotion, or of any military or- usurped power. Thus loss from fire happening in consequence of every other cause than those excepted was covered’ by the policy. The insurers took the risk of fires caused by lightning, explosions, and collisions. Such was'the contract. It is urged on behalf of the plaintiffs in error the findings in the casé establish that the sinking of the steamer, wherein consisted principally the loss, or that part of it in excess of $15,000 chargeable to the collision, was the result of two concurrent causes, one the fire, and the other the water in the steamer’s hold, let in by the breach made' by the collision. Ás the influx of the water was the direct and necessary eonsequeuce of the collision, it is argued that the collision was the predominating, and, therefore, the proximate cause of the loss. The argument overlooks the fact, distinctly found, that the damage resulting from the sinking of the vessel was the natural and necessary result of the fire only. If it be said that this.was but an inference from \facts previously found, it was not for that reason necessarily a mere legal conclusion. But we need not rely, upon this. Apart from that findiug, the other findings, unquestionably of facts, show that neither the collision, nor the presence of water in *198 the steamer’s hold was the predominating efficient cause of her going to the bottom. That result required the agency of the fire. It is found that the water would not have caused the vessel to sink below her promenade deck, had not some other cause of sinking supervened. It would have expended its force at that point. The effects of the fire were necessary to give it additional efficiency. The fire was, therefore, the efficient predominating cause, as well as'nearest in time to the catastrophe, which not only directly contributed to all the damage done, after the steamer had sunk to her promenade deck, but enlarged the destructive power of the water, and rendered certain the submergence of the vessel. This plainly appears, if we suppose that the fire had occurred on the day after the collision, and had originated from some other cause than the collision itself. The effects of the prior disaster would then have been complete. The steamer would have been full of water, sunk to her promenade deck, and, ■remaining thus suspended, would have been towed to a place of safety and saved, in that condition, to her owners, except for the new injury. But the fire occurring on the next day, destroying the upper works and the housing,- thus liberating the light freight and greatly reducing the floating capacity of the steamer, would have caused her to sink to the bottom as she did. In the case supposed the water would have been as truly a concurrent and efficient cause of the steamer’s sinking, as it was in the case now in hand. It would have operated in precisely the same manner, remaining dormant until given new activity. But could there have been any hesitation in that case, in determining which was the proximate, the efficient, predominating cause of the sinking of the vessel ? And can it be doubted that the underwriters against loss by fire would be held responsible for such a loss? Wherein does the case supposed differ in principle from the present, when the facts found are considered ? True, the fire in this ease was caused by the collision, but the policy insured against fire caused by collision. True, the fire immediately followed the filling of the steamer with water, or commenced while she was filling, but the effects of the *199 fire are conclusively distinguished from the breach in the steamer’s hull, and the filling of her hold with water. The damages caused by the several agencies have been discriminated, aud its proper share assigned to each. It is an established fact that the damaging effect of the water, independent of the fire, would not have reached beyond sinking of the steamer to its upper deck, when she would have been saved from further injury. There is, undoubtedly, difficulty, in many cases, attending the application of the maxim, “próxima causa, non remota spectator ” but none when the causes succeed each other in order of time. In such cases the rule is plain. When one of several successive causes is sufficient to produce the effect (for example, to cause a loss), the law will never regal’d an antecedent cause of that cause, or the “ causa causans.” * In such a case there is no doubt which cause is the proximate one within the meaning of the maxim. But, when there is no order of succession in. time, when there are two concurrent causes of a loss, the predominating efficient one must be regarded as the proximate, when the damage done by each cannot be distinguished. Such is, in effect, Mr. Phillips’s rule! And certainly that cause which set the other in motion and gave to it its efficiency for harm at the time of the disaster must rank as predominant. In the present case, however, the rule hardly seems applicable, because the damage resulting from the fire and that caused by the filling of the steamer are clearly distinguished. It is true, as argued, that as the insurance in this case was only against fire, the assured must be regarded as having taken the risk of collision, and it is also true that the collision caused the fire, but it is well settled that when an efficient cause nearest the loss is a peril expressly insured against, the insurer is not to be relieved from responsibility by his showing that the property was brought within that peril by a cause not mentioned in the contract. † The case quoted— *200 St. John v. The American Mutual Insurance Company — is instructive, and is, in one particular at least, responsive to the argument of the plaintiffs in error. It exhibits the difference, in effect, between an express exception from a risk undertaken, and silence in regard to a peril not insured against. The policy, as here, was against fire, but it contained a provision that the company would not be liable “ for any loss occasioned by the explosion of a steam boiler.” While it was in force there was an explosion of a steam boiler which caused the destruction of the property7, insured by fire. It wás held the insurers were not liable. The proviso, or ex-, ception, was construed as extending to fire caused by such explosions, for, as the parties were contracting about the peril of fire alone, an express exception of all loss from explosions must have been meant to cover fire when a consequence of explosions, otherwise the exception would have been unmeaning. But the court said, if nothing had been said in the policy respecting a steam boiler, the loss, having been occasioned by fire, as its proximate cause, would have rested-on the insurers, though it had been shown, as it might have been, that the fire was kindled by means of the explosion. The judgment thus turned on the effect of an express exception. Had there been none, the court would not have inquired how the fire "happened, whether by an explosion or not. In the case before us there is no exception of collisions, or fires caused by collisions. It must therefore be understood that the-insurers took the risk of all fires not expressly excepted. It has-been argued that because the policy was against fire only’, the assured are to be considered their own insurers against perils of the sea, including collisions, and as insurers against marine risks are liable for collisions, with all their consequences, including fires, the assured in this case must be held to have undertaken that risk. This would be so if they had taken out no policy against fire. But that works a material difference. Suppose these underwriters had insured the steamer against collisions and fire, and had theii reinsured in another company against fire alone, as they *201 might have done, would it have been a sufficient answer to a suit brought by them against their insurers, that the fire which caused the steamer to sink was itself caused by.a collision ? No one will affirm that. Yet upon the theory of the plaintiffs in error, this is substantially what is now attempted Before any policy was issued, the Transportation Company were their own insurers against collisions and fire, no matter how caused. They sought protection against some of the possible consequences of these risks, and they obtained a policy insuring them against all loss by fire, except fire caused by certain things, of which collision was not one. Against every other consequence of a collision than a fire, they remained their own insurers, but the risk of fire was no longer theirs. "We have already sufficiently said that the amount of the loss caused by the collision, apart from the fire, was distinctly ascertained, and the insurers were not charged with it. So was the amount of loss caused by the fire itself ascertained. If therefore it was a case of the concurrence of two causes of loss, one at the risk of the assured, and the other of the insurers, the damage resulting from each has been discriminated, and the insurers have been held liable only for that caused by the peril against which they contracted.' * Judgment has therefore been given in conformity with the rules as above stated, in Phillips on Insurance. It is Affirmed. Footnotes [*] Phillips on Insurance, vol. i, 1136, 1137. [*] General Mutual Insurance Company v. Sherwood, 14 Howard, 366. [†] St. John v. The American Mutual Insurance Company, 1 Kernan, 519. [*] Vide Heebner v. Eagle Insurance Company, 10 Gray, 143.