Shoemaker v. Kingsbury

Mr. Justice FIELD delivered the opinion of the court. From the whole evidence in this case it is plain that the defendants were not common carriers of passengers at the time the accident occurred, which has led. to the present action. They were merely contractors for building the Eastern Division of the Union Pacific Railway, and were running a construction train to transport material for the road. The entire train consisted, besides the engine and its tender, of cars for such material and what is called in the testimony a “caboose car.” This.latter car was intended solely for the accommodation of the men connected with the train: it contained their bunks and mattresses; they slept in it, and deposited in it the lamps,of the cars, and the tools they used. It was not adapted for passengers, and, according to the tes..timony of the conductor-, the defendants did not wish to carry passengers, although when persons got on to ride the defendants did not put them off", and sometimes, though not always, fare was charged for their carriage. The plaintiff, -who was sheriff of a county in Kansas,.and deputy marshal.of the district, desired to arresta person on the line of the road, and, to enable him. to accomplish this purpose, he applied to the conductor for passage on the train as far as' Wilson’s Creek, and requested that the train would stop there until the arrest could be made. His wishes were grailted in both respects, and for the services rendered he *376 paid at the time a portion of the fare charged, and the balance subsequently. In the rendition of these services for the plaintiff, the defendants were simply private carriers for hire. As such carriers, having only á construction train, they were not under the same obligations and responsibilities which attach to common carriers of passengers by railway. The latter undertake, for hire, to carry all persons .indifferently who apply for passage., and tho law, for the protection of travellers, subjects snch carriers to a very strict responsibility. It imposes upon them the duty of providing, for the safe conveyance of passengers, so far as that is practicable by the exercise of human care and foresight. They are bound to see that the road is in good oi\der; that the engines are properly constructed and furnished-; that the cars are strong' and fitted for the accommodation of passengers, and that the running gear is, so far as themlosest scrutiny can detect, perfect in its character. If any injury results from a defect in any of those particulars they are liable. They are also bound to provide careful and skilful servants, competent in ¿very respect for the'positions to which they are assigned in the management and running of the cars; and they'are responsible for the consequences of any negligence or want of skill on the part of such servants. They are also bound to take all necessary precautions to keep obstructions from the track of the road; and, although it may not be obligatory upon them, in the absence of legislative enactment, to fepce in tlfe road so as to exclude cattle, it is incumbent upon them to use all practical moans to prevent the possibility of obstruction from the straying of cattle on to the track as well as. from. any other canse. As said by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in speaking of the duty of railway companies in this particular: * Having undertaken to carry safely, and holding themselves out to the world as able to do so, they are not to suffer cows to endang-er the life of a passenger any more than a defective *377 rail or axle. "Whether they maintain an armed police at e-'iss-roads, as is done by similar companies in Europe, or fence, or place cattle-guards within the bed of their road, or by any other contrivance exclude this risk, is for themselves to consider and determine. We do not say they are bound to do the one or the other, but if, by some- means, they do not exclude the risk, they are bound to respond in damages when injury accrues.”. ' It is evident that the defendants in this case were not subject to any such stringent .obligations and responsibilities as are here mentioned. They did not hold themselves out as capable of carrying passengers safely; they had no arrangements for passenger service, and they were not required to make provisions for the protection of the road such as are usually adopted and exacted of railroad companies. They did not own the road, and had no interest in it beyond its construction. It was no part of their duty to fence it in or to cut away the bushes or weeds growing on its sides. The plaintiff knew its condition and the relation of the defendants to it when he applied for passage. He had been previously over it several times, and was well aware that there were no turntables on a portion of the route; a fact, which compelled the defendants to reverse the engine on the return of the train from Walker’s Creek. He, therefore, took upon himself the risks incident to the mode of conveyance used by the defendants when he entered their cars. All that he could exact from them, under these circumstances, was the exercise of such care and skill in the management and running of the train as prudent and cautious men, experienced in that business, are accustomed to use under similar circumstances. Such care implies awa tchful attention to the working of the engine, the movement of the cars and their running gear, and a constant, and vigilant lookout for the condition of the road in advance of the train. If such care and skill were used by the defendants, they discharged their entire duty to the plaintiff-, and if an accident, notwithstanding, occurred, by which he was injured, they were not liable. They were not insurers of his *378 safety, nor responsible for the consequences of unavoidable accident. The question should have been put to the jury whether the defendants did in fact exercise such care and skill in the management and running of the train at the time the acei-: dent occurred. They were not responsible to the plaintiff, unless the accident was directly attributable to their negligence or unskilfulness in that particular. The evidence in the case shows that the accident was occasioned by the tender and engine running against a steer. The train was proceeding at its usual rate of speed when the steer suddenly, from a mass of high weeds or grass growing on the sides of the road, leaped upon the track directly in front of the advancing train, at a distance from it of about twenty feet. This distance was so short, and the movement of the animal was so sudden, that it was impossible to arrest the train, and a collision followed which threw the engine and tender from the track. The plaintiff, on the happening of the collision, either leaped from the “ caboose car,” in which he was at the time sitting, or was thrown-from it, it is immaterial which, and was.injured. The fifth instruction given by the court turned the attention of the jury from the simple question at issue for their determination, and directed it to the skill, habits, and attainments for their business of the agents and servauts of the defendants, as well as to their conduct on the occasion of the accident. It held proof that the agents and servants were possessed of competent skill, of good habits, and in every respect qualified and suita'bly prepared for the -business in which they were engaged, as essential as proof that they acted on the occasion with skill, prudence, and caution. And it made the occurrence of the accident presumptive evidence that they were destitute of such skill, habits, and qualifications. We are of opinion that the court erred in this instruction, and that it misled the jury. On this ground the judgment of the court below must be Reverse^ and the cause remanded eor a new trial. Footnotes [*] Sullivan v. Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company, 30 Pennsylvania State, 234.