Insurance Company v. Slaughter

Mr. Justice DAVIS delivered the 'opinion of the court. If the clause of the policy out of which the difference of opinion between the parties to this suit arises, were detached from other parts of the instrument, there might be some question as to its proper grammatical construction. But such is not the ease. It is the last clause in, the fourth subdivision of the conditions embraced in the body of the policy, and in this subdivision a number of causes are set forth which shall operate to avoid the policy. These causes are all embraced-in separate clauses, each class being separated from the others by a semicolon. If there were in the clause in dispute a semicolon where the word premises is first used, it may- be, in view of the punctuation adopted in reference to the other clauses, that this clause would be complete in itself, and exclude wholly from the premises gunpowder, saltpetre, and the other articles in the same class. But in the absence of the semicolon, it is manifest that no greater restriction can be applied to gunpowder and saltpetre than to camphene and burning fluid, and that, therefore, the words “ in quantities exceeding one barrel at any one time,’’¿are applicable alike to all the materials which are specified in the clause in controversy. This construction is fortified by the-nature of the forbidden articles. Saltpetre is not a dangerous substance; and yet, according to the view of the counsel for the plaintiff' in error, it is prohibited altogether,' while a barrel of camphene and burning fluid, which'are inflammable, can be stored with impunity; A construction.that would lead to such a result canuot be adopted, unless the_Jangüá'ge employed leaves no other alternative. ' . Besides, if the contract is as contended íór, it.'would'impeach the good faith' and fair dealing-.of the insurance company, for it would be deceptive, and calculated to mislead those who are not well informed on matters of this kind. *407 It is well known that the agencies of this company are located in all parts of tlie country, and that, in many places where they are established, housekeepers generally keep on hand, for their own use, in small quantities, gunpowder, saltpetre, benzine, and perhaps other interdicted articles. It would never occur to this class'of persons, on making application ' atone of these agencies for insurance,'that they were forbidden to keep these things in their houses, and unless their attention was particularly called to the subject, which would be an unusual occurrence, they would take out their'policies ini the belief that they could keep and use the substances required for their necessities as they had been in the habit of doing; and, if they should happen to-read over the schedule of conditions annexed to the policy, usually printed in the smallest type, not being accustomed to a critical examination of the structure of sentences, they would naturally conclude, as saltpetre and gunpowder are classed together, and as saltpetre is comparatively harmless, while eamphene and burning-fluid are quite dangerous, that the restriction at the end of the enumerated articles wras intended to be applied to all of them alike. This, too, is the i'ational construction of the clause in-question, and we cannot suppose the company which framed this policy intended it to be interpreted differently. If insurance companies do not mean to take risks .on property where gunpowder, Saltpetre, and tbe like substances are kqpt, even for ordinary use, then good faith totheassured requires that they should declare their intention in terms which -cannot admit of controversy; and, in order to avoid just cause of complaint, it would be better for them to employ type, in relation to this important subject, large enough to-arrest the attention of an interested party. In our opinion the Circuit Court did not err in sustaining the demurrer to the third' plea, and the judgment of that court is, accordingly, affirmed. The motion for damages is disallowed.