Tompkins v. Drennen

TOUIMIN, District Judge, after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the court. A court of equity does not interfere with judgments at law, unless the complainant has an equitable defense of which he could not avail himself at law, or had a good defense at law which he was prevented from availing himself of by fraud or accident, unmixed with negligence of himself or his agents. Knox Co. v. Harshman, 133 U. S. 152, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 257, and authorities therein cited. The facts averred in the original bill constitute no defense at law or in equity to Drennen’s claim as purchaser of the land from the mortgagors and owners of the equity of redemption, and as assignee of their claim against the appellant for the surplus of the proceeds of sale. Although appellant had authority under the mortgage to sell only for cash, he had the right to agree with the purchaser to allow him time for the payment of the purchase money. This was a matter between the mortgagee (appellant) and the purchaser, which they could arrange to suit themselves, (Durden v. Whetstone, 92 Ala. 480, 9 South. Rep. 176; Mewburn’s [696] Heirs v. Bass, 82 Ala. 622, 2 South. Rep. 520;) and whether the purchaser settled the purchase money in cash or by executing a note to appellant was a matter resting exclusively with them, and with which the mortgagors had no concern, (Cooper v. Hornsby, 71 Ala. 62.) The extent of their equity was to have credit for the sum bid as cash, and the appellee, as their grantee, was entitled to recover in an action for money had and received the balance of the purchase money remaining in appellant’s- hands after deducting the amounts which by the terms of the mortgage were authorized to be applied to the payment of the debt, and of such expenses and charges as were therein provided for. Tompkins v. Drennan, (Ala.) 10 South. Rep. 638. The averment in the amended bill to the effect that Drennen had no right or title to the claim sued on in the state circuit court shows a good defense at law, but it appears from the record that such defense was fully and fairly tried in that suit. A court of equity will not assume to control a judgment of a court at law for the purpose simply of giving a new trial. Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U. S. 596, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 62; Crim v. Handley, 94 U. S. 652; U. S. v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 61. The other facts averred in the amended bill, and relied on as an equitable defense to Drennen’s claim, if a good defense to such claim, could have been set up in his suit against the appellant in the state court. That suit was an action in assumpsit for money had and received, which, in its spirit and purposes, -has been likened to a bill in equity, and. is an exceedingly liberal action. King v. Martin, 67 Ala. 182. In Eddy v. Smith, 13 Wend. 488, the court says: “It is a most favorable way in which-he [the defendant] can be sued. He can be liable no further than the money he has received, and against that may go into every equitable defense upon the general issues. He may claim every equitable allowance; in short, he may defend himself by everything which shows that the plaintiff ex aequo et bono is not entitled to the whole of his demand, or any part of if.” These principles have, ever since their development, been recognized as sound, both in England and here, and are of daily application. It does not apjiear from the averments in the bill or in the amended bill that appellant was prevented from availing himself of such defense by fraud or accident, without which no equity is shown therein. We find no error in the record, and the decree is affirmed.