Frow v. De La Vega

82 U.S. 552 · Supreme Court of the United States · Dec 18, 1872

Full text

Frow v. De La Vega

*554 Mr. Justice BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the court. If the court in such a case as this can lawfully make a final decree against one defendant separately, on the merits, while the cause was proceeding undetermined against the others, then this absurdity might follow: there might be one decree of the court sustaining the charge of joint fraud committed by the defendants; and another decree disaffirming the said charge, and declaring it to be entirely unfounded, and dismissing the complainant’s bill. And such an incongruity, it seems, did actually occur in this case. Such a state of things is unseemly and absurd, as well as unauthorized by law. The true mode of proceeding where a bill makes a joint charge against several defendants, and one of them makes default, is simply to enter a default and a formal decree pro confesso against him, and proceed with the cause upon the answers of the other defendants. The defaulting defendant has merely lost his standing in court. He will not be entitled to service of notices in the cause, nor to appear in it in any way. He can adduce no evidence, he cannot be heard at the final hearing. But if the suit should be decided against the complainant on the merits, the bill will be dismissed as to all the defendants alike — the defaulter as well as.the others. If it be decided in the complainant’s favor, he will then be entitled to a final decree against all. But a final decree on the merits against the defaulting defendant alone, pending the continuance of the cause, would be incongruous and illegal. This was so expressly decided by the New York Court of Errors, in the case of Clason v. Morris. * Spencer, J., says: “It would be unreasonable to hold, that because one defendant had made default, the plaintiff should have a decree even against him, where the court is satisfied from the proofs offered by the other, that in fact the plaintiff is not entitled to a decree.” † Irregularities, if any occurred in the proceedings after *555 the decree complained of, are not now before us for adjudication. Decree reversed with costs, and the cause remanded for further proceedings, In conformity with this opinion. Footnotes [*] 10 Johnson, 524. [†] See 1 Hoffman’s Chancery Practice, 554.

Parentheticals

holding that a final judgment for joint fraud “against the 12 defaulting defendant alone, pending the continuance of the cause, would be incongruous and 13 illegal”
Youlin Wang v. Forensic Professional Group USA, Inc.
holding that the default of one defendant cannot be entered before determining the liability of the non-defaulting defendant because the inconsistency of two different judgments against joint defendants would be illogical
BRANCH BANKING AND TRUST COMPANY v. THE WOMEN'S HEALTH INSTITUTE OF MACON PC
holding that when a plaintiff “makes a joint charge against several defendants, and one of them makes default,” the court should “proceed with the cause upon the answers of the other defendants”
State National Insurance Company, Inc. v. Damon Treadwell, et al.
opining that absent the common-defense doctrine, defaults could result in an “absurdity” where courts both sustain a charge and deem it to be entirely unfounded
Hartford Fire Insurance v. Harris Co. of Fort Smith, Inc.
recognizing default judgment not appropriate when joint liability alleged and one party still defending
Vick v. Wong
stating if a suit is decided on merits against the Plaintiff, the complaint should be dismissed against all defendants, including the defaulting defendants
Rollason v. All State Van Lines Relocation, Inc.
reversing default judgment as to property ownership when plaintiff lost as to answering defendants
United States v. New-Form Manufacturing Co.
noting where a complaint alleges that defendants are jointly 26 27 2 Plaintiffs object to the Individual Defendants’ Reply, arguing they improperly included new evidence for the first time in their Reply. (ECF No. 86.
Appel v. Concierge Auctions, LLC
“judgment should not be entered against that defendant until the matter has been adjudicated with regard to all defendants, or all defendants have defaulted”
Alpine Fresh, Inc. v. Jala Trucking Corp.
“Frow stands for the narrow rule that a default judgment may not be entered against one of several defendants (1
Mitchell v. Morgan
“[A] final decree on the merits against the defaulting defendant[s] alone, pending the continuance of the cause, would be incongruous and illegal.”
Naresh Narayan v. Urban Commons 6th Ave Seattle, LLC
“[A] final decree on the merits against the defaulting defendant alone, pending the continuance of the cause, would be incongruous and illegal.”
Safety Nailer LLC v. The Individuals Partnerships and Unincorporated Associations identified on Schedule A