Central Trust Co. v. Ingersoll

BARR, District Judge, after stating tbe facts as above, delivered the opinion of the court. The assignment of error raises two questions. It is insisted — First, that the appellee, Ingersoll, is not entitled to any compensation out of the general fund; and, second, if he is entitled to compensation, the compensation allowed is excessive. It seems to us that the order directing the special master, Caldwell, to notify the petitioner, Inger [429] soil, as counsel for the creditors not secured by the mortgages, was a recognition by the court of his representative character; and, as it appears that this order was made in the presence of counsel for other unsecured creditors, we think it was sufficient to authorize petitioner, Ingersoll, in the absence of objections from other counsel, to go on and represent the unsecured creditors before the special master, which he did. There is much evidence taken before the special master showing what was done and what was not done by the petitioner, Ingersoll; and the result, we think, is to show that Caldwell, the special master, was himself exceedingly familiar with the whole; matter which he veas directed to investigate, and that he did some of the work which might have been properly done by counsel, but that Ingersoll was the representative counsel before the special master, and argued ike exceptions upon the report, and prepared the necessary orders to subject the property. During this reference the appellants had not filed their claims as unsecured creditors; and the appellants, especially the Southern Railway Company, were claiming as purchasers adversely to the interest of the unsecured creditors. This being true, he is entitled to a reasonable compensation to be paid out of the fund which has been subjected to the payment of the unsecured creditors. Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U. S. 527. In regard to the amount of the compensation allowed, it would seem from the record before us to be quite liberal; but as the special master reported §2,500, which was the smallest amouu t proven by any of the witnesses before him, and as the learned trial judge has increased ihe same to §3,300, we think we should not disturb it. The supreme court, by Justice Bradley, in the case of Trustees v. Greenough, above, said, in speaking of such allowances (page 537): “The allowances made t'or those purposes we have examined, and do not find anything therein seriously objectionable. The court below should have considerable latitude of discretion on the subject, as it has far hotter means of knowing wlmt is just and reasonable than an appellate court can have.” The earnest contention of appellants, that the unsecured debts which they own embrace nearly all of the debt allowed as unsecured debts to participate in the fund arising from the property reported by Caldwell as not being covered by the mortgages, and that, therefore, no allowance should be made out of the fund, should not, we think, have weight. It is true that it appears' in the record that over $15,258,000 was allowed as unsecured debts against this fund, and that a very large amount of this — §15,000,000 or over — is owned hv the appellants or those in their interest; yet, as almost all of this large debt is composed of mortgage bonds and came in under the supplemental bill filed by the Southern Railway Company, Coster, and others, January 30, 1896, and after the special master, Caldwell, had ascertained and reported the property subject to the unsecured debts, we think the ownership of this large amount of the unsecured debts should not affect the question. It. is quite clear that the owners of none of the bonds represented by the trust company and none of the bonds or debts owned or represented by the Southern Railway Company and its associates took part in ascertaining and subjecting the property which was reported and subjected to the unsecured debts; [430] nor should the fact that the appellant O. H. Coster has bought or owns part of the debt which the petitioner represented make his compensation any the less. The decree of the circuit court should be affirmed, and it is so ordered.