Campbell v. Waite

THAYER, Circuit Judge, after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the court. It is contended on behalf of the appellant, and it seems to be one of the principal errors which is relied upon for a reversal of the order of the district court, that the facts alleged in the petitioner’s reply to the sheriff’s return, hereafter termed' the “petitioner’s plea,” were insufficient to warrant his discharge from custody, and that the trial court erred both in overruling the demurrer thereto and in admitting testimony to substantiate the averments of the plea. In support of this contention it is said, in effect, that the plea which was interposed was inconclusive and of no avail, because it did not admit the doing of the acts charged in the indictment, and, furthermore, show by proper averments that they were done in obedience to the laws of the United States, but that the plea merely admitted the doing of certain other acts, quite different from those described in the indictment, and then averred or showed that such other acts were done in pursuance of federal authority. We think, however, that the plea was not bad for the reasons last indicated. It is manifest from an inspection of the pleading that it was not framed with a view of confessing and avoiding the specific charge contained in the indictment, but that it was framed upon an entirely different theory, namely, for the purpose of showing that the petitioner was not guilty of the specific acts described in the indictment; that the acts by him done and performed, which had furnished the sole basis for a criminal charge under the laws of the state, were done by the petitioner in the line of his duty as a federal officer; and that by reason of that fan I the federal court, to which the application for a writ of habeas corpus was addressed, was fully empowered by sec (ions 751, 753, and 7(51 of the Revised ¡Statutes of the United States to release him from imprisonment, notwithstanding his prior conviction as for a crime in the courts of the state of Iowa. The plea seems to have been well conceived for the purpose last indicated, and it admits of no controversy, we think, that the acts which were confessed by the plea, considering all the circumstances under which the petitioner was called upon to act, were within the line of his duty as a special examiner of the pension bureau, the same having been done in accordance with regulations lawfully made and instructions given by the commissioner of [106] pensions, and therefore haying been done and performed in pursuance of the laws of the United States. It is insisted, however, in behalf of the appellant, that the action taken by the trial court sets at naught the solemn adjudication of the courts of Iowa in a case properly within their jurisdiction, and that, because of this fact, the order discharging the petitioner was erroneous and beyond the power of the trial court. The answer to this contention is found in the fact that by section 7 of the act of March 2, 1833 (4 Stat. 632, c. 57), the substance of which is now embodied in section 753 of the Revised Statutes, the congress of the United States has expressly authorized the federal courts' to issue writs of habeas corpus for the release of persons who are confined or imprisoned “for any act done, or omitted to be done, in pursuance of a law of the United States, or any order, process, or decree of any court or judge thereof.” By means of numerous federal adjudications upon this act, which have been cited and approved by the supreme court of the United States, it is now well established: First, that the federal courts may release a person after his conviction by a state court as well as before a trial, when he is restrained of his liberty for an act done in pursuance of a law of the United States lawfully enacted; second, that the statute in question was designed to give relief to one in custody under a state law, not only when a state statute expressly imposes a penalty for executing a law of the United States or the process of its courts, but also when a state law is general in its terms, and applicable to all persons, and one is in custody under color thereof for an act which was in fact done in pursuance of federal authority; and, third, that, when an indictment charging an offense against a state law does not show on its face that the act which forms the basis of the charge was done in pursuance of a law of the United States, that fact may be established by proof aliunde, — in other words, that when, in a proceeding by habeas corpus, a person claims immunity from arrest and imprisonment on the ground that he is in fact held for an act done in pursuance of federal authority, the federal courts may go behind the indictment or information, as the case may be, and ascertain by an independent inquiry whether the act which furnishes the sole basis for the charge was in truth done in pursuance of a law of the United States, or the order, process, or decree of a federal tribunal. If the federal courts did not possess the power last mentioned, the habeas corpus act would in some cases prove ineffective to protect federal officers in the performance of their duties. In re Hurst, 2 Flip. 510, 12 Fed. Cas. 1024; Brown v. U. S., 2 Woods; 428, 4 Fed. Cas. 98; U. S. v. Jailer, 26 Fed. Cas. 571, 575, 2 Abb. (U. S.) 265; Ex parte Thompson, 1 Flip. 507, 23 Fed. Cas. 1015, 1016; Ex parte Jenkins, 2 Wall. Jr. 521, 13 Fed. Cas. 445; In re Bull, 4 Dill. 323, 328, Fed. Cas. No. 2,119; In re Neill, 8 Blatchf. 156, 17 Fed. Cas. 1296. It was also decided in Re Neagle, 135 U. S. 1, 75, 10 Sup. Ct. 658, where most of the foregoing cases were cited and approved, that no act done in pursuance of a law of the United States lawfully enacted can be an offense against the laws of a state, and that an act done in obedience to rules or regulations lawfully prescribed by one of the executive departments of the gov107 eminent or in obedience to the directions of one of the heads of such departments, acting within the scope of his authority, is to be regarded as an act done in pursuance of a law of the United States, although no statute of the United States has in express terms directed the doing of the act. It may be conceded that the act of congress of March 2,1833, which empowers the federal courts to go behind an indictment found in a state court, and determine by an independent investigation of the facts whether the act which forms the basis of the criminal charge was done in pursuance of federal authority, confers a delicate and anomalous power on the federal courts, which should in all cases be cautiously exercised; but, in view of the numerous adjudications cited above, we cannot doubt the existence of such a power, nor the fact that it was intentionally conferred by the lawmaker. The act in question owes its birth to an attempt by one of the states of this Union to nullify the action of the congress of the United States over subjects that had been committed to its charge by the federal constitution, and the power thereby conferred on federal courts and federal judges was granted for no other purpose than to prevent interference with the rightful authority of the general government. Owing to the dual nature of our government, it was deemed necessary legislation to accomplish that object. It follows from what has been said that no error was committed by the trial court in receiving the proof which was offered by the petitioner to show that, in point of fact, he was in custody for acts done in the legitimate discharge of his duties as a federal official, nor in ordering his discharge when fully satisfied (hat such was the case. For acts of that nature the state court was without power to imprison or fine the petitioner, and its judgment inflicting; such punishment was void in the same sense that the judgment of a court is void when it sentences a person to a kind of punishment not authorized by law. Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163; Ex parte Bain, 123 U. S. 1, 7 Sup. Ct. 781. It is further suggested in the brief of the attorney general, and some stress was laid on that point in argument, that, in any event, the petitioner should not have been discharged on habeas corpus, but should have been remanded to the custody of the sheriff, and reo,aired to prosecute a writ of error to the supreme court of the United States. This contention, we think, is without merit. While it is true that the relief prayed for by the petitioner could have been obtained in the usual way by a writ of error, yet. in our judgment, the case a.t bar does not belong to the class of cases in which a person in custody under the warrant of a state court should be compelled to seek relief by appeal or writ of error rather than by a writ of habeas corpus. In the case of Ex parte Royall, 317 U. S. 241, 251, 6 Sup. Ct. 734, it was said, in substance, that when a federal officer is in custody for an act done in pursuance of a law of the United States, or an order, process, or decree of a federal court, and that when a citizen of a foreign state is in custody, under the warrant of a state court, for an act done under an authority claimed to have been conferred by the sovereignty of which he is a citizen, so that our relations with foreign governments are involved in the controversy, s-'-.h [108] cases present questions of such importance and urgency that the court which is appealed to for relief may and should discharge the petitioner in a proceeding by habeas corpus, instead of compelling him to resort to the slower remedy by appeal, provided that it finds upon an investigation of the case that the petitioner’s complaint is well founded. The arrest of federal officers or other persons for acts lawfully done in discharge of their duties under federal laws impairs to a certain extent the authority and efficiency of the general government; and for that reason no court, so far as we are aware, has ever hesitated in that class of cases to discharge a petitioner from custody by writ of habeas corpus, when it appeared on a hearing of the case that the petitioner was entitled to be released from imprisonment. No other questions besides those already noticed and decided are presented by the assignment of errors which require consideration at our hands. In the brief of counsel for the appellant it is said, in substance, that the errors complained of consisted in overruling the demurrer to the petitioner’s plea; that, on the conceded facts of the case, which we take to mean the facts alleged in the petitioner’s plea, inasmuch as there is no special finding of fact contained in the record, the trial court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus or to discharge the prisoner; and that the court also erred in holding that the petitioner was illegally deprived of his liberty when it appeared that he was in custody under the judgment and sentence of the district court of Howard county, Iowa, upon an indictment alleging an offense under the laws of the state. These, in our opinion, are the only questions presented by the record which are open for review by this court; and, as they have each been considered and the position taken by the appellant adjudged to be untenable, the order discharging the petitioner from custody is hereby affirmed.