Masterson v. Howard

Mr. Justice FIELD delivered the opiuiou of the court. It is unnecessary to determine whether the decree against Maverick, entered in January, 1861, is to be deemed final or interlocutory. The subsequent decree against Herndon, entered in June, 1866, is in form against both of the defendants. The court below, in its subsequent proceedings, treated the latter decree as the one which finally determined the rights of the parties iii the case, and from that decree the appeal is taken. It is also unnecessary to determine whether the court erred in striking Herndon’s answer from the files, as his assignee makes no objection to the ruling, or to the decree which followed. He has consented through his counsel to the dismissal of his appeal. The only question, therefore, for our consideration upon th.e record, is whether the allegations of the supplemental bill, and of the original bill to which it refers, are sufficient to support the deefee thus entered upon the default of the defendants. And upon this question there can be no doubt. The suit was brought on the equity side of the court to quiet the title of the complainant to a tract of land situated in the State of Texas, and prevent harassing and vexatious litigation from a multiplicity of suits. The original bill alleges, in substance, that the complainant is in possession and seized in fee of the tract, deraigning his title from a *104 grant issued by the government of Spain, in 1766, to Indians of the mission of San José, in Texas; that the defendants have made locations and surveys of large parcels of the tract under certificates or warrants issued by the Republic of Texas, by virtue of which they assert a right to the parcels thus located and surveyed, and have thereby created a cloud upon the title of the complainant, aud disturbed his possession. The bill prays that the surveys and locations, and patents thereon, if any have been obtained, may be determined and declared void, and the cloud impending over the title of the complainant, be thereby removed; or that the right of the complainant being established, he may be quieted in his title and possession, and all obstruction to the peaceable enjoyment of his property be removed; or that he may have such other or further relief as the nature of the case may require. The original complainant having died, a supplemental bill, in the nature of a bill of revivor, was filed and prosecuted in the name of his heir's. It shows a change of parties consequent upon the death of the original complainant, and the death of several of the original defendants ; and brings in as new parties the heirs of one John McMullen, through whom the complainant traced his title. But so far as it concerns the defendants, Maverick and Herndon, who are alone represented by the appellants, its allegations are substantially the same as those of the original bill. The decree of the court entered on the 20th of June, 1866, responded substantially to these allegations. It adjudged the title of the complainants to the tract in question “ to be free from all clouds cast thereon” by the defendants, Maverick and Herndon, and all persons claiming under them, and that “ all patents, locations, and surveys obtained or owned” by them, in conflict with the title of the complainants, which was decreed- to be a good title, were null and void, and directed the defendants to cancel and remove them. The clause of the decree directing that the complainants have and recover the land of the defendants may be supported under the general prayer of the bill, if, pending the suit, the defendants had gone into possession of any *105 of the parcels located and surveyed by them ; and, if such were not the case, the clause could not in any way prejudice their rights. , But the counsel of the appellant Maverick, looking outside of the record to the condition of the country at the time the decree was rendered, takes the position that the decree is null and void because rendered by the court before the proclamation of the President of August 20th, 1866, announcing the close of the war in Texas, contending that, as the complainants were citizens of California and.Illinois, and the defendants citizens of Texas, it was a decree in a suit between public enemies, and, therefore, void. If it were true, which is not admitted, that the parties to the present suit were to be regarded as public enemies after the céssation of hostilities in Texas, and the restoration of the authority of the United States, until the proclamation of the President was issued, in August, 1866,-the conclusion drawn by counsel would not follow. The existence of war, does, indeed, close the courts of each belligerent to the citizens of the other, but it does not prevent the citizens of one belligerent from taking proceedings for the protection of their own property in their own courts, against the citizens of the other, whenever the latter can be reached by process. The citizens of California and Illinois had a right to seek the courts of the United States in Texas, or to proceed with suits commenced therein previous to the war, to protect their property there situated from seizure, invasion, or disturbance by citizens of that State, so soon as those courts were opened, whether official proclamation were made or not of the cessation of hostilities. In the case of The Protector, * it was held that the war began in the Gulf States at the date of the proclamation of intended blockade of their ports by the President. That was the first public act of the executive in which the existence of the war was officially recognized, and to its date the courts look to ascertain the eommencerpent of the war. *106 And, so far as the operation of the statutes of limitation in the several States is concerned, to determine the period which must be deducted for the pendency of the war from the limitation prescribed, it was held in the same case that the war continued until proclamation was in like manner officially made of its close. This is the extent of the decisions of this court. * It is well known that before such official proclamation was made courts of the United States were held in the several-States which had been engaged in the rebellion, and their jurisdiction to hear and determine the cases brought in them, as well before as after such proclamation, is not open to controversy. Judgment affirmed. Footnotes [*] 12 Wallace, 700. [*] Brown v. Hiatts, 15 Wallace, 184; Adger v. Alston, Ib. 560.