Railroad Company v. Richmond

Mr. Justice FIELD, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court, as follows: There is no question about the power of the Dubuque and Sioux City Railroad Company to make the contract in controversy with the elevator company; and if there were any, it would not be one within our province, upon the present appeal, to decide. The railroad company was obliged to discharge the grain it carried in its cars at the terminus of its road; and in securing the use of an elevator it provided the least expensive and the most expeditious mode for that purpose. The period for which the contract should be made, like other contracts for service, was one which rested in the discretion of the companies. No rule of law limited the period of its continuance. The occurrence of subsequent events, rendering it of more or less value to either of the parties, could not affect its validity or justify any violation of its provisions. The plaintiffs in error contend — we quote their own language — “that the contract sued on in this action is repuguant to the commercial power of Congress, as exercised in the passage of the acts of June 15th, 1866, and July 25th, 1866, and in contravention of the public policy established *589 thereby.” The act- of Congress of June 15th, 1866, authorized every railroad company in the United States, whose road was operated by steam, and its successors and assigns, to carry upon and over its road, boats, bridges, and ferries, all passengers, troops, government supplies, mails, freight, and property, on their way from one State to another State, and to receive compensation therefor, and to connect with roads of other States so far as to form continuous lines for the transportation of the same to their place of destination. The act of July 25th, 1866, authorized the construction of certain bridges over the Mississippi River, and among others a bridge connecting Dubuque with Dunleith, in the State of Illinois, and provided that the bridges, when constructed, should be free for the crossing of all trains of railroads terminating on either side of the river, for reasonable compensation. These acts were passed under the power vested in Congress to regulate commerce among the several States, and were designed to remove trammels upon transportation between difierent States, which had previously existed, and to prevent the creation of such trammels in future, and to facilitate railway transportation by authorizing the construction of bridges over the navigable waters of the Mississippi. But they were intended to reach trammels interposed by State enactments or by existing laws of Congress. They were not intended, even if it were competent for Congress to authorize any such proceeding, to invade the domain of private contracts, and annul all such as had been made on the basis of existing legislation and existing means of interstate communication. Contracts valid when made, continue valid, and capable of enforcement, so long, at least, as peace lasts between the governments of the contracting parties, notwithstanding a change in the conditions of business which originally led to their creation. The power to regulate commerce among the several States was vested in Congress in order to secure equality and freedom in commercial intercourse against discriminating State legislation; it was never intended that the power should be *590 exercised so as to interfere with private contracts not designed at the time they were made to create impediments to such intercourse. The argument of the plaintiffs in error would lead to the abrogation of all contracts of the Iowa Railroad Company which might prove from subsequent events to be more onerous than contracts made after such events had happened. A contract, for example, for the supply of coal for the engines of the company, made upon terms which were at the time reasonable, might be felt to be very hard and oppressive if, before its termination, the discovery of new fields of coal in the vicinity of the road should reduce the market price of the article one-half. To assert that the enforcement of a contract of this kind would be repugnant to the commercial power of Congress, because the expenses of transportation would be less if the contract were annulled, would not be more extraordinary than the position assumed by the appellant in the present case, and would be equally entitled to consideration. When counsel speaks of the public policy established by the acts of Congress mentioned, he must mean nothing more than that the acts were intended to facilitate commercial intercourse among the States. Undoubtedly such was the case, and it is of great public interest that such intercourse should be free and untrammelled. But if comparisons may be made with respect to a subject of this nature, we should say that the observance of good faith between parties, and the upholding of private contracts, and enforcing their obligations, are matters of higher moment and importance to the public welfare, and far more reaching in their consequences. Decree affirmed.