Tilden v. Blair

Mr. Justice STRONG delivered the opinion of the court. That the contract upon which the suit was brought'was made in Illinois must be considered as established by the findings of the Circuit Court. It is true the defendants formally accepted the draft in New York, and promised to pay at a bank in New York, but there was no operative acceptance until the draft was negotiated. They sent it back to Illinois, where it had been drawn, for the purpose of having it negotiated there. Pelton, the drawer, for whose accommodation the acceptance was given, was thus constituted the agent of the acceptors to give effect to their action. While the draft remained in his hands it was no binding contract. He had no rights as against the defendants, but he was empowered to negotiate the draft, and thereby to initiate a liability not only of himself, but also of the defendants. It was only when the instrument was negotiated that it became an accepted draft. It has long been settled that the liabilit}' of an acceptor does not arise from merely writing his name on the bill, but that it commences with the subsequent delivery to a bond fide holder, or with notice of acceptance given to such holder. † That this is so has *247 often been asserted in judicial decisions, and often in New York. * The doctrine is most reasonable. It is, therefore, quite immaterial, under the facts of this case, that the defendants resided in New York, and that they there wrote their acceptance upon the draft. In legal effect they accepted the draft in Chicago, when by their authority the drawer negotiated it, and thus caused effect to be given to their undertaking. Nor is the law of the contract changed by the fact that the acceptance was made payable in New York. The plaee of payment was doubtless designated for the convenience of the acceptors, or to facilitate the negotiation of the draft. But it is a controlling fact that before the acceptance had any operation — before the instrument became a bill, the defendants sent it to Illinois for the purpose of having it negotiated in that State — negotiated, it must be presumed, at such a rate of discount as by the law of that State was allowable. What more cogent evidence could there be that it was intended to create an Illinois bill? The ease is exactly the same as it would be if the. defendants had been residents of Chicago when the draft was drawn, 'and had accepted it at Chicago for the accommodation of the drawer, designating New York as the place of payment. It is plain, therefore, that the contract is an Illinois contract, and that the rights and liabilities of the parties must be determined according to the law of that State. By its statutes persons may contract to receive ten per cent, interest upon any debt due them, whether it be verbal or written. If they stipulate for a higher rate they forfeit the interest, but the statute expressly allows the recovery of the principal. The contract is'not declared to be void. Only so much of it is void as exacts the excessive interest. And by a legislative act passed February 12th, A.D. 1857, it is enacted as follows, viz.: “When any contract or loan shall be made in this State, or between citizens of this State and any other State or country, bearing interest at any rate which *248 was or shall be lawful according to any law of the State of Illinois, it shall and may be lawful to make the amount of principal and interest of such contract or loan payable in any other State or Territory of the United States, or in the city of London, in England, and in all such cases such contract or loan shall be deemed and considered as governed by the laws of the State of Illinois, and shall not be affected by the laws of the State or country’ where the same shall be made payable.” Provisions very similar to these are also made by the statute of February 12th, 1857. * If, then, the contract is, as we think it must be regarded, an Illinois contract, and if, therefore, the rights of the plaintiff are to be determined by the laws of that State, there can be no doubt he was entitled to judgment, and to judgment for the full face of the draft, with interest from the time it fell due. Even if the contract had been usurious, he would have been entitled to a judgment for all that the Circuit Court allowed him, for, as we have seen, the contract would not have been void, the statute expressly declaring that when usury is taken the principal debt may be recovered, while the interest reserved may not be. The case would be quite different if the law of the State made void an instrument usuriously negotiated. There was, however, no usury. And where a note or a bill is not made void by statute, mere illegality in its consideration will not affect the rights of a bond fide holder for value. † The plaintiff in this case was a bond fide purchaser of the draft. At the time of his purchase he had no notice of any equities in the drawer, or in the acceptors. There was nothing on the face of the instrument to awaken suspicion that it was accommodation paper, or that it had not been regularly and lawfully negotiated. He bought it from bill brokers, after it had been indorsed by the drawer and payee, and also by Carpenter, an apparent indorsee of the payee. That his purchase was not corrupt; that it was perfectly lawful under the law of *249 Illinois cau admit of no question. * And this is the rule everywhere uuless the note or bill is declared by statute to be void in its inception. The plaintiffs in error, therefore, have no cause of complaint. The Circuit Court gave judgment against them for the sum which the plaintiff had paid for the draft, without interest. The judgment was only too favorable to them. It should have been for the full amount of the acceptance, with interest from the time it fell due, and had the case beeu brought here by the plaintiffs below we should direct such a judgment. But the present writ presents to us only the assignments of error made by the defendants, and as they are unsustained, we can do no more than Affirm the judgment given. Footnotes [*] Sherman v. Blackman, 24 Illinois, 347; Hemenway v. Cropsey, 37 Id. 357. [*] Marquat v. Marquat, 12 New York, 336; Beach v. Cooke, 28 Id. 508; Edmonston v. McLoud, 16 Id. 543; Purchase v. Matteson, 25 Id. 211; Brownell v Winnie, 29 Id. 400; Hannay v. Pell, 3 E. D. Smith, 432. [†] Byles on Bills, 151. [*] Cook v. Litchfield, 5 Selden, 279; Lee v. Selleck, 33 New York Reps, 615, and Hyde v. Goodnow, 3 Comstock, 271. [*] Gross’s Statutes, 371-2. [†] Norris v. Langley, 19 New Hampshire, 423; Converse v. Foster, 32 Vermont, 320; Conkling v. Underhill, 3 Scammon, 388.