Michaels v. Post

*413 Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court. Debtors, owing debts to the amount of $300, who have committed any one of the acts of bankruptcy enumerated in the thirty-ninth section of the original Bankrupt Act, may be adjudged bankrupts on the petition of one or more of their creditors, the aggregate of whose debts provable under the act amounts to $250, provided such petition is filed within the period therein prescribed. By that section it is declared to be an act of bankruptcy if such a debtor shall make any assignment, gift, sale, conveyance, or transfer of his estate, property, rights, or credits, with intent to delay, defraud, or hinder his creditors, or if, being bankrupt or insolvent, or in contemplation of bankruptcy or insolvency, he shall make any payment, gift, grant, sale, conveyance, or transfer of money or other property, estate, or credits, with intent to give a preference to one or more of his creditors; and the provision is that if such a debtor shall he adjudged a bankrupt the assignee may recover back the money or other property so paid, conveyed, sold, assigned, or transferred contrary to that provision, provided the person receiving such payment or conveyance had reasonable cause to believe that a fraud on the Bankrupt Act was intended, or that the debtor was insolvent; and the further provision is that such creditor shall not be allowed to prove his debt in bankruptcy. * Proof, of the most satisfactory character, is exhibited in the record that the debtors described in the bill of complaint were, on the 1st day of December, 1869, adjudged, by the District Court of the United States for the district where the debtors resided, to be bankrupts, on the petition of the creditor therein named, and that such proceedings subsequently took place that the complainant was duly appointed the assignee of their estate. Argument to support those allegations is unnecessary, as they were admitted in opeu court, and it is equally clear that the assignee was duly qualified aud that all the estate, *414 real and personal, of the bankrupts was duly assigned and conveyed to the assignee, as required and directed by the fourteenth section of the Bankrupt Act. Nor is any discussion of those masters necessary, as they also were admitted at the hearing in the Circuit Court. Abundant proof is also exhibited to show that the bankrupts, prior to the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy, were engaged in business as retail traders, and that they were largely insolvent; that the principal means they possessed, either to pay their debts or to support their families, consisted of a stock of clothing, hats, caps and other furnishing goods for gentlemen, not much exceeding in value the sum of $4000, and that they sold and conveyed the whole of their stock of goods, on the 25th of October preceding the date of the decree by which they were adjudged-bankrupts, at the instigation and for the exclusive benefit of the appellants, who were their largest creditors. Such sale and conveyance having been made less than a month and a half before the-vendors were adjudged bankrupts, the assignee claimed that the sale and conveyance were null and void, aud that the attending circumstances were such that it became and was his duty, as such assignee, to take proper measures to cause the goods or their proceeds to be restored, as belonging to the estate of the bankrupts, and to procure, if practicable, a decree that the pur.chasing creditors should not be allowed to prove their debt against the estate of the bankrupts. Pursuant to that view the complainant instituted the present suit, in which he alleges, among other things, that the appellants held demands against the bankrupts exceeding $4000, and that the appellants becoming fearful that they should lose their claim, and being anxious to have the same paid or. secured, they, or one of them in behalf of the firm, made a visit to the bankrupts at their place of business, and "that while there they took an inventory of their stock of goods and proposed to buy them out and leave the goods in the store'of the vendors, and permit them to continue their business and to sell the goods for the vendees at such prices *415 as they, the vendors, could get for the same, and to account to the vendees at tho prices which they, the vendees, should mark the goods at the time of the sale, with the right on the part of the vendors to keep the balance for their commissions in selling the goods; that the respondents also proposed, as the complainant alleges, in order to induce their debtors to consent to the proposed arrangement, that they, the respondents, would furnish them additional goods to sell, on the same terms, as they, the debtors, should need thereafter to keep up their stock; and the further allegation is that the respondents also suggested that, in order to have the transaction “ look all right,” it would be better to have the goods transferred to some third person, naming the one to whom the goods were subsequently conveyed for their benefit. Objections were at first made by the debtors, but they finally acceded to the proposal, and assigned and transferred their entire stock of goods to the person named by the respondents, he, the nominal grantee, paying therefor the sum of $4000 in money, drafts, and his promissory notes, all of which were immediately handed over to the persons for ■whoso benefit the sale and purchase were made, and that they gave to their debtors a receipt in full of all demands. Beyond all doubt the debtors expected to remain in the possession of the goods and to be permitted to sell the same on commission, but the complainant alleges that the nominal vendee in a few days thereafter, acting under the advice and instructions of the real purchasers of the goods, made a demand of the same from the debtors, and that the latter having refused to surrender the possession, the person who made the demand sued out a writ of replevin against the debtors in possession, and succeeded in recovering the goods, which, with a few outstanding accounts, constituted tho entire property of the debtors, and that the taking away the said goods from them as aforesaid left them stripped of all means of paying their other creditors, to whom they were largely indebted, and several of whom have since proved their claims against the estate of the bankrupts. Prefaced by these allegations the complainaut charges in *416 the hill of complaint that the entire transaction of the pretended sale and transfer of.the goods and of the payment of the price by the money and notes, was but a scheme on the part of the respondents to obtain a preference over other creditors within four months before the petition in bankruptcy was filed, in violation of the express provisions of the Bankrupt Act, and that the respondents knew all about the pecuniary condition of the debtors, and knew that their assets were not equal in value to their indebtedness, and that they were insolvent. Superadded to that the complainant also charges' that the sale and transfer of the goods and the turning over of the money and notes to the respondents were not made and done in the ordinary course of the business of the debtors, and that the respondents had reasonable cause to believe at the time of the transaction that the pretended sale and transfer were made in fraud of the provisions of the Bankrupt Act. Wherefore the complainant prays that the sale and transfer may be decreed to be, in effect, a sale and transfer to the respondents, and if not, that they may be decreed to account to him, as such assignee, for the money and notes so turned over and transferred to them as aforesaid, and that the respondents may be decreed to have lost any and all claim to any share or dividend in the estate of the bankrupts. Service was made and the respondents appeared and filed an answer, as follows: (1.) They deny each and every of the allegations and statements of the answer. (2.) They allege that the vendee of the goods made the purchase of the debtors without any intention of defrauding, or in any way or manner affecting, the creditors of the vendors, and without any knowledge or information that the owners of the goods had any other creditors that could in any way be affected by the said purchase, and that the purchase was made by him with the consent and approbation of the petitioning creditor in the bankrupt proceedings. (3.) That the proceedings in bankruptcy were void and of no effect, and that they, were collusive and a fraud upon the Bankrupt Act; *417 that the petitioner in the case was not, in tact, a creditor of the bankrupts, and that the proceedings were instituted and prosecuted at the request and in the interest of the bankrupts, and with their consent, contrivance, and approbation, and by collusion with them. (4.) That the proceeds of the sale were paid over to the bankrupts, and were received by them, with the consent and approbation of the petitioning creditor, who is their father, and that he was present and consented to all that was done in respect to the sale of the goods and the disposition of the proceeds, and they deny that there are other creditors who would or could institute such proceedings agaiust the bankrupts. Evidence was taken on both sides and the parties were fully heard, and the Circuit Court entered a decree for the complainant, as follows: (1.) That the complainant recover of the respondents, principal and interest, the sum of f 4213.69 and costs of suit. (2.) That the respondents be, and they are hereby, adjudged to have lost any and all claim to any share or dividend in the property of said'bankrupts, or in any property, money, or effects obtained or to be obtained by the complainant by this decree, or from any share in the estate of the bankrupts in the hands of the complainant, as such assignee. Subsequently a final decree was entered and the respondents appealed to this court. Since that time the appellants have appeared and filed the following assignment of errors: (1.) That the Circuit Court erred in adjudging that the complainant recover of the respondents the sum mentioned in the decree, or any sum whatever. (2.) That the said court erred in adjudging that the appellants be debarred from any share in the estate of the bankrupts. (3.) That the said court erred in not deciding that the proceedings in bankruptcy were wholly void and of no effect, on the ground that the District Court had no jurisdiction of the petition, because the petitioner was not a creditor of the bankrupts. (4.) That the said court erred in not deciding that the bankrupt proceedings were wholly void and of no effect, on the ground that the proceedings were fraudulently instituted *418 and prosecuted. (5.) That the said court erred in deciding that the goods were transferred to the appellants in a manner to constitute a violation of any provision of the Bankrupt Act. Viéwed in the light of the assignment of errors, the objections to the decree of the Circuit Court embody three affirmative propositions, as follows: (1.) That the proceedings in bankruptcy were void and of no effect for the reasons which are set forth in the third and fourth assignments. (2.) That the decree is in favor of the wrong party, for the reasons set forth in the first and fifth assignments of errors. (3.) That the proofs did not warrant the court in adjudging that the respondents should be debarred from any share in the bankrupts’ estate. I. Even a slight ¡examination of the transcript will be sufficient to show that neither of the alleged errors is apparent in the record of those proceedings, nor is there anything apparent in the Record which affords any support whatever to either of the alleged objections. Instead of that the record shows that the petition in bankruptcy was in due form, and that all the proceedings antecedent to the decree adjudging the debtors to be bankrupts were regular and in strict conformity to the Bankrupt Act; nor is it pretended that there was any irregularity in the proceedings which led to the appointment of the assignee, or in his administration of- the bankrupts’ estate, or in the assignment and conveyance of the same to him as required and directed by the fourteenth section of the Bankrupt Act.- Such an objection, if made, could not be sustained, as the petition in bankruptcy is set forth at large in the transcript, and it was admitted by the respondents, in open court, that the debtors, on the day heretofore named, were adjudged bankrupts by the said District Court, upon the petition of the creditor named in the petition, and the express admission is that the adjudication was made, in the ordinary manner, upon default, and that an assignment of their effects was made, in due form, to the assignee. Every pretence, therefore, that there is any such error apparent in *419 the record is foreclosed by the stipulation contained in the transcript. Attempt is made in argument to maintain the first proposition by reference to the evidence reported in the record, but it is clear that the parts of the evidence referred to, when properly understood, afford no countenance to any such theory. What the respondents assume is that the evidence warrants the conclusion that the insolvents were not indebted to the petitioning creditor, and that the proceedings in bankruptcy were instituted and prosecuted by the petitioner in collusion and with the consent and approbation of the insolvent debtors, but it is demonstrable that a proper analysis and construction of the parts of the evidence invoked to sustain that issue will show that the whole theory is utterly destitute of any foundation. Unexplained it may be admitted that the act of the petitioning creditor in discharging his claim against his sons at the time the respondents purchased their stock of goods would afford some support to the assumed theory, but it is quite obvious that the evidence of that act, when weighed in connection with the attending circumstances, proves the very reverse of the theory it is invoked to support. Sufficient appears in the circumstances under which that discharge was given to show that it was procured by the false representations and the gross fraud and deception of the respondents, or of the senior partner of their firm, and that he was acting for the benefit of his partner as well as of himself. By the pleadings and proofs it appears that the respondents are wholesale clothing merchants, doing business in Rochester, in the State of New York, and that the insolvent debtors mentioned in the bill of complaint, prior to the sale of their stock of goods to the respondents, were retail traders engaged in business at Hudson, in the State of Michigan, owning a stock of goods consisting of such articles of merchandise as those before mentioned, of the value of $4000. They owed the respondents $4500 and were largely in debt to other creditors, amounting in the whole, as estimated by the senior partner of the respondent firm, to the sum of *420 $8000. Prior to the sale of their stock of goods to the respondents, or about the time they commenced business, they borrowed $2500 of their father, no part of which was evei paid, except the sum of $300 of the principal. Enough appears to show that the respondent firm became fearful that their debtors would not be able either to pay their debts or to continue their business, and that it was very desirable to enforce payment or to procure security. Doubtless it was such motives that induced the s'enior partner to make a trip to the place where the insolvent debtors were doing business. Before going there, however, he made a short visit to his brother-in-law, who resides forty miles beyond the place where his insolvent debtors lived. As shown in the proofs, on his return he called at the store of his debtors, the elder of the two being present, the other being sick at his dwelling-house. Conversation ensued in respect to the pecuniary condition of the debtor firm, and the creditor informed the partner present that he came to look over their matters, and he was permitted to examine the goods on hand and to look over their books. Estimates were made by each of them as to the value of the stock, and as they differed in opinion as to its value, they concluded to make an inventory of the same, which was done, and they also computed the debts of the debtor firm and found that their indebtedness amounted to $8000, including the amount due to their father. Having completed the examination of the goods and of the books, the respondent remarked that they had got only four or five thousand dollars to pay their whole indebtedness, amounting to $8000, and added to the effect that if they did not pay he should remain, and on Monday would throw them into bankruptcy. He did remain, and on the following day (Sunday) dined with his debtors at their dwelling-house, the junior member of the firm being still confined to the houses Monday came, but he did not attempt to institute proceedings in bankruptcy but proposed that they should sell their whole stock of goods to some third person, to be named by him, for the .benefit of his firm, and to induce the debtors to accept the *421 proposal he accompanied it with the assurance that they, the debtors, should remain in possession of the goods, as the agents of the purchasers, to sell the goods on commission, as alleged in the bill of complaint, aud that his firm or their agent, the nominal purchaser, would, from time to time, furnish thefii with additional goods to replenish their stock, to be held and sold by the insolvent debtors on the same terms. Embarrassed as the owners of the goods were, they were pretty easily persuaded by the threats of the respondent and by the false aud fraudulent promises and assurances, made in behalf of the respondents, to accept the deceptive, alluring, and fraudulent proposals. Objections, indeed, were at first made by the owners of the goods, and one of them inquired of his wily creditor what they should do when their other creditors presented their bills for payment; but the artful negotiator soon silenced every misgiving of that sort by the fraudulent suggestion, as follows: “ Pay no attention to them; they can’t collect anything.” Difficulties in that quarter having been overcome, it only remained to dispose of the debt which the young men owed to their father. Expedients to accomplish that end were soon devised by the unscrupulous creditor. He advised the young men to communicate with their father, and that he and they, or one of them, should immediately go to the place of the father’s residence in order to induce him to relinquish his claim, so that the proposed arrangement could be safely carried into effect. Measures were immediately adopted to notify the father and the brother-in-law of the respondent, who resided in the same place, of their intended visit, for which purpose the respondent sent a telegram to his brother-in-law, of the following terms: “Expect me next train. Tell the lawyer to be in his office.” Information of the intended visit was also communicated to the father by the elder son, who was authorized to act for his partner as well as for himself. On their arrival at the depot of the place of destination they were met by the brother-in-law of the respondent, -who *422 had previously been designated as “the third person” to whom the stock of goods was to be conveyed. Notice of their arrival was given to the father by his son, and they went immediately to the office of the attorney-at-law, referred to in the telegram sent by the respondent, and there they met the respondent and his brother-in-law. Nothing remained to be done to render the scheme successful except to dispose of the debt of the father. Plausible arguments to promote that purpose were presented by the respondent. He commenced the conversation by artful explanations to show that the arrangement. suggested was essential to save the insolvent debtors from ruin, saying that the boys were in a bad condition; that he was anxious to help them; that he did not want to see them thrown out of business. Inquiry was then made of him by the father of the debtors, what he proposed to do; to which he promptly replied to the effect following: that he proposed to buy the stock of goods and run the store' himself, through a third party, retaining the young men to conduct the business the same as they had done; that he and his partner would restock the store with such goods as they should need, and keep it stocked for the time proposed to the debtors, and repeated all the promises and assurances previously made and given to the insolvent debtors, among which were the promise and assurance that the debtors should remain in possession of .the goods and be constituted the agents of the purchasers to sell the same, and that they should receive to their own use the net profits of the sales, and should also have their living out of the business. Beyond all doubt these insidious remarks were intended as an introduction to the proposition to be made to the father of the debtors, which was that in order to effect the arrangement it would be necessary that he should withdraw his claim, so that the purchasers would not be exposed to any trouble in carrying out the proposal, until they should get their pay, when the goods should revert to the debtors. Alluring and plausible as these suggestions were to the father *423 of the insolvent young men, still he inquired in reply whether he ought not to have some writing to insure the performance of the stipulations on the part of the purchasers of the goods, but the respondent immediatelj’ remarked that nothing of the kind was necessary; that he had always done by the boys as he agreed and always intended to do so. Suffice it to say that the colloquy was continued for some time, during which one or two writings were drawn, which were destroyed because they were not satisfactory, and the negotiation terminated in the adoption of the original proposal made by the respondent, without any writing being given to secure the promises and assurances given, either to the father or the owners of the stock of goods. They, the owners of the goods, executed a bill of sale of the same to the brother-in-law of the respondent, the price being fixed at $3482.34, and he paid the consideration by a draft for $500, a check for $170.59, cash $200, and three notes signed by the nominal purchaser, each for the sum of $870.60. Care was taken at the time that the whole consideration, including the draft, check, money, and notes, should be delivered to the representative of the insolvent debtors, but the evidence 6hows that he, the debtor, immediately passed over the whole amount to the respondent, who gave a discharge of the debt of his firm. By this contrivance the respondent, through his brother-in-law, became the purchaser of all the stock in trade belonging to the insolvent debtors, which he accepted as a full payment of the debt due to his firm. Agreeably to the arrangement the father of the debtors also withdrew his claim and executed a discharge to his sons for the same without being paid even to the amount of a dollar. Steeped in fraud as the transaction was, the court here does not hesitate to decide that the discharge procured from the father of his debt against his so'ns is null and void, and that when he found that all the promises and assurances made and given by the respondent were broken, and that they were evidently never intended to be performed, he had a right to regard his debt as in full force. Proof of a more *424 satisfactory character to establish that proposition can hardly be imagined than that which is exhibited in the record. Before the week elapsed the nominal purchaser of the goods visited the bankrupts at their place of business, and pretending that he had been deceived by them in respect to 'a lien on the goods, procured from them an assignment of their books, and failing to induce them to turn over to him the only cow they owned, he demanded the goods, and the debtors having refused to deliver the same, he sued out a writ of replevin and took the same into his possession, leaving them stripped of everything except the cow, which they refused to convey. Examined in connection with the attending circumstances it is manifest that the discharge of the debt procured from the father is null and void, because it was obtained by gross deception, misrepresentation, and shameless fraud. Mingled threats and promises induced the insolvent debtors to accept the proposal of the respondent, and every candid and impartial investigator of the facts given in evidence must admit that it was the same appliances strengthened by the desire of the father that his sons might be able to continue in business that induced him to execute the discharge. Twenty-two hundred dollars of the principal lent by him to his sous were still due to him, and he was not paid one dollar for the discharge on the occasion. Nor is there any better foundation for the charge that the proceedings in bankruptcy were instituted and prosecuted in collusion with the bankrupts and with their consent and approbation, as the charge is not supported by any satisfactory evidence. II. Suppose that is so, still it is insisted that the complainant is not entitled to maintain the suit because the decree adjudging the debtors to be bankrupts was procured by fraud; Support to that proposition is not found in any defect in the decree of the District Court where it was entered, nor in any of the proceedings which led to it, nor is any reference madfe in the assignment of errors to the evidence invoked to establish the proposition, unless it be to the charge *425 that the insolvent debtors were not indebted to the petitioning creditor, which has already been shown to be without any just foundation. Defects of the kind should be specificallj- pointed out, and if they consist of matters of fact, the evidence to support the assignment should be the subject of distinct reference; but the court is not inclined to rest the decision upon any imperfections in the assignment of errors. Influenced by that determination the whole evidence reported has been examined, and our conclusion is that the proposition is not proved. Nor is the court inclined to stop there, as we are all of the opinion that the decree of the District Court in such a case is conclusive of the fact decreed, unless when it is called in question iu the court where it was entered or by some direct proceeding in some other court of competent jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is certainly conferred upon the District Court in such a case, if the petition presented sets forth the required facts, and the court upon proof of service thereof finds the facts set forth in the petition to be true; and it is equally certain that the District Court has jurisdiction of all acts, matters, and things to be done under and in virtue of the bankruptcy until the final distribution and settlement of the estate of the bankrupt and the close of the proceedings. Power, it is true, is vested in the Circuit Courts in certain cases to revise the doings of the District Courts, and in certain other cases an appeal is allowed from the District Court to the Circuit Court, but it is a sufficient answer to every suggestion of that sort that no attempt was made in this case to seek a revision of the decree in any other tribunal. Nothing of the kind is suggested, nor can it be, as the record shows a regular decree, unrevised and in full force. Grant that and still the proposition is submitted that it may be assigned for error that it was procured by fraud, and that such an assignment is valid, even though the decree was introduced as collateral evidence in a suit at law or in equity. But the court here is entirely of a different opinion, *426 as the District Courts are created "by an act of Congress which confers and defines .their jurisdiction, from which it follows that decrees rendered in pursuance of the power conferred are entitled in this court to the same force and effect as the judgments or decrees of any domestic tribunal, so long as they remain unreversed or not annulled. * Foreign judgments, by the rules of the common law, were only primd fade evidence of the debt adjudged to be due to the plaintiff, and every such judgment was open to examination, not only to show that the court in which it was rendered had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter, but also to show that the judgment was fraudulently obtained. Domestic judgments, under the rules of the common law, could not be collaterally impeached or called in question if rendered in a court of competent jurisdiction. † It could only be done directly by writ of error, petition for new trial, or by bill in chancery. ‡ Third persons only, says Saunders, could set up the defence of fraud or collusion, and not the parties to the record, whose only relief was in equity, except in the case of a judgment obtained on a- cognovit or a warrant of attoruey. § Judgments of any court, it is sometimes said, may be impeached by strangers to them for fraud or collusion, but the proposition as stated is subject to certain limitations, as it is only those strangers who, if the judgment is given full credit and effect, would be prejudiced in regard to some pre-existing right who are permitted to set up such a defence. Defences of the kind may be set up by such strangers. Hence the rule that whenever a judgment or decree is procured through the fraud of either of the parties, or by the collusion of both, for the purpose of defrauding some third person, such third person may escape from the injury thus attempted *427 by showing, even in a collateral proceeding, the fraud or collusion by which the judgment was obtained. * Third persons only, however, can set up such a defence, as the rule is well settled that neither the parties nor those entitled to manage the cause or to appeal from the judgment are permitted to make such defence in any collateral issue. † Unquestionably a judgment may be impeached for the purpose of showing that it was procured by the debtor for the purpose of avoiding the operation of the Bankrupt Act. Evidence for that purpose is admissible to show — (l.j That-it was procured within four mouths prior to filing the petition in bankruptcy, and with a view of giving the plaintifi'-a preference over the other creditors. (2.) That the debtor was insolvent at the time. (3.) That the plaintiff had at the time reasonable cause to believe that the defendant was insolvent, and that he procured the judgment to give the plaintiff such a preference. ‡ Competent evidence is admissible to prove those facts, but a judgment is no more liable to collateral impeachment in proceedings under the Bankrupt Act, except for the purpose of showing that the judgment in question was designed as a means of avoiding the equal distribution of the debtor’s estate among his creditors, than it is to such impeachment in the courts where it was rendered. § Power to establish uniform laws upon the subject of bankruptcy throughout the United States is conferred upon Congress, and Congress having exercised the power it has be *428 come an exclusive power. By the act of Congress the juris, diction to adjudge such insolvent debtors as are described in the thirty-ninth section of the act to be bankrupts is vested in the District Courts, and it follows that such a judgment is entitled to the same verity, and is no more liable to be impeached collaterally than any other judgments or decrees rendered by courts possessing general jurisdiction, which of itself shows that the ease before the court is controlled by the general rule that where it appears that the court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and that the defendant was duly served with process or voluntarily appeared aud made defence, the judgment is conclusive and is not open to any inquiry upon the merits. * Exactly the same rule is applicable to the ease before the court, as it is clear that the District Court had jurisdiction of the petition and that there is not even a suggestion that the notice required by law was not given as the law directs. † Such a decree adjudging a debtor to be bankrupt is in the nature of a decree in rent as respects the status of the party, and in case the court rendering it has jurisdiction it is only assailable by a direct proceeding in a competent court, if due notice was given and the adjudication is correct in forin. ‡ III. Preferences as well as fraudulent conveyances, if made within four months before the filing of the petition by or against the bankrupt, are forbidden by the Bankrupt Act; but three things must concur in order that the transac *429 tion may come within the prohibition and be affected by it as an illegal payment, security, or transfer: (1.) That the payment, pledge, assignment, transfer, or conveyance was made by the bankrupt, withiu the period mentioned, and with a view to give a preference to one or more of his creditors, or to a person having a claim against him, or who was under some liability on his account. (2.) That the person making the payment, pledge, assignment, transfer, or conveyance was insolvent or in contemplation of insolvency at the time the preference was secured. (3.) That the person receiving such payment, pledge, assignment, transfer, or conveyance, or to be benefited thereby, had reasonable cause to believe that the person was insolvent and that the payment, pledge, assignment, transfer, or conveyance was made in fraud of the provisions of the Bankrupt Act. * Creditors are forbidden to receive such a preference from such a debtor, and the provision is that if such a debtor shall be adjudged a bankrupt the assignee may recover back the money or other property so paid, conveyed, sold, assigned, or transferred contrary to that act, provided the person receiving such payment or conveyance had reasonable cause to believe that a fraud on the Bankrupt Act was intended, or that the debtor was insolvent; and the farther provision is, that such creditor shall not be allowed to prove his debt in bankruptcy. † Evidently that part of the decree which is the subject of the third complaint is founded upon that provision, and inasmuch as the facts exhibited in the record bring the case in all respects within the regulation there prescribed, it is clear that it was competent for the Circuit Court to render such a decree, and the court here sees no reason to question the action of the Circuit Court. decree Footnotes [*] 14 Stat. at Large, 536. [*] Parker v. Danforth, 16 Massachusetts, 299; Pecks v. Barnum, 24 Vermont, 76; 2 Smith’s Leading Cases, 7th edition, 814. [†] Lord v. Chadbourne, 42 Maine, 429. [‡] Cammell v. Sewell, 3 Hurlstone & Norman, 617. [§] 2 Saunders on Pleading and Evidence, part 1, p. 63; Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wallace, 304. [*] Crosby v. Leng, 12 East, 409; Insurance Co. v. Wilson, 34 New York 281; Hall v. Hamlin, 2 Watts, 354; Pond v. Makepeace, 2 Metcalf, 116; Sidensparker v. Same, 52 Maine, 488. [†] Homer v. Fish, 1 Pickering, 435; Railroad Co. v. Sparhawk, 1 Allen, 448; Atkinson v. Allen, 12 Vermont, 624; Granger v. Clark, 22 Maine, 130; Hammond v. Wilder, 25 Vermont, 346; Coit v. Haven, 30 Connecticut, 198; Hollister v. Abbott, 11 Foster, 448; 2 Philips on Evidence, 80, note 291 (5th Am. ed.); Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wallace, 306; Peck v. Woodbridge, 3 Day, 30. [‡] Buchanan v. Smith, 16 Wallace, 277; Wager v. Hall, 16 Id. 590. [§] Palmer v. Preston, 45 Vermont, 159. [*] 2 Smith’s Leading Cases (7th ed.), p. 622 Freeman on Judgments (2d ed.), sec. 606; Hampton v. McConnel, 3 Wheaton, 234; Nations v. Johnson, 24 Howard, 203; D’Arcy v. Ketchum, 11 Id. 166; Webster v. Reid, Ib. 460. [†] In re Robinson, 6 Blatchford, 255; Wimberly v. Hurst, 33 Illinois, 172; Corey v. Ripley, 57 Maine, 69; Ocean Bank v. Olcott, 46 New York, 15; Fortman v. Rottier, 8 Ohio State, 556; Revell v. Blake, Law Reports, 7 C. P. 308. [‡] Way v. Howe, 108 Massachusetts, 503; Ex parte Wieland, Law Reports, 5 Chancery Appeals, 489; Woodruff v. Taylor, 20 Vermont, 65; Mankin v. Chandler, 2 Brockenbrough, 126; Shawhan v. Wherritt, 7 Howard, 643, Imrie v. Castrique, 8 C. B., New Series, 407; Carter v. Dimmock, 4 House of Lords Cases, 346. [*] Wager v. Hall, 16 Wallace, 595; Scammon v. Cole, 5 National Bankruptcy Register, 259. [†] 14 Stat. at Large, 536.