Morton v. Nebraska

Mr. Justice DAVIS delivered the opinion of the court. The policy of the government since the acquisition of the Northwest Territory and the inauguration of our land system, to reserve salt springs from sale, has been uniform. The aet of 18th May, 1796, ‡ the first to authorize a sale of the domain ceded by Virginia, is the basis of our present rectangular system of surveys. That act required every surveyor to note in his field-book the true situation of all mines, salt licks, and salt springs: and reserves for the future disposal of the United States a well-known salt spring on the Scioto River, and every other salt spring which should be discovered. These reservations were continued by the act of May 10th, 1800,§ which created land districts in Ohio, with registers and receivers, and authorized sales by them; the preceding act having recognized the governor of the Northwest Terri *668 tory and the Secretary of the Treasury as the agents for the sale of the lands. And the same policy was observed when provision was made in 1804 for the disposal of the lands in the Indiana Territory (embracing what is now Illinois and Indiana). * It was then declared “ that the several salt springs within said Territory, with as many contiguous sections to each as shall be deemed necessary by the President, shall be reserved for tlie further disposal of the United States.” Without referring particularly to the different acts of Congress on the subject, it is enough to say that all the saliues in the Virginia cession wore reserved from sale and afterwards granted to the several States embraced in the ceded Territory. Congress, in the disposition of 1he public lauds in the Mississippi Territory, † and in the Louisiana purchase, preserved the policy which it had applied to the country obtained from Virginia. Over all the territory acquired from Prance the general land system was extended. The same rules which were prescribed by law for the survey and sale of lands east of the Mississippi River were transferred to this new acquisition. ‡ At the first sale of lands in this region which the President was authorized to make, salt springs and lands contiguous thereto were excepted. § And this exception was continued when, in 1811, a new land district was created. Prior to this time no portion of the country north of the State of Louisiana had been brought into market. The act of March 3d, 1811, authorized this to be done, but the President, in offering the lands for sale, was directed to except salt springs, lead mines, and lands contiguous thereto, which were reserved for the future disposal of the States to be carved out of this immense territory, which included the present State of Nebraska. || And so particular was Congress not to depart from this policy, that in giving lands, in 1815, to the sufferers by the New Madrid earthquake, every lead mine and salt spring were excluded from location. Indeed, in all the acts creating new hind districts in the territory now occupied by the States of Arkansas and *669 Missouri, the manner of selling the public lands is not changed, nor is a sale of salines in any instance authorized. On the contrary, they incorporate the same reservations and exceptions which are contained in the act of March od, 1811. In all of them the act of 18th May, 1796, is the rule of conduct for all surveyors-general and their deputies, as the act of 10th May, 1800, is the rule for all registers, requiring the'm to exclude from sale all salt springs, with the sections containing them. In this state of the law of saline reservations, the act of 22d July, 1854, was passed. It is by no means certain that the act of March Od, 1811, did not work the reservation of every saline in the Louisiana purchase, but without discussing this point, it is enough to say that the act of 1854 leaves no doubt of the intention of Congress to extend to the territory embraced by the States of Kansas and Nebraska the same system that had been applied to the rest of the Louisiana purchase. There was certainly no reason why a long-established policy, which had permeated the laud system of the country, should be abandoned. On the contrary, there was every inducement to continue for the benefit of the States thereafter to be organized the policy which had prevailed since the first settlement of the Northwestern Territory. In the admission of Ohio and other States, Congress had made liberal grants of land, including the salt springs. This it was enabled to do by reserving these springs from sale. Without this reservation it is plain to be seen there would have been no-springs to give away, for every valuable saline deposit would have been purchased as ’soon as it was offered for sale. An intention to abandon a policy which had secured to the States admitted before 1854 donations of great value, cannot be imputed to Congress unless the law on the subject admits of no other construction. But the law of 1854, * instead of manifesting an intention to abandon this policy, shows a purpose to continue it. It was the first law under which lands were surveyed in Ne *670 braska, offered at public sale, and so made subject to private sale by entry. By it surveyors-general for New Mexico, aud for Kansas and Nebraska, were appointed, with the usual powers aud duties of such officers. And although there are provisions relating to New Mexico applicable to that Territory alone, yet the leading purpose of this act was to bring into market, as soon as practicable, the lands of the United States in all of these Territories. In New Mexico this could not be done as soon as in Kansas, or Nebraska, on account of the policy adopted of donations to actual settlers, who should remove there before the 1st of January, 1858, and because of the necessity of segregating the Spanish and Mexican claims from the mass of the public domain. For this reason, doubtless, local land offices were not created in New Mexico, but they were in Kansas and Nebraska, and registers and receivers appointed, with the powers and duties of similar officers in other land offices of the Uuited States. And the President was authorized to cause the lands, when surveyed, to be exposed to sale, from time to time, in the same manner, and upon the same terms and conditions, as the other public lands of the United States. If there were no other provisions in the law than we have enumerated, we should hesitate to say, in view of the limitation on sales prescribed by law wherever public lands had been offered for sale, that they did not of themselves work a reservation of the land in controversy. In conducting the public sales the register always reserved salines, as it was his duty to do, when marked on the plats, and this was never omitted except by the neglect of the surveyors-general or their deputies. But the fourth section of the act removes all doubt upon that subject. That section declares that none of the provisions of this act shall extend to mineral or school lauds, salines, military, or other reservations, or lands settled on or occupied for purposes of trade aud commerce. It is contended that this seetiou applies to the donations, conceded in the preceding sections, to actual settlers in New Mexico. But why make this restriction ? To do it would require the importation of the word (foregoing), so that the *671 section would read, none of the (foregoing) provisions shall extend to salines or mineral lands. There is no authority to make this importation, and in this way subtract from the general words of the section. The language of the section is imperative and leaves no room for construction. Besides, why should an intention be imputed to Congress to exclude actual settlers from saline lands, but leave them open to private entry by speculators. The legislation upon the subject of public lauds has always favored the actual settlers, but the construction contended for would discriminate against them, and in favor of a class of persons whose interests Congress has never been swift to promote. Apart from this, however, the purpose which Congress had in view is to be found in the unbroken line of policy in reference to saline reservations, from 1796 to the date of this act. To perpetuate this policy, and apply it equally to all the lands of the three Territories, was the controlling consideration for the incorporation of the section, and although the words of the section are loose and general, their meaning is plain enough when taken in connection with the previous legislation on the subject of salines. It cannot be supposed, without an express declaration to that effect, that Congress intended t.o permit the sale of salines in Territories soon to be organized into States, and thus subvert a long-established policy by which it had been governed in similar cases. If anything were needed to show that the fourth section did reserve salines from sales, it can be found in the act of 3d of March, 1857, * rearranging the land districts in Nebraska. This act excepts from sale such lands “ as may have been reserved.” This is a declaration that lands had been reserved, and obviously it is a legislative construction of the fourth section of the act of 1854, for nowhere else, except by implication, had there been reservations of any sort in the Territory of Nebraska. Besides this, the Nebraska enabling act of April 10th, 1864, † affords still further evidence that the act of 1854 was *672 intended to reserve salines. The purpose of reserving them was to preserve them for the use of the future Slates, and no State had been organized without a grant of salt springs. In some of the States the grant was of all within their boundaries, but. on the admission of Missouri, and since, the number was limited to twelve. This number, with a certain quantity of contiguous lands, were granted to Nebraska on her admission. In doing this Congress must have assumed that the springs had been reserved from sale, for if this had not been done, the presumption is there would have been nothing for the grant to operate upon. It may be true, that lands only fit for agriculture will remain a long time unentered, but this would never be the case with lands whose surface was covered over with salt. It would be an idle thing to make a grant of such lands, if there had been a previous right of entry conceded to individuals. This was in the mind of Congress, and induced the reservation in the act of 1854, by means of which Nebraska could be placed on an equal footing with other States in like situation. But it is said the locations in question are ratified by the proviso to the section granting the salt springs. This proviso was as follows: “Provided that no salt spring or lauds, the right whereof is now vested in any individual or individuals, or which hereafter shall be confirmed or adjudged to any individual or individuals, shall by this act be granted to said State.” This provision, with an unimportant change in phraseology, was first introduced into the enabling act for Missouri, * and exactly similar provisions with the one iii question were inserted in the acts relating to Arkansas and Kansas. † The real purpose of the proviso is to be found in the situation of the country embraced in the Louisiana purchase. The treaty of Paris of April 30th, 1803, by which the “province of Louisiana” was acquired, stipulated for the protection of private property. This comprehended titles which were complete as well as those awaiting completion, ‡ *673 and Congress adopted the appropriate means for ascertaining and confirming them. They were numerous and of various grades, and covered town sites and every species of lands. In Missouri, as the records of this court show, they were quite extensive, and when she was admitted into the Union many of these titles were perfect and still a large number imperfect. In this condition of things Congress thought proper in granting the salt springs to the State to say, that no salt springs, the right whereof noio is or shall be confirmed or adjudged to any individual, shall pass under the grant to the State. Whether this legislation was necessary to save salt spriugs claimed under the French treaty, it is not important to determine, but manifestly it had this purpose in view and nothing more. It could not refer to salt springs not thus claimed, because all entry upon them was unlawful, on account of previous reservation. It speaks of confirmations which had been made and those which were awaiting governmental action, and in this condition were all the titles the United States were bound to protect. Although the words employed in the first division of the proviso to the saline grant to Nebraska are not the same as those used in the Missouri grant, they mean the same thing. There can be no difference between a right which has been confirmed and one which is now vested. Both are perfect in themselves, and refer to completed claims, while the last division in each proviso has reference to claims in course of completion but not finally passed upon. This proviso can have little significance in the enabling act of Nebraska, nor indeed in many other enabling acts, but Congress doubtless thought proper to introduce it out of the superabundance of caution, as there could be no certainty that in purchased or conquered territory, however remote from settlement, there might not be private claims protected by treaty stipulations to which it would be applicable. It cannot be invoked, however, for the protection of these plaintiffs. When a vested right is spoken of in a statute, it means a right lawfully vested, and this excludes the locations in question, for they were made on lauds reserved from sale or *674 entry. If Congress had intended to ratify invalid entries like these, they would have used the language of ratification. Instead of doing this, the language actually employed negatives any idea that Congress intended to give validity to any unauthorized location on the public lands. The Pre-emption Act of the 4th of September, 1841, * declares that “ no lands on wfiich are situated any known. salines or mines shall be liable to entry;” differing in this respect from the acts of 1796 and 1854, which reserve every “ salt spring ” and “ salines.” The salines in this case were not hidden as mines often are, but were so inerusted with salt that they résembled “ snow-covered lakes,” and were consequently not subject to pre-emption. Can it be supposed that a privilege denied to pre-emptors in Nebraska was conceded in the act of 1864 to persons less meritorious? It appears by the record, that on the survey of the Nebraska country, the salines in question were *noted bn the field-books, but these notes were not .transmitted to the registers’ general plats, and it is argued that the failure to do this gave a right of entry. But not so, for the words of the statute are general and reserve from sale or location all salines, whether marked on the plats or not. What effect the statute might have on salines bidden in the earth, not known to the surveyor or the locator, but discovered after entry, may become a question in another case. It does not arise in this. Here, the salines were not only noted on the field-books, but were palpable to the eye. Besides this, the locators of the warrants, before they made their entries, were told of the character of the lands. Indeed, it is quite clear that the lands were bntered solely on account of the rich deposits of salt which they were supposed to contain. It does not strengthen the case of the plaintiffs that they obtained certificates of entry, and that patents were subsequently issued ou these certificates. It has been repeatedly decided by this court that patents for lands which have been *675 previously granted, reserved from sale, or appropriated, are void. * The executive officers had no authority to issue á patent for the lands in controversy, because they were not subject to entry, having been previously reserved, and this want of power may be proved by a defendant in an action at law. † Judgment affirmed. Footnotes [§] Ib. 391. [‡] 1 Stat. at Large, 464. [§] 2 Id. 73. [*] 2 Stat. at Large, 277. [‡] 2 Id. 324. [†] Ib. 548; 3 Id. 489. [||] Ib. 665, § 10 [*] 10 Stat. at Large, 308. [*] 11 Stat. at Large, 186. [†] 13 Id. 47. [*] 3 Stat. at Large, 547, § 6. [†] 5 Id. 58; 12 Id. 126. [‡] Soulard v. United States, 4 Peters, 511. [*] 5 Stat. at Large, 456. [*] Polk v. Wendell, 9 Cranch, 99; Minter v. Crommelin, 18 Howard, 88; Reichart v. Felps, 6 Wallace, 160. [†] Minter v. Crommelin, supra.