In re N. B.

HUDSON, Judge. Respondent parents appeal an adjudication order finding abuse, neglect and dependency and a disposition order denying any reunification services and visits, arguing that the court considered inadmissible hearsay, prejudicially delayed entry of the order, and violated respondent parents’ due process rights with a deficient transcript of proceedings. For the reasons discussed below, we dismiss respondent parents’ appeal as moot. After respondents appealed the 17 October 2002 adjudication order to this Court, the trial court on 20 October 2003 entered a judgment terminating the parental rights of both respondents. In the order terminating respondents’ parental rights, the trial judge specifically noted that, while she relied on some of the evidence presented at the adjudication hearing, she did not rely on the previous adjudication of abuse and neglect itself. Instead, she found two additional grounds to support termination: 1) leaving N.B. in foster care for twelve months without making reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to her removal, and 2) failing to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of N.B.’s care, although physically and financially able to do so. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-llll(a)(2) and (a)(3) (2001). This Court has recently addressed the very situation presented here, and held that a pending appeal of an adjudication of abuse and neglect is made moot by a subsequent termination of parental rights based on independent grounds. In re Stratton, 159 N.C. App. 461, 583 S.E.2d 323 (2003). “A case is ‘moot’ when a determination is sought on a matter which, when rendered, cannot have any practical effect on the existing controversy.” Roberts v. Madison County Realtors Ass’n, 344 N.C. 394, 398-99, 474 S.E.2d 783, 787 (1996). Because courts will not determine abstract propositions of law, a case should be dismissed “[w]henever during the course of litigation it develops that the relief sought has been granted or that the questions originally in controversy between the parties are no longer at issue.” Dickerson Carolina, Inc. v. Harrelson, 114 N.C. App. 693, 697, 443 S.E.2d 127, 131, disc. review denied 337 N.C. 691, 448 S.E.2d 520 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where an appellant has “received a new, independent adjudication of the neglect issue and any resolution of the issues raised on this appeal will have no practical effect on the existing controversy,” the appeal should be dismissed. Stratton, 159 N.C. App. at 464, 583 S.E.2d at 325. [184] While we acknowledge that the issues raised here could regain life were the subsequent termination of parental rights to be reversed, we are unable to distinguish this case from Stratton, and are bound to follow that decision. In re Appeal from Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989) (“Where a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided the same issue, albeit in a different case, a subsequent panel of the same court is bound by that precedent, unless it has been overturned by a higher court”). In both cases, an adjudication of neglect was followed by the termination of parental rights, based on independent grounds following a hearing by an independent judge. Thus, because the issues regarding the 17 October 2002 order have been rendered moot by the subsequent 20 October 2003 order, according to Stratton, we dismiss respondent parents’ appeal. Dismissed. Judge STEELMAN concurs. Judge TYSON dissents.