Reedy v. Scott

Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court, and after stating the case and making some general remarks proceeded as follows: The following assignment of errors is the assignment made: 1st. That the Circuit Court erred in holding that the plea of the respondent was true and sufficient with respect to the matters alleged in the supplemental bill. *364 2d. That the said court erred in finding that the equity of the case with respect to the matters set forth in the supplemental bill is with the respondent. In the case before us all necessity for any discussion of the charges contained in the original bill of complaint is superseded, as the assignment of errors does not impugn in that respect or call in question the correctness of the decision or decree of the Circuit Court. Such an assignment of errors, if it had been filed, would have been utterly unavailing, for the reason that the surrender of a patent to the commissioner within the sense of the provision, means an act which, in judgment of law, extinguishes the patent. It is a legal cancellation of it, and hence the patent can no more be the foundation for the assertion of a right, after the surrender, than could an act of Congress which has been repealed, and it has frequently been determined that suits pending which rest upon an act of Congress fall with the repeal of it. Antecedent suits depend upon the patent existing at the time they were commenced, and unless it exists and is in force at the time of the trial and judgment, the suits fail. * "Where the patent expires and is extended pending the litigation, and the infringement by the respondent is continued in respect to the extended patent, a supplemental bill is a proper pleading to prolong the suit, as in that state of the case the complainant may well claim, if he is the original and first inventor of the improvement, to recover of the respondent the gains and profits made by the infringement, both before and subsequent to the extension, but the rule is otherwise where the original patent is surrendered, as the effect of the surrender is to extinguish the patent, and hence it can no more be the foundation for the assertion of a right than can a legislative act which has been repealed without any saving clause of pending actions. Consequently the infringement of the reissued patent becomes a new cause *365 of action for which, in the absence of any agreement or implied acquiescence of the respondent, no remedy can be had except by the commencement of a new suit. Instances, however, may be found where in such a case the complainant sought his remedy in a supplemental bill, no objection having been made by the respondent, and such examples induce the court to disregard the irregularity in\ this case, inasmuch as neither the respondent or the court below appear to have regarded it as a matter of any importance. Instead of that the complainant was permitted to file his supplemental bill charging infringement as in case of an extended patent, and the respondent making no objection to the regularity of the bill, refiled the plea which he filed to the original bill of complaint, accompanied with a general denial of every material allegation contained in the supplemental bill, as subsequently amended by leave of the court. Subsequently the proofs exhibited were taken, and the parties having been heard the court entered the aforesaid decree deciding the whole case, as more fully set forth on the record. None of the proofs were taken before the reissued patent was granted, nor until after the supplemental pleadings were completed. These suggestions are sufficient to show that every irregularity, whether on the one side or the other, was waived before the decree of the Circuit Court was entered, and that both parties understood that the question submitted to the arbitrator was whether the machine manufactured by the respondent infringed the improvement invented by the complainant. Conclusive support to that proposition is found in the fact that both parties proceeded, throughout the trial in the'Circuit Court, upon the legal ground that the reissued patent was for the same invention as that embodied in the original patent. Reissued patents are required by law to be for the same invention as that secured by the surrendered patent, and the complainant expressly alleges in this case that his reissued patent is for the same invention as the surrendered original. Nor can the court take any other view of the *366 ease, as neither the original nor the reissued patent is made a part of the record. Clear proof is exhibited that the agreement to arbitrate and the submission in form were both executed before the original patent was surrendered, and that the submission had been signed and delivered before the complainant made any effort to revoke the instrument. Sufficient has already appeared to show that the arbitrator examined the question submitted to him, and made an award that the machine manufactured by the respondent did not infringe the invention secured to the complainant in his original patent, and that he gave his reasons for the conclusion, which appear to be .satisfactory as far as can be ascertained without the means of comparing the patent of the complainant with the machine of the respondent. Such a comparison cannot be made without such means, nor can the court look out of the record for means to make the comparison. Attempt is made to avoid the force and effect of the award of the arbitrator, upon the ground that the complainant was misled in signing the agreement and that he was deprived of the opportunity to summon witnesses and to be heard in person or by counsel, but it will be sufficient to say in response to those suggestions that the proofs exhibited do not satisfactorily sustain the charges. On the contrary, enough appears to convince the court that the agreement is obligatóry and that the complainant is bound to execute the agreement and to dismiss his bill of complaint and not to molest the respondent in the manufacture of his machine. Substantial doubt cannot be entertained that the rule of decision adopted by the arbitrator is correct if he properly construed the patents. He found that the patent of the complainant was a combination of old ingredients, and that the machine manufactured by the respondent did not contain all of the ingredients embodied in the combination patented by the complainant. Nothing is exhibited in the record to show that the arbitrator erred in the construction of the patent, and if he did not, and his finding as to the *367 character of the machine manufactured by the respondent is correct, it is settled law that his decision is correct. * Arbitrators as well as courts are presumed to decide correctly until the contrary appears, and if the party desires that the decision of such a tribunal shall be re-examined by an appellate court he must see that the means for such a review is embodied in the record. Neither the patent of the complainant nor any authentic description of the machine manufactured bj7 the respondent is contained in the record, and in the absence of such-it must be presumed that the arbitrator construed the patent correctly, and that his finding in respect to the construction and mode of operation of the machine manufactured by the respondent is also correct. Judging from the character of the assignment of errors it is presumed that none of these views as applied to the matters alleged in the original bill are controverted, and the court here is of the opinion, in view of the previous explanations, that they are equally applicable to the matters alleged in the supplemental bill, for several reasons: 1st. Because the agreement to arbitrate and the submission in form were duly executed before the original patent was surrendered. 2d. Because the arbitrator proceeded to examine and to decide the question submitted without any objection from either party growing out of the surrender or reissue. 3d. Because the subsequent pleadings and proceedings in the suit show that the surrender and reissue did not have the effect to change the substantial issue in the litigation. 4th. Because the complainant alleged in his supplemental bill that, the reissued patent was for the same invention as that embodied in the original. 5th. Because the agreement to dismiss the bill of complaint, if executed by a proper decree, must include all the subsequent appendages to it and would be of itself a decision adverse to the complainant. Decree affirmed. Footnotes [*] Moffitt v. Garr, 1 Black, 273; Curtis on Patents, §§ 399, 342. [*] Gill v. Wells, 22 Wallace, 1; Gould v. Rees, 15 Id. 194; Vance v. Campbell, 1 Black, 428; Prouty v. Ruggles, 16 Peters, 341; Carver v. Hyde, Ib. 514; Brooks v. Fiske, 15 Howard, 212; Stimpson v. Railroad, 10 Id. 329.