Keyes v. Johnson

BEASLEY, Judge. Sharon A. Keyes (Plaintiff) appeals from an order granting summary judgment in favor of W. Glenn Johnson, Guardian of the Estate of Nelson T. Currin (Defendant). For the following reasons, we affirm. Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a complaint on 20 January 2011 alleging breach of contract and asking to recover legal fees incurred while she represented Defendant’s Ward, Nelson Currin (Nelson). The legal fees Plaintiff seeks to recover stem from Plaintiff’s representation of Nelson Currin in his guardianship proceeding in 2009. Plaintiff appeared before the trial court on the matter purporting to represent both Nelson and his wife Coma Lee Currin (Coma Lee). A motion to remove Plaintiff as attorney of record, alleging there was a direct conflict of interest in representing both Nelson and Coma Lee, was filed on 22 September 2009. A hearing on that motion was held on 12 November 2009, and Plaintiff was present at and participated in that hearing. By order filed 17 November 2009, the trial court allowed the motion to remove Plaintiff as attorney of record for Nelson. Defendant moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s complaint filed 20 January 2011 and on 15 June 2011. A hearing on Defendant’s motion was held on 22 August 2011. On 30 August 2011, the trial court entered an order granting Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. On 20 September 2011, Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal to this Court from the 30 August 2011 order. Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. We disagree. A motion for summary judgment shall be granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue [440] as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2011). “A trial court’s grant of summary judgment receives de novo review on appeal, and evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Sturgill v. Ashe Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 186 N.C. App. 624, 626, 652 S.E.2d 302, 304 (2007) (citing Stafford v. County of Bladen, 163 N.C. App. 149, 151, 592 S.E.2d 711, 713 (2004)). Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, sometimes referred to as “issue preclusion,” “the determination of an issue in a prior judicial or administrative proceeding precludes the relitigation of that issue in a later action, provided the party against whom the estoppel is asserted enjoyed a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in the earlier proceeding.” Whitacre Partnership v. Biosignia, Inc., 358 N.C. 1, 15, 591 S.E.2d 870, 880 (2004). In the guardianship proceeding, and in response to a motion filed by Denise Currin Matthews and Durane Currin to disqualify Plaintiff as Nelson’s attorney, the Clerk of Court entered an order on 17 November 2009 which found in part that the waiver of conflict of interest signed by Nelson to allow Plaintiff to represent both Nelson and Coma Lee “does not contain any specifics as to what conflicts either party waives and is ineffective.” The Clerk of Court further found and concluded that Plaintiff in this action had an irreconcilable conflict of interest in representing both Nelson and Coma Lee. The order additionally found and concluded that even if the conflict could be waived, Nelson was not capable of making a knowing waiver of the conflict. Plaintiff was present at the hearing on the aforementioned motion and in fact questioned the petitioners’ witnesses regarding the motion. Thus, Plaintiff enjoyed a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue. Plaintiff failed to appeal the 19 November 2009 order and therefore failed to challenge the findings of fact contained therein. Although Plaintiff contends that she could not appeal the earlier order because it was interlocutory, that argument is without merit. See Travco Hotels v. Piedmont Natural Gas Co., 332 N.C. 288, 293, 420 S.E.2d 426, 429 (1992)(recognizing that an interlocutory order granting a motion to disqualify counsel is immediately appealable because it “has immediate and irreparable consequences for both the disqualified attorney and the individual who hired the attorney”). Plaintiff cannot now ask this Court to find that she is owed payment for services under a contract that the trial court found contained a direct conflict of interest for which the waiver Plaintiff prepared was [441] ineffective. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant. Affirmed. Judge HUNTER, Robert C. dissents with separate opinion. Judge GEER concurs.