Home Ins. Co. v. City Council of Augusta

Mr. Justice Swayne delivered the opinion of the court. Under an, act of. the legislature of Georgia,-of the 19th of March, 1869, the. insurance company procured the' requisite authority to. transact, by itself or agents, the business of insurance for one year, from the 1st of January, 1874, and, at the option of the company, for sixty days longer.. The company thereupon established an office and agency in the city of Augusta, and thereafter transacted business at that place. A general law'of the State-imposed a tax of one'per cent upon the gross, amount of premiums received.- An ordinance of the city imposed a -tax of- one and a quarter per cent upon such receipts. These taxes were paid by the company without objection. On,the 5th of January, 1874, the city council passed an ordinance which imposed, further, a license tax of $250-'“on each and every fire, marine, or accidental insurance company located, having an office, or doing- business within the city of Augusta.” The bill was filed to enjoin the collection of -this tax. The Superior Court of Richmond County sustained the validity of the tax, and dismissed the bill. The Supreme Court of the State affirmed the decree. The complainant there -upon sued out á writ of error, and removed the case to this court.' *121 In the argument here, it was insisted by the defendant in error that this .court has no jurisdiction.of the case.. We will first consider this objection. The bill alleges that the ordinance imposing the tax in question is void for many reasons, and, among them, that it is in conflict with the contract clause of the Constitution of the United States. Where a judgment or decree is brought to this court by a writ of error to a. State court for review, the case, to warrant the exercise of jurisdiction- on our part, must come within one" of three categories: — 1. There must have been drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or authority exercised under, the United States; and the decision must have been against the claim which either was relied upon to maintain. 2. Or there must have been drawn in question a statute of, or authority exercised under, a State, upon the ground of repug- . nance to the Constitution,. or a law or treaty of, the United States; and the decision must have been, in favor of the validity of the State law or authority in question. 3'. Or a right must have been-claimed under the Constitution, or a treaty, or law of, or by virtue of a commission held .or authority exercised under, the United States; and the decision must have been against the right so claimed. Rev. Stat. 132, sect. 709; Sevier v. Haskell, 14 Wall. 15; Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 2 Pet. 449; McGrwyre v. The Commonwealth, 3 Wall. 385. Here there was drawn in question the authority exercised by the city council under the State in passing the ordinance imposing the tax complained of. The question raised was as to its repugnancy to the Constitution of the United States; and.-the decision was in’ favor of the -validity of .the authority 'so exercised. A right was also claimed under the Constitution of the United States. The. decision was adverse to the claim. The case is, therefore, within two of the categories we have stated. The jurisdictional objection cannot' be maintained. This brings us to the consideration of the case upon its merits. Whether the claims which give us jurisdiction áre well founded, is the question to be considered. The national Constitution (art. 1, sect. 10, clause 1) declares *122 that “ no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts.” The act of 1869, before mentioned, forbids any company to do the business of insurance in the State, without first obtaining a certificate from the comptroller-general of the State. Before obtaining such certificate, every company is required to furnish a sworn statement, setting forth certain specified particulars. Upon being satisfied of the truth of the statement, he is required to issue the certificate. He is entitled to a fee of seven dollars and a half for examining and filing each statement, and a fee of two dollars and a half for each certificate. The fifth section declares that whatever deposits, taxes, penalties, certificates, or license-fees are exacted from Georgia companies in any other State, shall be exacted from the companies of such State in Georgia. It does not appear by the record that any Georgia insurance company was doing business in New York in the year 1874. This section, therefore, does not affect the case in hand. The act contains no other allusion to the subject of taxation. It does not, therefore, circumscribe in any degree the taxing power of the State, or of any municipality within the State clothed with such authority. It left both, in this respect, standing just where they would have stood if this act had not been passed. It contained no stipulation, express or implied, that either should be thereby in any wise limited or restrained. If it were competent for the State to impose the tax of one per cent upon the gross amount of premiums received, would it not have been equally so for the State to impose a further tax, the same with that in question, and in the same way ? And if it were competent for the city council to impose the tax of one and a quarter per cent upon the same receipts, why might it not impose the further burden here in question ? If the State could impose the further tax, why not the municipality ? Is there any sensible ground of contract prohibition upon which the claim of exemption- from either can be placed ? This question must necessarily be answered in the negative. We find no semblance of a contract that' additional taxes should not be imposed. In The License Cases, 5 Wall. 462, the nature of the tax exaction here in controversy was carefully considered by this court. *123 There the revenue laws of the United States required payment in advance to be made for permission tb carry on the business of selling liquor, and of selling lottery-tickets. It was provided-that no license so granted,- or special tax so laid, should be construed to authorize any business within a State forbidden by the laws of such State, or so as to prevent the taxation-by the. State of the same business. This court held that the payment required was a special tax, levied in the manner prescribed; that the penalty provided was a mode of enforcing its payment; and that the license, when issued, was only a receipt for the tax. It was held further, that, as regards the reservation of power in' favor of the States, the result would have been the same .if the acts of Congress had been silent upon the subject. This was necessarily so, because the objects taxed bfelonged to the internal commerce of the States, and were within their police power, and the right of Congress and the States to tax was concurrent. Congress could, therefore, no more restrict the power of a State than the State could restrict that of Congress. What is said there as to license taxes is applicable to the case before us. There is no difference in principle between such a tax and those which have been paid by the plaintiff in error to the defendant in error, and to the Stale; without objection. In the ordinance in question the tax is designated “ a license tax,” but its payment is not made a condition precedent to the right to do business. No special penalty is prescribed for its non-payment, and no second license is required to .be. taken out. Had the ordinance been otherwise in these particulars, we have seen, viewing the subject in the light of the License Tax Oases, that the result would have been the same. The case in all its aspects was ably and elaborately examined by the Supreme Court of the State. Their conclusion upon the “Federal question” we have considered is the same -with ours. There being no other such question raised in the record, our duty is thus terminated. We have no authority to look further into the case. Judgment affirmed.