Utley v. Donaldson

94 U.S. 29 (1876) UTLEY v. DONALDSON. Supreme Court of United States. *39 Mr. Charles M. Da Costa for the plaintiffs in error. *40 Mr. William Patrick, contra. *42 MR. JUSTICE SWAYNE delivered the opinion of the court. This is an action at law, brought by the plaintiffs in error. The case was submitted to the court without the intervention of a jury, pursuant to the act of Congress of March 3, 1865, 13 Stat. 501. The court found specially. The question presented for our determination is whether the facts found are sufficient to support the judgment. Those facts are neither voluminous nor complicated. On the 24th of May, 1871, Newman & Havens, bankers, of Leavenworth, telegraphed to Nichols, the cashier of the Commercial Bank of St. Louis, to "get rate for $15,000 California Central Pacific Railroad bonds, delivered to-morrow." The defendants offered "100½." Newman & Havens accepted by a telegraphic despatch. On the 25th of May Cashier Nichols received from Newman & Havens the bonds, and also a letter, in which they said, "The party selling these bonds is waiting here to get the money for them. He is an entire stranger to us." "We desire them sold without any recourse on us." On the same day Cashier Nichols showed this letter to the defendants, and proposed to deliver the bonds without recourse. They refused to receive them on such terms, but offered to take them, and pay for them when ascertained to be good; otherwise, to return them. The cashier acceded to this proposition. On the 24th of May the defendants telegraphed to the plaintiffs, who were brokers in the city of New York, "Make best bid for fifteen Central Pacifics, quick." The plaintiffs answered, on the 25th of May, that they would buy at 102½. Their despatch to this effect reached the defendants about ten A.M. the same day. The defendants answered by despatch on that day, "We accept your offer." The bonds were delivered by the cashier to the defendants on the 25th of May, and were by them forwarded by express on that day to a bank in New York, with a draft on the plaintiffs for $15,375, the bonds to be handed over on the payment of the draft. On *43 the morning of that day the defendants addressed a letter to the plaintiffs, which is the hinge of this controversy. It is as follows: — "In accordance with your offer for 15 Central Pac. 1st mort. bonds, 102½, we replied, We accept your offer, and have forwarded them by ex. to Bank North America, with draft attached for $15,375. We would further add, that we have purchased the bonds from a party strange to us; and, not having ever handled any of the Pacific Central, we would sell the bonds without recourse as to their being genuine; consequently, please examine them, and, upon being found correct, telegraph immediately (Central all O.K.). We do not doubt the bonds, but, coming to us through strange parties, we use this as a precaution, and not willing to take any risk." This letter reached the plaintiffs on the 29th of May, a short time before the draft and bonds were presented. The plaintiffs had sold the bonds "to arrive" to Rasmus & Lissignola. They could not be delivered after two o'clock. It was within a few minutes of that time when the messenger of the bank presented himself. One of the plaintiffs went with the messenger to the office of their vendees, and requested Rasmus to examine the bonds. He did so, said they seemed to be correct, and thereupon gave a check for the amount his firm had agreed to pay for them. This check was duly paid. On the same day the plaintiffs wrote to the defendants, "The Centrals all correct, and we telegraphed you to that effect." Such a despatch had been sent. Upon receiving it, the defendants paid the bank for the bonds, and the money was remitted by the bank to Newman & Havens. On the 12th of June information was received for the first time in New York, or elsewhere, that there were in existence counterfeits of such bonds. On that day the plaintiffs wrote to the defendants, "Look out for counterfeit Central Pacifics; some appeared on market to-day." On the next day the plaintiffs telegraphed to the defendants, "Central Pacifics sold us probably counterfeit. Bonds shipped to Europe. Can't hear from them for several days." On the same day the plaintiffs wrote to the defendants to the same effect, and said further: "In case your parties are doubtful, it would be well to act at once as if the bonds were *44 not genuine. There has been no suspicion of counterfeits until yesterday." On the same day, June 13, the defendants replied by despatch: "We sold without risk. Have purchased same day from Commercial Bank, and they from Newman & Havens, of Leavenworth, without risk." The bonds were counterfeit, and the plaintiffs refunded to Rasmus & Lissignola the amount they had paid. On the 12th of July the plaintiffs telegraphed to the defendants, "The Central Pacifics bought of you in May are declared counterfeit. We shall look to you for indemnity." On the same day the defendants replied by telegraph, and asked upon what ground it was proposed to hold them liable. Some subsequent correspondence took place between the parties, which it is unnecessary to refer to in detail. The plaintiffs asked a transfer of the claim of the defendants, whatever it might be, but without guarantee, against the bank. This the defendants refused to give. The money paid to Newman & Havens by the bank was not called for by the party from whom they received the bonds for two or three weeks after the money was paid to them. Before examining the case in its strictly legal aspects, it is proper to make several remarks suggested by the facts as found. 1. The defendants sold the bonds absolutely by their despatch of the 25th of May. The qualification insisted upon was, by their letter of that date, received by the plaintiffs on the 29th. If the defendants intended to qualify, it should have been done in the despatch. This would have given the plaintiffs notice in time for reflection before the presentation of the draft, might have prevented their selling the bonds before the letter was received, and would have enabled them to avoid the hurry and confusion incident to the payment of the draft and the delivery of the bonds to their vendees. If the draft had not been paid at sight, it would doubtless have been protested. 2. The circumstances attending the purchase of the bonds by the defendants are shown in our analysis of the facts of the case. The statement in the letter upon the subject is not accurate. 3. They refused upon any terms to put the plaintiffs in *45 their place with respect to any claims they might have against the Commercial Bank. 4. They were notified on the 12th of June that the bonds were counterfeit. If they had thereupon at once caused Newman & Havens to be advised also, it is not improbable that the latter would have retained the funds, and thus have saved from loss all the honest parties through whose hands the bonds had passed. The defendants failed to take any step whatever, in this direction. It cannot be questioned that the despatches between the parties on the 25th of May constituted a complete contract of sale, upon the condition or with an implied warranty, which it is not material here to consider, that the bonds were genuine. Nor can it be doubted that, if the bonds had been delivered without any thing further occurring, the defendants, upon the bonds proving to be counterfeit, would have been liable in this action. Taylor v. Merchants' F. Ins. Co., 9 How. 390; Benjamin on Sales, 56; Flyn v. Allen, 57 Penn. St. 482; Webb v. Odell et al., 49 N.Y. 583. Was this contract changed so that this condition or warranty was waived by the plaintiffs? In other words, did the letter of the defendants propose the modification insisted upon, of the pre-existing contract, and if so, did the plaintiffs agree to it, and accept the delivery of the bonds accordingly? We pass by without remark the plaintiffs' propositions that the alleged modification was within the Statute of Frauds, and could not, therefore, be effectually accepted otherwise than in writing; that there was no consideration for such an agreement; and that, if made, it was contrary to public policy, and therefore void. The view which we take of the case renders it unnecessary to consider either of these points. The first sentence of the letter relied upon by the defendants recognizes distinctly the contract as made by the despatches. The defendants say: "In accordance with your offer for 15 Central Pac. first mort. bonds, 102½ we replied, We accept your offer, and have forwarded them by ex. to Bk. North America, with draft attached for $15,375." This, standing alone, would have been a mere carrying out of the contract as made, and as it must have been understood by *46 both parties. The stress of the case is upon what follows. The letter proceeds: "We would further add, that we have purchased the bonds from a party strange to us." They had in fact bought them from the Commercial Bank, but were not to take them unless genuine, and were not to pay for them until found to be so. Next: "And not having ever handled any of the Pacific Central, we would sell the bonds without recourse as to their being genuine; consequently, please examine them, and, upon being found correct, telegraph immediately (Central O.K.)." The phrase, "we would sell without recourse," considered in the light of the context and the circumstances, may well be interpreted to mean that the writers would prefer or like so to sell, if it could be done. This view derives support from the succeeding member of the sentence, "please examine," &c. Examine for whom? It is not said, examine for yourselves. The language employed is usual where the thing asked is for the benefit of the asker, but not where it is for the benefit of the party addressed. Lastly, it is said: "We do not doubt the bonds, but, coming through strange hands, we use this precaution, and are not willing to take risk." This is consistent with the construction we have given to the preceding clause. If the examination the plaintiffs were requested to make showed clearly that the bonds were not counterfeit, then there could be no risk, whether the sale was with or without warranty of genuineness. In connection with these views, it is to be observed that while the bonds and draft were sent on pursuant to the original contract, which is distinctly recognized, it is not said in the letter in plain terms, such as would naturally have been used if such had been the intent of the writers. We will sell only at your risk as to genuineness. We will not guarantee it: examine for yourselves. If the bonds are counterfeit, and you take them, the loss will fall upon you, and not upon us. If this language, or terms equally clear and explicit, had been used, the case would have presented a very different aspect. "Every intendment is to be made against the construction of a contract under which it would operate as a snare." Hoffman v. Ætna Ins. Co., 32 N.Y. 405. Upon the whole letter, considering what it does and what it *47 does not contain, we are unable to come to the conclusion that the defendants intended to require that the modification since insisted upon should be made, and to make such modification the condition upon which the plaintiffs should take the bonds, if they took them at all. This result leaves the rights of the parties as they were under the original contract, and entitles the plaintiffs to recover. But conceding for the purposes of this opinion that the letter did contain such a proposition or annunciation as is insisted upon, then the inquiry arises whether it was so understood and agreed to by the plaintiffs. There can be no contract without the mutual assent of the parties. This is vital to its existence. There can be none where it is wanting. It is as indispensable to the modification of a contract already made as it was to making it originally. Where there is a misunderstanding as to any thing material, the requisite mutuality of assent as to such thing is wanting; consequently the supposed contract does not exist, and neither party is bound. In the view of the law in such case, there has been only a negotiation, resulting in a failure to agree. What has occurred is as if it were not, and the rights of the parties are to be determined accordingly. In Phillips v. Bistotti, 2 B. & C. 511, the defendant was a foreigner, and understood the English language imperfectly. Certain jewelry was struck off to him at auction for eighty-eight guineas. He was sued for that amount, and set up as a defence that he thought he had bid forty-eight guineas. Abbot, C.J., left it to the jury to find whether the mistake had actually occurred, "as a test of the existence of the contract." Benj. on Sales, 43. In Baldwin et al. v. Middleburger, 2 Hall, 176, the defendant bought merchandise of the plaintiff, and it was agreed that it should be paid for by the note of a third person payable to the defendant, to be by him indorsed to the plaintiff. After the goods were delivered the note was tendered, indorsed without recourse. The plaintiff refused to receive it, insisting that the agreement was that the note should be indorsed without this qualification, and thereupon brought the suit. The court left it to the jury to find whether there was a misunderstanding *48 between the parties as to the manner of the indorsement. The jury so found; and it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover as if there had been nothing said about the note, there being no such assent of the two minds as was necessary to make a contract in relation to it. In Coles v. Browne, 10 Paige, 526, a block of lots was struck off at auction to the defendant. The plaintiff insisted and proved that the sale was of the lots separately. The defendant insisted that his bid was for the entire block as one parcel, and that he so understood the premises to be offered and sold. The vendor instituted the suit for specific performance. The evidence rendered it doubtful whether the defendant's allegations as to his understanding and bid were not true, and upon that ground the Chancellor dismissed the bill. If there was a misunderstanding on the subject between the parties, there was clearly no contract. See also Calverly v. Williams, 1 Ves. Jr. 210; Saltus v. Pryn, 18 How. (N.Y.) Pr. 512; Bruce v. Pearson, 3 Johns. (N.Y.) 34; Crane v. Portland, 9 Mich. 493; 2 Pars. Contr. (4th ed.) 475 et seq. It is essential to the validity of a contract that the parties should have consented to the same subject-matter in the same sense. They must have contracted ad idem. Hazzard v. N.E.M. Ins. Co., 1 Sumn. 218. "Where a written agreement exists, and one of the parties sets up an arrangement of a different nature, alleging conduct on the other side amounting to a substitution of this arrangement for the written agreement, he must clearly show, not merely his own understanding as to the new terms of arrangement, but that the other party had the same understanding." Darnley v. The Proprietors, & c., 2 Law Rep. H.L. 43, 60. The plaintiffs were not asked to assent expressly with respect to the waiver of the warranty, if it were demanded, and made no such answer. They were asked to "please examine," &c., and to telegraph the result. This they did. The despatch was wholly silent as to any thing else. That they understood the waiver was demanded as a sine qua non in no way appears. On the other hand, the contrary is clearly manifest. The moment they had reason to apprehend that the bonds might be *49 counterfeit, they notified the defendants; and, as soon as it became certain they were so, the defendants were advised of the fact, and that they would be looked to for indemnity. The defendants denied their liability by reason of their letter. In due time this suit was brought. Conceding that both parties have acted in good faith, it is clear that there was a misunderstanding between them as to the meaning and effect of the letter, and that the plaintiffs never understood and agreed to it as it is now interpreted and insisted upon by the defendants. The aggregatio mentium requisite to give that interpretation effect was, therefore, wanting. To constitute the abandonment of a contract, the act must be mutual. Robinson v. Page, 3 Russ. 122. It has been held that, to make a negotiation for the modification of a contract effectual, it must appear that it was the intention of the party proposing it wholly to abandon the original contract, if the modification proposed were not assented to. Murray v. Harway, 56 N.Y. 347; Robinson v. Page, supra. "A waiver of a stipulation in an agreement, to be effectual, must be made intentionally, and with knowledge of the circumstances." Darnley v. The Proprietors, & c., supra; Howard et al. v. Carpenter, 2 Md. 259. When one party assents to a contract, relying upon the representations of the other, his assent is given upon the condition that the representations are true. Duncan v. Hoge, 24 Miss. 671. Judgment reversed, with directions to the court below to render a judgment for the plaintiff in error. MR. JUSTICE STRONG, with whom concurred MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD and MR. JUSTICE HUNT, dissenting. I dissent from the judgment given in this case. Before the plaintiffs received the bonds, and before they accepted or paid the draft drawn upon them by the defendants, they were notified that the defendants would sell without recourse, and that they were unwilling to run any risk. They were requested to examine, and telegraph to the defendants whether the bonds were genuine, and this as a precaution of the defendants against *50 risk. The letter of the defendants clearly manifested an intention not to deliver the bonds unless they were genuine, or unless the plaintiffs would take them at their own risk. On any other terms the plaintiffs had a right to take them. Inquiry and notice to defendants afterwards would have been idle, and would have been no precaution. Consequently the receipt of the bonds by the plaintiffs, after the notice given to them, can have no other meaning than that they took them at their own risk. MR. JUSTICE DAVIS did not sit in this case.