Peik v. Chicago & North-Western Railway Co.

Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court. These suits present the single question of the power of the legislature of Wisconsin to provide by law for a maximum of charge to be made by the Chicago and North-western Railway Company for fare and freight upon the transportation of persons and property carried within the State, or taken up outside the State and brought within it, or taken up inside and carried without. That company was by its charter authorized “ to demand and receive such sum or sums of money for the transportation of persons and property, and for storage of property, as it shall deem reasonable.” Charter of the Wisconsin & Superior Railroad Co., sect. 6. Other forms of expression are used in charters granted by Wisconsin to other companies, which by consolidation have become merged in the present corporation; but they are all the same in effect. None go beyond this. The Constitution of- the State in force when each of the several acts of incorporation was passed, provides that all acts for the creation of corporations within the State “ may be altered or repealed by the legislature at any time after their passage.” Art. 11, sect. l.~ It was conceded upon the argument that this reserved power of the Constitution gaye the legislature “ the ’ same power over the business and property of corporations that it has over indi *176 viduals,” or, as it is expressed by one of tbe counsel, “ nothing more could have been intended than to leave the stockholders in corporations in such a position that the legislature could place them on the same footing with natural persons before the law, and disable them from permanently evading the burdens on all others engaged in similar vocations, by appealing to the letter of their charter. Their object was not .to open the door to oppression, but to secure simple equality between citizens of the State, whether working singly or in corporate associations.” And, in another place, the same learned counsel says: “ The privilege, then, of charging whatever rates it may deem proper is a franchise, which may be taken away under the reserved power, but the right to charge a reasonable compensation would remain as a right under the general law governing-natural persons, and not as a special franchise or privilege.” Without stopping to inquire whether this is the extent of the operation of this important constitutional reservation, it is sufficient to say'that it does, without any doubt, have that effect. In Munn v. Illinois, supra, p. 118, and Chicago, Burlington, Quincy Railroad Co. v. Iowa, supra, p. 155, we decided that the State may limit the amount of charges by railroad companies for fares and freights, unless restrained by some contract in the charter, even though their* income may have been pledged as security for the payment of obligations incurred upon the faith of the charter. So far this case is disposed of by those decisions. It remains only to consider a few questions raised here which were not involved in the cases that have already been decided. 1. As to the consolidation of the Wisconsin corporations with those of Illinois. For the purpose of promoting this consolidation, the legislature of Wisconsin passed an enabling act, and, in so doing, provided .that if such consolidation was perfected, “the consolidated company shall be and remain subject to the laws of the State of Wisconsin and the State of Illinois, respectively, and' shall have in all respects the same privileges as though this consolidation had not taken place; provided, that the laws of Illinois shall have no force and effect in the State of- Wisconsin.” Wisconsin Consolidation Act, March 10,1855, *177 sect. 8. The second section of the same act also provided that the consolidated company should “ have all the fights, privileges, and franchises conferred on the said companies [those in Illinois as well as those in Wisconsin] by the laws of the States of Illinois and Wisconsin, respectively, the same, and not otherwise, as though the said consolidation had not taken place.” In this way, Wisconsin in effect said to the Illinois companies, “ You may consolidate your interest with those of the named companies in this State, and form one corporation in the two States ; but, in so doing, yoq must, in Wisconsin, be subject to ouf laws. In Wisconsin, all corporations áre liable to have their charters altered or repealed at. the will of the legislature. If you are willing to take this risk, we will care for you, within our jurisdiction, precisely .as we do for our own corporations.” . Upon these terms the consolidation was finally perfected, and the consolidated company now exists under the two jurisdictions, but subject to the same legislative control as to its business in Wisconsin as private persons. The Illinois companies might have stayed out. But they chose to come in, and must now abide the consequences. Thus Wisconsin is permitted to legislate for the consolidated company in that State precisely the same as it would for- its own original companies, if no consolidation had taken place. This is the contract by which the Illinois stockholders must abide. Haying availed themselves of what they supposed to be the advantages of the consolidation, they cannot repudiate their corresponding obligations. Thei’e is nothing, therefore, in -this objection. 2. The obligations of the consolidated company, under the land grant to the Wisconsin and Superior Railroad Company, to keep that, part of its road which formerly belonged to that company open as a public highway for the use of the government of the United States, free from toll or other charges upon the transportation of property or troops of the United States, and to transport the mails at such prices as Congress may by law direct. The United States do.not complain. It will be time enough for us to consider this objection when they do.' 8. As to the effect of the statute as a regulation of interstate commerce. The law is confined to State commerce, or *178 such ínter-staté commerce as directly affects the people of Wisconsin. Until Congress acts in reference to the relations of this company to inter-state commerce, it is certainly within the power of Wisconsin to regulate its fares, &c., so far as they are of domestic concern. With the people of Wisconsin this company has domestic relations. Incidentally, these may reach beyond the State. But certainly, until Congress undertakes to legislate for those who are without the State, Wisconsin may provide for those within, even though it may indirectly affect those without. 4. As to the repeal of this act by that of March 12, 1874. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has decided that there is no such repeal as is claimed. The Atty.- Gen. v. Railroad Companies, 35 Wis. 427. This is binding on us. 5. As to the claim that the courts must decide what is reasonable, and not the legislature. This is not new to this case. It has been fully considered in Munn v. Illinois. Where property has been clothed with a public interest, the legislature may fix a limit to that which shall in law be reasonable for its use. This limit binds the courts as well as the people. If it has been improperly fixed, the legislature, not the courts, must be appealed to for the change. 6. The sale of the Chicago, St. Paul, and Fond du Lac Rail road Company. The charter of the company whose road was sold does not confer any right which has been impaired by this legislation. That company, like other railroad companies in Wisconsin, was subject to regulation as to its fares, &c. It is, therefore, unnecessary to consider what might under other circumstances have been the effect of such a sale. This disposes of the case. No other questions need be considered. If the question ever arises whether the company can be compelled to continue its business at the prices fixed, it will be time enough for us to pass upon it when it reaches here in due course of proceeding. It is not here now. Reerees affirmed. Me. Justice Field and Me.-Justice Steong dissented.