Melendy v. Rice

Me. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court. Whenever the judgment of the highest court of a State is brought here for the re-examination of some decision of a Federal question, we must consider the question as it comes to us from that court. This record shows that the question below was whether a finding of fact by a referee should be set aside *798 because not sustained by the evidence. Upon writs of error to the courts of the United States, we cannot be called upon to decide such a question, because the finding of the court below as to facts is conclusive upon us. Norris v. Jackson, 9 Wall. 127; Insurance Company v. Sea, 21 id. 160. But in Iowa a different practice prevails, and our rule has been so far, and only so far, relaxed as to permit the Appellate Court to set aside a judgment of an inferior court, because against the weight of the evidence, when there is no evidence whatever to support it, or when there is such an absence of evidence that it may be presumed to have been given through the influence of passion, prejudice, or favor. Rice v. Melendy, 41 Iowa, 400; Wilson v. B. & M. R. Railroad Co., 33 id. 592; Starker v. Leese & Mahone, id. 595; Pearson v. Minturn, 18 id. 37; Bellamy et al. v. Doud, 11 id. 255. The judgment must be clearly and manifestly wrong. Applying even this relaxed rule to the present case, we are satisfied that the judgment of the Supreme Court of the State' ought not tó be reversed. The question is one of preponderance of testimony alone. It certainly cannot be said there is no evidence in the case to support the finding, and, after three judgments of affirmance in the courts below, hardly any thing short of that would justify a reversal here. Judgment affirmed.