Warnock v. Davis

Mr. Justice Field, after stating the facts, delivered the opinion of the court, as follows: — As seen from the statement of the case, the evidence before the court was not conflicting, and it was only necessary to meet the general allegations of the first defence. All the facts established by it are admitted in the other defences. The court could not have ruled in favor of the defendants without holding that the agreement between the deceased and the Scioto Trust Association was valid, and that the assignment transferred to if the right to nine-tenths of the money collected on the policy. For alleged error in these particulars the plaintiff asks a reversal of the judgment. The policy executed on the life of the deceased was' a valid contract, and as such was assignable by the assured to the association as security for any sums' lent to him, or advanced for the premiums and assessments upon it. But it -was not assignable *779 to the association for any other purpose. The association had no insurable interest in the life of the deceased, and could not have taken out a policy in its own name. Such a policy would constitute what is termed a wager policy, or a mere speculative contract upon the life of the assured, with a direct interest in its early termination. It is,not easy to define with precision what will in all cases constitute an insurable interest, so as to take the contract out of the class-of wager policies. It may be stated generally, however, to be such an interest, arising from the relations of the party obtaining the insurance, either as creditor of or ■surety for the assured, or from the ties of blood or marriage to him, as will justify a reasonable expectation of advantage or benefit from the continuance of his life. It is not necessary that the expectation of advantage or benefit should be always capable of pecuniary estimation; for a parent has an insurable interest in the life of his child, and a child in the life of his parent, a husband in the life of his wife, and a wife in the life of her husband. The natural affection in cases of this kind is considered as more powerful — as operating more efficaciously — to protect the life of'the insured than any other consideration. But in all cases there must be a reasonable ground, founded upon the relations of the parties to each other, either pecuniary or of blood or affinity, to expect some benefit or advantage from the continuance of the life of the assured. Otherwise the contract is a mere wager, by. which the party taking the policy is directly interested in the early death of the assured. Such policies have a tendency to create a desire for the event. They are, therefore, independently of any statute on the subject, condemned, as being against public policy. The assignment of a policy to a party not having an insurable interest is as objectionable as the taking opt of a policy in his name. Nor is its character changed because it is for a portion merely of the insurance money. To the extent in which the assignee stipulates for the proceeds of the policy beyond the sums advanced by him, he stands in the position of one holding a wager policy. The law might be readily evaded, if the policy, or an interest in it, could, in consideration of paying the premiums and assessments upon it, and the promise *780 to pay upon the death of the assured a portion of its proceeds to his representatives, be transferred so as to entitle the assignee to retain the whole insurance money. The question here presented has arisen, under somewhat different circumstances, in several of the State courts ; and there is a conflict in their decisions. In Franklin Life Insurance Company v. Hazzard, which arose in Indiana, the policy of insurance, which was for $3,000, contained the usual provision that if the premiums were not paid at the times specified the policy would be forfeited. The second premium was not paid, ■and the assured, declaring that he had concluded not to keep up the policy, sold it for twenty dollars to one having no insurable interest, who took an assignment of it with the consent of the secretary of the insurance company. The assignee subsequently settled with the company for the unpaid premium. In a suit upon the policy, the Supreme Court of the State held that the assignment was void, stating that all the objections against the issuing of a policy to one upon the life of another, in whose life he has no insurable interest, exist against holding'such a policy by mere purchase and assignment. “ In either case,” said the court, “the holder of such policy is interested in the death rather than the life of the party assured. The law ought.to be, and we think it clearly is, opposed to such speculations in human life.” (41 Ind. 116.) The court referred with approval to a decision of the same purport by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in Stevens v. Warren, 101 Mass. 564. There the question presented was whether the assignment of a policy by- the assured in his lifetime, without the assent of the insurance company, conveyed any right in law or equity to the proceeds when- due. The court was unanimously of opinion that it did not; holding that it was contrary not only to the terms of the contract, but contrary to the general policy of the law respecting insurance, in that it might lead to gambling or speculative contracts upon the chances of human life. The court also referred to provisions sometimes inserted in a policy expressing that it is for the benefit of another, or is payable to another than the represen, tatives of the assured, and, after remarking that the contract in such a case might be sustained, said “ that the same would *781 -probably be held in the case of an assignment with the assent of the assurers. But if the assignee has no interest in the life of the subject which would sustain a' policy to himself, the assignment would take effect only as a designation, by mutual agreement of the parties, of the person who should be entitled to receive the proceeds when due, instead of the personal representatives of the deceased. And if it should appear that the arrangement was a cover for- a speculating risk, contravening the general policy of the law, it would not be sustained.” Although the agreement between the Trust Association and the assured was invalid as ,far as it provided for an absolute transfer of nine tenths of the proceeds of the policy upon the conditions named, it was not of that fraudulent kind with respect to which the courts regard the parties as alike culpable and refuse to interfere with the results of their action. No fraud or. deception upon any one was ' designed by the agreement, nor did its execution involve any moral turpitude. -It- is one which must be treated as creating'no legal right to the proceeds of the policy beyond the sums advanced upon its security; and the courts will, therefore, hold the recipient of the moneys beyond those sums to account to the representatives of the deceased.’ It was lawful for the association to advance to the assured the sums payable to the insurance company on the policy as they became due. It was, also, lawful for the assured to assign the policy as security for their payment. The assignment was only invalid as a transfer of the proceeds of the policy beyond what was re-, quired to refund those sums, with interest. To hold it valid for the whole proceeds would be to sanction speculative risks on human life, and encourage the evils for which wager policies are condemned. The decisions of the New York Court of Appeals are, we are aware, opposed to this • view. They hold that a valid policy of insurance effected by a person upon his own life, is assignable v like an ordinary chose in -action-, and that the assignee is entitled, upon the death of the assured, to the full sum payable without regard to the consideration given by him for the assignment, or to his possession of any insurable interest in the life of the assured. St. John v. American *782 Mutual Life Insurance Company, 13 N. Y. 31; Valton v. National Loan Fund Life Assurance: Company, 20 id. 32. In the opinion in the first case the court cite Ashley v. Ashley (3 Simons, 149) in support of its conclusions; and it must be admitted that they are sustained by many other adjudications. But if there be any sound reason for holding a policy invalid when taken out by a party who has no interest in the life of the assured, it is difficult to see why that reason is -not as cogent and operative against a party taking- an assignment of a policy upon the life of a person in which he has no interest. The same ground which invalidates the one should invalidate the other — so far, at least, as to restrict the right of the assignee to the sums actually advanced by him. In the conflict of decisions on this subject we are free to follow those which seem more fully in accord with the general policy of the law against speculative contracts upon human life. In this conclusion we are supported by the decision in Cammack v. Lewis, 15 Wall. 643. There a policy of life insurance for $3,000, procured by a debtor at the suggestion of a creditor to whom he owed $70, was assigned to the latter to secure the debt, upon his promise to pay the'premiums, and, in case of the death of the assured, one third of the proceeds to his widow. On the death of the assured, the assignee collected the money from the insurance company and paid to the widow $950 as her proportion after deducting certain payments made. The widow, as administratrix of the deceased’s estate, subsequently sued for the balance of the money collected, and recovered judgment. The case being brought to this court, it was held that the transaction, so far as the creditor was concerned, for the excess beyond the debt owing to him, was a wagering policy, and that the creditor, in equity and good conscience, should hold it only as security for what the debtor owed him when it was assigned, and for such advances as he might have afterwards made on account of it; and that the assignment was valid only to that extent. This decision is in harmony with the views expressed in this opinion. The judgment of the.court below will, therefore, be reversed, and the cause remanded with direction to enter a judgment for the plaintiff for the amount collected from the insurance com *783 pany, with interest, after deducting, the sum' already paid to the widow, and the several sums advanced by the defendants ; and it is So ordered.