Warren v. Moody

Mr. Justice Blatchford, after stating the case as reported above, delivered the opinion of the court. It will be noticed that the bill does not attack the deed on the ground of fraud. It does not allege that it was made with any intent to delay, hinder, or defraud the creditors named in the bill, or any other creditors of Kennedy. It does not allege that there are any other creditors than those *137 named in the bill, or any creditors who became such after the making of the deed. The sole ground on which it proceeds is, that the deed was a voluntary deed, and is void as against the persons who were creditors of Kennedy prior to the making of the deed. It claims that the plaintiffs, as assignees in bankruptcy, represent the debts of those creditors, for the purposes of the suit. The alleged right of action of the plaintiffs is asserted under § 14 of the Bankruptcy Act of March 2, 1867, c. 176, 14 Stat. 522, which provides, that “all the property conveyed by the bankrupt in fraud of his creditors ” “ shall, in virtue of -the adjudication of bankruptcy and the appointment of his assignee, be at once vested in such assignee, and he may sue for and recover the said estate, debts, and effects.” This provision is also found in §§ 5046 and 5047 of the Revised Statutes. The deed in question was a valid instrument between the grantors and the grantees. The stipulation on which the case was heard, containing an admission “ that the facts set forth in the answers are substantially true, except so far as controverted by the. depositions and other evidence in the cause,” makes the allegations of fact contained in the answer of Kennedy and his wife evidence in the cause. When the deed was made, Kennedy was, as the answer alleges, in prosperous circumstances, and possessed of ample means to pay all debts, and was able to withdraw the value of the donation to his daughter from his estate without the least hazard to his creditors, and the amount of his individual debts was very small as compared with the amount of his property. The deed to the daughter being honest in fact and in intent, and being, on the evidence, a proper provision for her, as an advancement on the occasion of her marriage, and being valid as between her parents and herself, and no fraud in fact, or intent to commit a fraud, or to- hinder or delay creditors, being alleged in the bill, the case is not one in which these plaintiffs can set aside the deed, as being a deed of “ property convened by the bankrupt in fraud of his creditors,” even though the conveyance may have, been invalid, under the statute of Alabama, as *138 against the creditors named in the bill, because it was a voluntary conveyance. These creditors, whatever remedies they may have had to collect their debts, are not represented by the plaintiffs, as assignees in bankruptcy, for the purposes of this suit, on the facts developed. The case of Pratt v. Curtis, 2 Lowell, 87, cited by the plaintiffs, was a case of two bills in equity by the assignee of a.' bankrupt to set aside conveyances of land made by the bankrupt, one being a voluntary deed of settlement for the benefit of his children, and the other being a like deed for the benefit of his wife. Each bill alleged that, at the time of the settlement, the bankrupt was indebted to persons who were still his creditors, and was embarrassed in his circumstances, and that the deed was made with intent to delay and defraud his creditors. On demurrer, the bill was sustained, on the view that the assignee in bankruptcy, and he only, had the right to impeach the deeds, in the interest of creditors. That decision, based on a case of intent to delay and defraud creditors,- on the part of a person embarrassed in his circumstances, has no application to the present case. The decree.of the Circuit Court is reversed, and the case is remanded to it, with a direction to dismiss the till, with costs to the defendants in the Cincmt Court and in the District Count.