Walter v. Bickham

Mr. Justice Harlan, after stating the case as above reported, delivered the opinion of the court. On behalf of the plaintiff it is insisted: 1. That the law does not authorize any one to serve writs directed to a marshal, ex *325 cept that officer himself, or such of his appointees as may have duly qualified as deputies, by taking the oath or affirmation prescribed by § 782 of the Revised Statutes of the United States; and that service by any one else is void. 2. 'Assuming that an appointee of the marshal, who was not thus qualified, can serve process directed to the marshal, the latter has no right to delegate to another his power of appointment; and he cannot ratify such an appointment, nor validate a levy made in his name by one not lawfully appointed. 3.' Assuming that the marshal has the right .to delegate his power of appointment, the authority conferred by him on the" attorney of Bickham & Moore was exhausted after Hall’s appointment and agreement to serve. On the other hand, it may be claimed that, if the appointment of Ladd to execute the attachment ivas illégal, and if his levy was void, the subsequent action of a regular deputy of the marshal, in taking possession of the attached property,' and holding it under the writ delivered to him by Ladd, made the levy from that, time so far valid, that the property was thereafter'to be deemed in the lawful custody of such deputy, under the writ of attachment. It is unnecessary to determine any of these questions; for, the record shows that on .the 19th of October, 1883 — before the plaintiffs in error obtained their judgment against Lake & Austin, and, therefore, before .they .had acquired any special interest in the property —in the court below, upon the application and with the consent of all the creditors who had theretofore sued out attachments, and with the consent, as well of the debtors themselves as of Hebron, the assignee in the deed of assignment executed' by the debtors, the attached effects were sold, by order of the court,, and the proceeds paid, pursuant to that order, to the clerk. Thus, every person, who was in a position, in reference to the property, to object to the manner in which the writ of attachment was executed,-consented that the property be placed under the control of the court, the proceeds of the sale to be appliéd to the attachment hens in their order. Under these circumstances, creditors who did not obtain *326 judgments until after such consent order was made, cannot be heard to object to the manner in which the property was originally seized and brought into court, and made subject to its orders. The attaching creditors, the debtors, and the assignee of the debtors, having all approved what was done, subsequent judgment creditors— the consent order of sale, not being impeached on the ground of fraud — acquired no such lights in the property-as entitled them to question the disposition made of it or of the proceeds of sale. The judgment is affirmed.