Mattingly v. Three Hundred & Fifty-Seven Bales of Cotton

BAXTER, Circuit Judge. The claimants have appealed to this court and here complain of the decree below as awarding an excessive compensation in salvage. I cannot concur with the district court in the amount allowed. Upon the statement of the case as presented by the proctor for libellants, I think the sum of seven hundred and fifty dollars most ample compensation in the way of salvage. Indeed, I think five hundred dollars would be liberal; but I fix it at seven hundred and fifty dollars to cover interest. There is no doubt in my mind but that, if libellants had been called upon to do the work at a stated price, they would have gladly undertaken it for one hundred dollars. Their own proof shows that the ordinary compensation charged by the tug for towage was ten dollars per hour. I cannot consent to adopt the rule, which seems to have grown up among some of the courts, exercising maritime jurisdiction over the western rivers, of allowing such large awards of salvage. The learned counsel for the libellants insists that upon the principles laid down in the text-books, and under the precedents established; the amount allowed below, being about one-third the value of the cotton, is not excessive. I cannot adopt this view. In former years such services as these, requiring but little time and labor, were rendered by steamboats on the rivers as acts of courtesy to each other, without any demand for [1144] compensation. But beyond this, “in salvage claims arising on tbe western rivers, tbe precedents of courts administering the admiralty law of the ocean in regard to the amount of compensation, cannot be safely adopted, because the peril of life is generally much less.” McGinnis v. The Pontiac [Case No. 8,801]. This principle I most cordially approve; and while it may be true that in the multiplicity of courts and judges having salvage causes before them, some of them have been disposed to adopt and apply, in large degree, the theory of compensation recognized in ocean salvage; still, for myself, I am wholly unwilling to countenance or continue such extreme liberality in the exercise of my judicial discretion. In this circuit over which I am required to preside, and so long as I occupy my present position, I shall be careful to guard the property of suitors, whether they be insurance companies or general owners, against what seem to me to be excessive or extortionate demands; and in. the expression of the judicial discretion vested in me under the law, I shall make for this circuit such precedents in the matter of salvage allowance as seem to me just and proper according to the circumstances of each ease. There are no facts presented in this record justifying a larger allowance than that I have fixed. The danger of peril to the tug and her crew, alleged in behalf of the sal-vors, and mentioned in their testimony, was more fanciful than real, and could, at any moment, have been withdrawn from and escaped. The time occupied in the rendition of the service was very short, and these elements, taken in connection with the other circumstances surrounding the transaction, lead me to the conclusion that the allowance of the gross sum of seven hundred and fifty dollars, instead of a pro rata per bale, or on the entire value of the property, saved, is the proper amount to be awarded as salvage in this cause. But I adjudge this amount free of all costs, and direct the whole of the costs in the district court and in this court to be taxed against the claimants. The decree of the district court is, therefore, reversed and modified as indicated in the opinion, and the decree will be entered accordingly.