Smith v. Missouri Val. Life Ins.

DILLON, Circuit Judge. The defence is, that this is a Missouri transaction; that, under the statute of that state (2 Wag. St. p. 930, § 15), the policy is void in toto, as the annual premium exceeded $300; or if this be not so, the right of action is in the administrators of the husband, and not in the plaintiff; and that the plaintiff is neither the legal owner of the right of action, nor “the real party in interest,” and hence cannot maintain this suit. I concede without inquiry, for the purposes of this case, that the Missouri statute applies, and will govern in determining the validity and effect of the contract. The entire chapter in which this provision occurs is one expressly designed to enlarge the rights of married women, and should be construed to carry out its purpose. A married woman always had an insurable interest in the life of her husband, and if she paid the premiums for the risk out of her own estate, she could insure his life for any sum upon which she and the insurer might agree. And a husband who is free from debt may insure his own life for his wife’s benefit for any sum he may choose, it is a mode, and a favorite mode, for making provision for wife and children. The statute of Missouri (section 15, supra, et seq.) is not entirely free from obscurity, but the construction placed upon it by Judge Treat, of the United States district. court, seems reasonable, viz.: that under its provisions an insolvent husband may withdraw from his estate for this purpose not exceeding $300 annually, where the beneficial interest in the policy is in the wife. If the insolvent husband pays more, the policy is not void, but' the wife, if she recover, might hold in part in trust for the creditors as represented by her husband’s administrator, or as-signee in bankruptcy. In re Yeager, 8 West. Ins. Rev. 378; Charter Oak Life Ins. Co. v. Brant, 47 Mo. 419; McComas v. Covenant Mut. Life Ins. Co., 56 Mo. 573. The case before the court, in any view of the Missouri statute as to the respective rights of the plaintiff and the creditors of the husband, is easy of solution. The agreement of the defendant in the policy is, “to pay the amount assured to Augusta S. Smith.” This gives her the right to sue upon the policy in her own name. If she recovers, it is a different question whether she may not hold the proceeds of the recovery, or some part thereof, for the benefit of the estate of her husband, if necessary to pay debts. The company cannot set up such supposed rights in others, to defeat an action on the policy. The plaintiff, having the legal title, may maintain the action, and this will protect the company from another suit, and in the event of a recovery by her, the equities of others, if any exist, which I do not decide, can be adjusted in an action between them and the plaintiff. The administrators of the husband are not here insisting upon their rights, if they have any, and the company cannot set up rights for them, and, on its motion, introduce into this suit matters with which it has no concern. I am of opinion the plaintiff is entitled to recover. Judgment for plaintiff.