Delancey v. McKeen

WASHINGTON, Circuit Justice. I have no doubt, but that, according to the true construction of the act of 1715, the deed should be recorded in the county where the land lies; but, if the deed conveyed lands lying in different counties, the law does not require the deed to be recorded in each county, either by the words or the intention of it, so far as this intention can be discovered. Until the act of 1775, there was no absolute necessity to record any deeds, mortgages excepted;' and the provision made by the law of 1715, for recording them, was merely made with a view to their preservation. This is manifest from the act of 1775; which was passed, with a view to protect the rights of subsequent purchasers against secret deeds, which the grantees might have kept in their pockets for years; without the possibility of subsequent purchasers, and creditors, knowing of their existence. If this were the case, then there was no absolute necessity, at that time, to require that a deed, if recorded, should be recorded in every county in which there were lands conveyed by the deed; because, the recording the deed in any one county, was bettering the situation of subsequent purchasers; and the law had no view to them at all, that I can perceive. It is, however, perfectly clear, that the deed might legally be recorded in the office of the county where part of the lands lay; and that quoad that law, the exemplification was evidence. The public officer was instructed and commanded to record and to exemplify it. If, from being the exemplification of a sworn public officer, it was evidence as to the lands lying in his county, upon what principle should it not be evidence as to lands conveyed by the same deed, lying in other counties, proved in the same way, and recorded by the same officer? I can see no reason why his exemplification should give credit and authenticity to his copy in one case, and not in the other. But, as soon as the attention of the legislature was drawn to the frauds, practised by secret conveyances upon subsequent purchasers and creditors, and the necessity was perceived of giving notoriety to all conveyances; it naturally followed, that such deeds should be recorded, as a matter of compulsion, or that the grantee should be postponed to fair, bona fide, and subsequent purchasers. But, what influences my opinion more than any thing else, is, that courts, lawyers, conveyancers, and all others, seemed to have concurred in the opinion, that the exemplifications of deeds, like the present, recorded as this was, were evidence. If one solitary decision, affirming this practice, had taken place, all would have agrec'd. that it would bind us; and yet the uniformity of practice and of conduct, respecting such deeds, operates more powerfully with me; because they amount to a contemporaneous exposition of the act of 1715, fortified by a subsequent, unvarying usage. The practice is incorporated with the land titles of this state; and, if it be an error, it is common and uniform; and a decision now against the practice, would be mischievous in the extreme. I am therefore of opinion, that the exemplification of this deed was properly admitted, and that judgment should be for plaintiff. Mr. Dallas asked if the court meant, to say, that if a deed for lands lying in different counties, made and recorded since 1775, in one county, would be good as to lands lying in other counties; and, that an exemplification would be evidence, as to such lands; because the act of 1775 does not in terms require such deed to be recorded in each county. BY THE COURT. We give no opinion on this point; it is not before us. There might, in the case supposed, be a distinction between the validity of such a deed against subsequent purchasers of lands lying in a county, where the deed was not recorded, and the exemplification of the deed. But we give no opinion on the point Judgment for plaintiff.