Li v. Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court

22-3040-cv Li v. Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 2 held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the 3 City of New York, on the- 29th day of June , two thousand twenty-three. 4 5 PRESENT: GERARD E. LYNCH, 6 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., 7 JOSEPH F. BIANCO, 8 Circuit Judges. 9 ------------------------------------------------------------------ 10 YU CHAN LI, 11 12 Plaintiff-Appellant, 13 14 v. No. 22-3040-cv 15 16 APPELLATE DIVISION OF THE NEW YORK 17 SUPREME COURT, FIRST DEPARTMENT, 18 STATE OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK CITY 19 LANDMARKS PRESERVATION COMMISSION, 20 SARAH CARROLL, MARK A. SILBERMAN, 21 JOHN WEISS, CLAVA BRODSKY, 22 23 Defendants-Appellees.

1 2 ------------------------------------------------------------------ 3 4 FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: MARC H. GERSTEIN, New 5 York, NY 6 7 FOR CITY DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: KATE FLETCHER, Of 8 Counsel, New York City 9 Law Department 10 (Richard Dearing, 11 Rebecca L. Visgaitis, Of 12 Counsel, on the brief), on 13 behalf of Sylvia O. Hinds- 14 Radix, Corporation 15 Counsel of the City of 16 New York, New York, 17 NY 18 19 FOR STATE DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: KWAME N. AKOSAH, 20 Assistant Solicitor 21 General (Barbara D. 22 Underwood, Solicitor 23 General, Ester 24 Murdukhayeva, Deputy 25 Solicitor General, on the 26 brief), on behalf of Letitia 27 James, Attorney General 28 for the State of New 29 York, New York, NY 30 31 Appeal from a judgment entered in the United States District Court for the

32 Southern District of New York (P. Kevin Castel, Judge). 33 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

1 AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED. 2 Yu Chan Li appeals from a November 7, 2022 judgment of the United 3 States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Castel, J.) dismissing 4 her complaint alleging various constitutional violations arising from her public 5 hearing before the Landmarks Preservation Commission (“LPC”) and 6 subsequent proceedings that she initiated in New York state court. We assume 7 the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and the record of prior 8 proceedings, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to 9 affirm. 10 Li filed the present action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Appellate 11 Division of the New York Supreme Court and the State of New York 12 (collectively, the “State defendants”), as well as the LPC and various city officials 13 (collectively, the “City defendants”). She alleges that the defendants violated her 14 procedural and substantive due process rights during the LPC hearing and in the 15 state court proceedings, and that both the New York City Landmarks 16 Preservation Law and New York Civil Practice Law & Rules § 5701 are 17 unconstitutional. The District Court dismissed Li’s claims against the State 18 defendants as barred by the Eleventh Amendment and her claims against the

1 City defendants as precluded under the collateral estoppel doctrine. We review 2 the District Court’s findings of fact for clear error and its legal conclusions de 3 novo. See Brokamp v. James, 66 F.4th 374, 386 (2d Cir. 2023). 4 At the outset, we note that Li does not challenge the District Court’s 5 determination that her claims against the State defendants are barred by the 6 Eleventh Amendment. See Appellant’s Br. 6 n.5, 19. We therefore affirm the 7 District Court’s dismissal of Li’s claims against the State defendants, including 8 her constitutional challenge to § 5701. 9 All that remains are Li’s claims against the City defendants: (1) her 10 procedural and substantive due process claims concerning the LPC hearing, and 11 (2) her challenge to the constitutionality of the Landmarks Preservation Law. 12 The District Court ruled that Li is collaterally estopped by a final judgment of the 13 New York Supreme Court from relitigating her claims against the City 14 Defendants. “Collateral estoppel . . . prevents parties or their privies from 15 relitigating in a subsequent action an issue of fact or law that was fully and fairly 16 litigated in a prior proceeding.” Phoenix Light SF Ltd. v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 66 17 F.4th 365, 371 (2d Cir. 2023) (quotation marks omitted). The doctrine applies 18 where: “(1) the identical issue was raised in a previous proceeding; (2) the issue

1 was actually litigated and decided in the previous proceeding; (3) the parties had 2 a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue; and (4) the resolution of the issue 3 was necessary to support a valid and final judgment on the merits.” Wyly v. 4 Weiss, 697 F.3d 131, 141 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted). 5 We agree with the District Court that Li’s claims against the City 6 defendants are barred by collateral estoppel. The New York Supreme Court has 7 already considered and rejected Li’s claim that the LPC hearing violated her 8 procedural due process rights. See Joint App’x 21–22, 99–101; see also 9 Appellant’s Br. 25 (“The New York Supreme Court rejected Plaintiff-Appellant’s 10 claim that it did not have an adequate opportunity to effectively present legal 11 argument at the LPC’s [hearing].”). It further rejected Li’s argument that the 12 LPC’s decision was arbitrary and capricious, see Joint App’x 98–99, which lies at 13 the heart of her substantive due process claim, see Harlen Assocs. v. Inc. Vill. of 14 Mineola, 273 F.3d 494, 505 (2d Cir. 2001). And it also determined that the 15 Landmarks Preservation Law is constitutional. See Joint App’x 102–03. Li does 16 not dispute that these issues were fully litigated and decided by the New York 17 Supreme Court or that their resolution was necessary to support a valid and final 18 judgment on the merits. And insofar as Li argues that she did not have “a full

1 and fair opportunity to litigate” because she “has not had the opportunity to 2 appeal an adverse finding,” Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 91 (2d Cir. 3 2007) (quotation marks omitted), we disagree. Here, even though Li ultimately 4 failed to perfect her appeal to the Appellate Division, she nevertheless had the 5 opportunity to appeal directly from the state court’s initial adverse ruling. 6 Under these circumstances, we conclude that Li’s claims against the City 7 defendants are precluded by the collateral estoppel doctrine. We therefore 8 affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Li’s claims against the City defendants. 9 Li also suggests that we must reverse or vacate the District Court’s ruling 10 even if it correctly determined that her claims are barred by collateral estoppel, 11 because holding otherwise would itself violate her procedural due process rights. 12 But her arguments in support of that proposition simply restate her claim that 13 the LPC violated her due process rights. That claim, as we have explained, is 14 barred by collateral estoppel. Nor does the application of collateral estoppel 15 cause a deprivation of due process rights, since the doctrine itself requires that 16 litigants are afforded “a full and fair opportunity to litigate” before it can apply. 17 Wyly, 697 F.3d at 141. *7 1 We have considered Li’s remaining arguments 1 and conclude that they are 2 without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is 3 AFFIRMED.

4 FOR THE COURT: 5 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court 6

1 To the extent that Li also asks us to consider the constitutional implications of the state court judgment itself, rather than the constitutional implications of the LPC hearing that the state court addressed in its decision, we lack subject matter jurisdiction to do so. See Hoblock v. Albany Cnty Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 83–92 (2d Cir. 2005) (discussing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine).