A.D. Brown v. Correct Care Solutions

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Alton D. Brown, : : Appellant : : v. : No. 924 C.D. 2019 : Submitted: April 14, 2023 Correct Care Solutions, John E. : Wetzel, and Tom Wolf :

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION PER CURIAM FILED: September 18, 2023

Alton D. Brown (Inmate) appeals pro se the order of the Fayette County Court of Common Pleas (trial court) granting the Motion to Dismiss filed by Correct Care Solutions (CCS) pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure (Pa.R.Civ.P.) 233.1.1 We affirm.

1 Pa.R.Civ.P. 233.1(a) and (c) states, in pertinent part:

(a) Upon the commencement of any action filed by a pro se plaintiff in the court of common pleas, a defendant may file a motion to dismiss the action on the basis that

(1) the pro se plaintiff is alleging the same or related claims which the pro se plaintiff raised in a prior action against the same or related defendants, and

(2) these claims have already been resolved pursuant to . . . a court proceeding.

*** (Footnote continued on next page…)

On October 22, 2018, Inmate filed a 100-page Complaint in the trial court containing 25 counts and naming over 380 defendants, including CCS, a contracted healthcare service provider with the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC), and its employees; DOC, and its former Secretary John E. Wetzel (Secretary); and former Pennsylvania Governor Tom Wolf (Governor) (collectively, Defendants). See Original Record (O.R.) Docket (Dkt.) Entry 1. Specifically, the Complaint generally alleged: (1) Defendants deprived Inmate of his rights, privileges, and immunities under the First Amendment to the United States (U.S.) Constitution, U.S. Const. amend. I; (2) violation of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, U.S. Const. amends. VIII, XIV, with respect to his housing and treatment in various DOC facilities; (3) violation of the Eighth Amendment through the use of excessive force and corporal punishment while being housed in DOC facilities; (4) violation of the Eighth Amendment through the denial of proper medical care for his prostate cancer, and other physical and mental conditions, while being housed in DOC facilities; (5) violation of the Fourteenth Amendment right to be free of a civil conspiracy among the named government officials; (6) violation of his rights under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§12101-12213, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §794; (7) violation of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by providing medical care and facilities that do not comply with a number of state statutes and regulations; (8) various torts including negligence, malpractice, and intentional

(c) Upon granting the motion and dismissing the action, the court may bar the pro se plaintiff from pursuing additional pro se litigation against the same or related defendants raising the same or related claims without leave of court.

infliction of emotional distress, for acts relating to his housing and care in DOC facilities; (9) breach of contract regarding the medical care provided by CCS employees; and (10) violation of his right to access to the courts under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See generally id. Based on the foregoing, Inmate sought various forms of declaratory and injunctive relief; monetary damages totaling $50,000,000.00; court costs; and any other relief the trial court deemed to be appropriate. See id. On May 2, 2019, CCS and its named employees filed a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 233.1 (Motion) and a brief in support thereof. See O.R. Dkt. Entries 12, 13. On June 14, 2019, the trial court granted the Motion and dismissed the Complaint with prejudice. See id. at 16. In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion filed in support of its order, the trial court explained the reasoning underlying its dismissal of all claims against CCS and its employees under Pa.R.Civ.P. 233.1. See O.R. Dkt. Entry 19 at 2-4. The trial court also cited the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 Pa. C.S. §§6601-6608,2 as a basis upon

2 Specifically, Section 6602(e)(2) of the PLRA states, in pertinent part: “Notwithstanding any filing fee which has been paid, the court shall dismiss prison conditions litigation at any time, including prior to service on the defendant, if the court determines . . . [t]he prison conditions litigation is frivolous or malicious or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted . . . .” 42 Pa. C.S. §6602(e)(2). As this Court has observed: “Section 6602(e)(2) of the [PLRA] establishes that the court shall dismiss prison conditions litigation at any time if it determines that the litigation fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 42 Pa. C.S. §6602(e)(2).” McCool v. Department of Corrections, 984 A.2d 565, 569 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (emphasis in original).

In addition, Section 6602(f) of the PLRA states, in relevant part:

If the prisoner has previously filed prison conditions litigation and:

(1) three or more of these prior civil actions have been dismissed pursuant to subsection (e)(2); or (Footnote continued on next page…)

which it dismissed all of the claims raised against the remaining Defendants. See id. at 4-5. Inmate then filed the instant timely appeal of the trial court’s order. On appeal,3 Inmate claims: (1) the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the Defendants that were not served with his Complaint; (2) the trial court erred as a matter of law and fact in dismissing the Complaint under Pa.R.Civ.P. 233.1; and (3) the trial court erred as a matter of law in applying the PLRA’s “three strikes rule” in Section 6602(f) to dismiss the claims that were raised in the Complaint.4

(2) the prisoner has previously filed prison conditions litigation against a person named as a defendant in the instant action or a person serving in the same official capacity as a named defendant and a court made a finding that the prior action was filed in bad faith . . .

the court may dismiss the action. The court shall not, however, dismiss a request for preliminary injunctive relief or a temporary restraining order which makes a credible allegation that the prisoner is in imminent danger of serious bodily injury.

42 Pa. C.S. §6602(f)(1), (2). As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained: “It is undisputed [Inmate] has previously filed more than three prison conditions litigation actions that have been dismissed. It is also undisputed the underlying complaint the prothonotary refused to accept constitutes prison conditions litigation.” Brown v. Levy, 73 A.3d 514, 517 (Pa. 2013) (citations omitted).

3 “‘The interpretation and application of a [Pa.R.Civ.P.] presents a question of law. Accordingly, to the extent that we are required to interpret a [Pa.R.Civ.P.], our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.’” Ligonier Township v. Nied, 161 A.3d 1039, 1046 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (citation omitted). Likewise, with respect to the trial court’s dismissal of claims under the PLRA, our scope of review is plenary, and our standard of review is de novo. Robertson v. Zaken (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1111 C.D. 2019, filed December 22, 2021), slip op. at 4 n.5; see also Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (“‘[N]on-precedential decision’ refers to . . . an unreported memorandum opinion of the Commonwealth Court filed after January 15, 2008. Non-precedential decisions . . . may be cited for their persuasive value.”).

4 As indicated above, as alternate bases, the trial court also dismissed all of the claims in the Complaint pursuant to both Section 6602(e)(2) and (f) of the PLRA See O.R. Dkt. Entry 19 at (Footnote continued on next page…)

However, after reviewing the record, Inmate’s brief, and the relevant law, we conclude that the appellate issues have been ably resolved in the thorough and well- reasoned opinion of the Honorable Linda R. Cordaro, and affirm on the basis of her opinion in the matter of Brown v. Correct Care Solutions (C.P. Fay., No. 2299 of 2018, G.D., filed September 18, 2019).5

Judge Fizzano Cannon did not participate in the decision of this case.

4-6. Inmate does not raise a claim of trial court error with respect to the dismissal of all of the claims under either Section 6602(e)(2) or (f)(1). See Brief of the Appellant at 2, 20.

5 In its order, the trial court relied exclusively on Pa.R.Civ.P. 233.1, while its opinion explicated that Section 6602(e)(2) and (f)(1), 42 Pa. C.S. §6602(e)(2) and (f)(1), provides another basis upon which its order could be affirmed. Because courts speak in orders, the exclusive rationale set forth in the trial court’s order ordinarily would control. However, because the trial court added analysis to its order in the opinion, we are adopting that analysis as well, despite the fact that the trial court did not amend its order to reflect the total analysis set forth in its opinion. It is well settled that “‘[w]e may affirm a trial court determination under a different rationale, where the result is correct and the basis on which we affirm is clear on the record.’” Brown v. James, 822 A.2d 128, 131 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (citation omitted).

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Alton D. Brown, : : Appellant : : v. : No. 924 C.D. 2019 : Correct Care Solutions, John E. : Wetzel, and Tom Wolf :

PER CURIAM

ORDER

AND NOW, this 18th day of September, 2023, the order of the Fayette County Court of Common Pleas (trial court), dated June 14, 2019, is AFFIRMED on the reasoning set forth in the trial court’s September 18, 2019 Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion.