NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2023 IL App (3d) 230088-U
Order filed October 23, 2023 ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
ANGELA CAGWIN, f/k/a ANGELA TREND, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit, Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Will County, Illinois, ) v. ) Appeal No. 3-23-0088 ) Circuit No. 21-L-959 ANGELA HENDERSON, HENDERSON ) LAW AND MEDIATION, and ) HENDERSON AND MEHTA LAW, ) ) Honorable ) John C. Anderson, Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices McDade and Hettel concurred in the judgment. __________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: This court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal. Appeal dismissed. ¶2 Plaintiff, Angela Trend, now known as Angela Cagwin, filed a complaint against her
former attorney, Angela Henderson, and the law firms of Henderson Law and Mediation and
Henderson and Mehta Law, raising negligence and legal malpractice claims relating to their
representation of plaintiff in postdissolution proceedings. The trial court granted defendants’
motion to dismiss with prejudice, and plaintiff appeals. For the reasons set forth below, we
dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. ¶3 I. BACKGROUND ¶4 On December 10, 2021, plaintiff filed, as a self-represented litigant, a multi-count
complaint against defendants arising out of their two-month representation of plaintiff in
postdissolution proceedings. Plaintiff raised the following claims: (1) “NEGLIGENCE
(BREACHING CONFIDENTIALITY AND ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE)”; (2)
“NEGLIGENCE (FAILURE TO REPRESENT AND PROTECT)”; (3) “NEGLIGENCE
(NOTARY FRAUD)”; AND (4) “NEGLIGENCE (FORGERY).” Plaintiff alleged that, in her
dissolution proceeding, Henderson filed a motion with a supporting affidavit titled “Affidavit of
Michael Fuller.” The affidavit purported to be signed by plaintiff, but plaintiff never signed that
affidavit. Plaintiff alleges that there was a second such affidavit, but she does not allege that the
affidavit was ever filed or used for any purpose. ¶5 On January 26, 2022, defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619 of
the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2022)), arguing that plaintiff failed
to allege any actual damages or injury arising out of any use of the affidavits. The motion was
briefed by both sides, and the trial court heard argument on the motion on April 12, 2022, and
April 20, 2022. ¶6 Meanwhile, on December 23, 2021 (a few weeks after the complaint in this case was
filed), plaintiff filed, as a self-represented litigant, a complaint against the attorney who
represented plaintiff’s former spouse in postdissolution and other proceedings. See Trend v.
Flynn, et al., No. 21-L-986 (Cir. Ct. Will County) (Flynn). The defendants in the Flynn case also
moved to dismiss the complaint and sought sanctions. At a March 30, 2022, trial court status
proceeding, at which plaintiff did not appear, the trial court inquired as to whether the cases
should be consolidated. Counsel for defendants in both cases responded that the cases were
distinct. At a July 20, 2022, status hearing, the trial court advised that it would like to
simultaneously rule on the motions to dismiss in this case and Flynn. ¶7 The trial court issued its written order on July 26, 2022, granting defendants’ motion to
dismiss with prejudice. In the order, the trial court stated that it had, on its own motion,
consolidated the case with Flynn. The trial court reasoned that both cases stemmed from
plaintiff’s dissolution case and that numerous other court cases and filings in various agencies
were all essentially part of her ongoing dissolution-related litigation. ¶8 As for the complaints in both this case and Flynn, the trial court found that neither
complied with the requirement in section 2-603 of Code (735 ILCS 5/2-603 (West 2022)) that
there be a plain and concise statement of the cause of action with each claim stated in a separate
count and “separately pleaded, designated, and numbered” with “each paragraph containing, as
nearly as may be, a separate allegation.” The trial court then proceeded to separately analyze the
two cases, finding in this case that, inter alia, plaintiff was not damaged by the affidavits. The
trial court reasoned that the “Michael Fuller” affidavit was submitted in support of a motion
plaintiff won, and there was no allegation that the other affidavit was ever used or filed
anywhere. Accordingly, the trial court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss and dismissed
plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice. ¶9 However, given the trial court’s grant of the defendants’ sanctions motion in Flynn, that
proceeding continued. Following the defendants’ filing of a supporting fee petition in Flynn, on
October 19, 2022, plaintiff filed in that case what was titled a “2-1401 Petition Challenge to
Court’s Ruling,” with the caption “2021 L 986”—the caption of the Flynn proceeding. In the
petition, plaintiff stated that she “presents this 2-1401 Challenge to the Court’s ruling on Bretz
Flynn’s 2-615 Mot. To Dismiss and Entry of R. 137 award ***.” In an October 31, 2022, written
order, the trial court, on its own motion, directed plaintiff to advise as to why the petition should
not be stricken and explicitly stated that it severed the instant case from Flynn on its own motion.
While litigation proceeded with various filings in Flynn, culminating in the trial court’s February
21, 2021, written order resolving the various pending matters, there was no further litigation in
the case sub judice. ¶ 10 However, plaintiff did not file a notice of appeal in this case until March 7, 2023 (months
after the trial court’s July 26, 2022, dismissal order), purporting to appeal from, inter alia, the
trial court February 21, 2023, order in Flynn. ¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS ¶ 12 On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in consolidating this case with Flynn.
She also inexplicably challenges the trial court’s ruling on the section 2-1401 petition in the
Flynn case, and, in doing so, appears to argue that, here, the trial court improperly dismissed her
complaint with prejudice. Plaintiff proceeds as a self-represented litigant on appeal. ¶ 13 We note first that defendants did not file an appellees’ brief. However, we may decide the
merits of the case where, as here, the record is simple and the issues can be easily decided
without the aid of an appellee’s brief. See Thomas v. Koe, 395 Ill. App. 3d 570, 577 (2009)
(citing First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976)). ¶ 14 Before we address the merits of the appeal, we have an independent duty to consider our
jurisdiction. Secura Insurance Co. v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 232 Ill. 2d 209, 213 (2009).
A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after the entry of the final judgment appealed
from, or, if a timely posttrial motion directed against the judgment is filed, within 30 days after
the entry of the order disposing of the last such motion. Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017).
When a notice of appeal is untimely, we lack jurisdiction and must dismiss the appeal. See Dus
v. Provena St. Mary’s Hospital, 2012 IL App (3d) 091064, ¶ 10. ¶ 15 Here, the trial court entered a written order on July 26, 2022, granting defendants’ motion
to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint. The dismissal was with prejudice and therefore a final order. See
Fabian v. BGC Holdings, LP, 2014 IL App (1st) 141576, ¶ 12 (a dismissal with prejudice is
usually considered a final judgment because it denotes that the plaintiff will not be allowed to
amend the complaint, thereby terminating the litigation). While proceedings continued in Flynn,
nothing remained pending in this case. Thus, the July 26, 2022, dismissal was a final and
appealable order, yet plaintiff did not file a notice of appeal until March 7, 2023. Given the
untimely notice of appeal, we must dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. ¶ 16 The consolidation of this case with Flynn does not cure the jurisdictional defect. Where
two cases are consolidated only for convenience and economy, the cases do not merge into a
single suit but retain their distinct identities. In re Marriage of Sanfratello, 393 Ill. App. 3d 641,
657 (2009). Accordingly, a final judgment in one of the actions is deemed final and immediately
appealable. Id. We further note that plaintiff recognized the distinct identity of the cases in the
filing of her October 19, 2022, section 2-1401 petition, where she included only the caption in
Flynn and challenged only the dismissal in Flynn. ¶ 17 Moreover, in addition to the distinct identity of the cases throughout these proceedings,
the trial court affirmatively severed the cases in its October 31, 2022, written order. As set forth
above, plaintiff did not file her notice of appeal until months later. In sum, plaintiff’s notice of
appeal in this case was untimely, and there is no basis upon which this court may exercise
jurisdiction over plaintiff’s appeal. *6 ¶ 18 III. CONCLUSION ¶ 19 For the foregoing reasons, we lack jurisdiction over this appeal. ¶ 20 Appeal dismissed.