United States v. Gilliat

Mr. Justice Peckham, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court. The appellee moves to dismiss the appeal in this proceeding on the ground that the action of the Court of Claims was conclusive under the special statute of August 23,1894, c. 307, 28 Stat. 424, 487, providing for the hearing of the question of fact by the court as to what person was entitled to recover and receive the amount appropriated to be paid to John A. Brimmer, Jr., under the act of March 3, 1891, c. 540, § 4. 26 Stat. 862, 900. We think the appeal should be dismissed. The original act of Congress of January 20, 1885, by which the claimants in the spoliation cases- were referred to the Court of Claims, gave no power to that court to enter judgment upon its finding. By section 6 of that act, the finding and report of the court were to be taken merely as advisory as to the law and facts- *45 found, and were not to conclude either the claimant or Congress. No appeal, therefore, could be taken from the report of the Court of Claims made to Congress under that act. The liability of the government for the payment to those entitled to it Of the amount of damages sustained by them by reason of 'the capture of the ship Hannah and its cargo, owned by the firm of Messrs. Cilliat & Taylor, was found by the Court of Claims and reported to Congress pursuant to the act of 1885, and the appropriation was subsequently made by that body for the payment of such damages. The person to whom the appropriation was made was unable to l’eceive the same, because of his inability to comply with the proviso contained in the act of appropriation. For the purpose of ascertaining the person who might be entitled to recover and receive the sum already appropriated by Congress for the payment of the damages described, Congress passed the act referring to the Court of Claims that single question, and that court, after having ascertained the fact upon sufficient evidence, was by the act directed to certify the same to the Secretary of the Treasury. As the action of the Court of Claims upon the original claim made under the act of 1885 was not the subject of an appeal to this court, but was simply advisory in its nature, the whole matter being left to the discretion of Congress, wre think it clear that it was not the intention of that body to permit an appeal from the. finding of the Court of Claims upon the subsidiary question as to the particular person to whom the appropriation already made by Congress should be paid. It was undoubtedly the intention of Congress, by the language used in the act of 1S91, to refer to the Court of Claims simply the ascertainment of the proper person to be paid the sum which it had already acknowledged to be due to the representatives of the original sufferers from the spoliation, and it was.not intended that the decision which the Court of Claims might arrive at should be the subject of an appeal to this court. We think Congress intended that when such fact had been ascertained by the Court of Claims, upon evidence sufficient to satisfy that court, the fact was to be certified by the *46 court to the Secretary of the Treasury, and such certificate ivas to be final and conclusive. The case resembles in some aspects that of Ex parte Atocha, 17 Wall. 439. It differs from Vigo’s case: Ex parte United States, 21 Wall. 648, because the original claim was never referred to the Court of Claims for such judicial action as should term-inate 'in a judgment, but it was only referred to it by Congress for the purpose of receiving what is termed its advisory conclusions, upon which Congress would proceed in its discretion. But aside from either of the above cited cases, the nature of the original claim and the manner in which it has been treated by Congress, and the language of the appropriation, as contained in the act of 1894, all clearly lead to the conclusion that Congress intended the decision of the Court of Claims to be final, and that the Secretary of the Treasury should pay upon receipt of the certificate provided for in the act. The motion to dismiss the appeal is, therefore, granted, and the Appeal dismissed.