Julian St. Rose Virginie George Raymond Alleyne Edgar Barrios and Other Persons Too Numerous to Mention, A Class Action v. Virgin Islands Industrial Maintenance Corporation (IMC) Jacobs Industrial Maintenance Corporation (JIMC) HOVENSA, LLC HOVIC and Amerada Hess Corporation

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SUPERIOR COURT OF "I HE VIRGIN ISLANDS DIVISION OF S"! CROIX JLI m ST ROSE; VIRGIME GEORCE9 R\YMO\D Case 1N0 SK 2002 CV 00598 AI LEYNE; EDG «R B xRRIOS, m!) OTHER PFRSONS T00 NLMEROl 5 T0 0112mm, A CLASS AC1 10x i Action for Damages PI UNTIHS, Complex Litigation Division V JIM} Trial Demanded VIRGIN ISL \‘\DS IVDLQTRIAL M unmAxCF CORPORATION (IMO, JACOBS INDLSTRHI M AINTEN mCE CORPORATION (JIMC), HOVENS A, LLC, HOVIC, AM) AVIILRADA Hr SS CORPORA rim, DEFEI\D n15 ' Cite as 2024 VI Super 18 Appearances LFE J ROHN ESQ RHEA LAWRENCE ESQ MARY FAITH CARPENTER ESQ I 66 J Rohn and Associates LLC Christiansted V100820 F0} P/amtgfﬂs CHARLES E LOCKWOOD ESQ GREGG R KRONENBERC‘ER ESQ GEORGE H LOGAN ESQ Dudley Newman Feuerzeig LLP Chxistiansted V100280 F0; Defendant Vugm Island? [ndusn ml Mamimance C01p01at10n STEPHANIE L ADLER PAINDIRIS FSQ AI [CIA M CHIL ESQ Jackson Lewis P C Orlando FL 32801 f0; Defendant Jacobs Indus!) Ia] Mamtemmcc C01 p01 anon ' Aithough the caption vx as amended when the Second Amended Complaint wax ﬁled the Court has Ietained the p1i01 caption to avoid contusion since the amendment remm ed Jaeobs Industrial Maintenance Corpmation and its dismissal is the foeux of motiom addressed herein 51 Rose a (1/ x I I Indus Marni Low eta] 2074 VI Supex 18 Case No SX ”002 CV 00598 MEMORANDth OPINION Page 2 01 29 CARL A BECKSTEDT III ESQ EARNESTA L TAYLOR Beckstedt & Kue7ynski LLP Christiansted V1 00820 For Defendants HOVENS’A [1P Hess Oz! lngm Islands C01p01anon (Ind Ameladu Hess C0) p01 anon CAROLYN F O CONNOR ESQ JOSEPH T HANLON ESQ Wilson Elsa Moskowitz Edelman and Dicker LLP Madison NJ 07940 To; Defendant Hess Caipozarlon MEMORANDUM OPINION W ILLOCKS, Administrative Judge ﬁll BEFORE THE COURT is a motion ﬁled by the Plaintiffs to amend the order dismissing Defendant Jacobs Industxial Maintenance Corporation (hereinafter ‘ Jacobs lMC , ‘JIMC ’ 0r ‘ Jacobs ’) to allow for interlocut01y appeal pursuant to Title 4 Section 33(0) of the Vixgin Islands Code In the alternative, Plaintiff‘s seek reeonsideration 0f the order and leave to serve process on Jacobs [MC late Jacobs [MC and Defendant Virgin Islands Industrial Maintenance C01p01ation (hereinafter IMC ’) ﬁled responses in opposition to the motion The other Defendants did not respond Plaintiffs ﬁled separate teplies to Jacobs IMC and t0 IMC The substantive arguments raised in each are lax gely the same however Plaintiffs contend that JIMC’S response must be stricken since it was dismissed and therefme does not have the right to be heard Plaintiffs also ﬁled a motion f01 an extension 0ftime to ﬁle thei1 Ieply t0 IMC’S response which IMC Opposed, and objected in thei1 reply to JIMC being heard in opposition 1Q Having e0nside1 ed the 211 guments 0f the palties, as well as the informal report of the Staff Master following a status conference With the panties and taking note of prim orders the Staff Master issued questioning whethel Plaintiffs’ motion is more applopriate under Rule 54(b) of the Virgin Islands Rules of C ivil Plocedure, the Coun now for the reasons given below concludes that the motion to amend t0 51 Rose ua/ x I 1 1mm Vault mp cla/ 7024 Vi Supei 13 Case No SX 2002 LV 00599 MILMORANDLH OPI'\ ION Page 3 0t 29 prox ide f01 inteilooutory appeal or in the altcmative for ieconsideration must be denied The Court also ﬁnds JlMC s response is propeily befme the Court and that Plaintiffs tailed to show good cause for an extension of time Thus Plaintiffs’ reply to IMC’S iesponse will be disregaided Howe\ er e\ (,1) though certification fox inteilocutory appeal is not propel the Court does ﬁnd that certifying the dismissal of Ideobs as ﬁnal under Rule 54(b) is appropriate This is case involves multiple claims and multiple parties and them is no just reason for fuithei delay given the decades that haw: passed sinee J aeobs [MC was untimely sewed to make the parties wait until all claims have been adjudicated to leam “116(er Jacobs should be reinstated Reversal and remand at that junctu1e would, in this Court 8 assessment, be contrary to justice Since little discovery has occurred notwithstanding the age of this case, if Jacobs IMC’s dismissal weie leveised it would come before the claims are adjudicated and it it were afﬁrmed, it would have an impact on how this case proceeds I FACTLAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 13 Julian St Rose, Viiginie George Raymond Alleyne, and Edgar Bairios (hereinafter ‘ Plaintiffs ) sued IMC Jacobs [MC HOVENSA LLC (heieinafter HOVENSA ) Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corpoxation (heieinaftei HOVIC ) arid Ameiada Hess Corporation (now known as Hess C01p01ation) (heieinaftei ( Hess ) 1°01 damages on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of tormei employees of IMC and Jacobs IMC According to the complaint ﬁled on September 18, 2002 and amended on Maich 4 2003, Plaintiffs initially wmked for [MC but during meeting in Octobei 1999 with lMC and Jacobs, IMC and Jacobs rcpiesented that it Plaintiffs agreed to ‘ being tiansteiTed to J [aebos] IMC they would ietain their rights including date of hire, seniority and seveiance pay and other beneﬁts accrued while woxking for [MC ’ (First Amend Compl 1W) ) Plaintiffs agreed to the transfei but weie lam teiminated between Decembei 2001 and Septembei 2002 They did not receive severance 01 beneﬁts 1J4 Plaintiffs contend that HOVENSA with HOVlC and Hess (hereinafter ‘ Hess Defendmts ) (.1 Rose (fa! t ,1 I Indus Marni (mp era] 2024 V1 Super 18 Case No SK 2002 CV 00398 VIEMOR XNDL M OPINION Page 4 01 2’) dew eloped a plan to have everyone f1 om IMC m0 ved to J 300135 IMC became the Hess Defendant.» V» anted t0 tome long tum employees 101 e0ntxact0rs to have to sign mandatory arbitration agieemehts in order to w01k in the reﬁnety (See Amend Compl 1] 32 ﬁled M31 8 2019 ) Plaintiffs sued the Hess Detendant‘; INK and Jacobs IMC for bieaeh 0f the duty of good faith and tair dealing \iOlation of the Vitgin Islands Plant Closing Act and traud They seek punitive ddmagee €15 Plaintiffs ﬁled their complaint on September 18 2002 as amended on Mach 4 2003 Summons iesued tor all Detendants and Plaintiffs served all Defendants all except J aeobs lMC, that is Teehnieally Plaintiffs did serve Jacobs IMC, on September I l 2003 but seniee was late and without leave 01‘ eouﬁ Plaintitts sought to ewe the deteet the next day by ﬁling a motion on September 12 2003 for leave to gene ‘ nzmc pm rune They explained that their attomey w as told by the process sen er, Antonio M Benjamin that all Defendants had been served but sometime in August 2003 they reali/ed Jacobs had not been served with discoy e1y demands Plaintiffs eounsel looked but could not lOeate a return of serviee so eounsel followed up with the process sewer Afte1 a delay Benjamin admitted that he erroneously withheld seivice fox Jaeobs [MC 116 Plaintiffs cited personnel changes in their attorney 3 ofﬁce whieh they contend contributed to the delay in realizing Jaeobs was not served '1 hey also noted that the ease was still in ‘ its infancy ’ that motions to stay discovery and to dismiss were pending and that late service on Jacobs lM( would not be ptejudieial becauSe, awarding t0 Plaintiffs, Jacobs IMC was part of a joint venture with IMC and theiefme, had notice of the law suit when IMC was served Plaintiffs asked for sixty days to serve Jaeobs 1MC but tailed in their motion to acknowledge that Jaeobs had already been sewed, with proof of service ﬁled the day betme 9'17 The Couit (Rees J ) denied Plaintifts motion in an order dated November 23, 2003 and enteied Nox embei 26 2003 The C curt tiist eenSidered whether the reasons Plaintiffs gave 101 not timely serving 8/ Ron LI“! 1 I I Indus Marni Corp cm! 2024 V1 bupm 18 Case No SK 2002 CV 00598 VIEVIOR \NDLM OPINION Page 5 0t 29 Iaeobs IMC show ed good cause to g1 ant an extension The Court found they did not (See Order 3 entered Nov 26 2003 ( Plaintiffs 1aek 0f oveisight and the process servei ’3 de1inqueney are the reason for non sen ice P1aintiffs haVe failed to piovide the Court with good eause for tai1ing to gene JIMC in a timely mannel ’) ) The CouIt next considered whether other factors warlanted an extension and hem aeknowledged P1aintitfs’ assertion about lambs IMC haVing notice thiough service on IMC The Court agreed that if Jacobs IMC and IMC weie ‘ engaged in ajoint ventuie” then ‘ service on one party is service on a11 ’ 1d at 4 (Liting 26 V I C § 3(0) The Couit then concluded that these reasons stated by Plaintiff d0 juslzfi extending the time for service to JIMC 10’ (emphasis added) But the Court nonetheless, denied Plaintiffs motion $8 Once the motion was denied, Plaintiffs proceeded under the assumption that leave to SCIVC was unnecessal y because >UV1£€ 0n IMC was imputed to Jacobs [MC That is, when the Lourt denied their motion to Serve Jacobs IMC mmc p10 rune Plaintiffs took that as the Ccurt ﬁnding that they did not need moxe time to seive Jacobs IMC Consequently, on January 14, 2004, Plaintiffs moved fox entry of defau1t once Jacobs 1MC tailed to appear 01 otherwise defend Technically J aeobs [MC did appear four months eailiel however, on OetobeI 14 2003 but to ﬁle a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of pexsonal juiisdietion and unde1 Rule 12(b)(5) for insufﬁciency of process Plaintiffs opposed that motion on Novembei 18 2003, and Jacobs replied on Decembei 16 2003 The parties remained in a state 01 limbo ﬁn the next twenty years with Jacobs having opposed default having ﬁled several notices advising of agreements with Plaintiffs to extend brieﬁng deadlines having appealed at status confetenees and hearings and having moved for (and obtained) or opposed reconsideration of celtain 01 (1615 In fact the Older that Plaintiffs want amended 01 ieeonsidered iesulted from a motion Jacobs IMC ﬁled tel rewnsidetation W) To explain duting a status confeienee 0n Januaiy 23 2019, the C0urt(M0110y I ) heatd a1 gument 31‘ Row £10] 1 I I Indus Mam! (mp elm 20 4\13uper18 Case No 5X 002 (V 00398 311231011 \NDLH OPINION Page 6 of 29 110111 Jacobs IMC on its October 14 2003 motion to dismiss Jacobs refeired the Court to the No\ emhet 73 2003 Order, which teehnieally postdated its motion to dismiss and asserted that the OIdCl was elem and controlling The Court disagreed in part (See Hr g Tr 25 15 17 (“T HE COURT The reasons is what 8 eonfusing but the oxdet is cleai and the order is what eontrols ’ ) ) Plaintitts counteied that the ordei could be ieeonsidered at any time prior to ﬁnal judgment and asserted that it would be manifestly unjust f01 the C Quit to have found that J acobs [MC had aetual notice of the law suit thtough 1\1C and then letme to grant an extension of time to serve When the Court pointed out that Plaintiffs had not ﬁled a motion to ieeonsider in the yeais since the {\ox ember 25 2003 Order was issued, Plaintiffs otfeted to ﬁle one stiaightaway The Court also questioned it service was necessary since Jacobs had been served See [(1 at 30 8 12 ( THE C OURT Hold on They mete sen ed The only question whether the Court shall allow the SCIV1C€ to be made notwitlbtanding the violation of 20 days whether there was good cause 01 extenuating eireumstances ’) The Court reiterated howevei that no motion t01 reconsideiation was ﬁled in the preceding ﬁfteen yeals which Plaintith took issue with referiing the C oun to a 1equest they had ﬁled in 2006 in pan to seek guidance on the impasse 1110 1 mm the bench the Court gave Plaintiffs a deadline not to ﬁle a motion for [econsideration but to ﬁle a motion t01 leave to ﬁle the motion for ieeonsidCIation out oftime Discussion on othet matters ensued including discoveiy and Plaintiffs delay in ﬁling a motion to certify a class Relevant here, at the conclusion of the hearing the Court directed Jacobs lMC to provide Plaintiffs counsel with a list of the names of all employees Jaeobs IMC had hiied and terminated in 2001 and 2002 The Court redueed its bench luling to miting in a Januaiy 31 2019 Order which included a deadline tor Plaintiffs to ﬁle a motion ﬁn leax e to ﬁle a motion for ieeonsideiation out ofﬂine, and a deadline for Jaeobs W1C to piovide the list of employees ﬁll 1 On February 8 2019 Jacobs [MC ﬁled a timely motion for reconsideration ox elaxiﬁeation laeobs 51 Rm 9/ (1/ t 1 I Indus Mum! L011) er (1/ 2024 V1 Super 18 Case No SX 2002 CV 00398 ML\IOR 4011)th OPINION Page 7 of 29 objeeted to the Conn having given Plaintiffs a deadline to ﬁle a motion for leaxe to seek Ieeumidexation out of time gi\ en the amount oftime that had passed and objeeted to haxing to provide 11164 of employees because ‘JIMC has 11€V€I been sewed in in this action ﬁled in 2002 (Def lambs Indus Maint Cotp ’3 Mot tor Reeonsid andtm Clarif of the Ct’s Jan 31 2019 Ordet 1 ﬁled Feb 8 2019 ) 1n the a1tematiVe Jacobs sought claxiﬁcation 0f the scope ofnames it had to provide Plaintiffs noting that every employee who was hired or te1minated by Jaeobs during the relevant timeﬁame would not be in the Class of indi\ iduals Plaintitts seek to represent Plaintiffs did not ﬁle a response to JIMC s motion and also did not ﬁle the motion for leaxe to ﬁle out 0ftime a motion for reconsidelation of the Novemhe1 2}, 2003 Oldel befme the deadline the Couxt set in its January 31 2019 Oldel 1,112 On Mareh 4 2019, the Court (M0110)! J ) granted JlMC’s motion tor xeconsidelation agreeing that it eould not 0rde1 Jaeobs to do anything because Jacobs was not timely sen ed The Court furthet noted that it had heard argument on JIMC 5 October 14, 2003 motion to dismiss and that Plaintiffs failed to ﬁle a motion for leaxe to ﬁle a motion out 0ftime pertaining to serViee on Jacobs The Comt glanted Jaeobs s motion for reeonsidexation and dismissed Jacobs for failure to effectu ite serviee 0fp10eess[ ] (Older 2 enteled Match 4 2019 ) The C0u1t has no pelsonal julisdiction ova 11MC[ ] it eoneluded and cannot require it to submit a list 01 names of all employees hired and terminated by it in 2001 and 2002 ’ Id Two months 1ate1 Plaintiffs ﬁled the motion, addlessed herein to amend the Mareh 4 2019 Older to provide fox interIOeutmy appeal or altematix ely f01 reconsidetatioh J lMC ﬁled an unopposed motion for an extension 01 time to respond whieh the Court granted JIMC ﬁled its lesponse on June 28 2019 Plaintiffs also moved for an extension of the time to ﬁle its replies, which IMC opposed Plaintitte ﬁled thei1 reply to [MC 5 Iesponse on July 8, 2019, and their reply to JIMC S response on Julv 18 2019 [I DISCUSSION 3113 Before adchessing the motion to amend or for Ieconsideration the Court ﬁtst must addless VI Rose 6161] 1 I I Indus 11mm (trip eta] 2024 VI Supei 18 Case No SX 2002 CV 00598 NIEWIOR \NDLM OPINION Page 8 01 29 Plaintifls’ motion for an extension oftime as well as Plaintiffs" objeetion t0 Jaeobs lMC s iesponse Fliese aneillary matteis must be addressed ﬁrst because the outcome will determine the arguments the CQuit ean eonsider Cf G01 [0/1/16 0 S I I \ Sennullaslel Co [LC N0 8X 16 CV 700 2018 VI LEXlS 100 ><6 (V 1 Super Lt Sep 26 2018) ( Because the motions stipulations and notiees impact on what arguments are betOie the C Curt and therefore what the Court can consider in iendeiing a deeision the Court must resol\ e these aneillary motions ﬁrst, before proeeeding t0 the merits ’) A First Motion for an Extension of Time 114 Pursuant to Rule 6 l Iesponses to motions except Rule 12 and Rule 56 motions axe due Within fourteen days aftei the motion is served ‘ [u]nless othemise ordered by the court V I R C i\ P 6 l(f)( 1) Replies to responses axe similarly due within fourteen days aftei seivice unless the court orders otherwise See V I R Ci\ P 6 l(t)(5) In this instance the Court (Molloy J ) did ordei otherwise when it issued Standing Ordei N0 4, which piovides (f01 all cases pending in the Complex Litigation DlVlSlOﬂ) that the deadline for all responses is extended to twenty eight (28) days lrom the date a motion is sewed and ﬁled and the deadline f01 all replies is extended to twenty eight (28) days from the date the iesponse is served and ﬁled provided that the paxties meet and confer as directed and piovided fUI‘thel that a different deadline is not speciﬁed by court ordei Standing Cider No 4, § 5 entered Mar 5, 2019 [n w Complex [mg Cases Pendmg m the Supei CI of the VI Case No SX 2019 MC 035 (nal/ab/e at 2019 V1 LEXIS 28 7 8 (VI Super Mai 5 2019) Seetion 6 further provides that ‘ [b]ecause additional time has been gianted to ﬁle responses and Icplies, motions and stipulations f01 an extension ofﬂine or fox leave to ﬁle or act out of time will only be granted on motion showing exceptional Circumstances ’ Id at *8 How ever, parties are directed to ‘ pieceed as though leave were g1 anted ’ if then iequest has not been ruled on within twenty eight days but With full knowledge that, if exceptional eircumstances me not found, the Court may disxegaid 0r iejeet the late ﬁling Id (eitingAuguslmi Hcss 0111/1 Corp 67 V l 488 503 05 (Super Ct 2017)) SI Rue (I(l] \ 1 I Indus 11mm (mp cf (11’ 2024 V1 Supei 18 Lase No S\ 2002 LV 00398 \IEMOR \\DL M OPINION Page 9 0t 29 1113 Additionally Section 1 of Standing Order No 4 diiects that counsel must meet and eonfet before fi/mg am mollun 01 quzzesr including dispositive motions and discovery motions so that the issues axe crystalized and aneillaiy matters, whieh often can be resolved thtough communication without cou1t inter» ention ale iedueed ’ Id at >‘6 (emphasis added) This requirement camperts with othei meet and confer requirements including, relevant hue Rule 6 2 of the Virgin Islands Rules 01‘ Civil Proceduie which proxides that [21111 motions seeking an extension of time shall include [a] statement that the moving party has eonteued with opposing parties and there is agreement 01 objection to the motion or that despite diligent etfmt the moving party cannot ascertain opposing counsel 5 position ’ V1 R Civ P 6 2(a) 1116 Plaintiffs ﬁled their motion to amend the March 4 2019 order or f01 ieeonsidcration on May 9 2019 [MC ﬁled its iesponse on June 4 2019, two days before its 28 day deadline Plaintiffs ieply was due 28 days after that or by July 2 2019 Plaintiffs ﬁled their First Motion for Extension 01‘ Time on June 24 2019, stating (ineon ectly) that their reply was due the same day 7 They asked for fourteen mom days 01 until July 8 2019 because LOUIISCl responsible for drafting the Reply has been out ofthe country on a pre planned family vacation to Cape Town South Attica since June 3 and Vt ill not be back until June 25 ’ (PIS Fiist Mot fOI Ext of Time 2 ﬁled June 24 2019 ) Plaintiffs lepresented that they tried to confer With1MC per Rule 6 2 but ha[d] not received a Iesponse [d Plaintiffs also concluded that IMC will not be piejudiced by this delay and an extension Vt ill not have an impact on these proceedings as the extension is brief ’ Id 1117 {MC ﬁled its response in opposition on July 1 2019 [MC ﬁtst acknowledged that Plaintiffs did 7 Putsuant 10 Rule 6 0fthe Virgin Islands Rules ofLiVil Procedure when the period is 14 days or less (10 not count intermediate Saturda}s Sundays and legal holidays ” V I R Civ P 6(a)(1)(B) Plaintiffs were correct that 14 days per Rule 6 frOm lune 4 2019 would have been lune 24 2019 ifthis were an ordinary civil case Howe\ er because this is a complex east the 28 day deadline pun ided in Standing Order No 4 controlled whim; Plaintiffs mote time Sf Row (iu/ i I I Indus 11mm L(er Lfll/ 2024 V! Suppl 18 C ”15L l\o SK 2002 (V 00398 \IEMOR 5041)! M OPINION Paga 10 0t 29 attempt to wiifer as requiied by the lulu ‘ by sending an email at 12 53pm (m h m 24 2019 (Dd V I lildus Maint ( 0113 s Opp’n to P15 Hist Mot tor Ext 0101 ime 1, ﬁled July 1 2019 ) Plaintiffs ﬁled then motion appxoximately two hours latex at 3 19pm ‘Given the Supieme Court 8 decision to include Lliligenee as a precondition to satisfying the iequirement to attempt to confer a wisory email followed by immediate ﬁling can haidly be said to meet this requirement[ ] 1d at 2 lMC a1 gued Aeeording t0 IMC the masons uhy it Opposed giving Plaintiffs more time W616 the same masons why it opposed Plaintiffs’ underlying motion because they have tailed to meet numuous deadlines Id FLuther the CQUIT aheady gen e Plaintiffs a deadline February 4 2019 to ﬁle a motion for leave to seek iecomideration but of time Plaintiffs ignored that deadline, W1C argued yet went ahead and ﬁled an untimely motion for reconsideiation while also ignoring the tequitement that they seek leave ﬁx st Since the underlying motion is untimely and Plaintiffs did not comply with Rule 6 2 in ﬁling theiI motion for an extension 0ftime, the C 01111 should deny then tequest for 111016 time to ﬁle then reply IMC argued Plaintiffs did not ﬁle a reply to [MC 3 iesponse 1118 The. Court agiees with IMC that Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the meet and confei tequirement Fiist, IMC overlooked the Sepaiate tequiiement Standing Oldel No 4 imposes on counsel to meet and confer before ﬁling any motion or request in a complex case Plaintiffs motion for an extension 0t time does not include a certiﬁcation, as such of counsel 8 attempts to confei bef01e ﬁling it In this instance 0x eilooking the Standing Oldu is hannless because Rule 6 2(a) imposes a similar requiiement, that the movant include a statement in the motion indicating whethel the opposing panties agree or object to the tequest for mete time 01 a statement that despite diligent etfoxt the movant could not asceitain opposing counsel’spositions Sac V1 R Ch P 6 2(3) Plaintitfs failed to satisfy this requirement Diligent means [deﬁnition citation] One email sent to opposing LOUllSCl approximately 110L113 before a motion is ﬁled With the e0u1t does not satisfy the ‘ diligent effort requilement in the rule See [(1 ( despite diligent etfort SI Ros: cla/ \ I I Indus Mann Com t/a/ 2024 Vl Supei 18 Case No SK 2002 CV 00598 VILMORAINDI M OPIl\ ION Page 1 l of 39 the moving patty eannot ascertain opposing counsel's position ) {ll 9 Plaintiffs also failed to way then burden to show good cause When an act is required or allow ed to be done by or within a speciﬁed petiod the court may upon a showing of good cause 01 excusable negleet extend the date f01 doing that aet ’ V I R Civ P 6(b)(l) Faetoxs courts can consider include when the request was made (whether before or after the deadline has passed) the reason for the delay whether the teason was within the movant 5 control, prejudice to the othet parties the length of the delay, the impact on the proceedings whether the movant acted in good faith, and any othet relevant Circumstances See 1d The mox ant must also disclosc ‘ the number of motions for extension 0t time that have been ﬁled by the movant with tespeet to the same presexibed time period ’ V l R Civ P 6 2(b) By titling their motion ‘ First Motion fox Extension of Time ’ Plaintiffs disclosed that it was their ﬁrst request They also asked to have until July 8 2023 which is only six days after the ieply was initially due per Standing Ordei No 4 So the number of times Plaintiffs sought and extension and the length of the delay ate taetms that lean in Plaintiffs fax 01 How ever, the reason for the delay and whethe1 the reason was within the movant s LOl‘tthl are factors that weigh heavily against Plaintiffs Plaintiffs ﬁled the underlying motion on May 9, 2019 They should have appreciated that pet Standing OldCI No 4 responses were due four weeks later and 1eplies four Weeks thereaftet They calculated theit time to ﬁled their reply to IMC s response based on the 14 days piovided under Rule 6 l(t)(5) Howevei 14 days undel the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Proeedme W orks out to be more like 21 days because only business days are eounted Cf VI R Civ P 6(a)(1)(B) (excluding weekends and legal holidays for all deadlines 14 days 01 less) @1130 EV en under Plaintiffs’ own approaeh they knew on June 4 2019 that thei1 reply would have been due on June 24 2019 (per Rule 6 l), and they also knew that the attorney who was iesponsible 101 drafting that reply had lett the TeiTitor} and the country on a pre planned \aeation the day before on June 3 31 Ron ital i I I Indus 11am! Cm]: rial 2021\1 Super 115 ' ase 1V0 SK 2002 CW 0(h98 MP MORANDLM OPI‘WOtN Page 12 0t 29 2019 Y mt Plaintiffs waited three weeks until June 24, 2019 (they day they believed the reply was due) to eontaet opposing counsel and move for an additional two weeks Conits in the Virgin Islands have eonsiatently held that a busy schedule of counsel by itself, does not establish [good eatise 01] exc usable neglect ’ People i 1cm (do 2023 V1 Super 12, 11 8 (brackets omitted) (quoting [jdttdidS \ [less 01/ VI ( 01p 69 V 1 136, 142 (Supei Ct 2017)) The reason for the delay is entirely within Plaintifts’ eontrol and insufﬁeient to show good muse partieulatly when the 1equirement imposed by Section 6 oi Standing Oidet No 4 is embittered, namely that exceptional circumstances be shown to “£1116th an extension beyond the 28 days already given t01 responses and replies in complex cases 1121 Ultimately Plaintiffs ieply was only ﬁled six days late Nevertheless, the Coutt cannot ﬁnd good cause to excuse the delay Plaintiffs failed to eomply with the meet and confei tequirement in Section 1 of Standing Order No 4 and the diligent effort requirement in Rule 6 2 The motion spans two pages does not identify when the eonﬂict aiose 01 why another attorney in the same law ﬁlm could not (halt the ieply 01 at least have it piepared fol the responsible attorney 3 review who was due baek on June 25 2019 Plaintiffs also failed to explain why they needed another two weeks or until July 8 2019 again aceording to their own calculations While neithei Standing Ordei No 41101 Rule 6 2 1ddress what the consequences ate for failure to comply this Court believes that parties cannot take it upon themselves to pick and choose which orders and rules to follow and when Here the Coutt ﬁnds that the apptopriate consequence is to deny Plaintiffs motion and diSIegard then reply to IMC’s response 3 Although the Court will disregard the substanth e arguments Plaintiffs make in their reply to lMC s response the Couit must point out that Plaintiffs objection to [MC 5 response is itself out of order Plaintiffs contend in their ieply that {MC had no right file a iesponse Howevei ‘the 111le ct procedure require that parties file responses to motions Replies are optional responses are mandatory Olson i 1’] Han; & Pane) lull: 2023 V1 Super 61 ‘, 21 Rule 6 l mandates that may party file a It spawn within 14 days after service upon the party ofam motion ’ V 1 R Ci\ P 6 MW 1) (emphasis added) 1 he rule does not say may ﬁle does not require responses only to certain motions 01 only to motions the impondino patty is intetested in 1f a party is sen ed w ith a motion that part) must ﬁle a tesponse Siam all parties are with ten exceptions not relex ant hem served nith all papers ﬁled in a case every party must respond to every motion lhe contents of the response may be to 10in anothet patty 3 response or to state that the party takes no position The Court does acknowledge one apparent inconsistency in the rules insofai as Rule 6 1(c) directs that only responses in opposition may be ﬁled while Rule 6 2(1) 81 Rose LIN] \ l I [mun Wmn/ tarp Lid] 3024 Vl Super 18 (as IMO SK 2002 LV 00398 \H \IORA\DI M OPINION Page l3 0t 29 B Objection to Jacobs [ML Filing a Response $12 ’ in their reply Plaintiffs object that Jacobs ﬁled a iesponse to then motion As the Cou1t noted see supza note 3 even party must tespond to every motion What an guments oz position the patty takes is up to the party whether to iespond is not However, unlike the objection to lMC 5 response Plaintiffs object because lacobs has been dismissed and is no lOﬂng a party in this action ” (Pls Reply to Bet Jacobs Indus Maint Corp ’s Opp n to Pls Mot to Amend Ct Oldei to Provide fox lntetlocutory App 01 Alternatively to Reeonsid Ct ’s Oldei of Dismissal 2, ﬁled July 18 20l 9 (hereinafter ‘ Pls ’ Reply ) Plaintiffs contend that as a non patty Jacobs has no tight to be heard or to ﬁle papeis with the court Sec 10’ at 3 4 ( JIMC has ignored the procedural rules and intervened here without any explanation as to why JIMC should be allOVVLd to file a briefin a ease in which it is no longei a patty This Court should ietuse to allow this unauthorized brief by JlMC a non paity to this litigation[ ] and strike it completely from the reeotd ”) 7 his is a question ofﬁrst impiession in the Viigin Islands $23 Plaintitts contend that once a patty has been dismissed that party no longer has a tight to be head Instead, Jacobs must aw ait a tuling on the motion to amend or reconsidei its dismissal and cannot act unless and until it is tonnally brought back into the case Only then can lambs seek whatevci relief it believes appropriate Alternatively if the Coutt weie to deny ieconsideiation but giant the motion to amend the Older im intetlocutOIy appeal Jacobs could be heard on appeal But as a dismissed patty Jacobs requires the ﬁling of a [espouse to any motion C ompau V I R (it P 6 He) ( Only a motion a response in opposition and a iepl} may be sewed on other panties and ﬁled with the coun ) n 11/] V I R Ci» P 6 2(f)(2) ( UnleSs otherwise ordered by the noun a patty shall ﬁle a responsL Vt ithin 14 days after sen iee upon the party of any motion ) The in opposition language is contradictory as what arguments the patty makes and what position the party takes is up to the party Courts cannot otder parties to oppose motions But nouns can order parties to respond, which is what Rule 6 2(1) requires So [MC not only had a right to respond to Plaintiffs motion they (along with llMC and the Hess Defendants) had a duty to respond Consequently Plaintiits assertion that IMC should not be pennitled to have a say in this mattei’ because lML is not included in the scope of the ielief requested[ ] (Pls Reply to [MC s Opp n to Pls Mot to Amend Oidu to Pr0\ide for Interloeutoty App 01 Altematit ely Mot to Reconsid 2 ﬁled lul) 8 20l9) is rejected insolar as Plaintiffs beliue that only lambs [MC might hate been peiinitted to respond Of course Plaintiffs could assert that the Court should disteUard IMC s arguments That is entiiely appropriate and the proper scope of a reply But contending that IMC s Iesponsc \\ as not Vt attained and that it should not be peiinitted to hate 3 say is improper SI RUSL L[(ll t I I [Ill/US 11mm Com eta] 2024 Vl Supet 18 Case No S\ 2002 " V 00398 VILMORAINDLM OPINION Page 14 of 29 has no to oppose that motion, Plaintiffs contend See It] at 2 3 (‘ JIMC is no longer a party to this case and theretm as a non patty it had no right to 1) be served with a copy of Plaintitts Motion and 2) file the instant Opposition ’) Instead JIMC move for leave to intervene if it “ants to be heard in opposition See 20’ at 3 (eitingVI R (iv P 24(3)) The Court iejects Plaintiffs argument 1124 Putting aside the impxaeticality in tequiring that a formet party move tor leave to intervene so1e1y to iespond to a motion to set an inteilocutory dismissal aside 4 the plain language of Rule 5 may refute Plaintiffs’ argument Although there is no piecedent directly on point there is some guidance ‘ dismissed parties technically remain parties for some purposes until a ﬁnal order is enteied MaI/zmm 1 Hcss ()1! I 1 Com 75 VI 141 155 (Super Ct 2021) ‘The reason why is clean an order dismissing fewei than all parties is interlocutmy and can be vacated at any time Thus, dismissed parties can always be teinstated on propel grounds ’ 1d at 155 56 (citing Island Tile & Malble [LC1 Beifiana’ 57 V1 596 (2013)) ‘C ase 1th does not address whether current parties must continue to seive court papeis on parties pieviously dismissed from a case At ﬁist blush it may seem unnecessary and could also inCiease costs unnecessaiily JoneSi [ocklzeedMaltm Corp 68 VI 158 186 n 10(Super Ct 2017) But with the advent ofeleetronic S€1V1(,€ and the variety ofways of effecting sen ice it might not be as bu1densome as betote MOILOV er former parties may want to be (01 pethaps even should be) kept abreast of the status of the ease ’Id (citation omitted) $25 One way in Which dismissed patties remain invoked is with stipulations f01 dismissal ‘ Seyeial federal and Viigin Islands courts have recognized that dismissed patties remain parties for purposes of 4 Plaintiffs also fail to realize the perils of their approach Jacobs raised personal jurisdietion as defense Once a nonparty Chooses to intetVene it becomes either a party defendant or a patty plaintiff depending on the side on which it ghooses to intertene ’ Olson \ I 1 Nate) & Pan (>1 111th 2023 VI Super 61 f; 18 (citing Bnani Fawkes 61 VI 201 [221] 72 (2014)) Jacobs would intervene as a paitv defendant “[Cjourts have consistently held that an inten enimg defendant may not assut an atfirmatixe defense that has been waived by the 01 iginal defendant B) um 61 V I at 221 Iflacobs did inten ene it xx ould intervene on same footing as the other Defendants all of “110111 \t achd the defense of personal jurisdiction by not raising it at the earliest opportunity 87 Rmc eta] \ VI Indus Mam! Cw]? eta] 3024 V1 Supri 18 Case No SK 2002 CV 00598 \IFMORA\DLVI OPIZ\ ION Page 15 0129 signing a self executing stipulation 1°01 dismissal Mat/uum 75 V I at 155 (collecting eases) 8‘60 also (It; 0/ fadsomzllei Iac/momzllc Hosp Holdings Ltd P512110 82 F4th 1031 1038 (11th Ci} 2W3) ( We agree with the Sixth Clicuit s holding in Amie; son Tull} that a Rule 41(a)( l )(A)(ii) stipulation also requiies the signature of a party that appeared but has already been removed ﬁom an aetion ’) [A] stipulation tot dismissal must be signed by all parties who have appealed, which [can] ineludeH format 01 dismissed parties ” In 16 Alumina Dust Claims, 71 V1 443 456 (Supei Ct 2019) The reason why is insttuctiV e here 7,26 ‘ ‘The canons of constiuction in statutory interpretation apply equally to the interpretation of couit piocedmal rules Mathmm 75 V l at 158 (quoting White \ 3001mm 69 V l 749, 754 (2018)) Stipulations fox dismissal are governed by Rule 41 Sec V I R Civ P 41(a) Rule 41 piovides that a stipulation for dismissal must be signed by all parties who have appeared 56¢ V I R Civ P 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) To be effective without court apploval, the stipulation ‘ must be signed by all parties who have appeared,’ which includes former or dismissed parties ’ Alumina Dust Chums, 71 V I at 456 As the United States Court of Appeals 101 the Eleventh Circuit explained in Cm) QfJacAsozzi 1/[6 there is simply no language that qualzﬁcs the clause ‘ all parties who appealed The lack of any WOldS restricting the subsection 5 scope suggests that a bioad leading one Leveling all parties in a lawsuit is warranted This interpietation is supported by the fact that the diafters qualify the tenn party 01 ‘parties elsewhere in the Federal Rules 82 F 4th at 1038 (emphasis added) Similai reasoning may apply to Rule 5 l ike the federal rules Rule 5 0fthe Virgin Islands Rules Of CiVil PIOCLdUlC provides that ‘ all papeis after the complaint that are ﬁled with the court must be sewed on way party including a mitten motion and a w1itten notice appeaianee demand or ottei of Judgment 01 any similar paper ’ V I R Civ P 5(a)(1)(D) 3 Rule 5 uses the words “all parties eveiy Motions that may be heatd on an (H pm re basis axe excluded from this requiiement S1 Rose 01 (1/ l I I Indus 11am! (mp LIN] 2034 \Il super :8 (33‘. N0 8X 2002 CV 00398 MEMO]? \\DL31 OPL\ EON Page 16 of 29 paity and eaeh party multiple times without qualifying the party 5 status in the eaSe Rule 3 does make one exception how wet ‘ sertiee is [not] tequiied on a pdny who is in default for failing to appear \ l R Ch P 5(a)(2}‘ W7 By eontrast othei rules of procedure do quality the party’s status For example Rule 25 pioxides that [alfter a party's death, if the right sought to be enforeed survives only to 01 against the remaining patties, the action does not abate hut proceeds in favor 0t or against the Iemammg pm ms ’ V l R Civ P 25(a)(2) (emphasis added) Similarly, Rule 27 of the Viigin Islands Rules of Appellate Pioeedure provides that, [ilt any of the parties tail to appear to present argument the panel will heal aigument on behalf of the remaining parties, and sanctions shall be consideied against the absent party V l R App P 27(e) Although ‘ [L]aSL law does not address whether current parties must continue to saw e0uit papeis on parties pieViously dlsnllSSLd hem a case[ ] ’ Jones ()8 V I at 186 n 10 Rule 3’s plain language may requiie it The words all papers’ and eveiy party are plain theii meaning is clean No language qualiﬁes ox restiicts the sewiee requiiement to iemaining parties or current parties 1128 In a sense Plaintiffs ale con eat dismissed ox fonnel parties cannot be hand on all issues following theii dismissal “MC could not for example be lieaid in opposition to a motion fox an extension oftime But it dismissed oz fonner panties Iemain parties for some purposes and if Rule 5 xequhes seiviee of all papa s on all parties including formei parties then Plaintiffs are mistaken They did hate to serve a copy of their motion on llMC But even if Rule 5 does not requiie sewiee of all papeis on dismissed panics, due process and common sense dictate that dismissed parties be notiﬁed when their dismissctl is challenged Plaintiffs approach would add unnecessary layers of compliedtion It would also invite munds ofreeonsidetation defendant is dismissed plaintiff seeks reconside1 ation; dismissal is vacated defendant ﬁlm on parties in detdoji: retiuiied if a pleading asserts a new Llaim for relief and when notieL of default judgment is required under Rule 53 See VI R Civ P 5mm”) SI Row L)! (1/ x I I [17(le 11mm (mp er (1/ 3024 Vl 511th 18 Case No SK 2002 CV 00398 \IEMOR \\DLVI OI’II\ I()\ Page 17 01 29 is reinstated and moves again to dismiss for reconsideration ofxeeonsideiation Rules of pieeedure should be construed, administeied and employed to secure the just speedy and inexpensive detennination ofeyery action and proueeding V l R C iv P 1 (emphasis added) This Count holds that Rule 3 iequires senile: Ofmotions 0r Othet papers on dismissed or fennel patties it the motion or papa impacts the t01mer patty 3 rights And it former parties must be sewed, it follows that they also have a tight to be hand Sewing papers on parties SL1 yes a purpese giving notice, and notice would be pointless without the tight to be heard See Hanan! \ HlilC/llllSOH 10 Me 333, 344 (1833) (‘ The light to notice necessaiily follows from the right to be heard ’) F01 these reasons the C0u1‘t rejects Plaintitfs request to disregard and stlike JlMC 8 response C Motion for Reconsideration “1129 Rule 6 4 0f the Vixgin Islands Rules ofCivil Procedure authorizes a motion 1‘01 teconsideration in four instances when the law has Changed when new evidence becomes available, when Clear enoi must be corrected, or when the couxt neglected to address a point Iaised prior to tuling Sec genma/ly V l R Civ P 6 4(b)(1) (4) Reconsideration motions must be ﬁled ‘ within 14 days after the entry of the ruling unless the time is extended by the court Extensions will only be g1 anted for good cause show n V I R Civ P 6 4(a) Reeonsiduation is not appropriate here 1130 Plaintiffs did not ﬁle then motion within the 14 day deadline The elder Plaintiffs want teeonsidered was entered on March 4 2019 Plaintiffs ﬁled their motion tel reconsideration on May 9, 2019 It is untimer which they acknowledged But Plaintiffs did not show good cause ﬁn the two month delay Instead they contend good cause for then delay is ‘ the dismissal of J [MC [which] is an important development in the ease and where this Court ened in dismissing J IMC by failing to take into account dispositiVe legal matters plesented to it ’ (P15 ’ Mot to Amend Orderto Provide f01 lnteiloe App 01 Alt Reconsid Met 13 ﬁled May 9 2019 (heteinaftel ‘ Atmend Mot ”) ) But Plaintiffs eonﬂate the showing 3! Rose (rm 1 I 1 lmlux Mann (mp cl (1/ 2024 V1 Super 18 Case No 5x 3003 CV 00598 VIE\I()RANDL\IOPII\10\ Page 18 of 29 required 101 gtanting {econsideration with the showing 1equired for exeusing their delay in ﬁling the motion 101 leeonsideration 1ate Clean en 01 or neglecting to address axguments raiSed pxiox to a ruling may require granting a motion to; xecomidetation but not it the motion eomes late ll’VlC timely objected to the delay Plaintiffs ha\e not explained why they were two months late Thexefore the tequest f0] 1eeonside1ation is not pIOpell} before the Court 1131 But even it the Court wele to excuse the delay, since Plaintiffs request reconsidelation in the alternative it is not appxopliate hete First the Court (Molloy, J ) granted Plaintith from the heneh on January 23 2019 and in its Janualy 31 2019 Order redueing that 1ulingt0 \VIiting lean e to ﬁle a motion out ofﬁme legarding seniee on JIMC The Court was quite Clear (See H1 g 11 37 2 9 (Ian 23 2019) (“Okay What I'm going to do I'm going to giVe the plaintiffs an opportunity I'm going to give you ten days fox you to ﬁle a motion f01 leave 21$ to why you should be able to ﬁle a motion {01 reconsidelation out of time Not the motion for leeonsidelation You need to ﬁle a motion fox leave to ﬁle the motion for Ieeonsideration out of time ’)) The 1eeonsideration the Court leferred to was reconsidelation of the November 25, 2003 O1deI enteled November 26, 2003 that denied Plaintiffs motion for leave to serve JIMC mute p10 lune ’ Plaintiffs W016 given until Febmary 4 2019 to ﬁle a motion lor reeonsidexation They did not act on the Court s often So on Febmary 8 2019 JIMC ﬁled its own motion 101 teconsidemtion ofthe January 31 2019 Older speeiﬁeally ofthe discox e2} tequirement and dlgued that the Court lacked authority over it beeause sen lee was untimely Plaintifls did not ﬁle a response to JIMC s motion And aftel the Coutt g1a11tedthemotion on Ma1eh 4, 2019 and dismissed JIMC they waited neatly two months to move fox Ieeonsideration 1132 Second the Older Plaintiffs want reconsidexed was itself based on a motion fm reeonsideration That is, Plaintiffs me asking fox reeonsideration of reeonsideration Howevel, by not 1esponding in Opposition to JIMC s motion for reconsideration Plaintiffs waned any objeetion to Mateh 4, 2019 Order SI Ruse e! 11/ \ I I [1111118 \[umr Corp LIN] 2024\15upei 1% C131. No 5X 2002 ( \ 00398 VIE\IOR 1\D1 “310103101“ Film 19 0t 29 A patty who taiis to ﬁle a response in opposition to a motion for reconsideiation wan es the light to seek reconsideiation 1am unless the decision exceeds the scope of the initial motion C] GI 111110)) C(mm C 0 1 Dim m 0/ Columbia 704 A 2d 288 291 (D C 1997) (ﬁnding failure to oppose reconsideration Lenstitutes waivei) Je/Ams i HPT 112g Props T1 N0 19 w 62198 2019 U S Dist LEXIS 248740 4 (S D Fla DCL 2 2019) ( It is improper for Plaintiff to seek inconsideiation based on arguments that could have been Iaised 131101 to the ( ouit's Dismissal Ordei and Weie waived ) $133 Finally the law has not changed regaiding service of piecess no new evidence was presented and no pIU. ious1y raised points are identiﬁed in their motion, which the Conn (M0110y J ) failed to addiess in its March 4 2019 Order JIMC moved fox reconsideration of the Januaiy 31 2019 Order Plaintiffs did not respond Plaintiffs now try to bootstrap order on top 0f01der and motion on top of motion pointing to issues they raised in piior motions and ﬁlings The CQuit appieeiates the overall point they are making that JIMC (aCCOIding to them) was part 0t ajoint ventuxe with [MC and, thus seiviee 0n IMC should hate been imputed (according to them) on JIMC and further service in 2003 or even new (again according to them) would not be prejudicial 0n JIMC But Plaintiffs arguments wen already considered by the Couit (Ross J ) in its Noyeinbei 23, 2003 OldCI 1134 Mon importantly Plaintiffs overlook that Rule 52 oi the Virgin Islands Rules 0fCivi1 Piecedure expiessly pIOVidCS that [tjhe court is not tequila! to state ﬁndings 01 conclusions when ruling on a motion under Rule 12 Oi Rule 56 01 unless the[] iules piovide otheiwise on any othei motion ’ V I R Civ P 52(a)(3) (emphasis added) That is according to rules promulgated by our Supreme CQuit the Supeiim Conn can simply deny a motion without any ﬁndings or any explanation insofai as this may be ehange in prim law the Supieme Court 0fthe Virgin Islands has sanctioned it Accwd BI OH 116 i People 74 V 1 601 612 (2021) Thus the Comt did not have provide any ﬁndings 01 analysis in its 0min And the mason why is C1eai the Supreme C curt appl[ies] a de 11010 standaid 01 revietx to a detennination by SI Ron eta] 1 I I Indus Wham Com er (1/ 2021VI Supt: 18 Case No SX 2002 CV 00598 311‘ \IORA‘NDLM OPINION Page 20 0f 29 the Supetim Court that it lacked personal jurisdiction 110/10) \ Indep Blue CI 03s 56 V I 155 169 (2012) ‘06 now 0 means that the court’s inquiry is not limited to or Lonsttieted by the rewtd 1101 is any detetence due the conclusions under review Elbev Holding C01 p 1 BlaCkRocA Fm Mgmt 2023 VI Supe175 1113(qu0ting1n/e Infant 51262171021 49VI 452 460 (2008) {Swath} concuningD OfLOUISE the Dial court does have discretion to atate ﬁndings and give masons in support of a mhng But it is not tequixed when the ruling will be review ed anew on appeal vxithout any deference to those ﬁndings 01 conclusions Thus insotar as Plaintiffs complaint that the Court (Molloy, J ) cleanly etred by tailing to consider their (0r JIMC’S) alguments it is Iejeeted and does not provide a basis for reconsideration D Motion to Amend Order to Provide for Interlocutory Appeal ‘1135 The Court turns 110v» t0 the primary relief Plaintiffs seek amendment of the March 4 2019 OldSI to certify it t01 interlocutory appeal pursuant to Section 33(e) of Title 4 0f the Virgin Islands Code Plaintiffa contend that the order plesents a controlling question Yet they fail to frame that question in a cogent toxin They meander fxom asserting that the question to be certiﬁed is whether Judge Molloy ened on the one hand by reatﬁnning Judge Ross 3 1elianee on precedent from the United States Couxt of Appeals t01 the Third Cireuit namely Pet) Heel]: \ Bolmngcl & Rat Inge; 46 F 3d 1298 (3d Cir 1995) and on the 0the1 hand, by not following his own piecedent That is, Plaintiffs contend that Judge M0110y erred by not following a decision he lendered in McKen la 1 Hess Oz] Lugm Islands C01p0iatzon, 70 VI 2010 (Supex Ct 2019) HoweVer as JIMC points out Maker: 10 was decided on March 6 2019 two days aftel the March 4, 2019 OIdCI issued Courts cannot err by failing to follow future precedent Plaintiffs may have had a basis 101 seeking reconsideration, if Mcken 1c constituted ‘ an intervening Changein eontmllinglaw VI R Civ P 6 4(b)(1) ButMcKen 16 was not contlolling beeause deeisiom 0t tIial level courts are n0t binding on any other court including that same tlial court Be; the; \ Hess 01/ P I Cozp 60 V I 91 101 (Super Ct 2014) (collecting eases) Judges do often adhere to theil own 51 R086 era] 1 VI Indus Wumt (mp (ta! 2034 VI SUle 1%» (ASL N0 SX 2002 CV 00598 MEMORANDLM OPINION Page 21 of 79 decisions absent binding authority because they w ant to be consistent But trial court judges are not binding on themselV es H36 Plaintiffs difﬁculty in flaming the question to be certiﬁed discloses why theii motion it flawed they argue that the Match 4 2019 Order misapplied the November 25 2003 Older that Judge Molloy impioperly 1elied on’ Judge Ross S Olden, (see Amend Met 5), that Judge Molloy ened in 36V eral ways see 1d at 7 ( In dismissing JlMC this Court erred ’), and that Judge Ross 3 Oldei failed to provide a piopel analysis ’ Id at 10 These me all arguments in fawn 0f leveisal, not eeitifying a controlling question for interlocutoxy appeal $37 Certiﬁcation ofa controlling question of law undei Section 33(e) of Title 4 of the Viigin Islands Code is ‘ ‘ intended and should be reserved for Situations in which the appellate court can rule on a pure controlling question of law w ithout having to delve beyond the surface of the record in 01 der to determine the facts ’ ’ Elbe) Holdmg (01;) \ B/ac/uockfm Mgmt Inc , 2024 VI Super 10, 1] l l (brackets ellipsis emphasis and citation omitted) Plaintiffs own axguments show why Section 33(e) is unaV ailing hue (See PIS Reply 6 ( The Order to be appealed involves several controlling questions of law, one being whether good cause exists to extend a time limit f01 seivice The 2019 Order 1e1ying on the antiquated law from the 2003 Order applied a completely diffeient standard than this same Court and Judge applied in the recent ease of McKen 1c ) ) These are arguments to be raised on direct appeal not as a eertiﬁed question of puie law One pure question of law that could be certiﬁed heie one which Plaintiffs did not request is whethei service on one member of a joint venture constitutes service on all members lt the answer to that question is yes then Plaintiffs would be on ﬁrmer footing and certainly would haVe glounds for seeking reconsideration 1B8 But in addition to certifying a controlling question! Section 33(0) also tequires that the question has to materially advance the ultimate tennination of litigation ’ 4 V l C § 33(e) Plaintiffs tail to 5! Row (la! t 1 I Imlm 11am! (mp (ml 20241 \71‘Super 18 Case No S), 2002 L ‘v 00598 VILMORA\DLM OPINION Pave 22 of 29 satistv this tequiremmt as we“ became JIMC has been dismissed C utifying thc diamtssa] tot intelloeutory, rathu than ﬁnal appeal will not terminate this litigation 1n tact it mightplolong it bu ause JIMC would be leinstated Plaintiffs contend that if JIMC wele leinstated it is likely that the Duties Vt ou1d attempt to facilitate a settlement due to the length of time this case has been pending (P15 Rep1y 6 ) Likelihoods me not assuranees that litigation ultimately W111 terminate €139 1n the end Plaintitt‘; tows pledominately on Section 33(0) 5 tequirement that them be a substantia1 g1 ound t01 dittexmce of opinion 4 V I C § 33(c) But the diffetencc of opinion v hich mu§t be substantial contents the 12m novel or unsettled questions of law Cf Elba Holdmg Com 1 BICYC/UOC/x [m :14ng Inc , 2023 V1 Super 75 11 35 (certifying question involving exercise of consent jurisdietion based on business legisttdtion forms) As the United States Conn of Appeals tot the Ninth Citcuit explained To determine if a ‘ substantial ground for difference of opinion exists courts must examine to what extent the controlling law is unclean Courts traditionally will ﬁnd that a substantial glound f01 diffelcnce of opinion exists where the circuits are in dispute on the question and the cou1t of appeals of the circuit has not spoken on the point, if complicated questions misc under foreign law or ifnovcl and difﬁcult questions of ﬁxst impreSQion ate pIesented Couch \ fe/escope Inc , 611 F 3d 629 633 (9th Cir 2010)) (quoting Pedetal PIOCGdlIIC’ lauvezs fdmon § 3 212 (2010)) Locally, questions of ﬁrst impression raised via a Banks analysis, see Casn/lo 1 St (101x Bane Sens Inc , 72 V 1 528, 569 70 (Super Lt 2020) or where them is a split of authoxity among the txidl courts cf Klein t Basczl 2023 V1 14, W 12 13 & n 7 or when: there is uncertainty about the construction of lules 0t pIOC€dUI€ Cf. Island Izle & Maible, 57 V 1 at 609 14; sec also eg Maflnum 75 V 1 at 158 59 may present a substantial ground tut a diffexenee of opinion Howevel, ‘Just because a court is the ﬁrst to rule on a particular question or just because counsd contends that one placedent mthet than anothe1 its controlling does not mean them is sueh a substantial dittelenee of opinion as M11 support an intulowtoxy 2113136211 ( ouch 611 F 3d at 633 (quoting 3 Fedual Placedule 10111619 {(11110}: § 3 212 (2010)) 52‘ Rose 61 (1/ i I 1 [IldllS Mam] Cam (In! 2024 VI Super 18 C186 No 5X 2002 (V 00598 MLMORAINDI M OPINION Page 23 of29 1140 That said, Plaintiffs and JIMC do have glounds for the ditfcrence of opinion hue But a party 3 shong disagreement with the Court’s ruling is not sufﬁcient 101 then. to be a substantial giound for difference That Settled 12m might be applied differently does not establish a substantia1 ground fox difference of opinion ’ [d (quotation marks and citation omitted) P1aintitts’ giounds ale grounds for diiect appea1 not interlocutory 1n tact, the very fact that Plaintiffs also sought reconsideration undermines theix a1 gummt it them an substantial giounds for the difference of opinion on a contmlling unsettled question of hi“ there cannot be Clem enor because elem error is established based on the existence of eonti 011mg legal authority Plain}? Inc 1 A/Imtas 635 F Supp 3d 1087 1096 (D Nev 2022) (zCCOIdClczib/oo/xs 1 43C No 3 12 ev 00388 2013 U S Dist LEXIS 50876 at 11 (M D Tenn Apr 9 2013) (‘ As a general matter, the plaintiffs have essentially taken the incongruous position that this court committed '1 Clean enor of law in deciding a legal issue that even by the plaintiffs' own admission presented a mattu 0f tiist impression in this country ) Plaintiffs motion to amend the Mandi 4, 2019 Order to certify it for interlocutmy appeal under Section 33(0) of I itle 4 01‘ the Viigin Islands Code must be denied Cutitying the order is not appropiiate and more importantly even if the Court did certify it the Supreme Court 0fthe Virgin Islands may not giant the application fox appeal Sec [11 Ie [c Blane 49 V1 508 523 24 (2008) (pm cmmm) ( EV en ifthe trial court enteis an Oidei allowing an interlocutmy appeal this Court still has the discretion on whether to allow the appeal Therefoxe affmding a litigant a civil interlocutory appeal is nevel automatic because there is no unqualiﬁed right to such an appeal ”) E Ce: tification Undei Rule 54(b) of the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure 1141 Although the Ccurt concludes that neither xeconsideiation 1101 certiﬁcation fm interlocutory appea1 are applopiiate here the Court does believe that providing some ﬁnality to this issue is appiopriate In their February 3, 2006 request tor ruling Plaintiffs referenced the impasse legaiding Jacobs IML <13 f0110ws $1 Row ([(t/ 1 I I Indus Wain! Cm}; (1411 2024 V1 Sum: 18 \ ase V0 8X 200’ L\ 003% MF “110R \NDE \l OPIN ION Page 24 0f2‘) N0 Ordei was entet ed on the Motion fox 1 ntry ofDefault and no elari ﬁcatiOn of this L ouit’s Order dated November 23, 2003 has ever been issued Plaintiffs and Defendants have (11 gued the actual ﬁndings of the November 25 2003 Order in the briefs mentioned abox e Plaintiffs feel that Judge Ross has said that JIMC “ as sened though its partnership with EMC (P15 Rea t01 Rulings D ﬁled Feb 3 2006 ) Plaintitts earlier motion tor entry of default made the same representation that lambs had tailed t0 ans“ er and thus has ignmed this Court 3 Older considering them sen ed along with its partnei IMC as of September 27, 2002 01 as of the date of this Court’s Order dated Novemhet 25 2003 (HS ’ Mot 1°01 Entry of Detauit ZXgainst Def Jacobs Indus Maint Corp 2 ﬁled Jan 14 2004) 7142 Admittedly the Nos emer 25 Order is somewhat ambiguous because the Court denied Plaintiifs motion to setve Jacobs out of time while also acknov» [edging that serviee on one party is service on all ’ (Older 4 entered NOV 26 2003 (citing 26 V I C § 3(0) ) The Court also stated that ‘ n0 retutn ofserviee 1‘01 JIMC can be found ’ Id at 2 3 It is unclear whether the C curt was ieterring to the court 5 own ﬁles 01 t0 the Plaintiffs ﬁles since Plaintiffs had represented in their motion that they looked but did not ﬁnd a teturn 0t seniee and s0 leached out to the p10LLbS SL1 ver The court ﬁle does ieflect sewice 0n JlML beeausc Plaintiffs had ﬁled pioot 0f SLerCC the SuperiOI Court on September 15 September 19, and October 7 2003, showing service was etfected on Jacobs [ML on Septembei 1 1 2003 Thus the question a as whethei t0 giVe effect to the untimely sewiee that had a1ready occurred lather than gtant mete time to seive However that is not the reliefPlaintitfs tequested Q1143 What’s more none of this was brought to the Court 5 attention, not when the Court (Ross J ) issued its decision in N0\ ember 2003 01 after the Court (Molloy J ) gianted Plaintiffs leave in Januaiy 2019 to seek teconsideration 0f the Novembei 23 2003 Oidei out of time Instead, Plaintiffs Claim clear emu in the Maid) 4, 2019 Older vacating the January 31 2019 Order in part and dismissing JIMC Plaintitts contend Judge Molloy should have addiessed the meiits 0t JIMC s Octobei 14 ’003 motion to dismiss and (impoitantly to them) theii opposition, including then at guinent that Jacobs and lMC were a 5t Rosa LIN] 1 I I Indus Mann Cory) w (1/ 3024 1,! Superlft {Ase N0 SX 7007 CV 00598 MEMORAVDL M OPINION Page 25 of 29 joint ventuie a point this CQuit believes Jacobs suminetly iefuted in a footnote in its reply Plaintiffs ate eorieet that the Court (Molloy, 3 ) did not piovide any analysis OfJIMC s motion to dismiss in the Mareh 4 2019 Quiet 1 he Order also did not explicitly grant JIMC s motion linplieitly, howu U the Match 4 7019 Oldtl did giant JIMC s motion to dismiss because the Coutt the Court heard argument on JIMC s motion on January 23 2019 and then dismissed JIMC for laek personal jurisdiction which was one the grounds JIMC Iaised in 11: motion All of the issues Plaintiffs raise in then motion are more appiopiiate for direct, not interloeutmy appeal 1144 Rule 54(b) 01t the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Proceduie is modeled after Rule 54(b) tifthe Fedei 211 Rules of Civil Pioeeclure and thus fedelal precedent interpreting it is instruetive See Slack 1 Slack 69 V 1 567 573 (2018) The Supreme Court 0fthe United States in Cm {sz Wizglzz‘ (011901012021 1 (7010} a! Elem 1C Company 446 U S 1 (1980) ‘ outlined the steps to be followed in making deteiminations undei Rule 54(b) [d at 7 (citing Seals Roebuck & Co v Made) 351 U S 427 (1956)) The trial ‘ noun must ﬁrst determine that it is dealing uith a ﬁnal judgment ’ [F]inal in the sense that it is an ultimate disposition ofan individual claim enteied in the course ofa multiple Claims action ’Id (quoting Made), 351 U S at 436) Next the court must go on to detennine whether them is anyjust mason 101 delay Not all ﬁnal judgments on individual claims should be immediately appealable even if they ate in some sense sepaiable from the remaining unresolved claims [(1 at 8 Lastly, the court must take into account judicial administiative interests as well as the equities involved“ including by “consideling sueh faetors as whether the claims undei review VV ere separable from the otheis temaining to be adjudicated and whethei the natuie of the claims already determined was such that no appellate court would have to decide the same issues more than once CV en it there wele subsequent appeal ” 1d The Court ﬁnds the Cm m 9 W; 1gb! fawn.) instiueti‘ (3 here “1145 1 he dismissal of JlMC is ﬁnal in the sense that it disposed of all ofPlaintiffs Claims against JIMC 8‘! Rose (Ia! \ I I Indus Wain! Cmp Lch/ -024 VI Super 18 Case No SK 2002 (V 00598 MEMORAVDUVI OPIVXOIV Page 26 of 29 Theie also is no Just reason to delay enteiing judgment on JIMC’s dismissal Plaintiffs’ claims against [MC and HOVENSA teinain and impoxtantly will continue without JIMC However, Plaintiffs allege that JIMC is an essential part) as it is the defendant who employed Plaintiffs and then teimitiated them in Violation of 24 V l C § 471 hi cached their duty of good faith and fair dealing and committed fraud ’ (Amend Mot l3 ) They also argued, albeit in fayor 0f interlocutory appeal, that JlMC ’3 presence or absence would have a material impact on the outcome of this case To make the parties wait until Plaintitfs’ claims against IMC and HOVENSA are IESOlV€d before they can appeal the dismissal of JIMC would be inefﬁcient and, more importantly, delay this mattei even further If Plaintiffs prey ailed at tiial and the dismissal of JHle weie later ieVeised and iemanded it would place all the patties in a Lomplieated position as the liability, ifany, 0t JIMC would not hay e been assessed by thejury Viigin Islands law does not permitjuries to assess the liability ofnonparties 5ch W01 Id F1 65/? MAM LLC 1 Palezmo 74 V l 453 463 64 (2021) (‘ While the statute does not expressly state that apportionment cannot occur with iespeet to non defendants, the Legislatme is not requiied to include such an affirmative statement; 1athe1 the delibeiate use of the nanowei term defendant evinces a legislative intent to allow allocation oftault among only the parties to a lawsuit not against nonparties (ellipsis quotation marks footnote and citations omitted» M0160V€1 leveising JIMC s dismissal after trial would iequiie a second tiial 0n the same claims since Plaintiffs asserted the same claims against all three Defendants On other hand It as Plaintiffs contend, JIMC‘ is an essential ’ party and ifJIIVIC s dismissal is afﬁrmed on appeal Plaintiffs might be more inclined to settle with lMC and HOVENSA Waiting until all claims against HOVENSA and lMC are IGSOlVCCl to challenge JlMC’s dismissal could disincentivize settlement After all Plaintiffs can hold out hope that the dismissal of an ‘ essential party would be reveised 1(46 Certifying the dismissal ofJIML as ﬁnal now ensuie that JIMC s dismissal can be addressed eaily early enough toi JIML to be reinstatedt it the dismissal is reveised 01 for the parties to iethink stiategy SI Rme (I (1/ \ VI Indus Ham! Com 6/ :1] 2024 V1 51mm 18 Case No SX 2002 LV 00599 MEMORANDI \I OPINION Page 27 of 29 ifthe dismissal is afﬁrmed 1t piesents a discrete issue that is sepaiatt, fiom the metits and will not eause a subsequent appeal on the same issue Additionally, this action was commenced as a putatix e class action, whieh adds another layei 0t eomplexity Waiting until the claims against HO\ ENSA and 1MC have been determined to reinstate 1 1MC on temand could require reissuing notice to the class and a second opportunity to opt out And it the Court weie to conclude that a class cannot be certiﬁed the putatiVe class members would haxe to be given time to intervene or to ﬁle sepaiate lawsuits and all the individual lawsuits would inheiit JlMC s dismissal Under these Circumstances, the Cou1t believes that there is no Just teason to delay certifying the Match 4, 2019 Ordei’s dismissal oleMC as ﬁnal $47 One ﬁnal point must be addtessed The Staff Master informally reported to the Court that duiing a hearing held on February 9 2024 where the palties discussed the status of the case as well as pending motions JlMC had argued against ﬁnali/ing the March 4 2019 Orde1 undei Rule 54(b) 7 countering that 7 The Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands has held that before taking any signiﬁcant action ma spam [elouit[s] must ﬁrst give the parties a Chance to respond Cunhbean tum Man 0/ S! C 0n 1 Mol/m 73 V I 329 334 (Super Ct 2020) (citing Hugh/et i Gm ’t of flu 1 I 61 V I 323 (2014)) Here the Staff Master had asked the patties to wine to the Pebmary 9 2024 hearing prepared to discuss the propriety of the Court treating Plaintiffs motion to amend or for reeonsidexation as a motion to certify JIMC s dismissal as ﬁnal under Rule 54(1)) The Staff Master had asked the raised the same issue during an Apiil 1 2022 hearing and followed up with an Order dated and entered April 4 2022 to schedule this case and another case Comma]! e! (1/ i Vugm Islands Indusnm/ Maintenance (01pm anon er a] Case No SX 2002 CV 00641 for oral argument on April 29 2022 on wheter Plaintith motion should be construed under Rule 54(b) The April 29 2022 healing was rescheduled to June 3 2022 because ofa conﬂitt with administrative leave granted to all employees for Carnix al in St Thomas District The June 3 2022 hearing also did not go forward because this Court stayed all proceedings because ofthe HONX Inc bankruptcy proceeding Cf [)1 IL (ennui Cases Um/u a Discietzonzui Bank) Sim , 2023 VI Supei 74 Onee the stay was lifted the Staff Mastei returned to the question of Rule 54(b) intending to addIeSs it by way of recommendation as a matter pertinent to the proceedings[ j [n 1e 4111/) {01 the Cleanon & 4p}; 1 0/514]? Music); Position [0) (lie Supu Ct (1/1/19 1 1 Admin Order No 2021 0012 2021 VI Supreme I PXIS 14 *3 (V I Aug 12 2021) see also id at *3 4 (auth01izin0 staff master to [c]onduct legal analysis of patties' motions or othu submissions and make reeommended ﬁndings of facts and conclusions of law or othei repons[ ]’ ) The Court elected to address Plaintiffs motion, and Rule 54(b) itself after the Staff Master s informal ieport See [(1 at *3 (authorizing formal and informal ieeommendations and repotts to the judge regarding any mattei pertinent to the proceedings[ ] ’) 58L also eg Intugmplz C011) i [me] Com 253 F 3d 695 699 (Fed Cit 2001) ( Intergraph also argues that the district court had no authority sun 31201110 to enterjudgment under Rule 54(b) That is incorrect Wheter to allow an inteiim appeal is best decided by the trial court (quoting Stale Tlezzsmer 1 Ball} 168 P 3d 8 14 (1 1th Cir 1999)) accmd Balm 168 F 3d at 14 ( The district court sua sgontgor on motion could haVe Certified that there \\ as no reason {01 delav and directed the entry of tinal judgment on Plaintiffs complaint and Defendants counterelaim f0] tortious interferenee ) Gumani 4 I DupomHosp f0} Clnld/en No 08 0228 2009U S Dist LEXIS 77587 *10(1? D Pa Aug 28 2009) ( As with certification under§ 1292(b) a district untrt may sua sponte diieet entry offinaljudgment undei Fedexal Rule ofCi\il Procedure 54th) ) 91 Rust (21 (1/ 1 I I lmlm 11am] (mp (10/ 3024 V1 Supei 18 L the l\:0 S\ 3002 CV 00598 \IL VIORAINDL M OPII\IOI\ Pave 28 0f ’9 federal eourts unanimousl y hold that unsaved defendants are not parties ﬁn puiposes 01 Rule 54(1)) JIMC is e011eet 5w C(zmbique Haldmgs (rip Inc 1 Fed Ins Co 489 F 3d 1356 1360 (D C 2007)( [01m sister e11 euits t1 eat an impiopeily sewed defendant as net e1 having been before the disillet eOUIt for purposes 01 Rule 54(b) Light eiieuits have expressly adopted this View Mme has adopted a eontiary inteipretation ‘ (braekets citations, and footnotes omitted) But J lMC misundeistands the eontext 3148 Fedeial eouits treat unserved defendants as nonparties When detennining whether and if 30 v» hen a ﬁnal ordei was entered for sewed defendants Ste 1d at 1361 ( [W]hen a distiiet eouit dismisses a suit as to all served defendants and only an unsaved defendant remains theie is geneially no mason to antieipate additional pioeeedings before the disttict court Indeed unless the pioeedural requiiements 01 effectiVe service of process hax e been satisﬁed the court lacks personal jurisdietion to act with respeet to that defendant at all ) Here if the C Quit had not dismissed Jacobs and adjudicated Plaintiff? elaims against lMC and HOVENSA x1 ithout addlessing Jaeobs lMC 3 status. that might constitute a judgment adjudieating all the Claime and all the parties' rights and liabilities ”V l R C iv P 54(1)) Assuming Virgin Islands courts were to follow tcdeial preeedent heie the time to appeal could run from the date of entry of the orders adjudicating the claims against HOVENSA and [MC eVen though Plaintiffs motion to amend or for Ieeonsideration remained pending But that is not the situation here Instead the Court is ceitifying as ﬁnal a dismissal for laek 01 personal jurisdiction, which courts have heaid 0n diieet appeal See eg Dc lamem Magnﬂcence Caiizus Inc 654 F 2d 280 282 (3d Cir 1981) see also Gum“ 1 ( m Q/Mmot 529 N W 2d 868 (N D 1995) (eoneluding Rule 54(1)) eeitiﬁeation ofdismissal 101 untimely sewice was not warianted as eXeeption to ﬁnal judgment) J lMC 9 objeetions therefore are overitiled III CONCLUSION $349 F01 the reasons stated above the Couit ﬁnds that Plaintiffs did not shtm good CEILle and thus theii motion for an extension 01 time will be denied and theii reply to [MC 5 response has been diSIegaided SI RUXL 01 (1/ \ I I 112111“ Waltz! (01/) till] 2024 VI Supex 18 L 15: 1M) 5X 2002 (V 00398 MEMORANDUM OPINION Page 29 0f 29 The Couxt also overrulcs Plaintiffs’ Objections to JIMC having ﬁled a Iesponse in opposition to that motion to amend 01 for reconsideration Hating considered the dlguments raised in that motion, the Cou1t will deny it Reconsiduation is not propel hexe Certifying the dismissal oleMC f01 interlocutory appeal is also impmpel HOW ever, the Court does agree with Plaintiffs ()VCIall point that appellate review 01 HMC s dismigsal is appropliate For that reason the CQua will sua sponte certify the Match 4 2019 Ordel dismissing JIMC for lack of jtuisdiction and failure to timely serve as ﬁnal undel Rule 54(b) of the Virgin Islands Rules 01‘ C ivil Ploceduxe An appropriate order follows DOVE this Qt" 5“ d3) of April 2024 HAROLD W L WILLOCKS ATTEST Administrative Judge 01‘ the Superior Court Tamara Charles Clerk 0f the Court W 4:: Ccult lerk Dated Q/HM SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN lSI ANDS DI\ [SIGN OF ST CROIX J[ LIAN Sr ROSE, ViReIME GEORGE; Ru MOM) Case No SX 2002 CV 00598 ALLEYNE; him m BARRIOS; Am) OTHER PERSONS T00 NL\IEROLs r0 Mum», A C1 ASS ACTION Action for Damages PLAINTIFFS, Complex Litigation DiVision V Jul y Trial Demanded VIRGIN ISLANDS INDLSTRIAL MAIN TEINA\CP CORPORA rim (IMC), J XCOBS INDLSTRIAI MAINTE) XNCL CORPORM ION (JIMC), HOVENSA, LLC, HOVIC; AM) AMERADA HEss CORPORATION, DEFENDAsz ' ORDER AND NOW, for the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, it is hereby ORDERED that the First Motion for Extension ofTime ﬁled by Plaintiffs on June 24 2019 is DENIED and the Reply ﬁled by Plaintiffs on July 8 2009 is DISREGARDED It is fuithei ORDERED that the Motion to Amend Ordel t0 Piovide for lnterlocutory Appeal 0r Alternatively Motion to Reconsidei ﬁled by Plaintiffs on May 9 2020 is DENIED However the Court will by separate ordei certify the Ordei dated and enteied March 4 2019 as ﬁnal pei Rule 54(b) 0fthe Virgin Islands Rules Of Civil Piecedure DONF and so ORDERED this 9 I day of April 2024 / ATTEST ( ///// 1 RA CHARLES ‘ 1/ w 4/ 7/ X 4 TWA CLER F C0 unT/ HAROLD L W11 LOCKS \ /7 Administrative Judge of the Superior Court 141/ ”“4 OURT LERK ED. #wgzuw ‘ Although the caption was amended when the Second Amended Complaint Vt as ﬁled the C 0u1t has ietained the prior caption to avoid contusion since the amendment [emoved Jaeobs Industiial Maintenance Lomorition and its dismissal is the focus of motions addiessed herein