Sampanthar v. Walter

Sampanthar v Walter 2024 NY Slip Op 31602(U) May 8, 2024 Supreme Court, Saratoga County Docket Number: Index No. EF20222707 Judge: Richard A. Kupferman Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip Op 30001(U), are republished from various New York State and local government sources, including the New York State Unified Court System's eCourts Service. This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official publication.

STATE OF NEW YORK SUPREME COURT COUNTY OF SARATOGA

SUSAN SAMP ANTHAR and KESA VAN SAMP ANTHAR, DECISION & ORDER Plaintiffs,

-against- Index No.: EF20222707

SEAN WALTER and CASEY WALTER,

Defendants.

Appearances:

Justin W. Gray, Esq. Maynard, O'Connor, Smith & Catalinotto, LLP 6 Tower Place Albany, New York 12203 Attorneysfor Plaintiffs

Justin M. Grassi, Esq. Jones Steves Grassi LLP 68 West Avenue Saratoga Springs, New York 12866 Attorneys for Defendants

K UPFERMAN, J. ,

The Horsey Hostess operates in the Town of Saratoga ("Town"). The business (owned by

the defendant, Casey Walter) offers a variety of lessons ~ ' riding, grooming, and learning), and

provides customers with the opportunity to enjoy a "horsey experience" and engage in some horse

play. For the owner and the business' customers, the experience is calm and enlightening. Next

to a photo of a horse gazing into your inner being with its large eyes, the owner writes on her

website: The "non-judgmental, naturally mindful , and often loving presence [of horses] can lead

you to a deeper understanding of yourself and others'· (NYSCEF Document No. 53, Website).

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But one person's dream can be another person· s nightmare. For two of the neighbors (the

plaintiffs in this action). their horsey experience has been unsettling. They consider it disruptive

to their residential neighborhood, causing unpleasant smells, unsanitary runoff, and a reduction in

their property value. They commenced this action seeking, among other things, to enjoin the

operation of the business. They contend that the business violates certain restrictive covenants

(first cause of action) and/or the zoning law (second cause of action). 1 After discovery, the parties

filed competing motions for summary judgment.

Regarding the first cause of action, a party seeking to enforce a restrictive covenant must

establish its application by clear and convincing evidence (see Kumar v Franco, 21 1 AD3d 1437,

1439 [3d Dept 2022]). ··Where the language used in a restrictive covenant is equally susceptible

of two interpretations, the less restrictive interpretation must be adopted" (id. [internal quotation

marks and citations omitted]). Notwithstanding, "the intent of the parties is the paramount

consideration'· (Blair v Ladue, 14 AD2d 373, 375 [3d Dept 1961]; see Jennings Beach Ass'n v

Kaiser, 145 AD2d 607,608 [2d Dept 1988]; Rydberg v Jennings Beach Assn., 69 AD2d 816,817

[2d Dept 1979]. affd 49 NY2d 934 [ 1980]). Such intent must be ascertained from an examination

of the document as a whole and not from a particular clause alone (see Bovin v Galitzka, 250 NY

228, 232 [1929] ; Blair, 14 AD2d at 375). " In addition, the surrounding circumstances may, at

times, become an important consideration in deciphering the intent, and interpreting the scope, of

a restrictive covenant" (Birch Tree Partners, LLC v Windsor Digital Studio, LLC, 95 AD3d 1154,

1155-1156 [2d Dept 2012] [internal quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted]; see McCord

v Piche!, 35 AO2d 879, 880 [3d Dept 1970]).

1The plaintiffs' additional claims for nuisance, trespass, and negligence have since been resolved by the parties (see NYSCEF Document No. 33, So-Ordered Stipulation of Partial Settlement). 2

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The restrictive covenants at issue were placed on the properties by the developer/seller.

They are set forth in an amended declaration (the "DCRE") filed in the County Clerk's Office.

The heart of the dispute concerns Sections 2b and 6 of the DCRE. Section 2b restricts the use of

the properties for residential purposes only, while Section 6 provides an exception for a "home

occupation." The DCRE relies on the definition of " home occupation" in the Town' s zoning law.

The zoning law defines a "home occupation" as requiring, among other things, the

occupation/profession to be "customarily carried on in a dwelling unit" (Town Code, Chapter 400,

Attachment 1 - Appendix A, Definitions). The examples of a "home occupation" in the zoning

law include arts, crafts, and dancing; dressmaking; an office for a physician, dentist, lawyer,

engineer, architect, agent, broker, or accountant; and other occupations of "a similar nature" (id.).

The Court agrees with the plaintiffs that the business is not a "home occupation." The

business involves horse riding, grooming, and interaction. The horses are kept inside a stable (an

accessory structure) and ridden/enjoyed outside, around the property (i.e., outside the dwelling).

As such, the business is not customarily carried on in the dwelling and therefore fails to satisfy a

key element of a "home occupation." In addition, the business is not similar in nature to any of

the examples in the zoning law. None of the examples involve animals or any activities

customarily carried on outside a dwelling.

Further, even assuming for the sake of argument that the zoning law permits a horse

farm/business as of right or considers such to be a "home occupation," the business would still be

prohibited under Section 5 of the DCRE. Section 5 prohibits the harboring or raising of any

animals except for domestic animals that "are not kept and/or raised for commercial purposes."

Despite defense counsel' s zealous and creative attempts during oral argument to persuade

otherwise, the Court finds that the horses are being kept for commercial purposes, even though

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they are also being kept for the owner's personal enjoyment. The owner advertises the business

and markets the horses to paying customers. The business further charges customers for the use

and enjoyment of the horses. In fact, in the tax year preceding this litigation, the business reported

$27,332 in gross receipts and $12,977 in net profit. This is precisely the type of commercial

activity that the DCRE seeks to prohibit.

Even if any doubt existed regarding the intent of these provisions, the plaintiffs have

provided an affirmation from the developer/seller of the properties which further supports their

interpretation. The developer explains that the neighborhood was designed for buyers interested

in " large, single-family, high-end homes, costing at least $500,000.00." The developer further

explains that it intended for the DCRE to impose strict limitations upon the ability of the lot owners

to keep animals or operate an open business. According to the developer, the presence of animals

undermines the intended high-end residential character of the subdivision to the detriment o f other

lot owners. In addition, the developer explains that the home occupation exception was intended

to apply narrowly to those occupations performed inside a home and involving low visibility. The

developer opines that the business in this case is not permitted under the DCRE because it involves

the commercial use of horses outside the dwelling and is highly visible to the plaintiffs.

Further, the defendants misplace reliance on the zoning/code enforcement officer's letter

dated November 7, 2022. The letter does not determine that the business constitutes a "home

occupation" or that it is permitted by the DCRE. To the contrary, the letter states that the business

is permitted as a "horse farm" and expressly declines to render any opinion about the restrictive

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covenants. 2 Moreover, even if the letter had opined that the business was a "home occupation,"

the business would still be prohibited under Section 5 of the DCRE (discussed above).

Similarly, the Court disagrees that the plaintiffs were required to pursue an administrative

appeal from the zoning/code enforcement officer' s letter as a prerequisite to seeking judicial

enforcement of the DCRE. As explained above, the enforcement officer did not render any

determinations relevant to the restrictive covenants and, as such, there was no determination to

appeal on this issue. Further, this defense (the failure to exhaust administrative remedies) does not

apply where the remedies sought in a plenary action are substantially different from the remedies

available in an administrative proceeding (see Haddad v Salzman, 188 AD2d 515, 516 [2d Dept

1992], citing Little Joseph Realty v Town of Babylon, 41 NY2d 73 8 [ 1977]; see also Manuli v

Hildenbrandt, 144 AD2d 789, 790 [3d Dept 1988]). As the administrative board responsible for

hearing appeals could not have resolved the DCRE claim (and the Town's enforcement of its

zoning laws was discretionary), the Court disagrees that the plaintiffs' failure to pursue an

administrative appeal precludes the plaintiffs from seeking to enforce the DCRE.

Accordingly, the Court agrees that the horse farm/business is prohibited under the DCRE.

As such, the Court grants the injunctive relief requested in the first and sixth causes of action to

the extent that the defendants are prohibited from operating the horse farm/business on their

property.

2Previously, during a meeting before the Town' s Planning Board, the zoning/code enforcement officer commented that the business was ·'more a home occupancy business" than an academy (Meeting Minutes, dated August 24, 2022). The Court similarly does not consider these comments as an administrative resolution of the ·'home occupation" issue. Aside from its equivocal nature, the comments were made orally during ongoing proceedings, and they were also later amended/superseded by the zoning/code enforcement officer's letter dated November 7, 2022. 5

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This decision renders the second cause of action (zoning law) as moot and unnecessary. In

particular, the second cause of action seeks the following remedies: injunctive relief to prohibit the

business from operating; monetary damages for the alleged reduction in the value of the plaintiffs·

property based on the business' operation; and a declaratory judgment. As discussed above, on

the two other causes of action, the Court has already awarded injunctive relief to prohibit the

business from operating on the property. The plaintiffs' request for this same relief in the second

cause of action is now moot. In addition, given the injunctive relief awarded, the plaintiffs'

property value has now been restored. The Court further declines to grant the plaintiffs' request

for a declaratory judgment regarding the zoning law. Such a declaration would not be useful or

necessary given the injunctive relief awarded (see James v Alderton Dock Yards, Ltd. , 256 NY

298, 305 [1931]; see also CPLR 3001; Equitable Leasing. Inc. v Maguire, 36 AD2d 1020, 1020

[4th Dept 1971]).

The Court has considered the parties' remaining contentions and finds them to be either

unpersuasive or rendered academic.

It is therefore,

ORDERED, that the defendants' motion seeking summary judgment m their favor

(Motion No. l) is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED, that the plaintiffs' motion seeking summary judgment in their favor (Motion

No. 2) is GRANTED on the first and sixth causes of action and the defendants' counterclaim is

hereby DISMISSED; and it is further

ORDERED, that the plaintiffs' request for a declaratory judgment on the first cause of

action is GRANTED and the Court hereby declares that the defendants' operation of the horse

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farm/business on their property in the Town of Saratoga is in violation of the DCRE; and it is

further

ORDERED, the defendants are hereby enjoined and prohi bited from continuing to carry

on the horse farm/business on their property in the Town of Saratoga while the restrictive

covenants remain effective; provided, however, that nothing herein requires the defendants to

remove any improvements or prohibits them from owning or keeping the horses on their property;

and it is further

ORDERED, that the plaintiffs· motion seeking summary j udgment (Motion No. 2) on the

second cause of action is DENIED as moot and the second cause of action is hereby DISMISSED,

w itho ut prejudice.

This shall constitute the Decision & Order of the Co urt. The Co urt is hereby uploading the

original Decision & Order into the NYSCEF system fo r fi ling and entry by the County Clerk.

So-Ordered.

Dated: May 8, 2024 at Ballston Spa, ew York

Papers Considered: NYSCEF Document umbers: 36-68

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