Jonathan Dean-Adolph v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

Case 2:21-cv-08834-ODW-JEM Document 29 Filed 03/17/22 Page 1 of 8 Page ID #:370 O [7] 8 United States District Court 9 Central District of California [10] 11 JONATHAN DEAN-ADOLPH, Case № 2:21-cv-08834-ODW-(JEMx) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 13 v. DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S 14 MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC, a MOTION TO DISMISS AND 15 Delaware Limited Liability Company, STRIKE PORTIONS OF Defendant. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT [20, 22] [17] 18 I. INTRODUCTION 19 Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC moves to dismiss, and strike portions of, 20 Plaintiff Jonathan Dean-Adolph’s Complaint. (Am. Mot. Dismiss and/or Strike 21 (“Mot.” or “Motion”), ECF No. 22.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court 22 GRANTS in PART and DENIES in PART the Motion.1 23 II. BACKGROUND 24 On May 17, 2021, Dean-Adolph bought a used 2018 Mercedes-Benz 25 GLE350W (the “Subject Vehicle”). (Compl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges that 26 the Subject Vehicle had defects, including “engine, structural, suspension, steering, [27] 28 1 Having carefully considered the papers filed in connection with the Motion, the Court deemed the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. Case 2:21-cv-08834-ODW-JEM Document 29 Filed 03/17/22 Page 2 of 8 Page ID #:371 1 and electrical system defects.” (Id. ¶ 3.) On November 4, 2021, Dean-Adolph 2 brought this suit against Mercedes-Benz alleging: (1) breach of express warranty; 3 (2) breach of implied warranty; and (3) violation of section 1793.2(b) of California’s 4 Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (the “Song-Beverly Act”). On December 22, 5 2021, Mercedes-Benz moved to dismiss Dean-Adolph’s Complaint for failure to state 6 a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) and, alternatively, for 7 improper forum shopping. (See generally Mot.) Mercedes-Benz also moved to strike 8 certain damages from the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(f). (Id.) As explained 9 below, the Court grants with leave to amend Mercedes-Benz’s Motion to Dismiss for 10 failure to state a claim and denies Mercedes-Benz’s Motion to Dismiss for improper 11 forum shopping. The Court also denies as moot Mercedes-Benz’s Motion to Strike. 12 III. LEGAL STANDARD 13 A court may dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for lack of a cognizable 14 legal theory or insufficient facts pleaded to support an otherwise cognizable legal 15 theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police De’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). “To 16 survive a motion to dismiss . . . under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint generally must 17 satisfy only the minimal notice pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2)” by including a 18 short and plain statement of the claim. Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 494 (9th Cir. 19 2003); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The “complaint must contain sufficient factual 20 matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 21 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 22 also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (The “[f]actual allegations 23 must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”). “A pleading 24 that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 25 cause of action will not do.’” Id. (Quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 ). 26 Whether a complaint satisfies the plausibility standard is a “context-specific 27 task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common 28 sense.” Id. at 679 . A court is generally limited to the pleadings and must construe all [2] Case 2:21-cv-08834-ODW-JEM Document 29 Filed 03/17/22 Page 3 of 8 Page ID #:372 1 “factual allegations set forth in the complaint . . . as true and . . . in the light most 2 favorable” to the plaintiff. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 679 (2001). But 3 a court need not blindly accept conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of fact, 4 and unreasonable inferences. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979 , 988 5 (9th Cir. 2001). When a district court grants a motion to dismiss, it should generally 6 provide leave to amend unless it is clear the complaint could not be saved by any 7 amendment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., [8] 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). 9 IV. DISCUSSION 10 As discussed below, Dean-Adolph fails to state a claim with respect to each of 11 his three causes of action. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Dean-Adolph’s 12 Complaint with leave to amend the identified deficiencies. Additionally, the Court 13 denies Mercedes-Benz’s Motion to Dismiss Dean-Adolph’s Complaint for improper 14 forum shopping. Finally, the Court denies Mercedes-Benz’s Motion to Strike.2 15 A. Failure to State a Claim 16 1. Dean-Adolph’s First Cause of Action for Breach of Express Warranty 17 The elements of an action for breach of express warranty under section 1790 of 18 the Song-Beverly Act are: (1) nonconformity, (2) presentation, and (3) failure to 19 repair. Donlen v. Ford Motor Co., 217 Cal. App. 4th 138, 152 (2013). 20 i. Nonconformity Element 21 First, Dean-Adolph must plead that the Subject Vehicle had “a nonconformity 22 covered by the express warranty that substantially impaired the use, value, or safety of 23 the vehicle.” Donlen, 217 Cal. App. 4th at 152 . Here, the Complaint simply states 24 there are defects with the “engine, structural, suspension, steering, and electrical 25 system defects.” (Compl. ¶ 3.) The Complaint contains no other allegations 26 2 Mercedes-Benz also moves to strike from Dean-Adolph’s Complaint the replacement or restitution 27 and all related damages claims. (Mot. 1.) Because the Court is granting Mercedes-Benz’s Motion to Dismiss all of Dean-Adolph’s causes of action, no viable complaint remains in this action. Thus, the 28 Court DENIES as MOOT Mercedes-Benz’s Motion to Strike. [3] Case 2:21-cv-08834-ODW-JEM Document 29 Filed 03/17/22 Page 4 of 8 Page ID #:373 1 identifying the nature, source, or symptoms of the defects. Without these additional 2 details, Dean-Adolph’s claim amounts to no more than “a formulaic recitation of the 3 elements of a cause of action.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 . Dean-Adolph’s bare recitation 4 of the elements of his cause of action is insufficient to successfully plead a claim for 5 relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 ; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 . 6 By contrast, in Gavaldon v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., the plaintiff alleged a 7 defect in the transmission that specifically would cause her car to “get stuck” in a 8 certain gear or “shifting hard,” causing her vehicle to self-lock at the second gear to 9 avoid further damage to the transmission. 32 Cal. 4th 1246, 1252 (2004). This level 10 of factual specificity is simply not found in Dean-Adolph’s Complaint. Dean11 Adolph’s allegations leave both Mercedes-Benz and the Court wondering exactly 12 what was wrong with the Subject Vehicle. Dean-Adolph thus fails to properly plead 13 the nonconformity element. 14 ii. Presentation and Failure to Repair Elements 15 To properly plead the presentation element, Dean-Adolph must allege facts 16 showing that “the vehicle was presented to an authorized representative of the 17 manufacturer of the vehicle for repair.” Donlen, 217 Cal. App. 4th at 152 . For the 18 failure to repair element, he must allege facts showing that “the manufacturer or his 19 representative did not repair the nonconformity after a reasonable number of repair 20 attempts.” Id. In pleading the presentation element, Dean-Adolph only alleges he 21 delivered the Subject Vehicle to an authorized Mercedes-Benz repair facility. 22 (Compl. ¶ 26.) This statement is nothing more than a bare conclusion that simply 23 restates the definition of the presentation element, which is not “enough to raise a 24 right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 . Dean-Adolph 25 therefore fails to properly plead the presentation element. Regarding the failure to 26 repair element, Dean-Adolph generally alleges that the authorized repair facility was 27 unable to conform the Subject Vehicle to the terms of the express warranty after a 28 reasonable number of repair attempts. (Compl. ¶ 7.) Dean-Adolph again has simply [4] Case 2:21-cv-08834-ODW-JEM Document 29 Filed 03/17/22 Page 5 of 8 Page ID #:374 1 restated the element as his allegation, without providing facts sufficient to “raise a 2 right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 . Dean-Adolph 3 therefore fails to properly plead both the presentation and the failure to repair 4 elements. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Dean-Adolph’s breach of express 5 warranty claim with leave to amend the identified deficiencies. 6 2. Dean-Adolph’s Second Cause of Action for Breach of Implied Warranty 7 The elements of a claim for breach of implied warranty under section 1792 of 8 the Song-Beverly Act are: (1) the plaintiff bought a consumer good (i.e., a good used 9 primarily for personal, family or household purposes) that was manufactured or 10 distributed by the defendant; (2) the defendant was in the business of manufacturing 11 or distributing the particular good to retail buyers; and (3) the consumer good: (a) was 12 not of the same quality as those generally acceptable in the trade; (b) was not fit for 13 the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; (c) was not adequately 14 contained, packed and labeled; or (d) did not measure up to the promises or facts 15 stated on the container or label. Cal. Civ. Code § 1792 ; see CACI No.3210; Gutierrez 16 v. Carmax Auto Superstores Cal., 19 Cal. App. 5th 1234, 1246 (2018). 17 Here, Dean-Adolph fails to properly plead his breach of implied warranty cause 18 of action because he conclusively restates the third element as his allegation—namely, 19 that the Subject Vehicle was not fit for the ordinary purpose for which vehicles are 20 used and that the Subject Vehicle generally had defects. (Compl. ¶ 37.) Under Iqbal, 21 simply alleging a good was not fit for its ordinary purpose, without alleging case22 specific facts showing how the good was unfit—as Dean-Adolph has done—is 23 insufficient. (Compl. ¶ 37); see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 . Again referring to Gavaldon 24 as a contrasting example, the plaintiff in that case adequately pleaded this element by 25 alleging that the defect with the transmission was so severe that the car was not 26 drivable past a slow speed and could barely make it to a service repair station. 32 Cal. 27 4th at 1252. This level of factual specificity is simply not found in Dean-Adolph’s 28 Complaint, and without it, Dean-Adolph fails to state a claim. Accordingly, the Court [5] Case 2:21-cv-08834-ODW-JEM Document 29 Filed 03/17/22 Page 6 of 8 Page ID #:375 1 DISMISSES Dean-Adolph’s breach of implied warranty claim with leave to amend 2 the identified deficiencies. 3 3. Dean-Adolph’s Third Cause of Action Under § 1793.2(b) 4 By way of his third cause of action, Dean-Adolph seeks damages for a violation 5 of section 1793.2(b) of the Song-Beverly Act. (Compl. ¶¶ 46–59.) The Ninth Circuit 6 has held that “in order to state a claim under Section 1793.2(b) of the [Song-Beverly 7 Act], a plaintiff must plead that a single repair attempt took the defendant more than 8 30 days to complete.” Schick v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 801 F.App’x 519, 521 (9th Cir. 9 2020). Here, Dean-Adolph fails to plead facts that demonstrate a claim for relief 10 under section 1793.2(b). Dean-Adolph alleges that the Subject Vehicle was presented 11 to an authorized repair facility, and that Mercedes-Benz’s authorized repair facility 12 failed to conform the Subject Vehicle to the terms in the express warranty within thirty 13 days or commence repairs within a reasonable time. (Compl. ¶¶ 51–52.) Again, 14 however, this allegation is merely a recitation of the cause of action itself, and nothing 15 more. And “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation 16 of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting 17 Twombly 550 U.S. at 555 ). Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Dean-Adolph’s 18 claim for violation of § 1793.2(b) with leave to amend the identified deficiencies. 19 B. Forum Shopping 20 Finally, Mercedes-Benz argues Dean-Adolph’s Complaint should be dismissed 21 for improper forum shopping. (Mot. 10.) In evaluating forum shopping, courts must 22 consider “whether either party improperly sought more favorable rules in its choice of 23 forum or pursued suit in a new forum after facing setbacks in the original proceeding.” 24 Seneca Ins. Co. v. Strange Land, Inc., 862 F.3d 835, 846 (9th Cir. 2017). “It typically 25 does not constitute forum shopping where a party ‘acted within his rights in filing a 26 suit in the forum of his choice’” Id. (quoting Travelers Indem. Co. v. Madonna, 914 27 F.2d 1364 , 1371, (9th Cir. 1990)). This is the case “[e]ven where ‘[t]he chronology of 28 events suggests that both parties took a somewhat opportunistic approach to th[e] [6] Case 2:21-cv-08834-ODW-JEM Document 29 Filed 03/17/22 Page 7 of 8 Page ID #:376 1 litigation’” Id. (quoting R.R. St. & Co. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 656 F.3d 966, 981 (9th Cir. 2 2011)). Here, Mercedes-Benz argues that Dean-Adolph engaged in improper forum 3 shopping because he initially filed an action in state court, dismissed that action, and 4 subsequently refiled the action with this Court. (Mot. 3–4.) Mercedes-Benz argues 5 that Dean-Adolph did so to avoid an unfavorable California state court ruling that 6 would compel his suit to arbitration. (Id. at 4.) The Court finds that these facts do not 7 constitute improper forum shopping. See Nakash, 882 F.2d at 1417 (finding forum 8 shopping where a party sought a new forum for its claims after three-and-a-half years 9 of litigation that was progressing to its detriment in a different court); Am. Int’l 10 Underwriters v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 843 F.2d 1253, 1259 , (9th Cir. 1988) (finding forum 11 shopping where a party removed its case from state court after two-and-a-half years of 12 litigation because it determined the Federal Rules of Evidence were more beneficial to 13 its case). 14 Mercedes-Benz also sought judicial notice of court records in twelve other 15 actions to substantiate its assertion that Dean-Adolph is engaging in improper forum 16 shopping.3 (Req. Judicial Notice (“Request”), ECF No. 21, Ex. 1–12.) Specifically, 17 Mercedes-Benz cites to twelve actions in which its counsel served as defense counsel, 18 and some of which were against plaintiffs represented by Dean-Adolph’s counsel. 19 (Id.; Mot. 1.) Mercedes-Benz argues that these cases demonstrate that “Plaintiff’s 20 Counsel is well aware that Defense Counsel and MBUSA have had success winning 21 motions to compel binding arbitration in state court venues across California.” 22 (Mot. 1.) Although the Court grants Mercedes-Benz’s Request, the cited cases do not 23 demonstrate that Dean-Adolph is attempting to improperly forum shop in this case. In 24 fact, none of those cases appear to involve Dean-Adolph and some do not even 25 involve his counsel. (See generally Request; id.) Those cases are entirely separate 26 actions involving different parties and issues and therefore have no bearing [27] 3 A court may take judicial notice of court records in another case. United States v. Howard, 381 28 F.3d 873 , 876 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004). Because Mercedes-Benz requests judicial notice of twelve other cases, the Court GRANTS its Request. [7] Case 2:21-cv-08834-ODW-JEM Document 29 Filed 03/17/22 Page 8 of 8 Page ID #:377 1 whatsoever on the action at bar. Thus, the twelve cases do nothing to support a 2 finding of forum shopping. 3 Dean-Adolph was within his right to voluntarily dismiss his state court action 4 under California Code of Civil Procedure § 581. Civ. Code § 581(b)(1). And nothing 5 in the record indicates the Dean-Adolph’s state court action was “progressing to its 6 detriment.” Nakash, 882 F.2d 1417 . Accordingly, the court DENIES Mercedes7 Benz’s Motion to Dismiss for improper forum shopping. 8 V. CONCLUSION 9 For these reasons, the Court GRANTS in PART and DENIES in PART 10 Mercedes-Benz’s Motion. (ECF Nos. 20, 22.) The Court DISMISSES Dean11 Adolph’s Complaint, with leave to amend as described above. The Court otherwise 12 DENIES the Motion. If Dean-Adolph chooses to file an Amended Complaint, he 13 shall do so within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this Order, in which case 14 Mercedes-Benz shall answer or otherwise respond within fourteen (14) days of the 15 filing. If Dean-Adolph chooses not to amend, then as of the lapse of his deadline to 16 amend, his claims shall be deemed dismissed with prejudice and the case shall be 17 closed. [18] 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. [20] 21 March 17, 2022 [22] 23 ____________________________________ OTIS D. WRIGHT, II [24] UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE