Ana Doris Aparicio v. Kilolo Kijakazi

Case 2:20-cv-11376-GJS Document 24 Filed 08/12/22 Page 1 of 7 Page ID #:857 [7] 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [10] ANA A.,1 11 Case No. 2:20-cv-11376-GJS Plaintiff [12] v. 13 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND KILOLO KIJAKAJI, Acting ORDER 14 Commissioner of Social Security, 15 Defendant. [16] 17 I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 18 Plaintiff Ana A. (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint seeking review of the decision 19 of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her application for Disability 20 Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). The parties filed consents to proceed before the 21 undersigned United States Magistrate Judge [Dkts. 11 and 12] and briefs [Dkt. 16 22 (“Pl. Br.”), Dkt. 22 (“Def. Br.”), and Dkt. 23 (“Reply”)] addressing disputed issues 23 in the case. The matter is now ready for decision. For the reasons discussed below, 24 the Court finds that this matter should be remanded for further proceedings. [26] 27 1 In the interest of privacy, this Order uses only Plaintiff’s first name and initial of her last name. [28] Case 2:20-cv-11376-GJS Document 24 Filed 08/12/22 Page 2 of 7 Page ID #:858 1 II. ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION UNDER REVIEW 2 On June 19, 2018, Plaintiff filed an application for DIB alleging disability 3 beginning December 23, 2016. [Dkt. 15, Administrative Record (“AR”) 18, 1864 92.] Plaintiff’s application was denied at the initial level of review. [AR 89-93.] 5 Plaintiff testified with the assistance of a Spanish interpreter at a video hearing 6 before Administrative Law Judge Michael Mannes (“the ALJ”) on February 12, 7 2020. [AR 33-77.] 8 On April 7, 2020, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision applying the five9 step sequential evaluation process for assessing disability. [AR 18-28]; see 20 10 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (b)-(g)(1). At step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not 11 engaged in substantial gainful activity (“SGA”) since the alleged onset date through 12 her date last insured of June 30, 2018. [AR 20.] At step two, the ALJ determined 13 that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the 14 cervical and lumbar spine, osteoarthritis in the knee with meniscal tear, and 15 degenerative joint disease in the right wrist. [AR 20.] At step three, the ALJ 16 determined that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of 17 impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the impairments 18 listed in Appendix I of the Regulations. [AR 21]; see 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, 19 App. 1 . The ALJ found that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to 20 perform light work, as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567 (b)), but is limited to 21 occasional climbing of ramps, stairs, ladders, ropes, and scaffolds, occasional 22 stooping, kneeling, crouching and crawling, occasional reaching overhead 23 bilaterally, frequent balancing, and frequent handling and fingering with the right 24 upper extremity. [AR 21.] At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to 25 perform any past relevant work. [AR 26.] Considering Plaintiff’s age, education, 26 work experience, and RFC, the ALJ found at step five that Plaintiff could have 27 performed other work, including representative occupations such as inspector and 28 hand packager, power screwdriver operator, and small product assembler. [AR 262 Case 2:20-cv-11376-GJS Document 24 Filed 08/12/22 Page 3 of 7 Page ID #:859 1 27.] Based on these findings, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled 2 from the alleged onset date through the date last insured. [AR 27.] 3 The Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ’s decision on October 20, 4 2020. [AR 1-8.] This action followed. 5 Plaintiff raises the following issues challenging the ALJ’s findings and 6 determination of non-disability: 7 1. The final decision of the Commissioner arose from an 8 unconstitutional administrative process. [Pl. Br. at 5-9.] 9 2. The ALJ failed to properly evaluate the medical evidence in 10 assessing Plaintiff’s RFC. [Pl. Br. at 9-10.] 11 3. The ALJ failed to properly evaluate Plaintiff’s subjective 12 complaints. [Pl. Br. at 10-12.] 13 The Commissioner asserts that the ALJ’s decision should be affirmed or, in 14 the alternative, remanded for further administrative proceedings. [Def. Br. at 3-25.] [15] 16 III. GOVERNING STANDARD 17 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g), the Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to 18 determine if: (1) the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial 19 evidence; and (2) the Commissioner used correct legal standards. See Carmickle v. 20 Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); Brewes v. Comm’r 21 Soc. Sec. Admin., 682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012). “Substantial evidence is 22 more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence 23 as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Gutierrez 24 v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 740 F.3d 519, 522-23 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation 25 marks and citation omitted). 26 The Court will uphold the Commissioner’s decision when “the evidence is 27 susceptible to more than one rational interpretation.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 28 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). However, the Court may review only the reasons [3] Case 2:20-cv-11376-GJS Document 24 Filed 08/12/22 Page 4 of 7 Page ID #:860 1 stated by the ALJ in his decision “and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon 2 which he did not rely.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). The 3 Court will not reverse the Commissioner’s decision if it is based on harmless error, 4 which exists if the error is “inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability 5 determination.” Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015) 6 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). [7] IV. DISCUSSION [8] A. The ALJ Erred in Evaluating the Medical Opinion Evidence [9] Plaintiff contends the ALJ improperly rejected the medical opinion evidence [10] from her workers’ compensation doctors in assessing her RFC. [Pl. Br. 9-10; Reply [11] at 10-11.] Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to properly consider the [12] opinion of the agreed medical examiner in orthopedics, Dr. Chester Hasday. Dr. [13] Hasday examined Plaintiff on August 13, 2018, and assessed work restrictions, [14] which included lifting no more than 15 pounds, no repetitive flexion, extension, or [15] rotation of the head or neck, and no repetitive bending. [AR 458.] Dr. Hasday [16] opined that Plaintiff was temporarily totally disabled from January 2017 through the [17] date of the examination. [AR 458.] [18] Because Plaintiff filed her application after March 27, 2017, revised [19] regulations regarding the evaluation of medical source opinions apply to her claim. [20] See Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 21 5844, 5844 (Jan. 18, 2017) (codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404 & 416)). Under the new [22] regulations, special deference is no longer given to the opinions of treating and [23] examining physicians on account of their relationship with a claimant and an ALJ’s [24] “decision to discredit any medical opinion[] must simply be supported by substantial [25] evidence.” Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 787 (9th Cir. 2022) (“the requirement [26] that ALJs provide ‘specific and legitimate reasons’ for rejecting a treating or [27] examining doctor’s opinion, which stems from the special weight given to such [4] Case 2:20-cv-11376-GJS Document 24 Filed 08/12/22 Page 5 of 7 Page ID #:861 1 opinions, is [ ] incompatible with the revised regulations”) (citation omitted); 20 2 C.F.R. § 404 .1520c(a) (“We will not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, 3 including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) …, including those from [a 4 claimant’s] medical sources.”). “Supportability” and “consistency” are the most 5 important factors to be considered when evaluating the persuasiveness of medical 6 opinions and, therefore, the ALJ is required to explain how both factors were 7 considered. See 20 C.F.R. § 404 .1520c(b)(2). “Supportability means the extent to 8 which a medical source supports the medical opinion by explaining the ‘relevant … 9 objective medical evidence.’” Woods, 32 F.4th at 791 -92 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 10 404.1520c(c)(1)). “Consistency means the extent to which a medical opinion is 11 ‘consistent … with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources 12 in the claim.’” Woods, 32 F.4th at 792 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404 .1520c(c)(2)). 13 The ALJ disregarded the opinions of Dr. Hasday and Plaintiff’s workers’ 14 compensation doctors generally, as follows: [15] The record contained several medical opinions; however, 16 these opinions were prepared in the context of the claimant’s workers’ compensation claim and where the [17] claimant is “disabled” is a determination reserved to the 18 commissioner. 19 [AR 26.] The ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Hasday’s opinion is not supported by 20 substantial evidence. 21 While a workers’ compensation physician’s opinion of temporary total 22 disability is not binding in a social security case ( 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504 ), “an ALJ 23 may not disregard a physician’s medical opinion simply because it was initially 24 elicited in a state workers’ compensation proceeding, or because it is couched in the 25 terminology used in such proceedings.” Booth v. Barnhart, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1099 , 26 1105 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The 27 purpose for which medical reports are obtained does not provide a legitimate basis 28 for rejecting them.”). In addition to finding Plaintiff temporarily totally disabled, [5] Case 2:20-cv-11376-GJS Document 24 Filed 08/12/22 Page 6 of 7 Page ID #:862 1 Dr. Hasday also assessed specific work restrictions which could be applicable in 2 Plaintiff’s social security case. [AR 458.] The ALJ erred by failing to explain why 3 the work restrictions assessed by Dr. Hasday were rejected. See Woods, 32 F.4th at 4 792 (“[A]n ALJ cannot reject an examining or treating doctor’s opinion as 5 unsupported or inconsistent without providing an explanation supported by 6 substantial evidence.”). Although Defendant offers additional reasons in support of 7 the ALJ’s decision and various record citations, the Court is “constrained to review 8 the reasons the ALJ asserts” and cannot affirm on the basis of evidence the ALJ did 9 not discuss. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003). Moreover, the 10 ALJ failed entirely to explain whether or how he considered the supportability and 11 consistency factors with regards to Dr. Hasday’s opinion. See Woods, 32 F.4th at 12 792 (“The agency must ‘articulate ... how persuasive’ it finds ‘all of the medical 13 opinions’ from each doctor or other source, 20 C.F.R. § 404 .1520c(b), and “explain 14 how [it] considered the supportability and consistency factors” in reaching these 15 findings, id. § 404.1520c(b)(2).”). Thus, the ALJ’s decision to discredit Dr. 16 Hasday’s opinion is not supported by substantial evidence. [17] 18 V. REMAND FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS 19 The Court has discretion to remand or reverse and award benefits. See 20 Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 682 (9th Cir. 2017). “Remand for further 21 proceedings is appropriate where there are outstanding issues that must be resolved 22 before a determination can be made, and it is not clear from the record that the ALJ 23 would be required to find the claimant disabled if all the evidence were properly 24 evaluated.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1162 (9th Cir. 2012); Treichler v. 25 Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1101 (9th Cir. 2014) (remand for 26 award of benefits is inappropriate where “there is conflicting evidence, and not all 27 essential factual issues have been resolved”). But “[w]here ‘(1) the record has been 28 fully developed and further administrative proceedings would serve no useful [6] Case 2:20-cv-11376-GJS Document 24 Filed 08/12/22 Page 7of7 Page ID #:863 1 || purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting 2 || evidence, whether claimant testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly 3 || discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be required to find the 4 || claimant disabled on remand,’” it is appropriate to exercise this discretion to direct 5 || an immediate award of benefits. Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 682 -83 (quoting Garrison, 6 || 759 F.3d at 1020). 7 Here, remand is required because the ALJ failed to properly evaluate Dr. 8 || Hasday’s opinion and there are outstanding issues that must be resolved before a 9 || final determination can be made. 10 Having found that remand is warranted, the Court declines to address 11 || Plaintiff's remaining issues. See Hiler v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 12 || 2012) (“Because we remand the case to the ALJ for the reasons stated, we decline to 13 || reach [plaintiff's] alternative ground for remand.”) [14] 15 VI CONCLUSION 16 For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that: 17 (1) the decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED and this matter is 18 REMANDED pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g) for further 19 administrative proceedings consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and 20 Order; and 21 (2) Judgment be entered in favor of Plaintiff. [22] 23 IT IS ORDERED. [24] 25 || DATED: August 12, 2022 [26] 77 GAIL J. STANDISH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE