Teresa May Williams v. Kilolo Kijakazi

Case 5:21-cv-00564-JC Document 25 Filed 08/22/22 Page 1 of 13 Page ID #:2104 — 1 — — 2 — — 3 — — 4 — — 5 — — 6 — — 7 — — 8 — UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT — 9 — CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA — 10 — 11 TERESA M. W.,1 Case No. 5:21-cv-00564-JC 12 Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM OPINION AND 13 v. ORDER OF REMAND — 14 — KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting 15 Commissioner of Social Security, 16 Defendant. — 17 — 18 I. SUMMARY 19 On March 31, 2021, plaintiff filed a Complaint seeking review of the 20 Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of plaintiff’s application for benefits. 21 The parties have consented to proceed before the undersigned United States 22 Magistrate Judge. 23 This matter is before the Court on the parties’ cross motions for summary 24 judgment, respectively (“Plaintiff’s Motion”) and (“Defendant’s Motion”) 25 (collectively “Motions”). The Court has taken the Motions under submission — 26 — 27 1Plaintiff’s name is partially redacted to protect plaintiff’s privacy in compliance with 28 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(c)(2)(B) and the recommendation of the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States. — 1 — Case 5:21-cv-00564-JC Document 25 Filed 08/22/22 Page 2 of 13 Page ID #:2105 1 without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15; Case Management Order 2 filed on April 21, 2021, at ¶ 5. 3 Based on the record as a whole and the applicable law, the decision of the 4 Commissioner is REVERSED AND REMANDED for further proceedings 5 consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and Order of Remand. In this case, the 6 Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) materially erred by rejecting plaintiff’s 7 subjective symptom testimony without providing adequate reasons. 8 II. BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE 9 DECISION 10 Beginning on or about May 25, 2018, plaintiff filed applications for 11 Supplemental Security Income and Disability Insurance Benefits, alleging 12 disability since March 1, 2016, due to arthritis, acid reflux, high blood pressure, 13 and high cholesterol. (Administrative Record (“AR”) 199-208, 234-35). The ALJ 14 subsequently examined the medical record and heard testimony from plaintiff (who 15 was represented by counsel) and a vocational expert. (AR 32-62). 16 On September 2, 2020, the ALJ determined that plaintiff had not been 17 disabled through the date of the decision. (AR 15-26). Specifically, the ALJ 18 found: (1) plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments: degenerative 19 disc disease of the lumbar and cervical spine, status post left Achilles tendon repair 20 surgery, osteoporosis, bilateral SI joint osteoarthritis, bilateral carpal tunnel 21 syndrome, hypertension, and hyperparathyroidism (AR 17-18); (2) plaintiff’s 22 impairments, considered individually or in combination, did not meet or medically 23 equal a listed impairment (AR 18-19); (3) plaintiff retained the residual functional 24 capacity (RFC) to perform medium work ( 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567 (c), 416.967(c)), 25 with additional limitations (AR 19-25 (adopting RFC consistent with state agency 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// — 2 — Case 5:21-cv-00564-JC Document 25 Filed 08/22/22 Page 3 of 13 Page ID #:2106 1 physicians’ opinions at AR 73-75, 89-91, 106-08, 121-23));2 (4) plaintiff could 2 perform her past relevant work as a home attendant as generally performed and 3 therefore was not disabled (AR 25-26 (adopting vocational expert testimony at AR 4 58)); and (5) plaintiff’s statements regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting 5 effects of subjective symptoms were not entirely consistent with the medical 6 evidence and other evidence in the record (AR 19-20). 7 On January 29, 2021, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s application for 8 review. (AR 1-3). 9 III. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS 10 A. Administrative Evaluation of Disability Claims 11 To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must show that she is unable “to 12 engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 13 physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which 14 has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 15 months.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 42 16 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(1)(A)) (internal quotation marks omitted), superseded by 17 regulation on other grounds as stated in Sisk v. Saul, 820 Fed. App’x 604, 606 (9th 18 Cir. 2020); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505 (a), 416.905(a). To be considered disabled, a 19 claimant must have an impairment of such severity that she is incapable of 20 performing work the claimant previously performed (“past relevant work”) as well 21 as any other “work which exists in the national economy.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 22 F.3d 1094 , 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)). 23 /// — 24 — — 25 — 2The ALJ determined that plaintiff would be limited to: (1) lifting and carrying 50 26 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently; (2) standing and/or walking for six hours in an eight-hour workday; (3) sitting for six hours in an eight-hour workday; (4) frequently climbing 27 ramps and stairs, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling; (5) occasionally 28 climbing ladders, ropes, and scaffolds; and (6) frequently performing handling and fingering with the upper extremities. (AR 19). — 3 — Case 5:21-cv-00564-JC Document 25 Filed 08/22/22 Page 4of13 Page ID #:2107 1 To assess whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ is required to use the five2 || step sequential evaluation process set forth in Social Security regulations. See 3 || Stout v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration, 454 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th 4 || Cir. 2006) (describing five-step sequential evaluation process) (citing 20 C.F.R. 5 || §§ 404.1520, 416.920). The claimant has the burden of proof at steps one through 6 || four —i.e., determination of whether the claimant was engaging in substantial 7 || gainful activity (step 1), has a sufficiently severe impairment (step 2), has an 8 || impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of 9 || the conditions listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (“Listings’’) 10 || (step 3), and retains the residual functional capacity to perform past relevant work 11 || (step 4). Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). 12 || The Commissioner has the burden of proof at step five — i.e., establishing that the 13 | claimant could perform other work in the national economy. Id. 14 B. Federal Court Review of Social Security Disability Decisions 15 A federal court may set aside a denial of benefits only when the 16 || Commissioner’s “final decision” was “based on legal error or not supported by 17 || substantial evidence in the record.” 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g); Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 18 || F.3d 664, 674 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The standard 19 || of review in disability cases is “highly deferential.” Rounds v. Commissioner of 20 || Social Security Administration, 807 F.3d 996, 1002 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation and 21 || quotation marks omitted). Thus, an ALJ’s decision must be upheld if the evidence 22 || could reasonably support either affirming or reversing the decision. Trevizo, 871 23 || F.3d at 674-75 (citations omitted). Even when an ALJ’s decision contains error, it 24 || must be affirmed if the error was harmless. See Treichler v. Commissioner of 25 || Social Security Administration, 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 2014) (ALJ error 26 || harmless if (1) inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination; or 27 || (2) ALJ’s path may reasonably be discerned despite the error) (citation and 28 || quotation marks omitted). Case 5:21-cv-00564-JC Document 25 Filed 08/22/22 Page5of13 Page ID#:2108 1 Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 2 || accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 674 (defining 3 || “substantial evidence” as “more than a mere scintilla, but less than a 4 || preponderance”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). When determining 5 || whether substantial evidence supports an ALJ’s finding, a court “must consider the 6 || entire record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence 7 || that detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion[.]|’? Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 8 || 995, 1009 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 9 Federal courts review only the reasoning the ALJ provided, and may not 10 || affirm the ALJ’s decision “on a ground upon which [the ALJ] did not rely.” 11 || Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 675 (citations omitted). Hence, while an ALJ’s decision need 12 || not be drafted with “ideal clarity,” it must, at a minimum, set forth the ALJ’s 13 || reasoning “in a way that allows for meaningful review.” Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 14 }|| 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1099 ). 15 A reviewing court may not conclude that an error was harmless based on 16 || independent findings gleaned from the administrative record. Brown-Hunter, 806 17 || F.3d at 492 (citations omitted). When a reviewing court cannot confidently 18 || conclude that an error was harmless, a remand for additional investigation or 19 || explanation is generally appropriate. See Marsh v. Colvin, 792 F.3d 1170 , 1173 20 || (9th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). 21)1V. DISCUSSION 22 Plaintiff contends, inter alia, that the ALJ erred by improperly rejecting her 23 || subjective symptom testimony. (Plaintiff's Motion at 11-12). For the reasons 24 || stated below, the Court agrees. Since the Court cannot find that the error was 25 || harmless, a remand is warranted. 26 A. Pertinent Law 27 When determining disability, an ALJ is required to consider a claimant’s 28 || impairment-related pain and other subjective symptoms at each step of the Case 5:21-cv-00564-JC Document 25 Filed 08/22/22 Page 6 of 13 Page ID #:2109 1 sequential evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529 (a), (d), 416.929(a), (d). 2 Accordingly, when a claimant presents “objective medical evidence of an 3 underlying impairment which might reasonably produce the pain or other 4 symptoms [the claimant] alleged,” the ALJ is required to determine the extent to 5 which the claimant’s statements regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting 6 effects of his or her subjective symptoms (“subjective statements” or “subjective 7 complaints”) are consistent with the record evidence as a whole and, consequently, 8 whether any of the individual’s symptom-related functional limitations and 9 restrictions are likely to reduce the claimant’s capacity to perform work-related 10 activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529 (a), (c)(4), 416.929(a), (c)(4); SSR 16-3p, 2017 11 WL 5180304 , at *4-*10.3 12 When an individual’s subjective statements are inconsistent with other 13 evidence in the record, an ALJ may give less weight to such statements and, in 14 turn, find that the individual’s symptoms are less likely to reduce the claimant’s 15 capacity to perform work-related activities. See SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304 , at 16 *8. In such cases, when there is no affirmative finding of malingering, an ALJ 17 may “reject” or give less weight to the individual’s subjective statements “only by 18 providing specific, clear, and convincing reasons for doing so.” Brown-Hunter, — 19 — 806 F.3d at 488-89 . This requirement is very difficult to satisfy. See Trevizo, 871 20 F.3d at 678 (“The clear and convincing standard is the most demanding required in 21 Social Security cases.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 22 An ALJ’s decision “must contain specific reasons” supported by substantial 23 evidence in the record for giving less weight to a claimant’s statements. SSR 1624 3p, 2017 WL 5180304 , at *10. An ALJ must clearly identify each subjective — 25 — 26 3Social Security Ruling 16-3p superseded SSR 96-7p and, in part, eliminated use of the term “credibility” from SSA “sub-regulatory policy[]” in order to “clarify that subjective 27 symptom evaluation is not an examination of an individual’s [overall character or truthfulness] 28 . . . [and] more closely follow [SSA] regulatory language regarding symptom evaluation.” See SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304 , at *1-*2, *10-*11. — 6 — Case 5:21-cv-00564-JC Document 25 Filed 08/22/22 Page 7of13 Page ID#:2110 1 || statement being rejected and the particular evidence in the record which 2 || purportedly undermines the statement. Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1103 (citation 3 || omitted). “General findings are insufficient[.]” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715 , 4 || 722 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). 5 If an ALJ’s evaluation of a claimant’s statements is reasonable and is 6 || supported by substantial evidence, it is not the court’s role to second-guess it. See 7 || Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). When 8 || an ALJ fails properly to discuss a claimant’s subjective complaints, however, the 9 || error may not be considered harmless “unless [the Court] can confidently conclude 10 || that no reasonable ALJ, when fully crediting the testimony, could have reached a 11 || different disability determination.” Stout, 454 F.3d at 1056 ; see also Brown12 | Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492 (ALJ’s erroneous failure to specify reasons for rejecting 13 | claimant testimony “will usually not be harmless”). 14 B. Summary of Plaintiff's Testimony and Statements 15 Plaintiff testified that she stopped working after she injured her back at work 16 | in 2016. (AR 38). Plaintiff had foot and ankle problems and used crutches after an 17 || Achilles tendon surgery in 2017, but was not still using them. (AR 45-47).* 18 || Plaintiff said her legs swell, get numb, and have pain due to arthritis, she has daily 19 || pain in her neck, shoulders, back and feet, she is always in bed, and her hands 20 || cramp and get numb, but she could lift up to 40 pounds, and could stand or sit for 21 || about an hour at a time due to her pain limits. (AR 46, 53-56; see also AR 50-51 22 || (ALJ acknowledging during the hearing that plaintiff's pain was “well 23 || documented” in the record)). Plaintiff acknowledged that she could do housework 24 || at her own pace with rest. (AR 55). 25 } /// — 26 — 27 “The ALJ noted that the consultative examiner had limited plaintiff to medium work with 28 standing and walking only two hours in an eight-hour day likely because of the repaired Achilles tendon. (AR 47). Case 5:21-cv-00564-JC Document 25 Filed 08/22/22 Page 8 of 13 Page ID #:2111 1 In an Exertion Questionnaire form, plaintiff similarly reported that she had 2 daily pain in her back, neck, legs, and shoulder, hand numbness and spasm, 3 shortness of breath, and foot swelling and pain. (AR 240-42). She admitted she 4 was able to clean and cook but indicated that she gets tired quickly and must rest. 5 (AR 240-42). 6 C. Analysis 7 The ALJ summarized plaintiff’s allegations and testimony and discussed in 8 some detail the medical record reflecting, inter alia, degenerative disc disease with 9 pain and treatments including pain management, physical therapy, chiropractic 10 treatment, and injection therapy. (AR 19-25). The ALJ determined that plaintiff’s 11 “medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the 12 alleged symptoms,” but plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence 13 and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical 14 evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in th[e] 15 decision.” (AR 20). However, the ALJ failed to provide specific, clear, and 16 convincing reasons to support this determination. 17 The ALJ reasoned: 18 [T]he persuasiveness of the claimant’s allegations regarding the 19 severity of her symptoms and limitations is diminished because those 20 allegations are greater than expected in light of the objective evidence 21 of record, discussed below. . . . The positive objective clinical and 22 diagnostic findings since the alleged onset date. . . do not support 23 more restrictive functional limitations than those assessed herein. 24 (AR 20; see AR 20-25 (detailing the objective medical evidence and generally 25 concluding throughout the discussion that the medical evidence was consistent 26 with or otherwise supported the ALJ’s RFC assessment)). The ALJ also reasoned 27 that the treatment for plaintiff’s degenerative disc disease “had generally been 28 conservative and routine with no recommended surgical intervention other than — 8 — Case 5:21-cv-00564-JC Document 25 Filed 08/22/22 Page9of13 Page ID#:2112 1 || injection therapy.” (AR 20 (citing AR 307-13, 318-55, 1786-1882)). The ALJ 2 || described plaintiff's pain as generally controlled with medication without 3 || specifying the medication. See AR 20 (citing AR 631-33, 636 (noting treatment 4 || with Norco, Gabapentin, and Lidoderm patches); AR 1552-1669 (also noting 5 || ongoing treatment with Norco, Gabapentin, and Lidoderm patches)). 6 Turning first to plaintiff's assertedly “conservative and routine” treatment to 7 || control plaintiffs pain, a limited course of treatment sometimes can justify the 8 || rejection of a claimant’s testimony, at least where the testimony concerns physical 9 || problems. See, e.g., Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d at 1112 (in assessing claimant’s 10 || credibility, ALJ may properly rely on “unexplained or inadequately explained 11 || failure to seek treatment or to follow prescribed course of treatment’’); Burch v. 12 || Barnhart, 400 F.3d at 681 (lack of consistent treatment such as where there was a 13 || three to four month gap in treatment properly considered in discrediting claimant’s 14 || back pain testimony); Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 1999) (in 15 || assessing the credibility of a claimant’s pain testimony, the Administration 16 || properly may consider the claimant’s failure to request treatment and failure to 17 || follow treatment advice) (citing Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346 (9th Cir. 18 || 1991) (en banc)); Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 679-80 (9th Cir. 1993) 19 || (permissible credibility factors in assessing pain testimony include limited 20 || treatment and minimal use of medications); see also Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 21 || 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995) (absence of treatment for back pain during half of the 22 || alleged disability period, and evidence of only “conservative treatment” when the 23 || claimant finally sought treatment, sufficient to discount claimant’s testimony). 24 Here, it is doubtful that plaintiff's consistent treatment with narcotic pain 25 || medications may properly be characterized as “conservative” within the meaning 26 || of Ninth Circuit jurisprudence. See, e.g., Shepard v. Colvin, 2015 WL 9490094 , at 27 || *7 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2015) (“[p]rior cases in the Ninth Circuit have found that 28 || treatment was conservative when the claimant’s pain was adequately treated with Case 5:21-cv-00564-JC Document 25 Filed 08/22/22 Page 10o0f13 Page ID #:2113 1 || over-the-counter medication and other minimal treatment,” however where record 2 || reflected heavy reliance on Tramadol and Oxycodone and other prescriptions for 3 || pain, record did not support finding that treatment was “‘conservative’’) (internal 4 || citations omitted; citing for comparison Lapeirre-Gutt v. Astrue, 382 Fed. App’x 5 || 662, 664 (9th Cir. 2010) (doubting whether “copious amounts of narcotic pain 6 || medication” as well as nerve blocks and trigger point injections was “conservative” 7 || treatment)); Childress v. Colvin, 2014 WL 4629593 , at *12 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 8 || 2014) (“[i]t is not obvious whether the consistent use of [Norco] (for several years) 9 || is ‘conservative’ or in conflict with Plaintiff’s pain testimony”); Aguilar v. Colvin, 10 | 2014 WL 3557308 , at *8 (C.D. Cal. July 18, 2014) (“It would be difficult to fault 11 || Plaintiff for overly conservative treatment when he has been prescribed strong 12 || narcotic pain medications”); cf. Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 13 | 2001) (observing that treatment corroborating allegations of severe and unremitting 14 || pain may include a strong Codeine or Morphine basic analgesic). 15 The medical record shows that plaintiff regularly sought treatment for pain 16 || with her providers throughout the alleged disability period, and she consistently 17 || was prescribed narcotic pain medication (Norco) and had some epidural steroid 18 || injections which provided some relief. See, e.g., AR 319-55 (pain management 19 | records from April of 2016 through June of 2017); AR 520-24, 536-39, 551-63, 20 || 631-35, 647-48, 659-64, 1558-88, 1593-98, 1647-52 (primary doctor treatment 21 || records for osteoarthritic pain and neuropathy from December 2015, February, 22 || March, September, and December 2016, July 2017, October and December 2018, 23 || January, April, August, and November 2019, and January, March, and May 2020); 24 || AR 710, 712-15 (podiatrist’s treatment with steroid injections for neuropathy in 25 || July of 2016, April 2017, and December 2019); AR 1957-92 (pain management 26 || records from March 2019 through June 2020). Accordingly, it appears that 27 || plaintiffs treatment has not been “conservative” within the meaning of Ninth 28 || Circuit jurisprudence. Compare Hazelton v. Saul, 812 Fed. App’x 453, 454 (9th — 10 — Case 5:21-cv-00564-JC Document 25 Filed 08/22/22 Page 11 of 13 Page ID #:2114 1 Cir. 2020) (finding the record supported the ALJ’s “reasonable” interpretation of 2 treatments as “conservative” where doctor’s own treatment notes indicated 3 claimant had “attempted multiple conservative therapies” such as steroid 4 injections, nerve blocks, nerve ablation, and narcotic pain medications) (emphasis 5 added). Whereas, in this case, for example, plaintiff’s new pain management 6 doctor stated in March 2019 the intention not to prescribe Norco long term; the 7 doctor wanted to try other conservative therapies to treat plaintiff’s pain. (AR 8 1959). However, that doctor was still prescribing Norco in June 2020 – the last 9 available record – and in fact increased plaintiff’s Norco dose at that visit. (AR 10 1964-66). 11 Turning to the ALJ’s remaining reason for discounting plaintiff’s subjective 12 statements and testimony (i.e., the objective medical evidence), a purported lack of 13 supporting objective medical evidence is not – in and of itself – a sufficient basis to 14 discount a claimant’s testimony, but may be a relevant factor. See, e.g., Burch, 400 15 F.3d at 681 (“Although lack of medical evidence cannot form the sole basis for 16 discounting pain testimony, it is a factor that the ALJ can consider in his credibility 17 analysis.”). Because the ALJ’s only other reason for discounting plaintiff’s 18 subjective complaints (i.e., plaintiff’s assertedly conservative treatment) does not 19 withstand scrutiny on the current record, the ALJ’s reliance on the available 20 medical evidence in this case cannot stand. 21 Even if the ALJ’s evaluation of the available medical evidence could support 22 the ALJ’s determination, the ALJ did not explain adequately how the medical 23 evidence undermined or contradicted plaintiff’s specific statements. The ALJ’s 24 references to plaintiff’s examination findings and general conclusions that the 25 residual functional capacity assessment reasonably accounted for plaintiff’s 26 impairments fail to demonstrate how these findings support the rejection of 27 plaintiff’s statements. See Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1278 (9th Cir. 2020) 28 (“Although the ALJ did provide a relatively detailed overview of [plaintiff’s] — 11 — Case 5:21-cv-00564-JC Document 25 Filed 08/22/22 Page 12o0f13 Page ID#:2115 1 || medical history, ‘providing a summary of medical evidence . . . is not the same as 2 || providing clear and convincing reasons for finding the claimant’s symptom 3 || testimony not credible.”) (quoting Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 494 ); see also id. at 4 | 1268 (“‘[T]he ALJ must identify the specific testimony that he discredited and 5 || explain the evidence undermining it.”). 6 Defendant suggests that the ALJ adequately addressed plaintiff's testimony 7 || and statements by also citing to the state agency medical opinions finding no 8 || greater limitations than the ALJ found to exist. See Defendant’s Motion at 24. 9 || The contrary medical opinion evidence is not an independent reason the ALJ gave 10 || for discrediting plaintiffs testimony and statements. The Court is constrained to 11 || consider those reasons the ALJ provided. Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 675. In any event, 12 || the ALJ’s reliance on medical opinion evidence to determine plaintiff's residual 13 || functional capacity is nothing more than an additional citation to the objective 14 | medical evidence which, as the Court has stated, cannot stand alone as a reason to 15 | discount plaintiffs statements and testimony. 16 Because the ALJ failed to provide specific, clear, and convincing reasons to 17 || discount plaintiff’s subjective statements, remand is warranted for reconsideration 18 || of these statements. See Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1103 (“Because ‘the agency’s path’ 19 || cannot ‘reasonably be discerned,’ we must reverse the district court’s decision to 20 || the extent it affirmed the ALJ’s credibility determination.) (quoting Alaska Dep’t 21 || of Env’t Conserv. v. E.P.A., 540 U.S. 461, 497 (2004)). 22 | /// 23} /// 24 | /// 25 } /// 26 | /// 27 | /// 28 /// — 12 — Case 5:21-cv-00564-JC Document 25 Filed 08/22/22 Page 13 of 13 Page ID #:2116 1 V. CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons,5 the decision of the Commissioner of Social 3 Security is REVERSED in part, and this matter is REMANDED for further 4 administrative action consistent with this Opinion. 5 LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 6 DATED: August 22, 2022 — 7 — 8 ______________/s/___________________ Honorable Jacqueline Chooljian — 9 — UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE — 10 — — 11 — — 12 — — 13 — — 14 — — 15 — — 16 — — 17 — — 18 — — 19 — — 20 — — 21 — — 22 — — 23 — — 24 — 5The Court need not, and has not adjudicated plaintiff’s other challenges to the ALJ’s — 25 — decision, except insofar as to determine that a reversal and remand for immediate payment of 26 benefits would not be appropriate. When a court reverses an administrative determination, “the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional 27 investigation or explanation.” Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12 , 16 28 (2002) (citations and quotations omitted); Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1099 (noting such “ordinary remand rule” applies in Social Security cases) (citations omitted). — 13 —