Jaime Aguirre v. Kathryn Barger

[2] O [7] 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA [10] 11 JAIME AGUIRRE , ) Case No. CV 22-06676 DDP (MRWx) ) 12 Plaintiff, ) ) 13 v. ) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION ) TO DISMISS 14 KATHRYN BARGER, ET AL., ) ) 15 Defendants. ) ) [16] 17 Presently before the court is Defendants Kathryn Barger, 18 Janice Hahn, Holly Mitchell, and Hilda Solis’ Motion to Dismiss 19 Plaintiffs’ Complaint. Having considered the submissions of the 20 parties, the court grants the motion and adopts the following 21 Order. 22 I. Background 23 Plaintiffs are incarcerated in the Los Angeles County jail. 24 (Complaint ¶ 12.) Plaintiffs allege, on behalf of a putative 25 class, that they “were forced to sleep on and inhabit the floors 26 and to exist in filthy and intolerable physical and mental 27 conditions.” (Id. ¶ 13.) 28 Defendants are Los Angeles County Supervisors, responsible for 1 Plaintiffs allege that each Defendant, in her official capacity, 2 “knowingly, grossly negligently, or with deliberate indifference . 3 . . caused to come into being . . . the categories of wrongs” 4 described in the Complaint. (Id. ¶ 11.) Plaintiffs further allege 5 that Defendants, pursuant to a “long-standing policy of refusing to 6 clean up the intolerable jail conditions,” conspired to force 7 Plaintiffs to sleep on the floor, including by “failing and 8 refusing for over 10 years to provide funding to cure the 9 intolerable jail conditions.” (Id. ¶ 14.) Defendants also allege 10 that Defendants are responsible in their individual capacities 11 because they promulgated these policies and allowed jail conditions 12 to persist. (Id. ¶ 16.) 13 Defendants now move to dismiss the Complaint, or, in the 14 alternative to strike portions of the Complaint and for a more 15 definite statement. 16 II. Legal Standard 17 A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss when it 18 “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a 19 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, [20] 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 21 U.S. 544 , 570 (2007)). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a 22 court must “accept as true all allegations of material fact and 23 must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the 24 plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). 25 Although a complaint need not include “detailed factual 26 allegations,” it must offer “more than an unadorned, 27 the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 28 678. Conclusory allegations or allegations that are no more than a 1 statement of a legal conclusion “are not entitled to the assumption 2 of truth.” Id. at 679 . In other words, a pleading that merely 3 offers “labels and conclusions,” a “formulaic recitation of the 4 elements,” or “naked assertions” will not be sufficient to state a 5 claim upon which relief can be granted. Id. at 678 (citations and 6 internal quotation marks omitted). 7 “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court 8 should assume their veracity and then determine whether they 9 plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 10 at 679 . Plaintiffs must allege “plausible grounds to infer” that 11 their claims rise “above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. 12 at 555-56 . “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 13 claim for relief” is “a context-specific task that requires the 14 reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common 15 sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 . 16 III. Discussion 17 A. Individual Liability Claims 18 Defendants argue first that any individual capacity claims 19 premised upon Defendants’ legislative acts are barred by absolute 20 legislative immunity. Indeed, “[l]ocal government officials are 21 entitled to legislative immunity for their legislative actions.” 22 Cmty. House, Inc. v. City of Boise, Idaho, 623 F.3d 945, 959 (9th 23 Cir. 2010) (citing Bogan v. Scott–Harris, 523 U.S. 44 , 54–55 24 (1998)). Such immunity “attaches only to actions taken in the 25 sphere of legitimate legislative activity.” Kaahumanu v. Cnty. of 26 Maui, 315 F.3d 1215 , 1219 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks 27 omitted). Courts employ a “functional approach,” looking to the 28 “functional nature of the act itself” to determine whether a 1 particular act is legislative, in which case immunity applies, or 2 “administrative or executive,” in which case there is no absolute 3 immunity. Kaahumanu, 315 F.3d at 1219; see also Jones v. Allison, [4] 9 F.4th 1136 , 1140 (9th Cir. 2021). 5 Here, Plaintiffs assert that they are not suing Defendants for 6 any legislative act. Opposition at 14. Nor, however, do 7 Plaintiffs allege or contend that Defendants engaged in any 8 administrative or executive act. Instead, Plaintiffs assert, 9 “defendants are sought to be exposed to negative consequences for 10 not performing their government duties.” Id. This argument has no 11 merit. Decisions about whether to allocate funding to the County 12 jails fall squarely within “the sphere of legislative activity.” 13 Community House, 623 F.3d at 959 ; see also Kaahumanu, 315 F.3d at 14 1219 (listing relevant factors, including whether an act involves 15 policy formulations and applies to the public as a whole). Indeed, 16 this Court has rejected the very argument that County supervisors’ 17 alleged failure to provide adequate funding to the jail system 18 falls outside the ambit of absolute legislative immunity. Thomas 19 v. Baca, No. CV 04-008448 DDP, 2005 WL 1030247 , at *3 (C.D. Cal. 20 May 2, 2005). 21 Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ individual liability claims are 22 dismissed, with prejudice.1 23 B. Monell Claims 24 The Complaint alleges that “[e]ach defendant in his/her 25 official capacity knowingly, or grossly negligently, or with [26] 1 Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages is, therefore, [27] stricken. As Plaintiffs appear to acknowledge, municipal entities are immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . Mitchell [28] v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 527 (9th Cir. 1996). 1 deliberate indifference . . . caused to come into being, 2 maintained, fostered, condoned, approved of, . . . ratified, took 3 no action to correct, an official policy, practice, procedure, or 4 custom of permitting the occurrence of the categories of wrongs set 5 forth in this pleading,. . . so that each one of them is legally 6 responsible for all of the injuries and/or damages sustained by any 7 plaintiff pursuant to the principles set forth in Monell v. New 8 York City Dept. of Social Services and its progeny.” (Compl. ¶ 9 11.) Defendants contend that these boilerplate allegations are 10 insufficient to plead a Monell claim. (Motion at 5.) The court 11 agrees. 12 A municipality may be liable for a constitutional violation 13 when its policy or custom inflicts the injury, even if the policy 14 at issue is one of inaction. Long v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 442 15 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). A plaintiff alleging such a 16 claim, however, “must show that the municipality’s deliberate 17 indifference led to its omission and that the omission caused the . 18 . . constitutional violation.” Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe, Nev., [19] 290 F.3d 1175, 1186 (9th Cir. 2002) (overruled on other grounds by 20 Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016)) 21 “To prove deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must show that the 22 municipality was on actual or constructive notice that its omission 23 would likely result in a constitutional violation.” Id. (citing 24 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 841 (1994)). Furthermore, a 25 plaintiff must show that a policy or practice “was the ‘moving 26 force’ behind the constitutional violation.” Gravelet-Blondin v. 27 Shelton, 728 F.3d 1086, 1096 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation [28] 1 marks omitte). “To meet this requirement, the plaintiff must show 2 both causation-in-fact and proximate causation.” Id. 3 Here, Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations do not meet any of 4 these requirements, and “lack any factual allegations that would 5 separate them from the ‘formulaic recitation of a [Monell] cause of 6 action’s elements.’” Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892 , 7 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 .); see also 8 AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th 9 Cir. 2012). Courts regularly dismiss conclusory, boilerplate 10 Monell claims such as Plaintiffs’ here. See, e.g., Segura v. City 11 of La Mesa, No. 21CV565 JM (MDD), 2022 WL 17905529 , at *6 (S.D. 12 Cal. Dec. 23, 2022); A.B. v. City of Santa Ana, No. 13 SACV181553DOCADS, 2019 WL 1578380 , at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2019); 14 Warner v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 10CV1057 BTM BLM, 2011 WL 662993 , 15 at *4 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2011); compare M. M. v. Cnty. of San 16 Mateo, No. 18-CV-05396-YGR, 2019 WL 414962 , at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 17 1, 2019) (distinguishing Dougherty). 18 Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Monell claims are dismissed, with 19 leave to amend. 20 C. Official Capacity Claims 21 Plaintiffs’ Complaint brings claims against all four named 22 Defendants in their official capacities. (Complt. ¶ 11.) 23 Plaintiffs ask that official capacity claims against any three 24 Defendants be dismissed as duplicative and reduncant. (Mot. at 8.) 25 As this Court has explained, “official capacity suits . . . 26 are generally an alternative way of pleading an action against the 27 local government entity of which the named officer is an agent.” [28] 1 Rosas v. Baca, No. CV 12-00428 DDP SHX, 2012 WL 933609 , at *1 (C.D. 2 Cal. Mar. 20, 2012). Where a plaintiff brings official capacity 3 claims against multiple officers of the same entity, courts may 4 dismiss the duplicative claims. See Molina v. Diaz, No. 5 EDCV2000518SVWAS, 2021 WL 6125847 , at *10 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2021) 6 (“Because official-capacity claims are treated as a suit against 7 the entity, naming multiple employees of the same agency is 8 generally duplicative and redundant.”); Stewart v. Asuncion, No. CV 9 16-5872 JFW (AJW), 2016 WL 8735720 , at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 10 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV16-5872 JFW (AJW), [11] 2016 WL 8738146 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2016) Castle v. S. Soto, No. CV 12 14-9848-MMM (KK), 2015 WL 13919115 , at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 9, 2015); 13 Thomas v. Baca, No. CV 04-08448 DDP(SHX), 2006 WL 132078 , at *1 14 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2006); Caruso v. Hill, No. 120CV0084AWIEPGPC, [15] 2021 WL 195437 , at *6 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2021); see also Lara v. 16 Cnty. of Los Angeles, No. CV 12-08469 DDP JCGX, 2013 WL 100192 , at 17 *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2013). 18 Plaintiffs assert that requiring the dismissal of duplicative 19 claims would require a “Sophie’s choice” that might require counsel 20 to choose one client over another. (Opp. at 18.) The court sees 21 no reason why that might be necessary, given that, as explained 22 above, an official-capacity claim against any named Defendant is, 23 for all intents and purposes, a claim against the County. 24 Plaintiffs’ only other contention is that “attention needs to be 25 gotten from each of the four supervisor defendants, and “it 26 would serve a positive function to keep in all four supervisors: 27 there is no reason to cut any of them any slack . . . .” (Opp. at 28 17.) Plaintiffs’ desire to get attention from particular elected officials is not sufficient to justify the maintenance of 2|| duplicative and redundant claims.* 3]}IV. Conclusion 4 For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ individual-capacity claims are dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiffs’ Monell claims and duplicative official7! capacity claims are dismissed with leave to amend. Plaintiffs shall, within fourteen days of the date of this Order, file a First Amended Complaint in conformance with this Order.* Any amendments shall not exceed this scope of this Order.’ [11] 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. [13] Dated: April 17, 2023 DEAN D. PREGERSON 15 United States District Judge [20] 21 || -dv27UNN—__ 29 * Although “it would be proper for the Court upon request to dismiss the officer and substitute instead the local government 53 entity as the correct defendant,” no Defendant has made any such request. Luke v. Abbott, 954 F. Supp. 202, 204 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 24 °* Having ordered Plaintiffs to file a First Amended Complaint, 25 the court does not, at this juncture, reach Defendants’ request for a more definite statement pursuant to Federal Rule of Procedure 12(e). [26] 27 “The court expects counsel for all parties to work professionally, collaboratively, and in full accordance with the 28 letter and spirit of all applicable rules of procedure, including the Local Rules.