Reives v. Kijakazi

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION NATASHA R. REIVES, ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:21-00475-N ) KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting ) Commissioner of Social Security, ) Defendant. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff Natasha R. Reives brought this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405 (g) and 1383(c)(3) seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Defendant Commissioner of Social Security denying her applications for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits (collectively, “DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 , et seq., and supplemental security income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 , et seq.1 Upon due consideration of the parties’ briefs (Docs. 12, 18) and those portions of the certified transcript of the administrative record (Doc. 11) relevant to the issues raised, the Court finds that the Commissioner’s final decision is due to be AFFIRMED.2 1 “Title II of the Social Security Act (Act), 49 Stat. 620 , as amended, provides for the payment of insurance benefits to persons who have contributed to the program and who suffer from a physical or mental disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (a)(1)(D) (1982 ed., Supp. III). Title XVI of the Act provides for the payment of disability benefits to indigent persons under the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program. § 1382(a).” Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 , 107 S. Ct. 2287 , 96 L. Ed. 2d 119 (1987). 2 With the consent of the parties, the Court has designated the undersigned Magistrate Judge to conduct all proceedings and order the entry of judgment in this I. Procedural Background Reives filed the subject DIB and SSI applications with the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) on September 11, 2019. After they were initially denied, Reives requested, and on November 19, 2020, received, a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) with the SSA’s Office of Disability Adjudication and Review. On December 24, 2020, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on Reives’s applications, finding her not disabled under the Social Security Act and therefore not entitled to benefits. (See Doc. 11, PageID.48-73). The Commissioner’s decision on Reives’s applications became final when the Appeals Council for the Office of Disability Adjudication and Review denied her request for review of the ALJ’s unfavorable decision on September 16, 2021. (Id., PageID.42-46). Reives subsequently brought this action under §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) for judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 1383 (c)(3) (“The final determination of the Commissioner of Social Security after a hearing [for SSI benefits] shall be subject to judicial review as provided in section 405(g) of this title to the same extent as the Commissioner’s final determinations under section 405 of this title.”); 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g) (“Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of civil action, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 (c), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73, and S.D. Ala. GenLR 73. (See Docs. 16, 17; 3/29/2022 text-only order). With the Court’s consent, the parties jointly waived the opportunity to present oral argument. (See Docs. 19, 20, 21). notice of such decision or within such further time as the Commissioner of Social Security may allow.”); Ingram v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The settled law of this Circuit is that a court may review, under sentence four of section 405(g), a denial of review by the Appeals Council.”). II. Standards of Review “In Social Security appeals, [the Court] must determine whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards.” Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). The phrase “substantial evidence” is a “term of art” used throughout administrative law to describe how courts are to review agency factfinding. T-Mobile South, LLC v. Roswell, 574 U.S. [293], [301], 135 S. Ct. 808, 815 , 190 L. Ed. 2d 679 (2015). Under the substantialevidence standard, a court looks to an existing administrative record and asks whether it contains “sufficien[t] evidence” to support the agency’s factual determinations. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 , 59 S. Ct. 206 , 83 L. Ed. 126 (1938) (emphasis deleted). And whatever the meaning of “substantial” in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high. Substantial evidence … is “more than a mere scintilla.” Ibid.; see, e.g., [Richardson v.] Perales, 402 U.S. [389,] 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420 [, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971)] (internal quotation marks omitted). It means—and means only—“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Consolidated Edison, 305 U.S. at 229 , 59 S. Ct. 206 . See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153 , 119 S. Ct. 1816 , 144 L. Ed. 2d 143 (1999) (comparing the substantial-evidence standard to the deferential clearly-erroneous standard). Biestek v. Berryhill, -- U.S. --, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 , 203 L. Ed. 2d 504 (2019). In reviewing the Commissioner’s factual findings, a court “ ‘may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the [Commissioner].’ ” Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232 , 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983))). “ ‘Even if the evidence preponderates against the [Commissioner]’s factual findings, [the Court] must affirm if the decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.’ ” Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)). See also Hunter v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 808 F.3d 818, 822 (11th Cir. 2015) (“A preponderance of the evidence is not required. In determining whether substantial evidence supports a decision, we give great deference to the ALJ’s factfindings.” (citation omitted)). Put another way, “[u]nder the substantial evidence standard, we cannot look at the evidence presented to [an administrative agency] to determine if interpretations of the evidence other than that made by the [agency] are possible. Rather, we review the evidence that was presented to determine if the findings made by the [agency] were unreasonable. To that end, [judicial] inquiry is highly deferential and we consider only whether there is substantial evidence for the findings made by the [agency], not whether there is substantial evidence for some other finding that could have been, but was not, made. That is, even if the evidence could support multiple conclusions, we must affirm the agency’s decision unless there is no reasonable basis for that decision.” Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022 , 1029 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (citations and quotation omitted).3 3 See also Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) “Yet, within this narrowly circumscribed role, [courts] do not act as automatons. [A court] must scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence[.]” Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239 (citations and quotation omitted). See also Owens v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 1511, 1516 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (“We are neither to conduct a de novo proceeding, nor to rubber stamp the administrative decisions that come before us. Rather, our function is to ensure that the decision was based on a reasonable and consistently applied standard, and was carefully considered in light of all the relevant facts.”).4 (“The court need not determine whether it would have reached a different result based upon the record” because “[e]ven if we find that the evidence preponderates against the [Commissioner]'s decision, we must affirm if the decision is supported by substantial evidence.”); Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580 , 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991) (under the substantial evidence standard, “we do not reverse the [Commissioner] even if this court, sitting as a finder of fact, would have reached a contrary result…”); Hunter, 808 F.3d at 822 (“In light of our deferential review, there is no inconsistency in finding that two successive ALJ decisions are supported by substantial evidence even when those decisions reach opposing conclusions. Faced with the same record, different ALJs could disagree with one another based on their respective credibility determinations and how each weighs the evidence. Both decisions could nonetheless be supported by evidence that reasonable minds would accept as adequate.”); Barron v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 227, 230 (11th Cir. 1991) (“Substantial evidence may even exist contrary to the findings of the ALJ, and we may have taken a different view of it as a factfinder. Yet, if there is substantially supportive evidence, the findings cannot be overturned.”); Werner v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 421 F. App’x 935, 939 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“The question is not, as Werner suggests, whether ALJ could have reasonably credited his testimony, but whether the ALJ was clearly wrong to discredit it.” (footnote omitted)); Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended on reh'g (Aug. 9, 2001) (“If the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner.”). 4 However, the “burden of showing that an error is harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the agency’s determination.” Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 , 129 S. Ct. 1696 , 173 L.Ed.2d 532 (2009). See also Scharlow v. Schweiker, 655 F.2d 645, 648 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 8, 1981) (per curiam) (“It is the claimant who bears the weighty burden of establishing the existence of a disability within the meaning of the Act, and therefore the appellant has the burden of showing that the Secretary’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence in the record.” (citation omitted)); Sims v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 706 F. App’x 595, 604 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“Under a substantial evidence standard of review, [the claimant] must do more than point to evidence in the record that supports her position; she must show the absence of substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's conclusion.”). “[D]istrict court judges are not required to ferret out delectable facts buried in a massive record,” Chavez v. Sec'y Fla. Dep't of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1061 (11th Cir. 2011) ( 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas proceedings), and “ ‘[t]here is no burden upon the district court to distill every potential argument that could be made based on the materials before it…’ ” Solutia, Inc. v. McWane, Inc., 672 F.3d 1230, 1239 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 motion for summary judgment) (quoting Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995) (en banc)) (ellipsis added). The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, whose review of Social Security appeals “is the same as that of the district court[,]” Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam), generally deems waived claims of error not fairly raised in the district court. See Stewart v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 26 F.3d 115, 115-16 (11th Cir. 1994) (“As a general principle, [the court of appeals] will not address an argument that has not been raised in the district court…Because Stewart did not present any of his assertions in the district court, we decline to consider them on appeal.” (applying rule in appeal of judicial review under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405 (g), 1383(c)(3)); Crawford v. Comm'r Of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1161 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (same); Hunter v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 651 F. App’x 958, 962 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (unpublished) (same); Cooley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 671 F. App’x 767, 769 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“As a general rule, we do not consider arguments that have not been fairly presented to a respective agency or to the district court. See Kelley v. Apfel, 185 F.3d 1211, 1215 (11th Cir. 1999) (treating as waived a challenge to the administrative law judge’s reliance on the testimony of a vocational expert that was ‘not raise[d] . . . before the administrative agency or the district court’).”); In re Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., Maternity Leave Practices & Flight Attendant Weight Program Litig., 905 F.2d 1457 , 1462 (11th Cir. 1990) (“[I]f a party hopes to preserve a claim, argument, theory, or defense for appeal, she must first clearly present it to the district court, that is, in such a way as to afford the district court an opportunity to recognize and rule on it.”); Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999) (applying In re Pan American World Airways in Social Security appeal); Sorter v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 773 F. App’x 1070 , 1073 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“Sorter has abandoned on appeal the issue of whether the ALJ adequately considered her testimony regarding the side effects of her pain The “substantial evidence” “standard of review applies only to findings of fact. No similar presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner]’s conclusions of law, including determination of the proper standards to be applied in reviewing claims.” MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir. 1986) (quotation omitted). Accord, e.g., Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir. 1982) (“Our standard of review for appeals from the administrative denials of Social Security benefits dictates that ‘(t)he findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive ....’ 42 U.S.C.A. s 405 (g) … As is plain from the statutory language, this deferential standard of review is applicable only to findings of fact made by the Secretary, and it is well established that no similar presumption of validity attaches to the Secretary’s conclusions of medication because her initial brief simply mentions the issue without providing any supporting argument. See Singh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 561 F.3d 1275 , 1278–79 (11th Cir. 2009) (explaining that ‘simply stating that an issue exists, without further argument or discussion, constitutes abandonment of that issue’).”); Figuera v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 819 F. App’x 870 , 871 n.1 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“Figuera also argues the ALJ failed to properly assess her credibility … However, Figuera did not adequately raise this issue in her brief before the district court. She raised the issue only summarily, without any citations to the record or authority. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (noting that a party ‘abandons a claim when he either makes only passing references to it or raises it in a perfunctory manner without supporting arguments and authority’). As a result, we do not address the sufficiency of the ALJ’s credibility finding.”); Turner v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner, No. 21-13590, 2022 WL 842188 , at *2 (11th Cir. Mar. 22, 2022) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“An appellant forfeits an argument by ‘mak[ing] only passing references to it or rais[ing] it in a perfunctory manner without supporting arguments and authority.’ Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014). In her briefing, Turner states that the Appeals Council failed to request her records or obtain a consultative evaluation. But she cites no authorities or makes any other argument tending to establish that it had a duty to do so. She has therefore failed to adequately develop this argument, and it is forfeited.”). law, including determination of the proper standards to be applied in reviewing claims.” (some quotation marks omitted)). This Court “conduct[s] ‘an exacting examination’ of these factors.” Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (quoting Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)). “ ‘The [Commissioner]’s failure to apply the correct law or to provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted mandates reversal.’ ” Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991)). Accord Keeton v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994). In sum, courts “review the Commissioner’s factual findings with deference and the Commissioner’s legal conclusions with close scrutiny.” Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274 , 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). See also Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (“In Social Security appeals, we review de novo the legal principles upon which the Commissioner's decision is based. Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). However, we review the resulting decision only to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence. Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155 , 1158–59 (11th Cir. 2004).”). Moreover, an ALJ’s decision must “state with at least some measure of clarity the grounds for [the] decision.” Owens, 748 F.2d at 1516 ; Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179 . A court cannot “affirm simply because some rationale might have supported the [Commissioner]’ conclusion[,]” as “[s]uch an approach would not advance the ends of reasoned decision making.” Owens, 748 F.2d at 1516 . Rather, “an agency’s order must be upheld, if at all, on the same basis articulated in the order by the agency itself.” Fed. Power Comm'n v. Texaco Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 397 , 94 S. Ct. 2315 , 41 L. Ed. 2d 141 (1974) (quotation omitted). See also Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 455 (5th Cir. 2000) (“The ALJ’s decision must stand or fall with the reasons set forth in the ALJ’s decision, as adopted by the Appeals Council.”); Nance v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 781 F. App’x 912 , 921 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (unpublished)5 (“Agency actions … must be upheld on the same bases articulated in the agency's order.” (citing Texaco Inc., 417 U.S. at 397 , and Newton, 209 F.3d at 455 )). Eligibility for DIB and SSI requires a showing that the claimant is disabled, 42 U.S.C. §§ 423 (a)(1)(E), 1382(a)(1)-(2), meaning that the claimant is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment ... which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423 (d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Social Security Regulations outline a five-step, sequential evaluation process used to determine whether a claimant is disabled: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment meets or equals the severity of the specified impairments in the Listing of Impairments; (4) based on a residual functional capacity (“RFC”) assessment, whether the claimant can perform any of his or her past 5 In this circuit, “[u]npublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.” 11th Cir. R. 36-2. See also Bonilla v. Baker Concrete Const., Inc., 487 F.3d 1340 , 1345 n.7 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Unpublished opinions are not controlling authority and are persuasive only insofar as their legal analysis warrants.”); Henry v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 802 F.3d 1264 , 1267 n.1 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (“Cases printed in the Federal Appendix are cited as persuasive authority.”). relevant work despite the impairment; and (5) whether there are significant numbers of jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform given the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience. Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)- (v); Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1237-39 ).6 “These regulations place a very heavy burden on the claimant to demonstrate both a qualifying disability and an inability to perform past relevant work.” Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211 (citing Spencer v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 1090, 1093 (11th Cir. 1985)). “In determining whether the claimant has satisfied this initial burden, the examiner must consider four factors: (1) objective medical facts or clinical findings; (2) the diagnoses of examining physicians; (3) evidence of pain; and (4) the claimant’s age, education, and work history.” Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (citing Tieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1253 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam)). “These factors must be considered both singly and in combination. Presence or absence of a single factor is not, in itself, conclusive.” Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1240 (citations omitted). If, in Steps One through Four of the five-step evaluation, a claimant proves that he or she has a qualifying disability and cannot do his or her past relevant work, it then becomes the Commissioner’s burden, at Step Five, to prove that the claimant is capable—given his or her age, education, and work history—of engaging in another kind of substantial gainful employment that exists in the national 6 The Court will hereinafter use “Step One,” “Step Two,” etc. when referencing individual steps of this five-step sequential evaluation. economy. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999); Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th Cir. 1985). Although the “claimant bears the burden of demonstrating the inability to return to [his or] her past relevant work, the Commissioner of Social Security has an obligation to develop a full and fair record.” Shnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir. 1987). See also Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (“It is well-established that the ALJ has a basic duty to develop a full and fair record. Nevertheless, the claimant bears the burden of proving that he is disabled, and, consequently, he is responsible for producing evidence in support of his claim.” (citations omitted)). “This is an onerous task, as the ALJ must scrupulously and conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all relevant facts. In determining whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ must consider the evidence as a whole.” Henry v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 802 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (citation and quotation omitted). If a court determines that the Commissioner reached a decision “by focusing upon one aspect of the evidence and ignoring other parts of the record[, i]n such circumstances [the court] cannot properly find that the administrative decision is supported by substantial evidence. It is not enough to discover a piece of evidence which supports that decision, but to disregard other contrary evidence.” McCruter v. Bowen, 791 F.2d 1544, 1548 (11th Cir. 1986). Nevertheless, “ ‘there is no rigid requirement that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence in his decision, so long as the ALJ’s decision ... is not a broad rejection which is not enough to enable [a reviewing court] to conclude that the ALJ considered [the claimant's] medical condition as a whole.’ ” Mitchell v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 771 F.3d 780, 782 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (quotation and brackets omitted)). When, as here, the ALJ denies benefits and the Appeals Council denies review of that decision, the Court “review[s] the ALJ’s decision as the Commissioner’s final decision.” Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278. But “when a claimant properly presents new evidence to the Appeals Council, a reviewing court must consider whether that new evidence renders the denial of benefits erroneous.” Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1262 . Nevertheless, “when the [Appeals Council] has denied review, [the Court] will look only to the evidence actually presented to the ALJ in determining whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.” Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320, 1323 (11th Cir. 1998). III. Summary of the ALJ’s Decision At Step One, the ALJ determined that Reives met the applicable insured status requirements through March 31, 2024, and that she had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged disability onset date of May 17, 2019.7 (Doc. 11, PageID.53-54). At Step Two,8 the ALJ determined that Reives had the 7 “For SSI claims, a claimant becomes eligible in the first month where she is both disabled and has an SSI application on file. For DIB claims, a claimant is eligible for benefits where she demonstrates disability on or before the last date for which she were insured.” Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211 (citation omitted). 8 “The severity regulation increases the efficiency and reliability of the evaluation process by identifying at an early stage those claimants whose medical impairments are so slight that it is unlikely they would be found to be disabled even if their age, education, and experience were taken into account.” Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 153 . “[A]n following severe impairments: lumbar degenerative disc disease, and degenerative joint disease of the right shoulder. (Doc. 11, PageID.54-57). At Step Three,9 the ALJ determined that Reives did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or equaled the severity of a specified impairment in Appendix 1 of the Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. § 404 , Subpt. P, App. 1. (Doc. 11, PageID.58). At Step Four,10 the ALJ determined that Reives had the residual functional ‘impairment is not severe only if the abnormality is so slight and its effect so minimal that it would clearly not be expected to interfere with the individual's ability to work, irrespective of age, education or work experience.’ A claimant’s burden to establish a severe impairment at step two is only ‘mild.’ ” Schink v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 935 F.3d 1245, 1265 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (citation omitted) (quoting McDaniel, 800 F.2d at 1031). 9 Conversely to Step Two, Step Three “identif[ies] those claimants whose medical impairments are so severe that it is likely they would be found disabled regardless of their vocational background.” Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 153 . See also Crayton v. Callahan, 120 F.3d 1217, 1219 (11th Cir. 1997) (“If the claimant’s condition meets or equals the level of severity of a listed impairment, the claimant at this point is conclusively presumed to be disabled based on his or her medical condition.”). 10 At Step Four, the ALJ must assess: (1) the claimant's residual functional capacity (“RFC”); and (2) the claimant's ability to return to her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (a)(4)(iv). As for the claimant’s RFC, the regulations define RFC as that which an individual is still able to do despite the limitations caused by his or her impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545 (a). Moreover, the ALJ will “assess and make a finding about [the claimant's] residual functional capacity based on all the relevant medical and other evidence” in the case. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (e). Furthermore, the RFC determination is used both to determine whether the claimant: (1) can return to her past relevant work under the fourth step; and (2) can adjust to other work under the fifth step…20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). If the claimant can return to her past relevant work, the ALJ will conclude that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § capacity (RFC) “to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b)[11] except [she] can sit for six hours in an eight-hour day[;] can stand and/or walk for four hours in an eight-hour day[;] can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds[; w]ith the right upper extremity, 404.1520(a)(4)(iv) & (f). If the claimant cannot return to her past relevant work, the ALJ moves on to step five. In determining whether [a claimant] can return to her past relevant work, the ALJ must determine the claimant's RFC using all relevant medical and other evidence in the case. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (e). That is, the ALJ must determine if the claimant is limited to a particular work level. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567 . Once the ALJ assesses the claimant’s RFC and determines that the claimant cannot return to her prior relevant work, the ALJ moves on to the fifth, and final, step. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1238-39 (footnote omitted). “[A]n ALJ's RFC assessment is an administrative finding based on all the relevant evidence, including both medical and nonmedical evidence.” Pupo v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 17 F.4th 1054, 1065 (11th Cir. 2021). 11 “To determine the physical exertion requirements of different types of employment in the national economy, the Commissioner classifies jobs as sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and very heavy. These terms are all defined in the regulations … Each classification … has its own set of criteria.” Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1239 n.4. The criteria for “light” work are as follows: Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of performing a full or wide range of light work, you must have the ability to do substantially all of these activities. If someone can do light work, we determine that he or she can also do sedentary work, unless there are additional limiting factors such as loss of fine dexterity or inability to sit for long periods of time. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567 (b), 416.967(b). she can occasionally reach overhead and frequently reach in all other directions[; and t]he left upper extremity is not limited in reaching.” (Doc. 11, PageID.59-66). Based on the RFC and the testimony of a vocational expert,12 the ALJ found that Reives was incapable of performing any past relevant work. (Doc. 12, PageID.66). However, at Step Five, after considering additional testimony from the vocational expert, the ALJ found that there exist a significant number of jobs in the national economy as a surveillance system monitor (approximately 31,984 jobs) that Reives could perform given her RFC, age, education, and work experience. (Id., PageID.67-68). Thus, the ALJ found that Reives was not under a disability as defined by the Social Security Act from the disability onset date through the date of the ALJ’s decision. (Id., PageID.68). IV. Analysis a. Additional Severe Impairment Reives first argues that the ALJ erred by not finding her right wrist disorder to be a severe impairment at Step Two. No reversible error has been shown. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that Step Two is “a ‘threshold inquiry’ and ‘allows only claims based on the most trivial impairments to be rejected.’ ” Schink v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 935 F.3d 1245, 1265 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (quoting McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1031 (11th Cir. 1986)). See 12 “A vocational expert is an expert on the kinds of jobs an individual can perform based on his or her capacity and impairments. When the ALJ uses a vocational expert, the ALJ will pose hypothetical question(s) to the vocational expert to establish whether someone with the limitations that the ALJ has previously determined that the claimant has will be able to secure employment in the national economy.” Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240 . also Jamison v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 585, 588 (11th Cir. 1987) (“At step two the ALJ must determine if the claimant has any severe impairment. This step acts as a filter; if no severe impairment is shown the claim is denied…”). “[T]he finding of any severe impairment, whether or not it qualifies as a disability and whether or not it results from a single severe impairment or a combination of impairments that together qualify as severe, is enough to satisfy the requirement of step two.” Jamison, 814 F.2d at 588 . Therefore, “[n]othing requires that the ALJ must identify, at step two, all of the impairments that should be considered severe.” Heatly v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 382 F. App'x 823, 825 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (unpublished). An ALJ’s harmless errors do not warrant reversal of a final decision. See Diorio v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 726, 728 (11th Cir. 1983). An “error is harmless if it did not affect the judge’s ultimate determination[,]” Hunter v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 609 F. App’x 555, 558 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (unpublished) (citing Diorio, 721 F.2d at 728 ); accord Jacobus v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 664 F. App'x 774, 776 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (unpublished), and the “burden of showing that an error is harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the agency’s determination.” Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 , 129 S. Ct. 1696 , 173 L.Ed.2d 532 (2009). Since, again, an ALJ need find only one severe impairment to proceed past Step Two, any error in classifying additional impairments as non-severe has no effect on the ultimate outcome of the decision, so long as the ALJ, based on substantial evidence, accounts for the “true” limiting effects of those impairments at the later steps of the sequential evaluation. As the Commissioner correctly points out, the Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly held that any error in not finding additional severe impairments at Step Two is harmless, so long as the ALJ finds at least one,13 and 13 See e.g., Wood v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 726 F. App'x 742 , 745 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“Step two is a ‘filter’ which eliminates groundless claims. See Jamison v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 585, 588 (11th Cir. 1987). To meet his burden at this step, Mr. Wood only had to show ‘at least one’ severe impairment. See id. He met his burden and the ALJ appropriately proceeded to the next step of the sequential analysis. Therefore, any error in not finding additional severe impairments did not harm Mr. Wood.”); Ball v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 714 F. App'x 991 , 992–93 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“Ball contends that the ALJ erred at the second step of the five-step analysis because she found that Ball's depression was not a severe impairment. But step two of the test ‘acts as a filter’ in that the ‘finding of any severe impairment ... is enough to satisfy the requirement of step two’ and allow the ALJ to proceed to step three. Jamison v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 585, 588 (11th Cir. 1987). As a result, even if the ALJ should have determined that Ball’s depression was severe, any error was harmless because the ALJ determined that her compression fracture, spur formation, and lumbar fractures were severe, which allowed the ALJ to move on to step three.”): Vangile v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 695 F. App'x 510, 514 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“In this case, any step two error the ALJ may have committed by failing to explicitly mention Vangile’s chronic mastoiditis was harmless because she found two other severe impairments and proceeded to step three in any event.”); Medina v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 636 F. App'x 490, 492 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“[E]ven if Medina’s other conditions should have been categorized as severe impairments, any error was harmless because the ALJ determined that her obesity and ‘thyroid cancer status post total thyroidectomy’ were severe impairments, allowing him to move onto step three of the test.”); McCormick v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Com'r, 619 F. App'x 855, 858 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[S]tep two is merely a filter, and any error in considering an additional impairment is harmless since it does not factor into the determination of disability.” (citing Jamison, 814 F.2d at 588 )); Hearn v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 619 F. App'x 892, 895 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“[T]he finding of any severe impairment, whether or not it results from a single severe impairment or a combination of impairments that together qualify as ‘severe,’ is enough to satisfy step two.” (citing Jamison, 814 F.2d at 588 )); Tuggerson-Brown v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 572 F. App'x 949, 951 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“Based on our precedent and the regulations, … it is apparent that there is no need for an ALJ to identify every severe impairment at step two. Accordingly, even assuming that Tuggerson–Brown is correct that her additional impairments were ‘severe,’ the ALJ's recognition of that as a fact would considers all of the claimant’s medically determinable impairments, both severe and non-severe, at the later steps of the sequential evaluation.14 Here, the ALJ determined that Reives had two severe impairments at Step Two, then duly proceeded to the remaining steps of the sequential evaluation. In arguing this claim of error, Reives cites only case law concerning the standards for finding “severe” impairments at Step Two, and she otherwise fails to provide any explanation of how the ALJ failed to consider her right wrist disorder at the later steps of the evaluation.15 Thus, the ALJ’s failure to find an additional severe not, in any way, have changed the step-two analysis, and she cannot demonstrate error below.”); Heatly, 382 F. App'x at 824–25 (“Even if the ALJ erred in not indicating whether chronic pain syndrome was a severe impairment, the error was harmless because the ALJ concluded that Heatly had a severe impairment: and that finding is all that step two requires.”). 14 See Schink, 935 F.3d at 1268 (“Our conclusion that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s finding that Schink’s mental impairments were non-severe … could be harmless if the ALJ nevertheless proceeded in the sequential evaluation, duly considered Schink’s mental impairment when assessing his RFC, and reached conclusions about Schink’s mental capabilities supported by substantial evidence. Here, though, the ALJ’s RFC assessment was limited to Schink’s physical abilities and impairments and erroneously omitted his mental ones. As a result, we cannot say that the erroneous finding of non-severity was harmless.”); Ball, 714 F. App’x at 993 (“Ball’s argument that the purported error [in failing to find additional severe impairments in step two] affected the ALJ’s residual functional capacity analysis in step four fails because the ALJ considered all of Ball's symptoms and impairments (including her alleged depression), her medical records and testimony, and all opinion evidence (including Dr. Whitlock’s opinion) in determining her residual functional capacity.”); Tuggerson-Brown, 572 F. App’x at 951 (“While the ALJ did not need to determine whether every alleged impairment was ‘severe,’ he was required to consider all impairments, regardless of severity, in conjunction with one another in performing the latter steps of the sequential evaluation.”). 15 At most, she conclusorily states that, “[a]lthough the A[LJ] assigned a limitation of occasionally reaching and frequently reaching in all other directions, this does not encompass the permanent restriction given to [Reives] by her treating orthopedist.” impairment of the right wrist at Step Two was, at most, harmless. Moreover, the ALJ gave a thorough explanation at Step Two for why he found Reives’s right wrist disorder to be non-severe (see Doc. 11, PageID.54-55), and Reives largely fails to engage with the ALJ’s stated reasoning, instead simply providing her own summary of the evidence regarding her right wrist disorder and conclusorily asserting that it supports greater limitations. However, an ALJ’s factual finding need only be supported by substantial evidence, and must be affirmed even if the evidence preponderates against it. Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 . “Under a substantial evidence standard of review, [the claimant] must do more than point to evidence in the record that supports her position; she must show the absence of substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's conclusion.” Sims v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 706 F. App'x 595, 604 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (unpublished). See also Scharlow v. Schweiker, 655 F.2d 645, 648 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 8, 1981) (per curiam) (“It is the claimant who bears the weighty burden of establishing the existence of a disability within the meaning of the Act, and therefore the appellant has the burden of showing that the Secretary’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence in the record.” (citation omitted));16 Hunter, 808 F.3d at 822 (Doc. 12, PageID.920). However, this is in reality a challenge to the ALJ’s consideration of the treating orthopedist’s medical opinion, not an argument that the ALJ failed to consider an impairment at the later steps. Moreover, as will be explained, the ALJ did not err in finding the treating orthopedist’s opinion not persuasive. 16 On “October 1, 1981 pursuant to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, P.L. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1995 , … the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was divided into two circuits, the Eleventh and the (“Faced with the same record, different ALJs could disagree with one another based on their respective credibility determinations and how each weighs the evidence. Both decisions could nonetheless be supported by evidence that reasonable minds would accept as adequate.”). Without any attempt to show error in the ALJ’s stated reasoning, Reives’s bare discussion of the record amounts to little more than an invitation for the Court to impermissibly reweight the evidence or substitute its judgment for the ALJ’s. Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 . Additionally, Reives fails to address the ALJ’s finding that her right wrist disorder failed to meet the “duration requirement” to be considered severe. (Doc. 11, PageID.55). 17 In sum, Reives has failed to convince the undersigned that the ALJ’s decision to find Reives’s right wrist impairment to be non-severe is not at least supported by substantial evidence. ‘new Fifth.’ ” Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). “The Eleventh Circuit, in the en banc decision Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981), adopted as precedent decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered prior to October 1, 1981.” Smith v. Shook, 237 F.3d 1322 , 1325 n.1 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). 17 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509 , 416.909 (“Unless your impairment is expected to result in death, it must have lasted or must be expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. We call this the duration requirement.”); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1523 (a)-(b), 416.923(a)-(b) (“We cannot combine two or more unrelated severe impairments to meet the 12–month duration test. If you have a severe impairment(s) and then develop another unrelated severe impairment(s) but neither one is expected to last for 12 months, we cannot find you disabled, even though the two impairments in combination last for 12 months … If you have two or more concurrent impairments that, when considered in combination, are severe, we must determine whether the combined effect of your impairments can be expected to continue to be severe for 12 months. If one or more of your impairments improves or is expected to improve within 12 months, so that the combined effect of your remaining impairments is no longer severe, we will find that you do not meet the 12–month duration test.”). b. RFC Reives’s substantive argument in support of her second, and final, claim of reversible error, is as follows: In his decision, the Administrative Law Judge stated that Claimant’s removed Claimant’s hand restrictions as of the end of June 2019, “highly inconsistent with a permanent impairment.” PageID.54. The [ALJ} stated that Claimant’s five pound weight restrictions “were neither meant to be permanent nor were they accommodating a medically determinable impairment as we define it.” PageID.55. The Administrative Law Judge did not address the limitation given by Claimant’s Permanent Partial Impairment Summary. (Doc. 12, PageID.922). Though she provides no record citation to the “Permanent Partial Impairment Summary” she references, Reives’s argument in support of her prior claim of error references a Permanent Partial Impairment (PPI) Summary, dated August 28, 2019, “not[ing] a 4% upper extremity permanent partial impairment estimate for [Reives’s] right wrist, with a 2% Whole Person partial impairment estimate.” (Id., PageID.920 (citing Doc. 11, PageID.533)). While the ALJ did not specifically mention this PPI Summary in his decision, he did discuss physician treatment notes concerning Reives’s right wrist disorder that spanned the period from February 2019 to mid-2020, including notes from August 2019. (See Doc. 11, PageID.54-55). From his consideration of these notes, the ALJ concluded that the work restrictions imposed for Reives’s wrist impairment “were neither meant to be permanent nor were they accommodating a medically determinable impairment as [the Commissioner] define[s] it.” (Id., PageID.55). Thus, the ALJ implicitly rejected any suggestion that Reives had a permanent right wrist impairment.18 Reives has failed to show that this determination is not supported by substantial evidence, and “there is no rigid requirement that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence in his decision, so long as the ALJ’s decision is not a broad rejection which is not enough to enable a reviewing court to conclude that the ALJ considered the claimant’s medical condition as a whole.” Mitchell, 771 F.3d at 782 (quotation omitted).19 No reversible error having been shown, the Court finds that the Commissioner’s final decision denying Reives’s applications for benefits is due to be AFFIRMED. 18 The undersigned notes the PPI Summary states, at the bottom, that it was completed by an “occupational therapist,” that “[o]nly a physician may issue an impairment ‘rating[,]’ ” and that “[p]hysicians have the discretion to modify the above rating if medical conditions demand.” (Doc. 11, PageID.533 (alterations added)). Since the ALJ is responsible for assessing a claimant’s RFC at the ALJ hearing level, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1546 (c), 416.946(c), the ALJ could, under the PPI Summary’s own terms, reject that rating of permanent impairment if the medical evidence of record supported a different conclusion. 19 To the extent Reives’s brief attempts to raise other sub-issues in her second claim of error, they are deemed abandoned. Merely reciting evidence in the administrative record and quoting various Social Security rules and regulations, without any attempt to apply law to facts, is insufficient to raise an issue for the Court’s consideration. Moreover, though she asserts that “the ALJ erred in rejecting the limitations given by [her] orthopedist” in the heading to this section of her brief, she advances no substantive argument as to how. See Walker v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 835 F. App'x 538 , 542 n.1 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“As the government notes, Walker’s argument on this issue consists of lengthy block quotes to caselaw without any attempt to apply the law to the facts of this case. He has thus abandoned the issue by failing to develop his arguments. See Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., Inc., 680 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 2012) (‘A passing reference to an issue in a brief is not enough, and the failure to make arguments ... in support of an issue waives it.’).”). V. Conclusion & Order In accordance with the foregoing analysis, it is ORDERED that the Commissioner’s final decision denying Reives’s September 11, 2019 DIB and SSI applications is AFFIRMED under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g). A final judgment consistent with this opinion and order shall issue by separate document in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58. DONE and ORDERED this the 10th day of May 2022. /s/ Katherine P. Nelson KATHERINE P. NELSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE