Ray v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

1 WO [5] 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA [8] 9 Sharon Ray, No. CV-18-08337-PCT-DLR 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, [13] Defendant. [15] 16 Plaintiff applied for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits, and 17 supplemental security income in May 2015. After her applications were denied by state 18 agency reviewers, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge 19 (“ALJ”). Following a December 2017 hearing at which Plaintiff, her representative, and a 20 vocational expert (VE) testified, the ALJ issued a written decision finding Plaintiff not 21 disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. This became the Commissioner’s 22 final decision when the Appeals Council denied review. Plaintiff now seeks judicial 23 review. 24 The Court does not review the ALJ’s decision anew or otherwise determine whether 25 Plaintiff is disabled. Rather, the Court reviews the ALJ’s decision to determine whether it 26 “contains legal error or is not supported by substantial evidence.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 27 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla but less than a [28] 1 preponderance, and “such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as 2 adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. 3 Having considered the parties’ briefs and the administrative record, the Court 4 concludes that this case must be remanded for further proceedings. This is so because in 5 Social Security disability cases, the ALJ has a special duty to further develop the record 6 when inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence—even when the claimant 7 is represented by counsel. Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 45-60 (9th Cir. 2001); 8 Brown v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir.1983). Here, the record was inadequately 9 developed as to Plaintiff’s physical impairments of cervical spondylosis and osteoarthritis 10 of the right shoulder. 11 In fact, the ALJ’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) finding concerning 12 Plaintiff’s physical limitations is not based on a single medical opinion. The ALJ rejected 13 the August 2015 opinion of state agency medical consultant Neil Sapin, who concluded 14 that the evidence was insufficient to evaluate Plaintiff’s physical functionality, especially 15 related to her neck and shoulder. (Doc. 11-4 at 8.) The ALJ also rejected the December 16 2015 opinion of state agency medical consultant Yosef Schwartz because it was “rendered 17 before most of the medical evidence of record was submitted.” (Doc. 11-3 at 25.) Finally, 18 the ALJ rejected the only remaining medical opinion submitted by an acceptable medical 19 source addressing Plaintiffs’ physical functionality—a February 2016 check-the-box form 20 from Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Welly. (Doc. 11-8 at 170-72.) The ALJ rejected 21 the opinion because she determined that it was inconsistent with the objective evidence and 22 because Dr. Welly did not explain the basis for his findings as to Plaintiff’s limitations. 23 However, the ALJ could not substitute her lay interpretation of the objective evidence for 24 that of Plaintiff’s treating physician without any support from other medical opinions in 25 the record. See Day v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975); Trevizo v. 26 Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664 , 676–77 (9th Cir. 2017); Kelly v. Berryhill, 732 F. App'x 558 , 561 27 (9th Cir. 2018). And “[i]f the ALJ thought [s]he needed to know the basis of [the treating 28 physician’s] opinions in order to evaluate them, [s]he had a duty to conduct an appropriate inquiry, for example, by subpoenaing the physicians or submitting further questions to 2|| them. [She] could also have continued the hearing to augment the record.” Smolen v. || Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1288 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). The ALJ did not further 4|| develop the record, but instead improperly relied on her own interpretation of the medical 5 || evidence in order to craft Plaintiff's RFC. 6 For these reasons, the Court directs a remand for further development of the record 7\| with regard to Plaintiff's physical impairments and for further appropriate proceedings in 8 || light of that additional development. See Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2001). 10 IT IS ORDERED that the final decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED and 11 || REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 12 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk’s Office to enter judgment and 13 || close the case. 14 Dated this 4th day of March, 2020. [16] 17 {Z, 18 _- Ch 19 Upited States Dictric Judge [28] -3-