Strojnik v. C&H Kingman LLC

1 WO [5] 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA [8] 9 Peter Strojnik, No. CV-20-08313-PCT-MTL 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 C&H Kingman LLC, et al., 13 Defendants. [14] 15 Before the Court is Plaintiff Peter Strojnik’s motion to remand. (Doc. 5.) For the 16 reasons set forth below, the motion is denied.1 17 I. 18 In August 2020, Mr. Strojnik visited Defendant C&H Kingman LLC’s (“C&H”) 19 hotel, Travelodge by Wyndham, to test its compliance with the Americans with Disabilities 20 Act (“ADA”).2 (Doc. 1-3, Ex. A ¶ 30.) Afterwards, Mr. Strojnik filed suit in Mohave 21 County Superior Court asserting six causes of actions: (1) violations of the ADA, 22 (2) negligence, (3) failure to disclose, (4) brand deceit, (5) civil conspiracy, and (6) aiding 23 and abetting. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 12.) In November 2020, C&H, with Wyndham’s consent, timely 24 removed the action to this Court based on federal question jurisdiction over the ADA claim 25 and supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. (Doc. 1 at 1–2.) Mr. 26 1 Both parties have fully briefed the issues and oral argument would not have aided the Court’s decisional process. See Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998); see 27 also LRCiv 7.2(f); Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b). 2 C&H is a franchisee that operates the hotel under Defendant and franchisor Wyndham 28 Hotels and Resorts, LLC’s (“Wyndham”) brand name. (Doc. 9 at 2–3; see also Doc. 1-3, Ex. A ¶¶ 10–11.) 1 Strojnik then brought the motion to remand arguing that the brand deceit, civil conspiracy, 2 and aiding and abetting claims are not related to the ADA claim, requiring partial remand 3 for these three state-law causes of actions. (Doc. 5.) The motion is now fully briefed. (Docs. 4 9, 10.) 5 II. 6 District courts have original jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the 7 Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331 . Where a court has 8 original jurisdiction over at least one claim, the court also has “supplemental jurisdiction 9 over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original 10 jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy.” Id. § 1367(a). To 11 determine whether claims form “part of the same case or controversy,” the court must 12 evaluate whether the federal claims and state-law claims “involve a common nucleus of 13 operative facts.” In re Pegasus Gold Corp., 394 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation 14 and quotation omitted). Where supplemental jurisdiction is lacking over removed state-law 15 claims, the Court must sever and remand such claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (c)(2). 16 A district court may also decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state17 law claim “if (1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of state law, (2) the claim 18 substantially predominates over the [original jurisdiction] claim, (3) the district court has 19 dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional 20 circumstances.” Id. § 1367(c). When exercising its discretion, the court considers the 21 interest in “economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 22 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1997). 23 III. 24 A. 25 Mr. Strojnik contends that “[t]here are no common facts between the ADA claim 26 and the brand deceit and related claims.” (Doc. 5 at 4.) He then points to the different 27 elements that an ADA claim and an Arizona Consumer Fraud Act claim requires to show 28 there is “no common nucleus of operative facts.” (Id. at 5.) The standard for determining 1 if supplemental jurisdiction exists, however, is not whether these claims share the same 2 elements, but whether the claims share “a common nucleus of operative facts” and “would 3 ordinarily be expected to be resolved in one judicial proceeding.” In re Pegasus Gold 4 Corp., 394 F.3d at 1195 (citation and quotation omitted). 5 C&H is correct that “[a]ll of Mr. Strojnik’s claims arise from a common nucleus of 6 operative facts.” (Doc. 9 at 3.) The ADA, brand deceit, civil conspiracy, and aiding and 7 abetting claims all stem from Mr. Strojnik’s August 2020 visit to C&H’s hotel and website. 8 (Doc. 1-3, Ex. A ¶¶ 30–92.) Mr. Strojnik’s ADA claim arose when he inspected the hotel 9 and found what he claims are several ADA violations, which “deprived” him of the hotel’s 10 “full and equal access and enjoyment.” (Id. ¶¶ 32–37.) This same visit is also where Mr. 11 Strojnik discovered what he claims are violations of the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act, 12 which include the “brand deceit” and other related state-law claims, because C&H 13 “purchase[d] the rights to hold themselves out as a national hotel chain when in fact they 14 are not a national hotel chain.” (Doc. 5 at 1.) As C&H notes, “the events that give rise to 15 this lawsuit occurred on the same day, at the same location, and with the same parties.” 16 (Doc. 9 at 3.) The ADA, brand deceit, civil conspiracy, and aiding and abetting claims all 17 share a common nucleus of operative facts. The threshold requirement for supplemental 18 jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (a) is satisfied. 19 B. 20 There are also no factors that weigh toward the Court declining to exercise 21 supplemental jurisdiction over these state-law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c); see, e.g., 22 Palmer v. Web. Indus., No. CV 04-2362-PCT-SMM, 2007 WL 625924 , *3 (D. Ariz. Feb. 23 26, 2007) (“The Arizona Consumer Fraud Act is not novel or complex.”). The Court also 24 finds that considerations of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity support 25 the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. See Acri, 114 F.3d at 1001. The Court will 26 therefore deny Mr. Strojnik’s motion to remand and retain supplemental jurisdiction over 27 the brand deceit, civil conspiracy, and aiding and abetting claims. [28] 1 IV. 2 Accordingly, 3 IT IS ORDERED denying Plaintiff Peter Strojnik’s motion to remand. (Doc. 5.) 4 Dated this 5th day of January, 2021. [5] ° Wichal T. Fburde Michael T. Liburdi 8 United States District Judge [28] -4-